Engaged in Engagement: We Are Delighted We Did It

We emphasize that science and practice issues are equally salient when pursuing thinking and research on employee engagement. We agree with much of what the commentaries have to say, especially that organizational competitive advantage is the relevant focus of engagement research and practice and that engagement is not a new construct but one that required clarification vis-a-vis existing constructs. We also agree that state engagement can be highly variable, that disengagement needs study, that negative situations can induce engagement behaviors, that engagement surveys should yield actionable data, and that people can be hired who are more likely to be engaged. We disagree with the idea that all employee attitudes are essentially equal and that existing conceptualizations of performance make engagement behavior a nonuseful construct.     

BLOCKING THE PATH FROM VAGUENESS TO FOUR DIMENSIONALISM*

There is a general form of an argument which I call the ‘argument from vagueness’ which attempts to show that objects persist by perduring, via the claim that vagueness is never ontological in nature and thus that composition is unrestricted. I argue that even if we grant that vagueness is always the result of semantic indeterminacy rather than ontological vagueness, and thus also grant that composition is unrestricted, it does not follow that objects persist by perduring. Unrestricted mereological composition lacks the power to ensure that there exist instantaneous objects that wholly overlap persisting objects at times, and thus lacks the power to ensure that there exists anything that could be called a temporal part. Even if we grant that such instantaneous objects exist, however, I argue that it does not follow that objects perdure. To show this I briefly outline a coherent version of three dimensionalism that grants just such an assumption. Thus considerations pertaining to the nature of vagueness need not lead us inevitably to accept perdurantism.     

Philosophy and Science Dialogue: Mental Causation

This paper is a dialogue between Thalia Wheatley and Terence Horgan. Horgan maintains that philosophy is a broadly empirical discipline, and that philosophical theorizing about how concepts work treats certain intuitions about proper concept-usage as empirical data. He holds that the possibility of strong multiple realizability undermines the psychophysical identity theory. He holds that the concept of causation is governed by implicit contextual parameters, and that this dissolves Kim’s problem of “causal exclusion.” He holds that the concept of free will is governed by implicit contextual parameters, and that free-will attributions are often true, in typical contexts, even if determinism is true. Thalia Wheatley holds that the concept of multiple realizability hinges on the level of abstraction discussed and that neuroscientific data does not yet support multiple realizability of mental states from specific, high resolution brain states. She also holds that compatibilism redefines the concept of free will in ways that bear little resemblance to the common understanding―that of being free to choose otherwise in the moment. She maintains that this folk understanding is incompatible with the brain as a physical system and is not rescued by concepts of context and capacity.     

Gene-environment interdependence

Behavioural genetics was initially concerned with partitioning population variance into that due to genetics and that due to environmental influences. The implication was that the two were separate and it was assumed that gene-environment interactions were usually of so little importance that they could safely be ignored. Theoretical considerations suggested that that was unlikely to be true and empirical findings are now accumulating on the demonstrated and replicated biological interactions between identified common single genetic variants and the operation of environmentally mediated risks. The paper outlines the evidence and considers why it is changing concepts in ways that matter.     

Religions and Conflicts

Many believe that a peaceful, tolerant and respectful coexistence among religions is not compatible with the conviction that only one of them is true. I argue that this ‘incompatibility problem’ (IP) is grounded in a ‘naturalistic assumption’ (NA), that is, the assumption that every subject, including religion, should be treated without taking into account that a super-natural being may exist and reveal to us an unexpected way to deal with our experience. I then argue that in matters of religion, NA is untenable and that its very opposite, which I call ‘super-naturalistic assumption’ (SA), should be adopted. My thesis is that, once SA is adopted, IP can be dismissed and that it is plausible to maintain that a peaceful, tolerant and respectful coexistence among religions is compatible with the conviction that only one of them is true.     

Are Concepts Mental Representations or Abstracta?

I argue that thoughts and concepts are mental representations rather than abstracta. I propose that the most important difference between the two views is that the mentalist believes that there are concept and thought tokens as well as types; this reveals that the dispute is not terminological but ontological. I proceed to offer an argument for mental-ism. The key step is to establish that concepts and thoughts have lexical as well as semantic properties. I then show that this entails that concepts and thoughts are susceptible to the type/token distinction. I finish by considering some objections to the argument.     

BECOMING WHO WE ARE: A THEORETICAL EXPLANATION OF GENDERED SOCIAL STRUCTURES AND SOCIAL NETWORKS THAT SHAPE ADOLESCENT INTERPERSONAL AGGRESSION

A conceptualization of gendered interpersonal aggression that is grounded in the social ecological framework is presented to explicate factors in adolescents' gendered environments that give rise to aggression and victimization. The focus is on gendered social structures and social networks. Our framework for prevention suggests that violence prevention requires that we move our culture from one that continually recreates gendered structures that reinforce power and authority as masculine and that confer opportunities and constraints in ways that favor men over women. It will require deliberate action to legitimize the feminine in our culture and develop laws and practices that abolish gender inequities.     

Humean nomic essentialism

Humeanism – the idea that there are no necessary connections between distinct existences – and Nomic Essentialism – the idea that properties essentially play the nomic roles that they do – are two of the most important and influential positions in the metaphysics of science. Traditionally, it has been thought that these positions were incompatible competitors. We disagree. We argue that there is an attractive version of Humeanism that captures the idea that, for example, mass essentially plays the role that it actually does in the laws of nature. In this paper we consider the arguments that have lead many to conclude that Humeanism cannot be combined with Nomic Essentialism; we identify the weaknesses in these arguments; and we argue in detail that a version of Humeanism based on a variant of the Best System account of laws captures the key intuitions behind nomic essentialism.     

Possible knowledge of unknown truth

Fitch’s argument purports to show that for any unknown truth, p, there is an unknowable truth, namely, that p is true and unknown; for a contradiction follows from the assumption that it is possible to know that p is true and unknown. In earlier work I argued that there is a sense in which it is possible to know that p is true and unknown, from a counterfactual perspective; that is, there can be possible, non-actual knowledge, of the actual situation, that in that situation, p is true and unknown. Here I further elaborate that claim and respond to objections by Williamson, who argued that there cannot be non-trivial knowledge of this kind. I give conditions which suffice for such non-trivial counterfactual knowledge.     

Memory and identity

Among the many topics covered in Sven Bernecker’s impressive study of memory is the relation between memory and personal identity. Bernecker uses his grammatical taxonomy of memory and causal account to defend the claim that memory does not logically presuppose personal identity and hence that circularity objections to memory-based accounts of personal identity are misplaced. In my comment I investigate these claims, suggesting that the relation between personal identity and memory is more complicated than Bernecker’s analysis suggests. In particular, I argue (1) that while he shows that some memories do not presuppose personal identity he fails to show that those that are appealed to in memory-based accounts of personal identity do not, and (2) that the features of his view that allow him to define memory without reference to personal identity also obscure important features of memory that must be part of a complete account.     

Is Corporal Punishment Torturous?

The aim of this article is to determine whether fixed courses of judicial corporal punishment (JCP) and non‐abusive corporal punishment of children (CPC) amount to torture. I assess the reasons that have been offered for distinguishing fixed courses of JCP from torture and argue that none is successful. I argue that non‐consensual JCP that inflicts severe pain is appropriately classifiable as torture, but that JCP that inflicts mild pain and entirely consensual JCP are not torturous. I consider whether any of the reasons offered for distinguishing JCP from torture can distinguish non‐abusive CPC from torture given certain important differences between CPC and JCP. I submit that none of these reasons is successful. I consider other possible reasons for distinguishing non‐abusive CPC that inflicts severe pain from torture and argue that none is successful. I conclude that fixed courses of non‐consensual JCP which inflict severe pain and non‐abusive CPC that inflicts severe pain are correctly classifiable as torture.     

After Moral Error Theory,After Moral Realism

Moral abolitionists recommend that we get rid of moral discourse and moral judgement. At first glance this seems repugnant, but abolitionists think that we have overestimated the practical value of our moral framework and that eliminating it would be in our interests. I argue that abolitionism has a surprising amount going for it. Traditionally, abolitionism has been treated as an option available to moral error theorists. Error theorists say that moral discourse and judgement are committed to the existence of moral properties, and that no such properties exist. After error theory is established, abolitionism is one potential way to proceed. However, many error theorists suggest that we retain moral discourse as a sort of fiction. I evaluate some attractions of both fictionalism and abolitionism, arguing that abolitionism is a plausible position. No one doubts that error theorists can be abolitionists. However, what has gone largely undiscussed is that it is open to others to be abolitionists as well. I argue that moral realists of a metaphysically robust sort can and perhaps should be abolitionists. ‘Realist abolitionism’ makes for a surprisingly neat theoretical package, and I conclude that it represents an interesting new option in the theoretical landscape.     

Supererogation,optionality and cost

A familiar part of debates about supererogatory actions concerns the role that cost should play. Two camps have emerged: one claiming that extreme cost is a necessary condition for when (and why) an action is supererogatory, while the other denies that it should be part of our definition of supererogation. In this paper, I propose an alternative position. I argue that it is comparative cost that is central to the supererogatory and that it is needed to explain a feature that all accounts agree is central to the very notion of supererogation: optionality. Perhaps because of this agreement on its importance, few attempts have been made to clarify and explain the notion of optionality. I argue that giving an account of the optionality of supererogatory requires drawing a line between doing the bare minimum permissible and going beyond the bare minimum and that this line ought to be drawn based on comparative cost of alternative permissible acts. Having outlined my account and motivated it, I discuss and reject two concerns that might be raised: firstly, that it is extreme cost, not comparative cost, that matters and, secondly, that in fact no cost is needed for an act to be supererogatory.     

A Noneist Account of the Doctrine of Creatio ex Nihilo

I spell out a problem with the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo: that, contra the doctrine, it is not possible to efficiently cause something from nothing. This is because an efficient cause requires a material cause in order to have an effect. The material cause supplies the potency that the efficient cause actualises. Because nothingness has no potencies, there is nothing for an efficient cause to actualise. I show that this objection presupposes that the theory of noneism (the proposition that some things do not exist) is false. I postulate that the universe (i.e. the created order) is a non-existent item and so there is no problem with the claim that it was efficiently caused to come from nothing – the universe has no being anyway. After rehearsing the rather strong reasons in favour of the truth of noneism, I deal with two objections that are peculiar to my claim that the universe lacks reality: that creation possesses characteristics that are sufficient to render it existent and that a non-existent object has its properties independent of divine fiat. I show that there are sensible replies to both objections. With regard to the first I show that the possession of such characteristics at most shows that the universe has an ontological status that is equivalent to some reference point. With regard to the second I argue that the Characterisation Principle (i.e. in some world – not necessarily the actual world – an object has the properties that it is characterised as having) entails that non-existent objects possess their properties in virtue of some existent entity and that the only plausible candidate for such an entity is a divine mind of some sort.     

Transhumanism and Roman Catholicism: Imagined and Real Tensions

Abstract

Transhumanists have asserted that religious people would both oppose life extension and allowing people with extended lives to die. In this paper, coming from a Roman Catholic perspective, I refute four myths associated with these claims: that the Church materially opposes life extension, that it conceptually opposes the very idea of life extension, that it opposes human genetic manipulation, and that it opposes letting people die in hospitals. I then propose that there are four real tensions that are much more significant: that material immortality is highly improbable, that injustice and inequality are major concerns, that transhuman omnipotence is impossible, and that utopianism is extremely dangerous.     

Opting out or denying discrimination? How the framework of free choice in American society influences perceptions of gender inequality

American women still confront workplace barriers (e.g., bias against mothers, inflexible policies) that hinder their advancement at the upper levels of organizations. However, most Americans fail to recognize that such gender barriers still exist. Focusing on mothers who have left the workforce, we propose that the prevalent American assumption that actions are a product of choice conceals workplace barriers by communicating that opportunities are equal and that behavior is free from contextual influence. Study 1 reveals that stay-at-home mothers who view their own workplace departure as an individual choice experience greater well-being but less often recognize workplace barriers and discrimination as a source of inequality than do mothers who do not view their workplace departure as an individual choice. Study 2 shows that merely exposing participants to a message that frames actions in terms of individual choice increases participants' belief that society provides equal opportunities and that gender discrimination no longer exists. By concealing the barriers that women still face in the workplace, this choice framework may hinder women's long-term advancement in society.     

Gummed-up memory: Chewing gum impairs short-term recall

Several studies have suggested that short-term memory is generally improved by chewing gum. However, we report the first studies to show that chewing gum impairs short-term memory for both item order and item identity. Experiment 1 showed that chewing gum reduces serial recall of letter lists. Experiment 2 indicated that chewing does not simply disrupt vocal–articulatory planning required for order retention: Chewing equally impairs a matched task that required retention of list item identity. Experiment 3 demonstrated that manual tapping produces a similar pattern of impairment to that of chewing gum. These results clearly qualify the assertion that chewing gum improves short-term memory. They also pose a problem for short-term memory theories asserting that forgetting is based on domain-specific interference given that chewing does not interfere with verbal memory any more than tapping. It is suggested that tapping and chewing reduce the general capacity to process sequences.     

1996-2004年中国大陆儒学研究的新进展

1996-2004年,中国大陆的孔子、儒学研究持续繁荣发展,在以下八个方面上,取得了新的进展: (1)儒学与世界和平; ( 2 )儒家人文精神; ( 3 )简帛儒家文献; ( 4 )儒学宗教性问题; (5)儒学与生态伦理; (6)儒学与普世伦理; (7)儒学与文化保守主义; (8)儒学与自由主义; (9)儒学与民主、人权; (10)儒学与全球化。     

The Myth of Gender Cultures: Similarities Outweigh Differences in Men's and Women's Provision of and Responses to Supportive Communication

Michaud and Warner (1997) and Basow and Rubenfeld (2003) recently reported studies of gender differences in “troubles talk” that allegedly provide support for the different cultures thesis, that is, the notion that men and women communicate in such different ways that they should be regarded as members of different communication cultures or speech communities. In this article, we identify several limitations in these two studies that, collectively, have the effect of casting doubt on their conclusions. We then report three studies that show that men and women provide and respond to supportive messages (“troubles talk”) in ways that are much more similar than different. The current findings, in conjunction with other recent findings, suggest that the different cultures thesis is a myth that should be discarded.     

Better brains, better selves? The ethics of neuroenhancements

The idea of enhancing our mental functions through medical means makes many people uncomfortable. People have a vague feeling that altering our brains tinkers with the core of our personalities and the core of ourselves. It changes who we are, and doing so seems wrong, even if the exact reasons for the unease are difficult to define. Many of the standard arguments against neuroenhancements--that they are unsafe, that they violate the distinction between therapy and enhancements, that they undermine equality, and that they will be used coercively--fail to show why the use of any such technologies is wrong in principle. Two other objections--the arguments that such changes undermine our integrity and that they prevent us from living authentic lives--will condemn only a few of the uses that are proposed. The result is that very few uses of these drugs are morally suspect and that most uses are morally permissible.