Women, men, work, and family. An expansionist theory.

The lives of women and men, the relationships that they establish, and their work have changed dramatically in the past 50 years, but the dominant theories driving research in these areas have not. In this article, the authors argue that the facts underlying the assumptions of the classical theories of gender and multiple roles have changed so radically as to make the theories obsolete. Moreover, a large body of empirical data fails to support the predictions flowing from these theories. Yet the development of new theory for guiding research and clinical practice has not kept pace. The authors attempt to fill this theoretical gap by reviewing the research literature and articulating an expansionist theory of gender, work, and family that includes four empirically derived and empirically testable principles better matched to today's realities.     

Ideal and Non‐ideal Theory and the Problem of Knowledge

This article analyses a hitherto neglected problem at the transition from ideal to non‐ideal theory: the problem of knowledge. Ideal theories often make idealising assumptions about the availability of knowledge, for example knowledge of social scientific facts. This can lead to problems when this knowledge turns out not to be available at the non‐ideal level. Knowledge can be unavailable in a number of ways: in principle, for practical reasons, or because there are normative reasons not to use it. This can make it necessary to revise ideal theories, because the principle of ‘ought implies can’ rules out certain theories, at least insofar as they are understood as action‐guiding. I discuss a number of examples and argue that there are two tendencies that will increase the relevance of this problem in the future: the availability of large amounts of sensitive data whose use is problematic from a normative point of view, and the increasing complexity of an interrelated world that makes it harder to predict the effects of institutional changes. To address these issues, philosophers need to cooperate with social scientists and philosophers of the social sciences. Normative theorising can then be understood as one step in a long process that includes thinkers from different disciplines. Ideal theory can respond to many of the charges raised against it if it is understood along these lines and if it takes the problem of knowledge and its implications seriously.     

Criterion Shaped Behaviour: Pitfalls of Performance Appraisal

Behavioural consequences of performance appraisal, of students, teachers, and schools, or of workers, managers, and offices, are analyzed in terms of a newly proposed theory of Criterion Shaped Behaviour (CSB). Unstated assumptions of advocates for the extensive use of performance appraisal, using performance-based rewards and punishments, are scrutinized, and many are found to be insupportable. CSB Theory predicts that numerous behavioural effects, not all of which are desirable, will be shaped by the use of rewards and punishments made contingent upon criterion measure scores. Using cognitive expectancy theories of learning and performance, in conjunction with traditional measurement theory, it anticipates the types of behaviour change likely to result from imposition of different performance appraisal systems, and suggests alternatives less likely to result in undesirable effects.     

Alternatives to the fixed-set model: A review of appraisal models of emotion

Over several decades, appraisal theory has emerged as a prominent theoretical framework explaining the elicitation and differentiation of emotions, and has stimulated a great deal of theorising and empirical research. Despite the large amount of research in this area, there are many aspects of appraisal theory and research that remain unclear or problematic. In this review, we identify a common assumption of many appraisal theories—the fixed appraisal set—and argue that this assumption, combined with a lack of explicit theorising about the predicted relationship between appraisals and emotions, leads to a lack of clarity in both appraisal models and the empirical testing of those models. We recommend that appraisal theorists move in a direction already taken by a small number of theorists, and adopt the starting assumption of a variable appraisal set. We further suggest that theories of concepts and categorisation may inform theorising about appraisal–emotion relationships.     

Violations of implicit theories and the sense of prediction and control: implications for motivated person perception

Beginning with the assumption that implicit theories of personality are crucial tools for understanding social behavior, the authors tested the hypothesis that perceivers would process person information that violated their predominant theory in a biased manner. Using an attentional probe paradigm (Experiment 1) and a recognition memory paradigm (Experiment 2), the authors presented entity theorists (who believe that human attributes are fixed) and incremental theorists (who believe that human attributes are malleable) with stereotype-relevant information about a target person that supported or violated their respective theory. Both groups of participants showed evidence of motivated, selective processing only with respect to theory-violating information. In Experiment 3, the authors found that after exposure to theory-violating information, participants felt greater anxiety and worked harder to reestablish their sense of prediction and control mastery. The authors discuss the epistemic functions of implicit theories of personality and the impact of violated assumptions.     

The Epistemic Status of Evolutionary Theory

The theory of evolution continues to be a bone of contention among certain groups of theistic believers. This paper aims to bring some light to the debate about it, by introducing a framework for epistemic appraisal which can provide a realistic and sober assessment of the epistemic credentials of the various parts of evolutionary theory. The upshot is a more nuanced epistemic appraisal of the theory of evolution, which shows that there are significant differences in epistemic standing between its various parts. Any serious conversation about the theory of evolution ought to reflect these facts.     

Neuroscience findings are consistent with appraisal theories of emotion; but does the brain "respect" constructionism?

I reject Lindquist et al.'s implicit claim that all emotion theories other than constructionist ones subscribe to a "brain locationist" approach. The neural mechanisms underlying relevance detection, reward, attention, conceptualization, or language use are consistent with many theories of emotion, in particular componential appraisal theories. I also question the authors' claim that the meta-analysis they report provides support for the specific assumptions of constructionist theories.     

内隐人格理论的实体论－渐变论维度研究述评

对内隐人格理论的实体论－渐变论维度的研究是近年来社会认知研究的一个新趋势。研究发现,人们对人的特性（如智力、品德和人格特征等）的内隐认知理论,制约调节着他们对人的行为的理解和反应。人们持有的不同内隐人格理论导致他们不同的社会认知模式和行为反应方式。实体论者由于认为人的特性是固定不变的,而倾向于用抽象概括化的和静态的内在特质来理解人的行为;而渐变论者由于认为人的特性是动态可塑的,而倾向于用影响心理动态过程的内外具体调节因素来理解人的行为。作者在综述有关研究的基础上,进而提出一些新的见解。     

Integration of Two Skeptical Emotion Theories: Dimensional Appraisal Theory and Russell's Psychological Construction Theory

This inquiry attempts to integrate two skeptical emotion theories: dimensional appraisal theory and Russell's (2003) psychological construction theory. To bring out the skeptical elements of these theories, I compare them first with two classic theories: affect program theory and discrete appraisal theory. The skeptical theories are similar to each other in that they replace the concept of emotion with the concept of emotional episode, and that they organize the variety within the set of emotional episodes according to dimensions instead of vernacular emotion subsets. Their differences concern the strength of the relations among the components in emotional episodes and the scientific status of the set of emotional episodes. To make an informed decision about the elements to keep and to revise from both theories, I engage in a separate analysis of the behavior-related components and the experience component, guided by insights from general behavior theories and general theories of consciousness. The analysis of the behavior-related components suggests the relatively uncharted idea that the so-called emotional aspect of behavior can be caused by a goal-directed mechanism. The analysis of the experience component reveals that different theories have emphasized different aspects of experience and hence different paths toward experience. The inquiry ends with an integrated theory that rejects the scientific status of emotions or emotional episodes, but accepts the scientific status of the components and sees strong causal relations among them.     

Subjectivism,instrumentalism, and prudentialism about reasons: On the normativity of instrumental transmission

According to a subjectivist theory, normative reasons are grounded in facts about our desires. According to an instrumentalist theory, reasons are grounded also in facts about the relevant means to desired objects. These are distinct theories. The widespread tendency to conflate the normativity of subjective and instrumentalist precepts obscures two facts. First, instrumentalist precepts incorporate a subjective element with an objective one. Second, combining these elements into a single theory of normative reasons requires explaining how and why they are to be combined. I argue that the most plausible justification for combining the two elements—which appeals to a theory of well‐being—exposes the inadequacy of the instrumentalist theory: The grounds required to justify the instrumentalist combination are also grounds for the normativity of prudential precepts and with them practical reasons that may have no internal connection to an agent's conative, motivational states.     

道德哲学建基在错误之上吗？

责任或义务是伦理学中最基本的概念。它是客观的、绝对自明的,因而是不可定义的、无需推理的。人们既不能从别的非伦理的事实或非伦理的属性中推出义务,也不能把它归约为任何其它伦理属性。以往的各种伦理理论的错误在于用一些其它伦理属性来规定责任,从而使其丧失了绝对客观的和自明的意义,其结果是使伦理学长期陷入困境之中。     

Connectionism and dynamic systems: are they really different?

We propose that connectionism and dynamic systems theory are strong contenders for a general theory of development that holds true whatever the content domain. We illustrate, through our own career narratives, the origins of these theories in motor and language development. We situate connectionism and dynamic systems among other classic and contemporary theories and conclude that, although there are meaningful differences, these differences pale in relation to the shared assumptions about the fundamental processes and mechanisms of change.     

One Way to Face Facts

Stephen Neale takes theories of facts, truthmakers and non-extensional connectives to be threatened by triviality in the face of powerful 'slingshot' arguments. I rehearse the most powerful of these, and then show that friends of facts have sufficient resources not only to resist slingshot arguments but also to be untroubled by them. If a fact theory is provided with a model, then the fact theorist can be sure that this theory is secure from triviality arguments.     

False memories of the future: a critique of the applications of probabilistic reasoning to the study of cognitive processes

The authors argue that the ways in which people-scientists and laymen-use probabilistic reasoning is predicated on a set of often questionable assumptions that are implicit and frequently go untested. They relate to the correspondence between the terms of a theory and the observations used to validate the theory and to the implicit understandings of intention and prior knowledge that arise between the conveyer and the receiver of information. The authors show several ways in which the use of probabilistic reasoning rests on a priori commitments to a partitioning of an outcome space and demonstrate that there are many more assumptions underlying the use of probabilistic reasoning than are usually acknowledged. They unfold these assumptions to show how several different interpretations of the same results in behavioral decision theory and cognitive psychology are equally well supported by "the facts." They then propose a more comprehensive approach to mapping cognitive processes than those currently used, one that is based on the analysis of all of the relevant alternative interpretations presented in the article.     

DO FALLIBILIST ACCOUNTS OF THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE UNDERESTIMATE AND ENDANGER SCIENCE?

All fallibilist theories may appear to be defective, because they allegedly underestimate the security of at least some scientific knowledge and thereby leave science less defensible than it otherwise might be. When they call all scientific knowledge conjectural they may seem at first blush to underestimate the superiority of science vis a vis pseudo‐science. Fallibilists apparently fail to account for the fact that science turns theory into facts, because even “facts” are held only provisionally. This impression is false: the relatively secure establishment of facts can be accounted for with a fallibilist view. After theories have been honed through sharp criticism, there is often no reason to doubt some aspects of them. These aspects are what we regard to be factual knowledge, even though these facts are also provisionally accepted as such. We then explain the newly won factual knowledge with deeper theories, which often correct our factual knowledge in spite of its apparent security. Theories of justification add nothing useful to the fallibilists' observation that science finds the best theories because it has the highest standards of criticism. Fallibilist theories today give the best account and defence of science. We may abandon the quest for some kind of assurance that goes beyond the determination that some theory can answer all known objections to it and take up more interesting problems, such as how we can find new objections and how criticism may be improved and made institutionally secure. ¹ 1 I am grateful to Joseph Agassi and an anonymous referee of this journal for comments on an earlier draft of this essay.
     

In Pursuit of the Perfect Appearance: Discrepancies Among Self-Ideal Percepts of Multiple Physical Attributes 1

Testing self-discrepancy theories of body image, this investigation examined self-perceived and idealized physical attributes among 66 men and 69 women, who were white, heterosexual college students. Physical attributes included body size, weight, height, muscularity, hair color and length, eye color, and female breast size. Physical ideals included personal ideals, assumptions about the other sex's ideals for one's own sex, and actual other-sex ideals. Both sexes expressed significant self-ideal discrepancies on most attributes, whether ideals were assessed from personal or perceived other-sex standpoints. The sexes' discrepancies were often comparable in magnitude if the direction of discrepancy was ignored. Both sexes frequently exaggerated their assumptions of what the other sex idealized in the subjects' own sex. Particular self-ideal discrepancies predicted subjects' global body image. The applied and empirical implications of these findings were considered for both social and clinical contexts.     

Emotions and appraisals: can you have one without the other?

In his commentary on M. Siemer and R. Reisenzein (2007), B. Parkinson (2007) raised a number of important questions concerning the process of emotion inference and the scope of appraisal theories. Siemer and Reisenzein first examine the alternative explanations of their findings proposed by Parkinson and then look at the alternative "situated" view of emotions proposed by him. The main conclusion is that the issues raised by Parkinson can be dealt with by (suitable extensions of) appraisal theory.