What is an organ? Heidegger and the phenomenology of organ transplantation

This paper investigates the question of what an organ is from a phenomenological perspective. Proceeding from the phenomenology of being-in-the-world developed by Heidegger in Being and Time and subsequent works, it compares the being of the organ with the being of the tool. It attempts to display similarities and differences between the embodied nature of the organs and the way tools of the world are handled. It explicates the way tools belong to the totalities of things of the world that are ready to use and the way organs belong to the totality of a bodily being able to be in this very world. In so doing, the paper argues that while the organ is in some respects similar to a bodily tool, this tool is nonetheless different from the tools of the world in being tied to the organism as a whole, which offers the founding ground of the being of the person. However, from a phenomenological point of view, the line between organs and tools cannot simply be drawn by determining what is inside and outside the physiological borders of the organism. We have, from the beginning of history, integrated technological devices (tools) in our being-in-the-world in ways that make them parts of ourselves rather than parts of the world (more organ- than tool-like), and also, more recently, have started to make our organs more tool-like by visualising, moving, manipulating, and controlling them through medical technology. In this paper, Heidegger’s analysis of organ, tool, and world-making is confronted with this development brought about by contemporary medical technology. It is argued that this development has, to a large extent, changed the phenomenology of the organ in making our bodies more similar to machines with parts that have certain functions and that can be exchanged. This development harbours the threat of instrumentalising our bodily being but also the possibility of curing or alleviating suffering brought about by diseases which disturb and destroy the normal functioning of our organs.     

Individualism–collectivism and organ donation intentions

This article investigates the impact of individualism–collectivism on a person's willingness to donate organs. In Study 1, an online survey showed that individualism–collectivism was significantly and positively associated with participants' willingness to register as organ donors while perceived benefit mediated this relationship. Study 2 demonstrated the causal effect of individualism–collectivism on organ donation intentions using a priming technique. Participants primed with collectivism were more likely to register as organ donors than those primed with individualism. Our findings provide unique insights into whether cultural values (i.e., individualism–collectivism) can predict people's organ donation intentions.     

Harvesting the living?: separating "brain death" and organ transplantation

The chronic shortage of transplantable organs has reached critical proportions. In the wake of this crisis, some bioethicists have argued that there is sufficient public support to expand organ recovery through use of neocortical criteria of death or even pre-mortem organ retrieval. I present a typology of ways in which data gathered from the public can be misread or selectively used by bioethicists in service of an ideological or policy agenda, resulting in bad policy and bad ethics. Such risks should lead us to look at alternatives for increasing organ supplies short of expanding or abandoning the dead donor rule. The chronic problem of organ scarcity should prompt bioethicists to engage in constructive dialogue about the relation of the social sciences and bioethics, to examine the social malleability of the definition of death, and to revisit the question of the priority of organ transplants in the overall package of healthcare benefits provided to most, but not all, citizens.     

Introduction to the special issue on “psychological research and practice in organ transplantation”

This paper provides a brief overview of articles in this Special Issue on Psychological Research and Practice in Organ Transplantation. The articles provide empirical information on the psychological adaptation of transplant candidates and recipients, as well as addressing the myriad ethical and clinical issues evident in the field of organ transplantation. Heart, liver, lung, kidney, and bone marrow transplantation for children and adults has increased in frequency in recent years, and the articles address the need for more sophisticated and comprehensive assessment of psychological concomitants. The Guest Editor's Top Ten list of research needs which transplantation psychologists might further address is discussed in this article.     

Internal organs,integral selves,and good communities: opt-out organ procurement policies and the ‘separateness of persons’

Most people accept that if they can save someone from death at very little cost to themselves, they must do so; call this the ‘duty of easy rescue.’ At least for many such people, an instance of this duty is to allow their vital organs to be used for transplantation. Accordingly, ‘opt-out’ organ procurement policies, based on a powerfully motivated responsibility to render costless or very low-cost lifesaving aid, would seem presumptively permissible. Counterarguments abound. Here I consider, in particular, objections that assign a moral distinctiveness to the physical boundaries of our bodies and that concern autonomy and trust. These objections are singled out as they seem particularly pertinent to the stress I place on a distinctive benefit of the particular policy I defend. An opt-out system, resting not on the authority of ‘presumed consent’ but on the recognition of a duty to one another, has the prospect of prompting people to understand more richly the ways in which they are both physically embodied and communally embedded.     

The ethics of donation and transplantation: are definitions of death being distorted for organ transplantation?

A recent commentary defends 1) the concept of 'brain arrest' to explain what brain death is, and 2) the concept that death occurs at 2–5 minutes after absent circulation. I suggest that both these claims are flawed. Brain arrest is said to threaten life, and lead to death by causing a secondary respiratory then cardiac arrest. It is further claimed that ventilation only interrupts this way that brain arrest leads to death. These statements imply that brain arrest is not death itself. Brain death is a devastating state that leads to death when intensive care, which replaces some of the brain's vital functions such as breathing, is withdrawn and circulation stops resulting in irreversible loss of integration of the organism. Circulatory death is said to occur at 2–5 minutes after absent circulation because, in the context of DCD, the intent is to not attempt reversal of the absent circulation. No defense of this weak construal of irreversible loss of circulation is given. This means that paents in identical physiologic states are dead (in the DCD context) or alive (in the resuscitation context); the current state of death (at 2–5 minutes) is contingent on a future event (whether there will be resuscitation) suggesting backward causation; and the commonly used meaning of irreversible as 'not capable of being reversed' is abandoned. The literature supporting the claim that autoresuscitation does not occur in the context of no cardiopulmonary resuscitation is shown to be very limited. Several cases of autoresuscitation are summarized, suggesting that the claim that these cases are not applicable to the current debate may be premature. I suggest that brain dead and DCD donors are not dead; whether organs can be harvested before death from these patients whose prognosis is death should be debated urgently.     

Rationales for organ donation: Charity or duty?

Media appeals encouraging people to sign organ donor cards suggest that donating one's own organs after death or donating the organs of a deceased family member is an act of charity, i.e., something which it would be meritorious for people to do but not wrong to avoid. This paper argues to the contrary that posthumous organ donation is a moral duty, a duty of the type that rests at the base of recently enacted state “Good Samaritan” laws which require a witness to an emergency situation to render aid to the victim(s) when this can be done at minimal cost/risk to the potential rescuer.     

Clarifying the paradigm for the ethics of donation and transplantation: Was 'dead' really so clear before organ donation?

Recent commentaries by Verheijde et al, Evans and Potts suggesting that donation after cardiac death practices routinely violate the dead donor rule are based on flawed presumptions. Cell biology, cardiopulmonary resuscitation, critical care life support technologies, donation and transplantation continue to inform concepts of life and death. The impact of oxygen deprivation to cells, organs and the brain is discussed in relation to death as a biological transition. In the face of advancing organ support and replacement technologies, the reversibility of cardiac arrest is now purely related to the context in which it occurs, in association to the availability and application of support systems to maintain oxygenated circulation. The 'complete and irreversible' lexicon commonly used in death discussions and legal statutes are ambiguous, indefinable and should be replaced by accurate terms. Criticism of controlled DCD on the basis of violating the dead donor rule, where autoresuscitation has not been described beyond 2 minutes, in which life support is withdrawn and CPR is not provided, is not valid. However, any post mortem intervention that re-establishes brain blood flow should be prohibited. In comparison to traditional practice, organ donation has forced the clarification of the diagnostic criteria for death and improved the rigour of the determinations.     

Is the brain an organ for free energy minimisation?

Philosophical Studies - Two striking claims are advanced on behalf of the free energy principle (FEP) in cognitive science and philosophy: (i) that it identifies a condition of the possibility of...     

The anencephalic as organ donor: Whose baby is it anyway?

Should an anencephalic newborn, lacking cerebral hemispheres but possessing a functional brain stem, be eligible for organ donation? The dialectical method is used here to envision how a protagonist and an antagonist might debate the ethics of the issue.     

Three views of organ procurement policy: moving ahead or giving up?

The supply of organs for transplant remains inadequate to meet the needs of waiting patients, in spite of many programs and approaches to increase rates of donation. Over the years there have been numerous proposals to introduce schemes that would move toward the outright sale of organs. Three articles in this issue of the Journal propose methods for increasing organ supply--two by moving toward a market approach and the third by advocating a change in social culture. All three suffer from shortcomings, including the endorsement and encouragement of the exploitation of those who may offer organs. Although the shortage of organs must be addressed, the social price of a market in organs is too high, and proposals to encourage a rethinking of social responsibility are unlikely to be effective.     

Under what conditions would people be willing to make a living organ donation?

The aim was to examine the factors involved in people's willingness to make a living organ donation. A convenience sample of 200 people in southern France rated willingness to be a living donor in 48 scenarios consisting of all combinations of five factors: recipient's identity (close family member and city resident); donor's surgical risk (little and some); donor's possible long-term health consequences (none, some lessening over time, and durable); transplant success ("generally durably successful" and "durably successful one time out of two"); and likelihood of other donors (subject is one of the rare compatible donors or one among others). Cluster analyses showed the existence of three distinct organ donation philosophies. For the largest cluster (49% of participants), willingness to donate was very high to a family member, but low to a city resident. For the second cluster (37%), willingness was high to family, but also moderately high to a city resident. For the third cluster (14%), willingness was always low. Thus, most participants judged themselves ready to make a living organ donation to a family member and many even to a stranger.