Embodiment, spatial categorisation and action

Despite the subjective experience of a continuous and coherent external world, we will argue that the perception and categorisation of visual space is constrained by the spatial resolution of the sensory systems but also and above all, by the pre-reflective representations of the body in action. Recent empirical data in cognitive neurosciences will be presented that suggest that multidimensional categorisation of perceptual space depends on body representations at both an experiential and a functional level. Results will also be resumed that show that representations of the body in action are pre-reflective in nature as only some aspects of the pre-reflective states can be consciously experienced. Finally, a neuro-cognitive model based on the integration of afferent and efferent information will be described, which suggests that action simulation and associated predicted sensory consequences may represent the underlying principle that enables pre-reflective representations of the body for space categorisation and selection for action.     

Flexible visual processing of spatial relationships

Visual processing breaks the world into parts and objects, allowing us not only to examine the pieces individually, but also to perceive the relationships among them. There is work exploring how we perceive spatial relationships within structures with existing representations, such as faces, common objects, or prototypical scenes. But strikingly, there is little work on the perceptual mechanisms that allow us to flexibly represent arbitrary spatial relationships, e.g., between objects in a novel room, or the elements within a map, graph or diagram. We describe two classes of mechanism that might allow such judgments. In the simultaneous class, both objects are selected concurrently. In contrast, we propose a sequential class, where objects are selected individually over time. We argue that this latter mechanism is more plausible even though it violates our intuitions. We demonstrate that shifts of selection do occur during spatial relationship judgments that feel simultaneous, by tracking selection with an electrophysiological correlate. We speculate that static structure across space may be encoded as a dynamic sequence across time. Flexible visual spatial relationship processing may serve as a case study of more general visual relation processing beyond space, to other dimensions such as size or numerosity.     

The impact of continuity editing in narrative film on event segmentation

Filmmakers use continuity editing to engender a sense of situational continuity or discontinuity at editing boundaries. The goal of this study was to assess the impact of continuity editing on how people perceive the structure of events in a narrative film and to identify brain networks that are associated with the processing of different types of continuity editing boundaries. Participants viewed a commercially produced film and segmented it into meaningful events, while brain activity was recorded with functional magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). We identified three degrees of continuity that can occur at editing locations: edits that are continuous in space, time, and action; edits that are discontinuous in space or time but continuous in action; and edits that are discontinuous in action as well as space or time. Discontinuities in action had the biggest impact on behavioral event segmentation, and discontinuities in space and time had minor effects. Edits were associated with large transient increases in early visual areas. Spatial-temporal changes and action changes produced strikingly different patterns of transient change, and they provided evidence that specialized mechanisms in higher order perceptual processing regions are engaged to maintain continuity of action in the face of spatiotemporal discontinuities. These results suggest that commercial film editing is shaped to support the comprehension of meaningful events that bridge breaks in low-level visual continuity, and even breaks in continuity of spatial and temporal location.     

Direct social perception of others’ subjective time

In this paper, I deploy Gallagher et al.’s theory of Direct Social Perception (DSP) to help explain how we perceive others’ subjective time. This process of second-person temporal perception plays an important role in interpersonal interaction, yet is often glossed over in discussions of intersubjectivity. Using A.D. Craig (2009) ‘awareness’ model of subjective time to unify converging evidence that subjective time is embodied, affective, and situated, I argue that subjective time cannot be considered as a hidden or invisible aspect of a private mind, but is partially externally visible through our gestures, expressions, and other behaviours as they unfold within a particular context. My central thesis is that, in face to face interactions, we are able to directly perceive these visible components of other people’s subjective time. This is made possible by our “enculturated” (Menary, 2015) and enactive perceptual faculties. The process of social perception is not a passive, unidirectional affair where static information about one person’s subjective time is transmitted to the other, but rather inextricably linked with action (both at the personal and subpersonal level) and interaction effects produced by a dynamic coupling between participants. Such an enactive perspective reveals how others’ subjective time can be perceived in everyday interactions.     

Biological sex determines whether faces look real

Judging whether a face is real or artificial can be done relatively rapidly and accurately, even when visual information is substantially impoverished. The perception of animacy in the face also has several interesting properties that may reflect both the underlying “tuning” of face space to preferentially represent real face appearance and the diagnosticity of individual features for categorizing faces as animate or inanimate. In the current study, we examined how sex categories interact with animacy perception by separately characterizing animacy judgements as a function of stimulus sex. We find that stimulus sex affects subjective ratings of animacy and sex categorization of real and artificial faces. Specifically, female faces look more artificial and artificial faces look more female. We discuss our results in terms of the ecology of real and artificial faces and the possible role of visual experience with artificial female faces, and the objectification of female faces.     

Will a category cue attract you? Motor output reveals dynamic competition across person construal

People use social categories to perceive others, extracting category cues to glean membership. Growing evidence for continuous dynamics in real-time cognition suggests, contrary to prevailing social psychological accounts, that person construal may involve dynamic competition between simultaneously active representations. To test this, the authors examined social categorization in real-time by streaming the x, y coordinates of hand movements as participants categorized typical and atypical faces by sex. Though judgments of atypical targets were largely accurate, online motor output exhibited a continuous spatial attraction toward the opposite sex category, indicating dynamic competition between multiple social category alternatives. The authors offer a dynamic continuity account of social categorization and provide converging evidence across categorizations of real male and female faces (containing a typical or an atypical sex-specifying cue) and categorizations of computer-generated male and female faces (with subtly morphed sex-typical or sex-atypical features). In 3 studies, online motor output revealed continuous dynamics underlying person construal, in which multiple simultaneously and partially active category representations gradually cascade into social categorical judgments. Such evidence is challenging for discrete stage-based accounts.     

Interaction of Perception and Action in Discrete and Continuous Rapid Aiming Tasks

Previously, we have shown that discrete and continuous rapid aiming tasks are governed by distinct visuomotor control mechanisms by assessing the combined visual illusion effects on the perceived and effective index of difficulty (ID). All participants were perceptually biased by the combined visual illusion before they performed the rapid aiming tasks. In the current study, the authors manipulated the order of performing perceptual and motor tasks to examine whether perceptual or motor experience with the illusory visual target would influence the subsequent perceived and effective ID in discrete and continuous tapping tasks. The results supported our hypothesis showing that perceptual experience with the illusory visual target in the discrete condition reduced the effective ID in the subsequent discrete tapping task, and motor experience with the illusory visual target in the continuous condition reduced the illusion effects on the perceived ID in the subsequent perceptual judgment task. The study demonstrates the coinfluence of perception and action, and suggests that perception and action influence one another with different magnitude depending on the spatial frame of reference used to perform the perceptuomotor task.     

Gorillas in our midst: sustained inattentional blindness for dynamic events

With each eye fixation, we experience a richly detailed visual world. Yet recent work on visual integration and change direction reveals that we are surprisingly unaware of the details of our environment from one view to the next: we often do not detect large changes to objects and scenes ('change blindness'). Furthermore, without attention, we may not even perceive objects ('inattentional blindness'). Taken together, these findings suggest that we perceive and remember only those objects and details that receive focused attention. In this paper, we briefly review and discuss evidence for these cognitive forms of 'blindness'. We then present a new study that builds on classic studies of divided visual attention to examine inattentional blindness for complex objects and events in dynamic scenes. Our results suggest that the likelihood of noticing an unexpected object depends on the similarity of that object to other objects in the display and on how difficult the priming monitoring task is. Interestingly, spatial proximity of the critical unattended object to attended locations does not appear to affect detection, suggesting that observers attend to objects and events, not spatial positions. We discuss the implications of these results for visual representations and awareness of our visual environment.     

Serial dependence in position occurs at the time of perception

Observers perceive objects in the world as stable over space and time, even though the visual experience of those objects is often discontinuous and distorted due to masking, occlusion, camouflage, or noise. How are we able to easily and quickly achieve stable perception in spite of this constantly changing visual input? It was previously shown that observers experience serial dependence in the perception of features and objects, an effect that extends up to 15 seconds back in time. Here, we asked whether the visual system utilizes an object’s prior physical location to inform future position assignments in order to maximize location stability of an object over time. To test this, we presented subjects with small targets at random angular locations relative to central fixation in the peripheral visual field. Subjects reported the perceived location of the target on each trial by adjusting a cursor’s position to match its location. Subjects made consistent errors when reporting the perceived position of the target on the current trial, mislocalizing it toward the position of the target in the preceding two trials (Experiment 1). This pull in position perception occurred even when a response was not required on the previous trial (Experiment 2). In addition, we show that serial dependence in perceived position occurs immediately after stimulus presentation, and it is a fast stabilization mechanism that does not require a delay (Experiment 3). This indicates that serial dependence occurs for position representations and facilitates the stable perception of objects in space. Taken together with previous work, our results show that serial dependence occurs at many stages of visual processing, from initial position assignment to object categorization.     

The formation of rhythmic categories and metric priming

Two experiments on categorical rhythm perception are reported, the object of which was to investigate how listeners perceive discrete rhythmic categories while listening to rhythms performed on a continuous time scale. This is studied by considering the space of all temporal patterns (all possible rhythms made up of three intervals) and how they, in perception, are partitioned into categories, ie where the boundaries of these categories are located. This process of categorisation is formalised as the mapping from the continuous space of a series of time intervals to a discrete, symbolic domain of integer-ratio sequences. The methodological framework uses concepts from mathematics and psychology (eg convexity and entropy) that allow precise characterisations of the empirical results. In the first experiment, twenty-nine participants performed an identification task with 66 rhythmic stimuli (a systematic sampling of the performance space). The results show that listeners do not just perceive the time intervals between onsets of sounds as placed in a homogeneous continuum. Instead, they can reliably identify rhythmic categories, as a chronotopic time clumping map reveals. In a second experiment, the effect of metric priming was studied by presenting the same stimuli but preceded with a duple or triple metre subdivision. It is shown that presenting patterns in the context of a metre has a large effect on rhythmic categorisation: the presence of a specific musical metre primes the perception of specific rhythmic patterns.     

An investigation of detection biases in the unattended periphery during simulated driving

While people often think they veridically perceive much of the visual surround, recent findings indicate that when asked to detect targets such as gratings embedded in visual noise, observers make more false alarms in the unattended periphery. Do these results from psychophysics studies generalize to more ecologically valid settings? We used a modern game engine to create a simulated driving environment where participants (as drivers) had to make judgments about the colors of pedestrians’ clothing in the periphery. Confirming our hypothesis based on previous psychophysics studies, we found that subjects showed liberal biases for unattended locations when detecting specific colors of pedestrians’ clothing. A second experiment showed that this finding was not simply due to a confirmation bias in decision-making when subjects were uncertain. Together, these results support the idea that in everyday visual experience, there is subjective inflation of experienced detail in the periphery, which may happen at the decisional level.     

Attention enhances apparent perceptual organization

Perceptual organization and selective attention are two crucial processes that influence how we perceive visual information. The former structures complex visual inputs into coherent units, whereas the later selects relevant information. Attention and perceptual organization can modulate each other, affecting visual processing and performance in various tasks and conditions. Here, we tested whether attention can alter the way multiple elements appear to be perceptually organized. We manipulated covert spatial attention using a rapid serial visual presentation task, and measured perceptual organization of two multielements arrays organized by luminance similarity as rows or columns, at both the attended and unattended locations. We found that the apparent perceptual organization of the multielement arrays is intensified when attended and attenuated when unattended. We ruled out response bias as an alternative explanation. These findings reveal that attention enhances the appearance of perceptual organization, a midlevel vision process, altering the way we perceive our visual environment.     

A temporal same-object advantage in the tunnel effect: facilitated change detection for persisting objects

Meaningful visual experience requires computations that identify objects as the same persisting individuals over time, motion, occlusion, and featural change. This article explores these computations in the tunnel effect: When an object moves behind an occluder, and then an object later emerges following a consistent trajectory, observers irresistibly perceive a persisting object, even when the pre- and postocclusion views contrast featurally. This article introduces a new change detection method for quantifying percepts of the tunnel effect. Observers had to detect color changes in displays where several objects oscillated behind occluders and occasionally changed color. Across comparisons with several types of spatiotemporal gaps, as well as manipulations of occlusion versus implosion, performance was better when objects' kinematics gave the impression of a persisting individual. The results reveal a temporal same-object advantage: better change detection across temporal scene fragments bound into the same persisting object representations. This suggests that persisting objects are the underlying units of visual memory.     

Temporal cognition and the phenomenology of time: a multiplicative function for apparent duration

The literature on time perception is discussed. This is done with reference both to the "cognitive-timer" model for time estimation and to the subjective experience of apparent duration. Three assumptions underlying the model are scrutinized. I stress the strong interplay among attention, arousal, and time perception, which is at the base of the cognitive-timer model. It is suggested that a multiplicative function of two key components (the number of subjective time units and their size) should predict apparent duration. Implications for other cognitive domains are drawn, and in particular an analogy is suggested between apparent duration and apparent movement.     

The representation of visual scenes

The visual world exists all around us, yet this information must be gleaned through a succession of eye fixations in which high visual acuity is limited to the small foveal region of each retina. In spite of these physiological constraints, we experience a richly detailed and continuous visual world. Research on transsaccadic memory, perception, picture memory and imagination of scenes will be reviewed. Converging evidence suggests that the representation of visual scenes is much more schematic and abstract than our immediate experience would indicate. The visual system may have evolved to maximize comprehension of discrete views at the expense of representing unnecessary detail, but through the action of attention it allows the viewer to access detail when the need arises. This capability helps to maintain the 'illusion' of seeing a rich and detailed visual world at every glance.     

Smelling objects

Objects are central to perception and our interactions with the world. We perceive the world as parsed into discrete entities that instantiate particular properties, and these items capture our attention and shape how we interact with the environment. Recently there has been some debate about whether the sense of smell allows us to perceive odours as discrete objects, with some suggesting that olfaction is aspatial and doesn’t allow for object-individuation. This paper offers two empirically tractable criteria for assessing whether particular objects are exhibited in perceptual experience—(1) susceptibility to figure-ground segregation and (2) perceptual constancies—and argues that these criteria are fulfilled by olfactory perception, and thus there are olfactory objects. I argue that there are, in fact, two different ways that olfaction allows for figure-ground segregation. First, I look at various Gestalt grouping principles, which are thought to govern when features are perceived as grouped into structured wholes, segregated from everything around them. I argue that these principles apply to olfactory experience, providing evidence of non-spatial figure-ground segregation. Second, I defend the contentious idea that a spatial variety of figure-ground segregation can also occur in olfaction. To see this, however, we need to look to empirical evidence showing that tactile stimulation and bodily movements play a crucial role in olfactory phenomenology. Finally, I draw on empirical evidence and olfactory phenomenology to argue that there are perceptual constancies in olfactory experience, allowing us to perceive odours as coherent objects that survive shifts in our perspectives on the world.

     

Memory in motion: Movement dynamics reveal memory strength

Recognition memory is typically examined as a discrete end-state, describable by static variables, such as accuracy, response time, and confidence. In the present study, we combined real-time mouse-tracking with subsequent, overt confidence estimates to examine the dynamic nature of memory decisions. By examining participants' streaming x-, y- mouse coordinates during recognition decisions, we observed that movement trajectories revealed underlying response confidence. More confident decisions were associated with shorter decision times and more linear response trajectories. Less confident decisions were made slowly, with increased trajectory curvature. Statistical indices of curvature and decision times, including area-under-the-curve and time to maximum deviation, suggested that memory strength relates to response dynamics. Whether participants were correct or incorrect, old responses showed a stronger correspondence between mouse trajectories and confidence, relative to new responses. We suggest that people subjectively experience a correspondence between feelings of memory and feelings of confidence; that subjective experience reveals itself in real-time decision processes, as suggested by sequential sampling models of recognition decisions.     

A computational model of event segmentation from perceptual prediction

People tend to perceive ongoing continuous activity as series of discrete events. This partitioning of continuous activity may occur, in part, because events correspond to dynamic patterns that have recurred across different contexts. Recurring patterns may lead to reliable sequential dependencies in observers' experiences, which then can be used to guide perception. The current set of simulations investigated whether this statistical structure within events can be used 1) to develop stable internal representations that facilitate perception and 2) to learn when to update such representations in a self-organizing manner. These simulations demonstrate that experience with recurring patterns enables a system to accurately predict upcoming stimuli within an event, to identify boundaries between such events based on transient increases in prediction error, and to use such boundaries to improve prediction about subsequent activities.     

Dynamic perceptual completion and the dynamic snapshot view to help solve the ‘two times’ problem

Perceptual completion fills the gap for discrete perception to become continuous. Similarly, dynamic perceptual completion (DPC) provides an experience of dynamic continuity. Our recent discovery of the ‘happening’ (H) element of DPC completes the total experience for dynamism in the flow of time (FOT). However, a phenomenological explanation for these experiences is essential. The Snapshot Hypotheses especially the Dynamic Snapshot View provides the most comprehensive explanation. From that understanding the ‘two times’ problem (TTP) can be addressed. The static time of spacetime cosmologies has been irreconcilable with the dynamic FOT. Dismissing the FOT as an illusion is unsatisfactory. Therefore, we provide four hypotheses for the TTP.

1) Since cosmological static time demands that all events (cerebral included) are discrete, DPC elements for dynamism should likewise be expected to be discrete and accounted for by a snapshot phenomenology such as the DSV. 2) If temporality can be demonstrated to be similar to apparent motion by being a snapshot phenomenon and not demanding temporal extension it would confirm the DSV and permit reconciliation with static time. 3) If the ‘present moment’ (of the FOT) is subjective as static time theories suggest, it should be possible experimentally for an observer to choose his own ‘present’ by moving (perceptually) to various points in the past with the aid of virtual reality. 4) If dynamism e.g. motion can be precluded without significant information loss or violating physics principles it is a cognitive add-on, thereby contradicting non-static time theories which suggest that time is ‘real.’ We confirm those hypotheses.