当代中国的社会转型

本文以我国社会生活发生的广泛而深刻的变化为背景,深入揭示了这种变化深层的社会转型。这种转型就是：由权力社会走向能力社会;由人治社会走向法治社会;由人情社会走向理性社会;由依附社会走向自立社会;由身份社会走向实力社会;由注重先天给定社会走向注重后天努力社会;由一元化社会走向多样化社会;由人的依赖社会走向物的依赖社会;由静态社会走向流动社会;由“国家”社会走向“市民”社会。     

Cogmic space for narrative-based world representation

Representing a world or a physical/social environment in an agent’s cognitive system is essential for creating human-like artificial intelligence. This study takes a story-centered approach to this issue. In this context, a story refers to an internal representation involving a narrative structure, which is assumed to be a common form of organizing past, present, future, and fictional events and situations. In the artificial intelligence field, a story or narrative is traditionally treated as a symbolic representation. However, a symbolic story representation is limited in its representational power to construct a rich world. For example, a symbolic story representation is unfit to handle the sensory/bodily dimension of a world. In search of a computational theory for narrative-based world representation, this study proposes the conceptual framework of a Cogmic Space for a comic strip-like representation of a world. In the proposed framework, a story is positioned as a mid-level representation, in which the conceptual and sensory/bodily dimensions of a world are unified. The events and their background situations that constitute a story are unified into a sequence of panels. Based on this structure, a representation (i.e., a story) and the represented environment are connected via an isomorphism of their temporal, spatial, and relational structures. Furthermore, the framework of a Cogmic Space is associated with the generative aspect of representations, which is conceptualized in terms of unconscious- and conscious-level processes/representations. Finally, a proof-of-concept implementation is presented to provide a concrete account of the proposed framework.     

On the a priori and a posteriori assessment of probabilities

We argue that in spite of their apparent dissimilarity, the methodologies employed in the a priori and a posteriori assessment of probabilities can both be justified by appeal to a single principle of inductive reasoning, viz., the principle of symmetry. The difference between these two methodologies consists in the way in which information about the single-trial probabilities in a repeatable chance process is extracted from the constraints imposed by this principle. In the case of a posteriori reasoning, these constraints inform the analysis by fixing an a posteriori determinant of the probabilities, whereas, in the case of a priori reasoning, they imply certain claims which then serve as the basis for subsequent probabilistic deductions. In a given context of inquiry, the particular form which a priori or a posteriori reason may take depends, in large part, on the strength of the underlying symmetry assumed: the stronger the symmetry, the more information can be acquired a priori and the less information about the long-run behavior of the process is needed for an a posteriori assessment of the probabilities. In the context of this framework, frequency-based reasoning emerges as a limiting case of a posteriori reasoning, and reasoning about simple games of chance, as a limiting case of a priori reasoning. Between these two extremes, both a priori and a posteriori reasoning can take a variety of intermediate forms.     

Sleep,activity, temperature,and performance: Techniques for long-term monitoring in the mouse

This paper describes a test chamber, a food acquisition task, and a training procedure for the long-term testing of an implanted mouse in a circadian rhythm experiment. For the training phase, a special-purpose controller is provided to a single cage. For the experimental phase, behavioral, electrophysiological, and environmental measures are collected by means of a mini-computer.     

Perceiving a calling, living a calling, and job satisfaction: testing a moderated, multiple mediator model

The current study examined the relation between perceiving a calling, living a calling, and job satisfaction among a diverse group of employed adults who completed an online survey (N = 201). Perceiving a calling and living a calling were positively correlated with career commitment, work meaning, and job satisfaction. Living a calling moderated the relations of perceiving a calling with career commitment and work meaning, such that these relations were more robust for those with a stronger sense they were living their calling. Additionally, a moderated, multiple mediator model was run to examine the mediating role of career commitment and work meaning in the relation of perceiving a calling and job satisfaction, while accounting for the moderating role of living a calling. Results indicated that work meaning and career commitment fully mediated the relation between perceiving a calling and job satisfaction. However, the indirect effects of work meaning and career commitment were only significant for individuals with high levels of living a calling, indicating the importance of living a calling in the link between perceiving a calling and job satisfaction. Implications for research and practice are discussed.     

Mimic automata: A novel formal model for mimic computing

In this paper, we aim to establish a mathematical model for mimic computing. To this end, we present a novel automaton called a mimic automaton. First, a one-dimensional cellular automaton is used for expressing some dynamic changes in the structure of a computing unit, a sequential automaton is employed to describe some state transitions, a hierarchical automaton is employed to express the different granularities of some computing units, and a probabilistic automaton is used to depict some random changes of a computing unit. Second, a mimic automaton is obtained by combining the various types of automata mentioned above in a certain logical relationship. Compared with the existing models of mimic computing, the new model portrays the operational semantics for a mimic computing system, and it can directly describe the behaviors of a system. Furthermore, the new model possesses a stronger generality.     

Consider the source: One step in assessing premise acceptability

Premise acceptability is conceptually connected to presumption. To say that a premise is acceptable just when there is a presumption in its favor is to give a first approximation to this connection. A number of popular principles of presumption suggest that whether there is a presumption for a premise, belief, or claim depends on the sources which vouch for it. Sources consist of internal belief-generating mechanisms and external testimony. Alvin Plantinga's notion of warrant lays down four conditions upon a source for the belief which it generates to be warranted. We argue that there is a presumption for a premise, belief, or claim if and only if there is a presumption of warrant for that premise,belief or claim. This amounts to the thesis that there is a presumption for a belief from a challenger's point of view if and only if there is a presumption from that person's point of view that her cognitive faculties which have generated the belief have been functioning properly, in an appropriate cognitive environment, in accord with a segment of her design plan aimed at the truth, and that these faculties are reliable. In light of our argument for this thesis, we may legitimately claim that one way to determine that there is a presumption for a belief is to determine that there is a presumption of warrant for that belief, and thus that in determining whether there is a presumption for a belief or premise, we may consider the source.     

The preference to work for a man or a woman: A matter of sex and gender?

A survey of 455 individuals sampled from two populations that varied in age, educational level, and work experience posed a question asked in Gallup polls over six decades: “If you were taking a new job and had your choice of a boss, would you prefer to work for a man or a woman?” Respondents could state that they would prefer a male boss, prefer a female boss, or had no preference. As expected from theory and Gallup results, respondents who had a preference preferred to work for a man more than a woman, although a majority expressed “no preference.” When they expressed a preference, women preferred to work for a female boss over a male boss more than men did, whereas men preferred to work for a male boss over a female boss more than women did. Sex-typed (i.e., masculine or feminine) respondents in gender identity exhibited a greater preference to work for a boss of a particular sex over having no preference than non-sex-typed respondents. Further, feminine respondents preferred to work for a female boss over a male boss more than masculine respondents did, whereas masculine respondents preferred to work for a male boss over a female boss more than feminine respondents did. Overall, these results suggest that the preference to work for a man or a woman is a matter of both sex and gender. Implications for job applicants' vocational decisions and how female leaders fare in the workplace are discussed.     

A Behavior Systems View of Conditioned States during Long and Short CS–US Intervals

In the behavior systems view, a long CS–US interval should differentially condition a general search mode and related behavior, while a short CS–US interval should differentially condition a focal search mode and related behavior. Two experiments paired a long or a short CS with food, and then, during an extinction test, compounded the CS with an unconditioned probe-stimulus of a rolling ball-bearing. Presuming that the long CS differentially conditions a general search mode, and that unconditioned contact of a moving stimulus is characteristic of that mode, presentation of the long CS should facilitate interaction with the ball-bearing. Similarly, presuming that a short CS differentially conditions a focal search mode, and that feeder-directed responses are characteristic of this mode, presentation of a short CS should facilitate nosing in the food-tray. Consistent with these predictions, ball-bearing contact increased in rats receiving the long CS, while nosing in the food-tray was higher with the short CS.     

Task set persistence modulates word reading following resolution of picture-word interference

We extend the finding that word reading slows following successful responses to a color-word Stroop interference task (Masson, Bub, Woodward, & Chan, 2003). Word reading was assessed in a picture-word interference task in which subjects alternated between naming a picture (with either a word or a row of Xs superimposed on it) and reading a word. For the word-reading task, words were presented either in isolation or superimposed on a picture. Word reading was slower after subjects responded to a bivalent stimulus that required resolution of conflict (naming a picture with a word superimposed on it) than after they responded to a stimulus that involved no conflict (naming a picture with Xs superimposed on it), indicating modulation of dominant task performance. This effect was found when word-reading targets were superimposed on pictures but not when those targets were presented in isolation. Modulation of word reading, therefore, appears to be the result of interference from a persistent picture-naming task set, cued by a stimulus configuration that invites execution of both competing tasks.     

Memory for recent behavior in the pigeon

Variations of the symbolic delayed-matching-to-sample procedure were used to study a pigeon's memory for a small number of pecks. In the first experiment a choice of a left or right sidekey after a delay or retention interval was reinforced if a bird had not pecked at all or had pecked exactly once, before the delay, respectively. In the second experiment a choice of a red or green sidekey, regardless of its position, was reinforced if a bird had not pecked at all or had pecked exactly twice, respectively. In the first experiment a bird could orient toward the correct choice during the delay, whereas it could not in the second experiment. In a third experiment a feature-probing method was used to study a pigeon's memory for a number of pecks in the context of certain other pecks. The results showed that a pigeon can remember a small number of pecks for one-half to one minute or more and that the percent correct is a decreasing function of the log retention interval. When a second number of pecks is different from the first number, memory for the first number lasts only a few seconds. When a second number is the same, memory lasts considerably longer. The more recent number of pecks is remembered better. The results are interpreted in terms of a theory which holds that a reinforcer, in general, may act on a subjects' memory for recent behavior to generate patterns of behavior.     

Variations in explicitly unpaired training are differentially effective in producing conditioned inhibition

To evaluate a contingency interpretation of conditioned inhibition (CI), rats were given “explicity unpaired” training in which the locus and duration of a CS within the inter-US (shock) interval were systematically manipulated for different groups. Summation and retardation tests in Experiment 1 indicated that stronger CI resulted from both a backward and a trace CS than from a midlocus CS of equal or greater duration. Complementing these findings, the same tests in Experiment 2 showed that, by comparison with novel-stimulus controls, CI developed to a trace CS but not to a mid-locus CS, nor to a trace CS that was accompanied by an immediate signal for the US. These findings argue against a contingency interpretation of CI and favor a contiguity interpretation stressing the short-term rehearsal of stimulus events. Such rehearsal of the US allows a backward CS, but not a mid-locus CS with an extended US-CS interval, to be discriminated as a signal for nonreinforcement, and thus to develop as a conditioned inhibitor. Similarly, excitatory conditioning to the memory trace of a CS allows the nominal trace CS to develop as a signal for nonreinforcement, and thus as a conditioned inhibitor, but not when its memory trace is overshadowed by another CS that immediately precedes the US. In short, the development of CI is facilitated when excitation is mediated by the memorial processing of either the US or a discrete CS for the US rather than by contextual cues.     

Detection of repeated trigrams: evidence of all-or-none learning

Two experiments investigated trigram detection in a continuous recognition task. In Experiment 1 consonant trigrams were presented visually, one at a time, with occasional repetition of a trigram after an interval of 0, 2, 4, 8, or 16 other trigrams. Subjects were told to respond with a button press every time they saw a repeated trigram. If a subject responded to a repeated trigram, it was not repeated again. However, if a subject did not respond to a repeated trigram, it was repeated again at the same interval for up to 3 repetitions. For all intervals greater than 0, the probability of noticing a repeated trigram did not increase with the number of repetitions. In Experiment 2 meaningless shape trigrams were presented, and occasionally a trigram was repeated after an interval of 0, 1, or 2 trigrams. For both intervals greater than 0, the probability of noticing a repeated trigram did not increase with the number of repetitions. The results demonstrate that a repeated input does not necessarily leave a permanent trace in memory.     

On Presuppositional Implicatures

Scalar implicatures arise when a speaker uses a logically weak alternative in a context where a logically stronger alternative was available. Presuppositional implicatures, as I call them, arise when a speaker uses a presuppositionally weak alternative when a presuppositionally stronger alternative was available. My goal is to give a detailed, working theory of presuppositional implicatures, and show that they are a special case of scalar implicatures. In doing so, I carefully contrast presuppositional implicatures with antipresuppositions. These two phenomena have been treated as closely related in the literature, but some differences have not been adequately appreciated. Antipresuppositions are observed when a presuppositionally weak alternative is infelicitously used in a context that satisfies the presupposition of a presuppositionally stronger alternative. Presuppositional implicatures arise when a presuppositionally weak alternative is felicitously used in a context that does not satisfy the presupposition of a presuppositionally stronger alternative, but where that stronger presupposition would have been accommodated. Attention to this difference reveals a shortcoming in Schlenker’s (Nat Lang Semant 20:391–429, 2012) theory of presuppositional implicature. This paper both identifies and remedies that shortcoming.     

Effects of effort on response rate

Pigeons were trained to peck for food reinforcement, and the minimum effective force for a peck was varied. In a single-key situation, the response rate was unaffected up to a certain force value, beyond which increments caused a proportional decrement in response rate. Transient enhancement and suppression effects were observed following a change in the force requirement. A change from a high force requirement to a low force requirement resulted in a temporary enhancement of response rate above the stable performance level, whereas a change from a low to a high requirement produced a temporary suppression of the rate below the stable rate. In a two-key situation, the response rate on a key with a given force remained unaffected by the force requirement on the other key. When the rate of response was plotted against the required force, the resultant function was remarkably similar to that obtained from the single-key experiment. When the rates of reinforcement on the two keys differed, the decrement in response rate produced by an increase in the force requirement was proportionally greater on the key with the lower rate of reinforcement.     

The effects of near wins and near losses on self-perceived personal luck and subsequent gambling behavior

Which person would be most likely to continue gambling? A person who has just experienced a big win or a person who has just experienced a big loss? The answer appears often to be whichever gambler feels personally luckier. Two experiments investigated how perceptions of luck, understood as a personal quality, are affected by near, but unrealized outcomes during a game of chance. In Experiment 1, a near big loss at a gambling game heightened perceptions of personal luck relative to a near big win, even though all participants actually won the same modest amount. In addition, participants who experienced a near big loss generated significantly more downward counterfactuals than did those participants in the near big win condition. Most importantly, differences in self-perceived luck influenced future gambling behavior. Participants who experienced a near big loss on a wheel-of-fortune wagered significantly more on the outcome of a subsequent game of roulette than did those participants who experienced a near big win. Experiment 2 extended these results by testing the possible influence of a different type of near outcome and by including a control group. The discussion focuses on the emerging picture of how people understand luck.     

Natural laws and the problem of provisos

Hempel and Giere contend that the existence of provisos poses grave difficulties for any regularity account of physical law. However, Hempel and Giere rely upon a mistaken conception of the way in which statements acquire their content. By correcting this mistake, I remove the problem Hempel and Giere identify but reveal a different problem that provisos pose for a regularity account — indeed, for any account of physical law according to which the state of affairs described by a law-statement presupposes a Humean regularity. These considerations suggest a normative analysis of law-statements. On this view, law-statements are not distinguished from accidental generalizations by the kind of Humean regularities they describe because a law-statement need not describe any Humean regularity. Rather, a law-statement says that in certain contexts, one ought to regard the assertion of a given type of claim, if made with justification, as a proper way to justify a claim of a certain other kind.     

Detection of convexity and concavity in context

Sensitivity to shape changes was measured, in particular detection of convexity and concavity changes. The available data are contradictory. The author used a change detection task and simple polygons to systematically manipulate convexity/concavity. Performance was high for detecting a change of sign (a new concave vertex along a convex contour or a new convex vertex along a concave contour). Other things being equal, there was no evidence of an advantage for detecting a new concavity compared with a new convexity, for detecting a change of angle to a concave vertex compared with a convex vertex, for detecting a change within a concave region compared with a change within a convex region, or for an interaction between convexity and concavity and changes affecting or not affecting a vertex. The author concludes that change detection is affected by changes of sign of curvature (leading to changes in part structure). However, contrary to previous proposals, there is no special role for negative curvature or minima of curvature in guiding attention.