“PURE” VERSUS “PRACTICAL” EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION

Abstract: In this article I distinguish a type of justification that is “epistemic” in pertaining to the grounds of one's belief, and “practical” in its connection to what act(s) one may undertake, based on that belief. Such justification, on the proposed account, depends mainly on the proportioning of “inner epistemic virtue” to the “outer risks” implied by one's act. The resulting conception strikes a balance between the unduly moralistic conception of William Clifford and contemporary naturalist virtue theories.     

DIFFERENTIAL REINFORCEMENT OF OTHER BEHAVIOR AND NONCONTINGENT REINFORCEMENT AS CONTROL PROCEDURES DURING THE MODIFICATION OF A PRESCHOOLER'S COMPLIANCE1

Differential reinforcement of other behavior (DRO) and noncontingent reinforcement were compared as control procedures during the modification of a 3-yr-old preschooler's compliance. The recorded reinforcer was teacher proximity (within 3 ft (0.9 m) of the subject for at least 5 sec) which was often accompanied by positive verbal comments that varied in content across experimental conditions. The verbal content during contingent reinforcement might have been: “Thank you for picking up the blocks”; during noncontingent reinforcement: “You're wearing a pretty dress”; and during DRO: “I don't blame you for not picking up because it isn't any fun”. Contingent reinforcement increased compliance in all manipulation conditions. Noncontingent reinforcement decreased compliance during two reversal conditions. However, the behavior was variable and did not decrease to the low levels reached during the two DRO reversals.     

EFFECTS OF DIRECT,INTERMITTENT, AND VICARIOUS REINFORCEMENT PROCEDURES ON THE DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF INSTRUCTION-FOLLOWING BEHAVIORS IN A GROUP OF YOUNG CHILDREN1

A group of young children (mean age: 2.5 yr) were instructed to follow different requests by a teacher in a day-care setting. Experiment I verified that mean group instruction following was low (10%) despite the opportunity for “observational learning”, i.e., the group of 12 children could watch a nonreinforced adult comply with the teacher's request. In Experiment II, when positive consequences were provided contingent on the adult model's behavior, mean group instruction following was relatively unaffected (14%). When direct reinforcement was given to four peer models, each for several sessions, the individual performances of three of the four peer models was elevated (from 50% to 80%); however, the mean performance of the remaining nonreinforced children (N = 7) was only moderately affected (21%). When reinforcement contingencies were again changed, so that each group member was provided direct, but intermittent reinforcement, mean group performance increased substantially to levels of over 70%. Once instruction following was high, presentation of reinforcement only to one peer model sufficed to maintain performance whereas earlier, this same vicarious reinforcement procedure had failed to establish group compliance. The maintenance of instruction-following behavior when reinforcement was applied solely to one child was interpreted mainly in terms of a high resistance to extinction following a history of intermittent reinforcement rather than a “vicarious”- or “self”-reinforcement mechanism. Finally, removal and re-introduction of group intermittent reinforcement, respectively, lowered performance (to levels of 40%) and elevated (to levels of 65%) the group's performance.     

I'm free but I'll comply with your request: generalization and multidimensional effects of the “evoking freedom” technique

The “evoking freedom” technique is a verbal compliance procedure that solicits someone to comply with a request by simply telling them they are free to accept or to refuse the request. The measure of the efficiency of this technique on compliance with large samples and the evaluation of its influence on various requests was tested in the first set of experiments. This technique was found to be efficient in increasing the number of people who agreed to give money to a requester, the number of smokers who agreed to give a cigarette, passersby who agreed to respond to a survey, and homeowners who agreed to buy pancakes. In the second set of experiments in which the mode of interaction between the requester and the person solicited was tested, the “evoking freedom” technique was found to be associated with greater compliance with a request addressed by mail and through face‐to‐face, phone‐to‐phone, or computer‐mediated interaction. The third set of experiments tested the effect of semantic variations of the “evoking freedom” technique and the weight of the repetition of the semantic evocation of freedom. These later experiments that used various phrases evoking the freedom to comply were found to be associated with greater compliance. Moreover, a double evocation of freedom was associated with even greater compliance than a single evocation. The importance of this technique for commitment communication is discussed.     

When the “Stakes” are Communicative

Stakeholders seek to have their “stakes” met by organizations. Organizations assess those requests and sometimes grant stakes to stakeholders. This study examines this critical function of organizations by investigating the stakeholder communication of 66 nonprofit organizations undergoing change. Implementers' self‐reports of frequency, timing, approaches, and topics of communication with 10 stakeholder groups were examined. Results indicate that implementers generally follow a quid pro quo “matching rule” wherein stakeholders' resource importance serves as the basis on which they are awarded communicative attention. However, observance of this rule was not predictive of implementers' assessments of successful change outcomes. Further, results also show that “internal” stakeholders receive the most and earliest communication, compared to stakeholders external to the organization or near the organization's boundary, and that “information dissemination” is the most prevalent communicative approach taken.     

THE “NEGATIVE” AND “POSITIVE” ARGUMENTS OF MORAL MODERATES

According to Shelly Kagan, “ordinary” or “moderate” moralists must establish the existence of “options.” Kagan considers a “negative” and a “positive” argument, which he regards as the most promising means by which moral moderates might establish their position. He offers objections to both, and he concludes that the moderate position is indefensible. I argue that Kagan fails in his attempt to discredit the negative argument. I also argue that the positive argument is so implausible that Kagan's elaborate criticism of it is unnecessary. The positive argument is interesting nevertheless, because of why it cannot serve the moderate's purposes.     

PROGRAMMING “LOOSE TRAINING” AS A STRATEGY TO FACILITATE LANGUAGE GENERALIZATION

This study investigated the generalization of spontaneous complex language behavior across a nontraining setting and the durability of generalization as a result of programming and “loose training” strategy. A within-subject, across-behaviors multiple-baseline design was used to examine the performance of two moderately retarded students in the use of is/are across three syntactic structures (i.e., “wh” questions, “yes/no” reversal questions, and statements). The language training procedure used in this study represented a functional example of programming “loose training.” The procedure involved conducting concurrent language training within the context of an academic training task, and establishing a functional reduction in stimulus control by permitting the student to initiate a language response based on a wide array of naturally occurring stimulus events. Concurrent probes were conducted in the free play setting to assess the immediate generalization and the durability of the language behaviors. The results demonstrated that “loose training” was effective in establishing a specific set of language responses with the participants of this investigation. Further, both students demonstrated spontaneous use of the language behavior in the free play generalization setting and a trend was clearly evident for generalization to continue across time. Thus, the methods used appear to be successful for training the use of is/are in three syntactic structures.     

“Part of the Very Concept”: Wittgensteinian Moral Philosophy1

X is “part of the very concept” of Y. This formulation recurs throughout Raimond Gaita's philosophy and informs Christopher Cordner's. I elucidate the formulation's meaning and the nature of the necessity posited, then conclude with a criticism. One cannot love evil. One cannot love cow dung. For Gaita, these claims differ in type. The first testifies to a conceptual relation, but the second to a “mere fact.” I see no clear basis for assigning to claims one type over another, which challenges the footing of Wittgensteinian moral philosophy. Why do no moral“mere facts” partly define our form of life?     

MAKING IT EXPLICIT AND CLEAR: FROM “STRONG” TO “HYPER‐” INFERENTIALISM IN BRANDOM AND PEIRCE

Abstract: This article explores how Robert Brandom's original “inferentialist” philosophical framework should be positioned with respect to the classical pragmatist tradition. It is argued that Charles Peirce's original attack (in “Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man” and other early papers) on the use of “intuition” in nineteenth‐century philosophy of mind is in fact a form of inferentialism, and thus an antecedent relatively unexplored by Brandom in his otherwise comprehensive and illuminating “tales of the mighty dead.” However, whereas Brandom stops short at a merely “strong” inferentialism, which admits some non‐inferential mental content (although it is parasitic on the inferential and can only be “inferentially articulated”), Peirce embraces a total, that is, “hyper‐,” inferentialism. Some consequences of this difference are explored, and Peirce's more thoroughgoing position is defended.     

INTERVENTIONS TO REDUCE HIGH-VOLUME PORTABLE HEADSETS: “TURN DOWN THE SOUND!”

Two studies examined effects of interventions to reduce noise levels from portable stereo headphones. Study 1 examined the effectiveness of warning signs posted in and nearby public elevators with 567 passengers possessing a portable headphone (total N = 7,811). During a 9-day baseline, the mean percentage of headphones played at an observer-audible level was 85%. During a subsequent 6-day warning sign phase, the mean percentage of audible headphones declined to 59%, which increased to a mean of 76% during a second baseline phase (5 days). Study 2 assessed the impact of a student confederate who lowered his or her observer-audible headphone volume at the polite request of a second student confederate. Of the 4,069 elevator passengers, 433 possessed a portable headset. The mean percentage of observer-audible headphones during a 4-day baseline was 85%. Subsequently, a 5-day modeling intervention reduced audible volumes to a mean of 46%. During a second baseline phase of 4 days, the mean level was 77%, and during reintroduction of the modeling phase (9 days) the mean level was 42%. The modeling intervention was significantly more effective with women (53% compliance) than men (29% compliance).     

Learning about Spirituality Together with “Seekers”

The present era, often referred to as post‐secular, has in many places seen a resurgence in spirituality. Nevertheless, the contemporary quest for spirituality is unique in the sense that many people do not expect to have their spiritual needs fulfilled within the structures of organized religion, starting on a journey of their own explorations instead. Sociologists of religion, therefore, tend to employ the “dwellers” and “seekers” paradigm to account for this phenomenon. This paper will explore this phenomenon in the context of the Czech Republic, whose citizens are frequently characterized as distrustful toward institutional religiosity, through the lens of the recent World Council of Churches' affirmation on mission and evangelism, Together towards Life: Mission and Evangelism in Changing Landscapes (TTL). For our purpose, the statement's emphasis on both “transformative spirituality” and “mission from the margins” will be of central importance. Using the notion of transformative spirituality as the energy engendered by the Spirit for the transformation of life and creation, it will be suggested that “seekers” can be agents in God's mission of liberation, reconciliation, and transformation, despite their inability or unwillingness to identify themselves with the church as institution. Keeping in mind ethical considerations, the paper will not seek to make a case for a forced “christening” of the seekers. Rather, it will argue that they can become partners in missio Dei, thus giving the notion of “mission from the margins” a new, contextually relevant dimension.     

When Job Candidates Are “Hard-” Versus “Easy-to-Get”: Effects of Candidate Availability on Employment Decisions1

Research on interpersonal attraction suggests that being elusive or “playing hard-to-get” is effective for increasing one's desirability and the likelihood of being selected as a dating partner. The following two studies explored the effects of this hard-to-get phenomenon in an employment decision setting. Both college students (Experiment 1) and professional recruiters (Experiment 2) reviewed application materials that conveyed that a candidate was either hard- (e. g., considering other job opportunities) or easy-to-get (e. g., not considering other opportunities) and then indicated their evaluations of these candidates. In both studies, being hard-to-get affected the interviewers’ judgments. However, this effect was moderated by the type of rationale given for being hard- or easy-to-get, as well as the objective qualifications (GPA) information. In addition, recruiter sex and candidate gender differences were explored. Male recruiters’ evaluations of application materials were more lenient than were females’ evaluations.     

THE EFFECTS OF AN ENVIRONMENTAL “ENRICHMENT” PROGRAM ON THE BEHAVIOR OF INSTITUTIONALIZED PROFOUNDLY RETARDED CHILDREN

This study determined the effects of procedures designed to “enrich” the physical and social environment of an institutional ward on the “adaptive” and “maladaptive” child, adult, self, and object-directed behaviors of five profoundly retarded ambulatory females. Behavior observed in two treatment conditions, an environment “enriched” with toys and objects and an “enriched” environment coupled with differential reinforcement of adaptive behavior, was compared to behavior occurring in corresponding baseline or “austere” conditions and during a period of noncontingent reinforcement. The results generally revealed: (1) little change in adaptive and maladaptive child and adult-directed behavior across conditions, (2) an overall higher incidence of adaptive object-directed behavior and reduced self-directed maladaptive behavior in each treatment condition from that observed in corresponding control conditions, and (3) the use of an “enriched” environment and differential reinforcement of adaptive behavior resulted in maladaptive self-directed behavior being reduced and adaptive object-directed behavior being increased beyond that observed in the “enriched” environment alone. These behavioral gains were largely maintained during a follow-up condition by continuing the “enriched” environment and transferring the responsibility for differential reinforcement to direct-care staff.     

Third-Party Consent Searches: Legal vs. Social Perceptions of “Common Authority”1

We investigate the degree of correspondence between legal concepts underpinning third-party consent searches (a co-resident permits police search of shared living space and belongings) and laypersons' sociocultural expectations. In accord with the legal concepts, we hypothesized that laypersons would be able to distinguish between authority over (1) exclusive-use vs. common-use areas, and (2) personal effects in exclusive-use vs. common-use areas. But, we also expected that (3) the interpretation of “common authority” would be influenced by the presence vs. absence of the co-resident, and (4) the type of intruder (social, commercial, civil authority, or criminal justice authority) would influence responses to requests for entry. These hypotheses were tested using a fully between-subjects, factorial design (N= 160). Results supported our first three hypotheses. Subjects understood the concept of a warrantless search and distinguished between “exclusive use” areas and “common authority” areas at the level of rooms within the shared residence. Subjects' interpretation of “common authority” for third-party consent purposes was influenced by physical presence of the co-resident. If the co-resident was absent, “common authority” was interpreted as independent consent power. There was no consensual interpretation of “common authority” when the co-resident was present and protested the proposed search. Results suggest situational dependence of lay understandings of “common authority” over jointly used areas.     

BION'S “EVIDENCE” AND HIS THEORETICAL STYLE

The author discusses “Evidence” (1976), a brief but very intense and fascinating paper in which Bion provides a unique opportunity to see him at work in his clinical practice. In the story of a patient, Bion reconstructs two sessions that are all the more true for being imaginary—i.e., narrated (“dreamed”). The matter of language and style in psychoanalysis is of the utmost importance, according to Bion—one could say, literally, a matter of life or death. In Bion's discourse, writing, reading, and analysis converge in the same place, the author notes; all are significant if they involve an experience of truth and the ability to learn from experience.     

SOCIAL INFLUENCES ON “SELF-STIMULATORY” BEHAVIOR: ANALYSIS AND TREATMENT APPLICATION

We tested the hypothesis that the “self-stimulatory” behaviors exhibited by some individuals may be socially mediated. Four developmentally disabled children who exhibited hand flapping and body rocking participated in a series of three experiments conducted to assess the influence of social variables on stereotyped behavior and to develop a treatment based on the assessment. Experiment 1 used an assessment procedure to determine the relative influences of social attention and task demands on stereotyped behavior. For all four children, hand flapping and body rocking increased when difficult academic tasks were introduced. Experiment 2 involved the use of a procedural time-out and demonstrated that removing task demands contingent on stereotyped behavior resulted in increased rates of hand flapping and body rocking. In Experiment 3, these results were used to develop a communication treatment that consisted of teaching the children to request assistance on the difficult tasks. This treatment resulted in significant reductions in self-stimulatory behavior. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that some forms of repetitive stereotyped behavior may come to serve social functions (e.g., escape from aversive situations). Teaching a functionally equivalent communicative alternative to escape-motivated stereotyped behavior can be an effective form of intervention for this problem.     

That “Ought” Does Not Imply “Right”: Why It Matters for Virtue Ethics

Virtue ethicists sometimes say that a right action is what a virtuous person would do, characteristically, in the circumstances. But some have objected recently that right action cannot be defined as what a virtuous person would do in the circumstances because there are circumstances in which a right action is possible but in which no virtuous person would be found. This objection moves from the premise that a given person ought to do an action that no virtuous person would do, to the conclusion that the action is a right action. I demon‐strate that virtue ethicists distinguish “ought” from “right” and reject the assumption that “ought” implies “right.” I then show how their rejection of that assumption blocks this “right but not virtuous” objection. I conclude by showing how the thesis that “ought” does not imply “right” can clarify a further dispute in virtue ethics regarding whether “ought” implies “can.”