Exploring Habermas’s Critical Engagement with Chomsky

This article explores Jürgen Habermas’s critical employment of Noam Chomsky’s insights and the philosophical assumptions that motivate or justify Habermas’s early enrichment of his universal pragmatics with material drawn from generative linguistics. The investigation of the influence Chomsky’s theory has exerted on Habermas aims to clarify what Habermas means by universalism, reason embedded in language and the universal core of communicative competence—away from various misinterpretations of Habermas’s rationalist commitments and from reductive, conventionalist readings of his notion of consensus. Much against hasty and unexamined incriminations of Habermasian pragmatics, a turn to a neglected and scantly researched topic such as the philosophical affinity of some Chomskian and Habermasian themes (and to the philosophical justification of the points where Chomsky and Habermas part company) will retrieve the kind of depth and nuance that may lead us beyond facile and simplistic understandings of what discursively reaching consensus might mean from a Habermasian point of view.     

The Post-National Constellation: Habermas and ``the Second Modernity'

For some years now, Jürgen Habermas, possibly the most influential European philosopher of today, has been producing a growing number of publications on world politics. In the historical context of the collapse of bipolarity and the advent of the triad, along with the punitive wars in the Gulf and Yugoslavia, he is very far from being alone: Jacques Derrida and Noberto Bobbio,Michael Walzer and John Rawls, to name only the most forceful, have also been thinking out loud about the new political configurations beyond the nation-state. The characteristic feature of Habermas’s thought is to perceive a radically new historical configuration, which he calls a‘post-national constellation’ and which would justify the development of a new political project, as a transition to a new cosmopolitan law. In what follows, I examine the precise modalities that are supposed to transform his philosophical design into political and legal arrangements, attempting to dissect the Habermasian vision of a post-Cold War politics better adapted to the challenges of the new century, and to throw light on the ideology behind it, as a prolegomenon to the larger project Habermas invites us to undertake. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

William J. Morgan’s ‘conventionalist internalism’ approach. Furthering internalism? A critical hermeneutical response

Several authors, such as William J. Morgan, John S. Russell and R. Scott Kretchmar, have claimed that the limits between the diverse normative theories of sport need to be revisited. Most of these works are philosophically grounded in Anglo-American philosophical approaches. For instance, William J. Morgan’s proposal is mainly based on Richard Rorty’s philosophy. But he also discusses with some European philosophers like Jürgen Habermas. However, Habermas’ central ideas are rejected by Morgan. The purpose of this paper is to analyse Morgan’s rejection of Habermas’ thought and show that a more appropriate normative of sport that explains better our current sporting world can be achieved by drawing on the German philosopher’s ideas. The plan of this paper is the following. It shall analyse the limits of the distinction between broad internalism and externalism by taking Morgan’s work as its starting point. To do so, firstly, the conventionalist way in which Morgan criticises the limits of interpretivism shall be explained (§2). Secondly, the relationship between Morgan’s proposals and the hermeneutical theories which are at the roots of his proposal shall be brought to light. Thirdly, since Morgan takes Habermas’ hermeneutical ethics to be an example of externalism, the relationship between his theory and Habermas’ ethical account shall be clearly defined. Moreover, Morgan’s proposal shall be criticised in the light of Habermas’ discourse ethics (§3). To conclude, a Habermasian approach in sport ethics shall be described (§4).     

Thinking “difference” differently: Cassirer versus Derrida on symbolic mediation

Cassirer’s approach to symbolic mediation differs in some important ways from currently prevailing approaches to meaning and signification such as semiology and its more recent poststructuralist varieties. Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms offers a theory of symbols that does not amount to a sign theory or semiology. It sketches out, rather, a dynamic and nonrepresentational framework in which an alternative notion of difference takes centre stage. In order to make the original features of Cassirer’s approach stand out, I will compare it with the approach of the perhaps most influential differential thinker of our day, Jacques Derrida. The philosophy of symbolic forms explicitly prefigures a great many of the insights and concerns of poststructuralism. Yet, there are some critical differences. Rather than rejecting the concepts of objectivity, identity, and truth on the premises established by traditional metaphysics, Cassirer chooses to redefine these concepts through a radical conceptual reframing. The result is a doctrine that—in Derridean parlance—neither jumps beyond the oppositions of metaphysics, nor tries to resolve them in a Hegelian synthesis—a doctrine, that is, that even though it appeals to origins, cannot so easily be dismissed as yet another instantiation of the metaphysics of presence.     

The Relevance of Fink’s Notion of Operative Concepts for Derrida’s Deconstruction

In the literature on Derrida’s philosophical formation, the name of Eugen Fink is usually forgotten. When it is recalled, it is most often because of his 1930s articles on phenomenology. In this paper, I claim on the contrary that Fink’s writings exerted a lasting influence on Derrida’s thought, well beyond his early phenomenological works. More specifically, I focus on a 1957 paper presented at a conference on Husserl’s thought where Fink formulates an important distinction between operative and thematic concepts. By adopting both historical and theoretical perspectives, I show how this couple of notions can help to understand Derrida’s singular way of reading philosophical texts. In particular, I present the Derridean concept of supplement as a reworking of Fink’s notion of operative concept. I conclude by suggesting that deconstruction can be understood in part as a radicalization of Fink’s theses.     

Returning (to) the gift of death: violence and history in Derrida and Levinas

The purpose of this paper is to establish a proper context for reading Jacques Derrida’s The Gift of Death, which, I contend, can only be understood fully against the backdrop of “Violence and Metaphysics.” The later work cannot be fully understood unless the reader appreciates the fact that Derrida returns to “a certain Abraham” not only in the name of Kierkegaard but also in the name of Levinas himself. The hypothesis of the reading that follows therefore would be that Derrida writes The Gift of Death not as an attempt to re-present Kierkegaard’s Abraham either rightly or wrongly but as an effort to do with Kierkegaard’s Abraham what is possible with his thought in a broadly Levinasian/Derridean framework. That the reading he provides of the Abraham story would not be recognizable to Kierkegaard is not the principal point of Derrida’s effort; his aim is to demonstrate that Levinas should not have been so hasty to dismiss Kierkegaard but could have recovered his interpretation of Abraham for purposes that Derrida and Levinas both share.     

'Tarrying with the Negative': Bataille and Derrida's Reading of Negation in Hegel's Phenomenology

Central to Bataille's critique of Hegel is his reading in 'Hegel, Death, and Sacrifice' of 'negation' and of 'lordship and bondage' in the Phenomenology of Spirit . Whereas Hegel invokes negation as inclusive of death, Bataille points out (following his teacher Kojeve) that negation in the dynamic of lordship and bondage must of necessity be representational rather than actual. Derrida, in 'From Restricted to General Economy' sees in Bataille's perspective an undercutting of the overall Hegelian project consonant with his own ongoing deconstruction of Hegelian sublation. I argue that not only does Hegel fail to adequately pursue his own best advice to 'tarry with the negative,' but Bataille and Derrida's critique misconstrues the relation between sublation and dialectic in Hegel's work. I explicate Adorno's 'negative dialectic' by way of alternative both to Hegelian speculative dialectic and to its Bataillean–Derridean deconstruction.     

Derrida's language-games

Conclusion In previous essays (1973, 1975, 1977) I have praised Derrida's contributions to philosophical dialogue and also insisted on their limitations. The considerations raised in this present essay do not lead me to a position that is less ambivalent.Philosophy is a particular language-game. Like any other, it has its constitutive rules; or, perhaps better: its practice has certain distinctive features by means of which we recognize philosophizing and distinguish it from other linguistic activities. None of this can be set down in the form of necessary and sufficient conditions, and there always will be large areas of controversy about the paradigms themselves. Nonetheless there are philosophers, and they generally acknowledge Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz, Hume, and even some of their colleagues as also being philosophers. This acknowledgement holds even where there is philosophical disagreement - as must inevitably be the case, in view of the dialogical character of philosophical discourse.Derrida occasionally enters into the dialogue, as do many others - poets, novelists, critics, diplomats, attorneys, cooks, barbers, and babysitters. These occasional contributions to philosophical dialogue differ in focus, in style, and in lack of self-referentiality from the works which constitute the main corpus of philosophy. Some might wish to say, as if the matter were paradoxical, that such contributions are both philosophical and not philosophical, or that they are neither philosophy nor not-philosophy. That might be as good a thing to say as anything. The practice of philosophy is complex and has many levels. Those who are acknowledged as its finest practitioners have a focus, a style, and a respect for where questions begin and end. Derrida does not share these qualities, and does not care to share them. That is no reason to ignore his work, but it is sufficient to explain why philosophers do not recognize it as a contribution to the central corpus of philosophy.     

Theology After Derrida

It has recently been argued that Derrida's work is thoroughly atheistic, which seems to put any dialogue between Derrida and theology out of play. However, such arguments forget that to forbid the impossible outright is as much to be a slave to metaphysics as to presume that one could attain to it in language. Here I revisit the relationship between deconstruction and negative theology, and reconsider utilising Derrida to think God as the impossible. Arguing that thinking God in the absolute future still cannot sustain theology, I suggest how Derrida's work might nevertheless open onto the possibility of revelation.     

Secular humanitarians and the postsecular: reflections on Habermas and the Typhoon Haiyan disaster response

The international humanitarian system aims to save lives and alleviate suffering following disasters worldwide. Secular and faith-based actors make up the system, but the system can operate to a secular standard that may, some have argued, marginalise religious experience and well-being post-disaster. This article assesses what can be learned from examining secular humanitarianism from a postsecular perspective. Debate on secularity in the humanitarian system is reviewed, before Jürgen Habermas’s conception of the postsecular is proposed as a theoretical lens. Habermasian postsecularism invites the secular to take part in a process of ‘complementary learning’ with the religious. Results from interviews and focus groups in the Philippines following Typhoon Haiyan are used. Results show the reflexivity of secular individuals within the humanitarian system, with cases demonstrating co-operation and consideration of other views at the interpersonal level. Yet, at a system-wide level, instances of marginalisation of religion were noted, such as responses to requests for chapel reconstruction and psycho-social assistance. While some organisations made a contextualised decision that either maintained their strict secularity or negotiated a compromise, in other cases, these decisions were based on preconceptions rather than deliberation. Overall, a level of reflexivity required in Habermasian postsecularism was found, but there were also further opportunities for complementary learning.     

Ricoeur's Account of Tradition and the Gadamer–Habermas Debate

While it is clear that the Gadamer–Habermas debate has had a major influence on Paul Ricoeur, his commentators have had little to say about the nature of this influence. I try to remedy this silence by showing that Ricoeur's account of tradition is a direct response to the Gadamer–Habermas debate. First, I briefly explain the debate's importance and describe Ricoeur's reaction to it. Next, I show how his discussion of tradition in Time and Narrative steers a middle course between Gadamerian hermeneutics and Habermasian Ideologiekritik. Finally, I raise some critical questions about the adequacy of Ricoeur's middle course. Specifically, I argue that it rests on an implausible distinction between the form and the content of tradition.     

Kierkegaard,Levinas and the Question of Escaping Metaphysics

While Kierkegaard and Levinas may well be thought of as religious or ethical thinkers, I should not like the reader to be misled by this into assuming that this article is primarily about religion or ethics. Rather, my main concern may more properly be described as metaphysical or epistemological, for I am interested in certain styles of thinking that underlie the religious/ethical themes dealt with here. Thus, this article aims to show that in relation to traditional metaphysical styles, and to each other, the thinking of Kierkegaard and Levinas is parallel and divergent in complex ways. Both share a mistrust of modernist metaphysics, which they aim to escape by pointing to the way in which conceptions of metaphysical totalities (or systems) are breached by a destabilising infinity already internal to them. This anticipates later postmodern styles of thinking which challenge modern metaphysics, its resentment against time, and its confidence in human power to represent all that is by means of closed systems of interpretation. To the extent that they offer philosophical alternatives that accommodate the temporal, both have had highly significant contributions to make to a postmodern style of thinking that has implications not limited to religion or ethics. A study of the philosophical strategies of these two thinkers, where they seem to succeed or fall short in relation to each other and to the traditional strategies of metaphysics, should go some way toward clarification of what I believe to be the most viable style of thinking for a postmodern world. As I see it, one is confronted with three options. The first, represented by Kierkegaard’s ‘infinite resignation,’ may be associated with a Derridean style of thinking. Kierkegaard himself abandons this in favour of a style of thinking for which faith and revelation stand as metaphors. Levinas, in contrast, offers an alternative whose leitmotif is ethical responsibility. I shall try to show in the end that the first of these, which best accommodates the ‘undecidability’ of a middle ground, is the most suitable for contemporary thinkers.     

APPROACHING ISLAM: Comparative Ethics through Human Rights

A dialogical approach to understanding Islamic ethics rejects objectivist methods in favor of a conversational model in which participants accept each other as rational moral agents. Hans-Georg Gadamer asserts the importance of agreement upon a subject matter through conversation as a means to gaining insight into other persons and cultures, and Jürgen Habermas stresses the importance of fairness in dialogue. Using human rights as a subject matter for engaging in dialogue with Islamic scholars, Muslim perspectives on issues such as democracy, toleration, and freedom of conscience emerge. A capabilities approach to human rights, such as that developed by Martha Nussbaum, enables the coexistence of multiple religious ethical visions while insisting upon the need to protect and nurture essential human abilities.     

Toward a Needs-Based Conception of Intersubjectivity

Abstract

Lawrence Hamilton's The Political Philosophy of Needs is an attempt to suggest an alternative to the current tendency of political theorists towards discussing politics in an overly abstract and theoretical manner, as well as their propensity to introduce an idealised-consensual picture political discourse. As part of such a project, the book includes a critique of Habermas and, more directly, of Habermasian advocates of Discursive Ethics. In one of its more provocative moments, the book offers an analysis of the opaqueness of the category of 'Civil Society'. Its conclusion is that political theorists would be better off to abandon this category altogether. Hamilton, however, shares with Habermas and the proponents of Discursive Ethics a view of politics at the centre of which is an ‘intersubjective’ conception of human nature. On this matter, and contrary to the Habermasian schema, the book introduces what can be termed as a 'needs-based conception of intersubjectivity'. This article suggests a critical examination of this novel conception of intersubjectivity, along with its strengths and weakness. More concretely, the paper seeks to examine: a. the extent to which 'needs-based intersubjectivity' suggests a complete departure from an idealised-consensual picture of political discourse.

b. the relations between 'needs-based intersubjectivity' and political authority.

     

Apologies: Levinas and Dialogue

Abstract

In his recent article ‘Speech and Sensibility: Levinas and Habermas on the Constitution of the Moral Point of View’, Steven Hendley argues that Levinas’s preoccupation with language as ‘exposure’ to the ‘other’ provides an important corrective to Habermas’s focus on the ‘procedural’ aspects of communication. Specifically, what concerns Hendley is the question of moral motivation, and how Levinas, unlike Habermas, responds to this question by stressing the dialogical relation as one of coming ‘into proximity to the face of the other’ who possesses ‘the authority to command my consideration’. Hendley’s thesis is bold and provocative. However, it relies on too partial a reading of Levinas’s work. In this paper I argue that the sense in which Levinas thinks of ‘justifying oneself’ cannot be adequately understood in terms of an ‘outstretched field of questions and answers’. Rather, Levinas’s primary concern is to show how, prior to dialogue, the ‘I’ is constituted in existential guilt: the violence of simply being‐there.     

Derrida’s Quasi-Transcendental Thinking

Abstract

Instead of paralysing readers with a technical account of its nature and genealogy, I aim to accumulate a sense of Derrida’s quasi-transcendental thinking over a series of expositions. I begin with a critical account of the most prevalent misreading of Derrida’s work, generated by attempts, such as Rorty’s, to place it on one side of a clear duality that sets old-fashioned “philosophical” foundationalism against contemporary anti-foundationalist “textuality.” In contrast, through an analogy between what occurs in the giving of a gift and the happening of différance, I shall try to articulate the more complex, quasi-transcendental “logic” of Derrida’s thinking, which refuses a clear-cut “either/or” choice between the poles of this duality, precisely because these alternatives stand in a relation, not of analytical contradiction, but of aporia, or dilemma. If this exposition proves to be too abstruse and metaphysical for some, a second, more practical, example concerning the aporias of ethical decision-making should go some way towards compensation. Through these expositions, I aim to show that a complex, quasi-transcendental way of thinking serves as a more sophisticated and accurate key to the interpretation of Derrida’s texts than attempts to reduce it to the anti-foundationalist side of supposedly contradictory opposites. To support this claim, I return with a critical eye to Rorty’s rejection of Jonathan Culler’s argument that Derrida must and does maintain a philosophy/literature distinction, and of Christopher Norris’s explanation for Derrida’s claim that one cannot escape philosophy. I also try to answer Rorty’s rejection of the very idea of quasi-transcendentality by reducing this mode of thinking to a mere restatement of the co-implication of binaries. I conclude with a brief outline of what deconstructive practice amounts to when understood in the light of quasi-transcendental thinking.     

Compassion, Ethics, and Neuroscience: Neuroethics Through Buddhist Eyes

As scientists advance knowledge of the brain and develop technologies to measure, evaluate, and manipulate brain function, numerous questions arise for religious adherents. If neuroscientists can conclusively establish that there is a functional network between neural impulses and an individual??s capacity for moral evaluation of situations, this will naturally lead to questions about the relationship between such a network and constructions of moral value and ethical human behavior. For example, if cognitive neuroscience can show that there is a neurophysiological basis for the moral appraisal of situations, it may be argued that the world??s religions, which have traditionally been the keepers and purveyors of ethical values, are rendered either spurious or irrelevant. The questions point up broader dilemmas in the interface between science and religion, and raise concerns about the ethics of neurological research and experimentation. Since human beings will still arbitrate what is ??moral?? or ??ethical,?? how can religious perspectives enrich the dialogue on neuroethical issues and how can neuroscience enrich dialogue on religion? Buddhist views on the nature of consciousness and methods of practice, especially meditation practice, may contribute to discussions on neuroscience and theories about the interrelationship between consciousness and ethical awareness by exploring the role that karma, intentionality, and compassion play in Buddhist understandings of the interrelationship between consciousness and ethics.     

Habermas and Dummett: Beyond Dogmatism and Scepticism

In this article I suggest a way of overcoming the traditional dichotomy between analytic and continental philosophy by pointing at some similarities between apparently disparate philosophical approaches, viz. those of Michael Dummett and Jürgen Habermas. The comparison revolves around the so-called 'paradox of analysis', which poses a dilemma concerning philosophical propositions: these are allegedly shown to be either trivial or unsecured. Both Dummett and Habermas offer ways out of the dilemma, through recognition of the intersection of analysis with life. A transcendentally characterized conception of language is conceived by both as the only way to overcome the haunting objective m subjective distinction. Thus they offer fresh insights into the nature of meaning and truth, and the place these occupy within philosophical systems. Both philosophers take the notions of justification and procedural rationality to be primary in the order of philosophical explanation. Meaning is not conceived in terms of representation and truth conditions, but in terms of validity claims. Truth is not viewed as independent and static, but as historically conditioned and constantly unfolding. As a result, even the statements of logic, and certainly those of philosophy, find a place between the alleged emptiness of analyticity and the robust empirical character of science. This common ground represents, I believe, one of the new faces of post-analytic m and hence also post-continental m philosophy. Parts of it are shared by other contemporary philosophers, such as Derrida and Brandom. What marks this new Weltanschauung is the way it surpasses the current eliminativist trends in philosophy.     

Values and the scientific culture of behavior analysis

As scientists and practitioners, behavior analysts must make frequent decisions that affect many lives. Scientific principles have been our guide as we work to promote effective action across a broad spectrum of cultural practices. Yet scientific principles alone may not be sufficient to guide our decision making in cases with potentially conflicting outcomes. In such cases, values function as guides to work through ethical conflicts. We will examine two ethical systems, radical behaviorism and functional contextualism, from which to consider the role of values in behavior analysis, and discuss potential concerns. Finally, we propose philosophical pragmatism, focusing on John Dewey's notions of community and dialogue, as a tradition that can help behavior analysts to integrate talk about values and scientific practices in ethical decision making.