Pragmatic schemas and conditional reasoning in children

Solving problems involving conditional relationships has been postulated to play a central role in the development of deductive reasoning, which itself underpins much cognitive developmental theory. The traditional Piagetian and “natural logic” approaches to this topic have more recently been challenged by findings that are more readily explained in terms of the concept of pragmatic schemas. On this basis it was predicted that even young “pre-formal” children would be able to succeed in a Reduced Array Selection Task if the test statement (referring to a previously told story about bees living in a hive) was couched in such a way as to evoke an authorization or permission schema. This proved to be the case in the present study involving 54 nine- and ten-year-old children: The permission condition elicited 70% globally correct solutions, compared to the 11% elicited by the formal control condition. Moreover, this facilitatory effect of the permission condition carried over to a second trial conducted in a standard way across all the conditions.     

Traces of reasoning with pragmatic schemas

Holyoak and Cheng's (1995) account of Wason's (1966) selection task was evaluated by testing participants' recognition memory for the rule. To accommodate the finding that participants' selections are systematically influenced by manipulating their perspective on the rule to be tested, Holyoak and Cheng put forward a development of Pragmatic Reasoning Schema (PRS) theory, according to which the rule being tested is mapped onto different schematic rules depending on the perspective taken. The instantiated schema then becomes the basis for reasoning, and the different schemas encourage the selection of different cases. We hypothesised that if participants interpret the rule by instantiating a particular schema, then they should falsely recognise a sentence corresponding to the instantiated schema a short time after performing the task. An experimental test provided limited support for this hypothesis.     

The elusive pragmatic reasoning schemas effect

The present study examined the pragmatic reasoning schema theory of deductive reasoning—specifically, its explanation of performance on the selection task. Experiment 1 replicated a result crucial to the theory, the finding of facilitation on abstract versions of the selection task based on pragmatic reasoning schemas. However, Experiments 2, 3, and 4 established that this facilitation was dependent upon two presentation factors: (1) the presence of explicit negatives on the NOT P and NOT Q cards and (2) the inclusion of a checking context in the problem statement. These results are discussed in terms of Evans's two-stage (heuristic/analytic processing) model of reasoning.     

The emergence of inferential rules: The use of pragmatic reasoning schemas by preschoolers

This study contrasts the pragmatic view with the natural logic view regarding the origin of inferential rules in conditional reasoning. The pragmatic view proposes that pragmatic rules emerge first, and the generalizations of these produce formal rules. In contrast, the natural logic view proposes that the formal rules emerge first and serve as a core that is then supplemented by pragmatic rules. In an experiment, scenarios involving conditional rules in different contexts, permission and arbitrary, were administered to independent groups of preschool children. To rule out the matching bias [Evans, J. St. B. T., & Lynch, J. S. (1973). Matching bias in the selection task. Br J Psychol 64, 391–397] as a possible explanation of reasoning performance, children were given conditional rules with a negated consequent. The results show that in the arbitrary context modus tollens (MT) was unavailable, and the use of modus ponens (MP) was unstable. In contrast, children in the permission context reliably used both MP and MT. In addition, they realized that a conditional rule does not imply a definite answer when the consequent holds. These findings suggest that, in their explicit forms, pragmatic rules emerge earlier than formal rules and in particular, even as basic a rule as MP is generalized from a context-specific form to a context-general one in preschool children.     

Pragmatic reasoning from multiple points of view: A response

Abstract

In our response we consider several broad sets of issues raised in the commentaries on our target article. We provide an elaboration of the general theory of pragmatic reasoning schemas and of the mechanisms posited to explain pespective effects and other contextual influences on reasoning. We consider the strengths and limitations of a number of alternative proposals offered by the commentators. Finally, we discuss possible links between pragmatic schemas and more elementary “building blocks” for human reasoning     

Reliance on schemas in source memory: age differences and similarity of schemas

The present study has examined the effects of source-schema-consistency, schematic distinctiveness and encoding time of schematic information on source memory of younger and older adults. Participants were administered a source memory test, in which two sources presented statements that were congruent with, incongruent with or irrelevant to sources' professions. Professions of sources were schematically similar or distinct, and they were revealed before or after the presentation of items. The results yielded that revelation of profession information before presentation of items enhanced source memory for incongruent items. Aging was associated with a general decrease in source monitoring processes. Participants who were assigned to similar-source condition and had their schemas activated before learning phase had higher source monitoring scores. Results are discussed in relation to source monitoring framework and aging of memory.     

Permission schemas and the selection task

Cheng and Holyoak's abstract permission schema version of Wason's selection task and the standard abstract version of the task were examined in two experiments, each a factorial design with type of problem (permission vs. standard), presence or absence of a checking context, explicit or implicit negatives on the not-p and not-q cards, and presence or absence of a rule clarification statement as factors. The original permission problem violation-type instruction was employed in Experiment 1, and Margolis's not-p and not-q violation instruction (Griggs & Jackson, 1990) was used in Experiment 2. Subjects were 640 university undergraduates, with each subject solving only one problem. The major findings for permission tasks were: (1) facilitation for the abstract permission version was replicated but found to be dependent upon the presence of explicit negatives on the not-p and not-q cards; and (2) this facilitation was enhanced by the Margolis not-p and not-q instruction. Per Girotto, Mazzocco, and Cherubini (1992), these findings and the observed error patterns are consistent with pragmatic schema theory. The major findings for the standard version of the task were: (1) none of the factors significantly impacted proportion correct [performance was poor, ≦10% correct in 15 of 16 conditions] and (2) the number of not-p & not-q incorrect selections was increased significantly for the not-p and not-q instruction. These results are discussed in terms of Manktelow and Over's argument that the standard abstract task and the permission schema version are actually different problems.     

Machiavellianism and early maladaptive schemas in adolescents

Given the relationship between personality dysfunction and Machiavellianism, schema-approach and early maladaptive schemas (EMSs) in particular offer a promising approach to the better understanding of Machiavellianism. Using self-report measures of Machiavellianism and EMSs with 498 adolescents (354 girls), we tested which EMSs were associated with Machiavellianism. Results showed that Emotional deprivation, Mistrust/abuse, Entitlement/grandiosity, and Approval-seeking/Recognition-seeking EMSs were positively associated with Machiavellianism, while Enmeshment/Undeveloped self and Self-sacrifice EMSs were negatively related to Machiavellianism. Results are mostly discussed from developmental and relational perspectives. Machiavellianism is suggested to be the result of maladaptive coping responses to the EMSs listed above.     

Early maladaptive schemas in personality disordered individuals

The present study aimed to examine the specificity of schema domains in three personality disorder (PD) groups, namely borderline (BPD), obsessive-compulsive (OCPD), and avoidant PD (AvPD), and to correctly identify the three PD groups on the basis of these schemas. The sample consisted of 48 clinical participants diagnosed with PDs and assigned to 1 of 3 groups on the basis of their Axis II diagnoses (BPD: n = 13; OCPD: n = 13; AvPD: n = 22). High scores on Dependence/Incompetence, Defectiveness/ Shame and Abandonment were found for the BPD group. Such pattern appears to be most consistent with Young's theory of BPD. Consistent with the theory and empirical findings of Beck et al. (1990, 2001), OCPD was associated with elevations on the Unrelenting Standards schema domain, but not on Emotional Inhibition, which was found to be elevated for AvPD. In conclusion, the present study suggests that there are different patterns of schema domains across different PDs and that the Schema Questionnaire (SQ) is potentially useful in differentiating between these PDs.     

A Pragmatic Case against Pragmatic Scientific Realism

Pragmatic Scientific Realism (PSR) urges us to take up the realist aim or the goal of truth although we have good reason to think that the goal can neither be attained nor approximated. While Newton-Smith thinks that pursuing what we know we cannot achieve is clearly irrational, Rescher disagrees and contends that pursuing an unreachable goal can be rational on pragmatic grounds—if in pursuing the unreachable goal one can get indirect benefits. I have blocked this attempt at providing a pragmatic justification for the realist aim of PSR on precisely the same pragmatic grounds—since there is a competing alternative to PSR, and the alternative can provide whatever indirect benefits PSR can offer while being less risky than it is, prudential reasoning favours the alternative to PSR. This undermines the pragmatic case for the realist aim of science since the instrumentalist alternative does not aim at the truth.     

Recollections of things schematic: room schemas revisited

In 2 experiments, the authors examined the effects of schemas on the subjective experience of remembering. Participants entered a room that was set up to look like a graduate student's office under intentional or incidental learning conditions. They later took a recognition memory test that included making remember-know judgments. In Experiment 1, they were tested during the same session; in Experiment 2 they were tested either during the same session or after a 48-hr delay. Consistent with the authors' predictions, memory for atypical objects was especially likely to be experienced in the remember sense. In addition, false remember judgments rose dramatically after the 48-hr delay, especially for participants in the incidental learning condition. Results are discussed in terms of schema theory, fuzzy-trace theory, and the distinctiveness heuristic.     

Early maladaptive schemas of personality disorder subtypes.

This investigation attempted to examine the cognitive schemas of five distinct clusters that emerged from a cluster analysis of the personality disorder scales of the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory-II (Millon, 1987). Specifically, the degree to which early maladaptive schemas, as measured by the Cognitive Schema Questionnaire-Short Form (Young, 1994), could correctly identify empirically derived patterns of personality disorders was examined. Between-cluster differences centered on five personality components and five schemas. Discriminant analyses revealed two significant functions composed of cognitive schemas, which correctly identified 61.2% of the entire sample in terms of cluster group membership. The total proportion of variance in the two significant functions associated with cluster group differences was 76.8%. Findings are discussed in relation to the domain theory of personality disorders posited by Millon and Davis (1996).     

Link between early maladaptive schemas and defense mechanisms

IntroductionDefense mechanism and early maladaptive schemas are two concepts distorting the perception of reality.ObjectiveThe aim of this study was to explore the link between two reality-distorting concepts from two theoretical models: early maladaptive schemas from the cognitive and behavioral model and defense mechanisms based on the psychoanalytic model.MethodTwo hundred thirty-two non-clinical participants completed the Defense Style Questionnaire and the Young Schema Questionnaire (short version). Then a Bravais Pearson correlation analysis connecting these two concepts, and a multiple regressions analysis using early maladaptive schemas as predictors for defense style mechanisms levels were conducted.ResultsThe results indicate that 2 early maladaptive schema domains (i.e. other-directedness as well as over-vigilance and inhibition) predict the frequency of use of the neurotic defense mechanism, and 3 schema domains (i.e. disconnection and rejection, impaired autonomy and performances as well as impaired limits) predict the frequency of use of the immature defense mechanism.ConclusionTo conclude, two psychological concepts based on two different theoretical models (psychoanalytic and cognitive and behavioral therapy) seem to share an important link justifying the use of integrative therapies such as schema therapy.     

Causal reasoning

The main focus of this paper is the question as to what it is for an individual to think of her environment in terms of a concept of causation, or causal concepts, in contrast to some more primitive ways in which an individual might pick out or register what are in fact causal phenomena. I show how versions of this question arise in the context of two strands of work on causation, represented by Elizabeth Anscombe and Christopher Hitchcock, respectively. I then describe a central type of reasoning that, I suggest, a subject has to be able to engage in, if we are to credit her with causal concepts. I also point out that this type of reasoning turns on the idea of a physical connection between cause and effect, as articulated in recent singularist approaches of causation.     

Unless reasoning

We report the results of two experiments investigating conditional inferences from conditional unless assertions, such as Juan is not in León unless Nuria is in Madrid. Experiments 1 and 2 check Fillenbaum's hypothesis about the semantic similarity of unless with if not and only if assertions; both also examine inferential endorsements (Experiment 1) and endorsements and latencies (Experiment 2) of the four logically equivalent conditional formulations: if A then B, if not-B then not-A, A only if B and notA unless B. The results of these experiments show the similarity of unless and only if confirming that the representation of both conditionals from the outset probably include two possibilities directionally oriented from B to A; results also confirm the especial difficulty of unless assertions. The implications of the results are discussed in the context of recent psychological and linguistic theories of the meaning of unless.