A Moderate Defence of the Use of Thought Experiments in Applied Ethics

Thought experiments have played a pivotal role in many debates within ethics—and in particular within applied ethics—over the past 30 years. Nonetheless, despite their having become a commonly used philosophical tool, there is something odd about the extensive reliance upon thought experiments in areas of philosophy, such as applied ethics, that are so obviously oriented towards practical life. Herein I provide a moderate defence of their use in applied philosophy against those three objections. I do not defend all possible uses of thought experiments but suggest that we should distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate uses. Their legitimate uses are determined not so much by the modal content of any actual thought experiment itself, but by the extent to which the argument in which it is nested follows basic tenets of informal logic and respects the fundamental contingency of applied ethical problems. In pursuing these ideas, I do not so much provide a set of criteria for their legitimate use, but more modestly present two significant ways in which their use can go awry.     

Spurious Causal Kinds: A Problem for the Causal-Power Conception of Kinds

There is an assumption common in the philosophy of mind literature that kinds in our sciences—or causal kinds, at least—are individuated by the causal powers that objects have in virtue of the properties they instantiate. While this assumption might not be problematic by itself, some authors take the assumption to mean that falling under a kind and instantiating a property amount to the same thing. I call this assumption the “Property-Kind Individuation Principle”. A problem with this principle arises because there are cases where we can sort objects by their possession of common causal powers, and yet those objects do not intuitively form a causal kind. In this short note, I discuss why the Property-Kind Individuation Principle is thus not a warranted metaphysical assumption.     

The Psychological Benefits of Humor

In Men and Their Religion: Honor, Hope, and Humor (2002), I proposed that men have two primary ways of being religious—the religion of honor and the religion of hope. I also proposed that because these two religions do not always have their desired outcomes, men have developed a third way of being religious, the religion of humor. In A Time To Laugh (2005) I have expanded on my claim in Men and Their Religion that if men have three religions—honor, hope, and humor—the greatest of these is humor. In the course of doing the necessary research for a book on humor, I acquired and read a few books and a host of articles that explored the psychological benefits of humor. While I did not report on these studies in the book, I believe they are relevant to the assumption that a religion will have psychological benefits for those who embrace it. This article therefore provides a review of empirical studies of the psychological benefits of humor in order to answer the question whether a religion of humor is likely to have psychological benefits and, if so, what these might be.     

No bare particulars

There are predicates and subjects. It is thus tempting to think that there are properties on the one hand, and things that have them on the other. I have no quarrel with this thought; it is a fine place to begin a theory of properties and property-having. But in this paper, I argue that one such theory—bare particularism—is false. I pose a dilemma. Either bare particulars instantiate the properties of their host substances or they do not. If they do not, then bare particularism is both unmotivated and false. If they do, then the view faces a problematic—and, I shall argue, false—crowding consequence.     

Co-occurrence of sequential and practice effects in the Simon task: Evidence for two independent mechanisms affecting response selection

The Simon effect refers to the observation that responses to a relevant stimulus dimension are faster and more accurate when the stimulus and response spatially correspond than when they do not, even though stimulus position is irrelevant. Recent findings have suggested that the Simon effect can be strongly modulated by prior practice with a spatially incompatible mapping and by correspondence sequence. Although practice is thought to influence conditional stimulus —response (S-R) processing, leaving response priming through the unconditional route unaffected, sequential effects are thought to represent trial-by-trial adaptations that selectively involve unconditional S —R processing. In the present study, we tested this assumption by assessing the effects of correspondence sequence both when the Simon task alone was performed and when it was preceded by a spatial compatibility task with either incompatible (Experiments 1-2) or compatible (Experiment 2) instructions. The observation that practice and correspondence sequence co-occur and exert additive effects strongly demonstrates that the two factors affect different processing routes.     

Strategic influences on recollection in the exclusion task: Electrophysiological evidence

One assumption underlying the use of the exclusion task as part of the process dissociation procedure is that studied items are successfully excluded only when they are recollected. The present study employed event-related potentials (ERPs) to demonstrate that successful exclusion does not necessarily require recollection. In two experiments, the study tasks for to-be-excluded items were identical, but the tasks employed withtarget items differed, giving better memory for these items in Experiment 1 than in Experiment 2. Successfully excluded items elicited the ERP signature for recollection—theleft parietal old/new effect—in Experiment 2 only. These findings indicate that the subjects adopted different retrieval strategies in the two experiments. It is suggested that they made more use of source information about to-be-excluded items in the second experiment than in the first.     

Implementation intentions and imagery: individual and combined effects on prospective memory among young adults

Prospective memory (PM) has been found to benefit from implementation intentions (i.e., “when I see X, I will do Y”). However, to date, it is unclear whether implementation intentions must incorporate imagery in order to produce a positive effect on PM, or whether the verbal statement alone is sufficient. It is also equivocal whether the use of visual imagery alone improves PM, absent an intentional statement. The present study investigated the individual influences of implementation intentions and imagery, as well as their combined effect, on PM. A total of 64 undergraduates were placed into one of four instructional conditions—read-only, implementation intention, imagery, or combined—and were then tested on a laboratory PM task. The results revealed that participants in the implementation intention, imagery, and combined groups completed significantly more PM tasks than did participants in the read-only group, but they did not differ from one another. Combining implementation intentions and imagery, however, did not improve PM performance over either strategy alone. Additionally, the implementation intention and imagery groups outperformed the read-only group on a secondary ongoing digit detection task. The results of this study suggest that implementation intentions do not require imagery to be effective in improving PM, and that imagery alone has positive effects on PM. Finally, the results of the ongoing digit detection task suggest that the use of implementation intentions and imagery might provide for automatic identification and processing of environmental cues.     

When Experts Argue: Explaining the Best and the Worst of Reasoning

Expert reasoning is responsible for some of the most stunning human achievements, but also for some of the most disastrous decisions ever made. The argumentative theory of reasoning has proven very effective at explaining the pattern of reasoning’s successes and failures. In the present article, it is expanded to account for expert reasoning. The argumentative theory predicts that reasoning should display a strong confirmation bias. If argument quality is not sufficiently high in a domain, the confirmation bias will make experts tap into their vast knowledge to defend whatever opinion they hold, with polarization and overconfidence as expected results. By contrast, experts should benefit even more from the power of group discussion to make the best of the confirmation bias—when they genuinely disagree that is, otherwise polarization is again likely to ensue. When experts interact with laymen other mechanisms can take the lead, in particular trust calibration and consistency checking. They can yield poor outcomes if experts do not have a sustained interaction with laymen, or if the laymen have strong opinions when they witness a debate between experts. Seeing reasoning as a mechanism of epistemic vigilance aimed at finding and evaluating arguments helps make better sense of expert reasoning performance, be it in individual ratiocination, in debates with other experts, or in interactions with laymen.     

Reasoning about the future: Doom and Beauty

According to the Doomsday Argument we have to rethink the probabilities we assign to a soon or not so soon extinction of mankind when we realize that we are living now, rather early in the history of mankind. Sleeping Beauty finds herself in a similar predicament: on learning the date of her first awakening, she is asked to re-evaluate the probabilities of her two possible future scenarios. In connection with Doom, I argue that it is wrong to assume that our ordinary probability judgements do not already reflect our place in history: we justify the predictive use we make of the probabilities yielded by science (or other sources of information) by our knowledge of the fact that we live now, a certain time before the possible occurrence of the events the probabilities refer to. Our degrees of belief should change drastically when we forget the date—importantly, this follows without invoking the “Self Indication Assumption”. Subsequent conditionalization on information about which year it is cancels this probability shift again. The Doomsday Argument is about such probability shifts, but tells us nothing about the concrete values of the probabilities—for these, experience provides the only basis. Essentially the same analysis applies to the Sleeping Beauty problem. I argue that Sleeping Beauty “thirders” should be committed to thinking that the Doomsday Argument is ineffective; whereas “halfers” should agree that doom is imminent—but they are wrong.     

Feedforward, -backward,and neutral transparency measures for Grade 1 and Grade 2 Greek readers

In the present study, orthographic metrics for Greek children’s Grade 1 and Grade 2 reading materials were presented. Data for five transparency metrics—three of which being neither feedforward nor feedbackward— were presented and offered for use in the research of children’s reading and spelling acquisition. The analysis demonstrated the complex relationships between metrics and compared the results with those obtained for the English language. The structure of these metrics from a variety of corpus sizes was investigated, and we concluded that large corpus sizes do not necessarily make a substantial contribution to the value of such metrics when compared with smaller samples.     

The Paranoia of Everyday Life: Some Personal,Psychological, and Pastoral Thoughts

Freud, early in his writings, makes the argument that paranoia results from the repression of distressing memories, paralleling hysteria and obsessional neurosis. The difference, however, is that paranoia makes use of a special psychic mechanism—projection—whereas hysteria makes use of conversion into somatic innervations and obsessional neurosis makes use of substitution or displacement. Drawing on recent research in paranoia, which suggests that feelings of paranoia are quite common among non-clinical populations, perhaps even as common as feelings of anxiety and depression in non-clinical populations, I suggest that paranoia “in everyday life”—that is, paranoia among non-clinical or so-called “normal” populations—results from the suppression (rather than the repression) of distressing thoughts (rather than memories). The mechanism of projection is still at work, but because paranoia in everyday life results from suppression rather than repression, it is much less severe but also much more common. I have followed the logic of Freud’s writings and I have used the method of introspection to come to this conclusion. I argue that pastors and other such persons would do well in knowing something about paranoia so that (1) they can deal more compassionately with those struggling with paranoia and so that (2) they can deal more compassionately with themselves, since it is likely, I believe, that many pastors often struggle with feelings of paranoia. I note several strategies for coping with paranoia as I deal with religious and psychological aspects of paranoia.     

Relativism about Reasons

Historians must be sensitive to the alienness of the past. Insofar as they are concerned with their actors’ reasoning, they must (through open-minded empirical investigation) find out how their actors thought, and not assume that they thought like us. This is familiar historiographical advice, but pushed too far it can be brought to conflict with rather weak assumptions about what historians must presuppose if they are to interpret their actors at all. The present paper sketches those assumptions, and argues that the influential ‘Strong Program’ in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK) falls foul of them. We do not argue from the correctness of the assumptions to the falsity of SSK. Rather, we note the incompatibility, and then show how SSK theorists’ tendency to take interpretation for granted blinds them—and perhaps their readers—to the existence of the conflict.

Perceiving a strong causal relation in a weak contingency: Further investigation of the evidential evaluation model of causal judgement

Contingency information is information about the occurrence or nonoccurrence of a certain effect in the presence or absence of a candidate cause. An objective measure of contingency is the δP rule, which involves subtracting the probability of occurrence of an effect when a causal candidate is absent from the probability of occurrence of the effect when the candidate is present. Causal judgements conform closely to δP but deviate from it under certain circumstances. Three experiments show that such deviations can be predicted by a model of causal judgement that has two components: a rule of evidence, that causal judgement is a function of the proportion of relevant instances that are judged to be confirmatory for the causal candidate, and a tendency for information about instances in which the candidate is present to have greater effect on judgement than instances in which the candidate is absent. Two experiments demonstrate how this model accounts for some recently published findings. A third experiment shows that it is possible to use the model to predict the occurrence of high causal judgements when the objective contingency is close to zero.     

The epistemological challenge to metanormative realism: how best to understand it,and how to cope with it

Metaethical—or, more generally, metanormative—realism faces a serious epistemological challenge. Realists owe us—very roughly speaking—an account of how it is that we can have epistemic access to the normative truths about which they are realists. This much is, it seems, uncontroversial among metaethicists, myself included. But this is as far as the agreement goes, for it is not clear—nor uncontroversial—how best to understand the challenge, what the best realist way of coping with it is, and how successful this attempt is. In this paper I try, first, to present the challenge in its strongest version, and second, to show how realists—indeed, robust realists—can cope with it. The strongest version of the challenge is, I argue, that of explaining the correlation between our normative beliefs and the independent normative truths. And I suggest an evolutionary explanation (of a pre-established harmony kind) as a way of solving it.     

Exploring the Promise of Eudaimonic Well-Being Within the Practice of Health Promotion: The “How” is as Important as the “What”

A brief historical and philosophical analysis suggests that the biomedical model and prevention have been the pillars of health promotion practices with the underlying assumption that these concepts provide answers to people’s health woes. Another observation resulting from this analysis is that biomedical, prevention, and more recently, wellness, do not differ much from each other paradigmatically (e.g., instrumental rationality) and, hence, are severely restricted in their short- and long-term effectiveness for helping people with healthy living and quality of life. It is proposed that eudaimonic well-being—if explored, understood, and implemented in a manner that holds true to the purity of the concept—offers significant promise for shifts in health promotion practices that may lead to transformative health experiences and enhanced quality of life.     

Can Persistence be a Matter of Convention?

This paper asks whether persistence can be a matter of convention. It argues that in a rather unexciting de dicto sense persistence is indeed a matter of convention, but it rejects the notion that persistence can be a matter of convention in a more substantial de re sense. However, scenarios can be imagined that appear to involve conventional persistence of the latter kind. Since there are strong reasons for thinking that such conventionality is impossible, it is desirable that our metaphysical-cum-semantic theories of persistence be able to account for such scenarios in terms of conventions of the first kind. Later parts of the article therefore investigate whether three of the currently most influential metaphysical-cum-semantic theories of persistence—the endurance theory, the stage theory, and the perdurance theory—can do this. Fortunately, for them, it turns out that all can, though some philosophers have disputed this. However, when we ask how they account for a typical case of “conventional persistence” some problematic features of the theories—having to do with reference, persistence conditions, how they relate, and the epistemology of persistence—are revealed.     

Causal Learning: Association Versus Computation

Causal learning enables humans and other animals not only to predict important events or outcomes, but also to control their occurrence in the service of needs and desires. Computational theories assume that causal judgments are based on an estimate of the contingency between a causal cue and an outcome. However, human causal learning exhibits many of the characteristics of the associative learning processes thought to underlie animal conditioning. One problem for associative theory arises from the finding that judgments of the causal power of a cue can be revalued retrospectively after learning episodes when that cue is not present. However, if retrieved representations of cues can support learning, retrospective revaluation is anticipated by modified versions of standard associative theories.     

Nothingness and the Human Umwelt

In the paper I argue that the great impact of empiricism on psychology and the enclosed dualist agenda traps psychological phenomena into subjectivism. By discussing the phenomena of nothingness in biological and cultural life it is argued that meaning must be considered as a phenomenon that represents both a fit and a misfit of the individual with the environment. By stressing the overall presence of nothingness phenomena it is argued how the reduced ontology of empiricism—and its blindness to relations and transformations out of which meaning grows—should be overcome. In human cultural life, transformations are constitutive and ongoing changes are being produced to make sure that continuity as well as discontinuity will happen. The analysis of especially one case—the removal of an Amish school after a shooting episode—serves to prove how meaning grows out of cultural processes as people produce their own conditions of life. From a cultural-ecological point of view, analyzing meaning at the level of individual phenomenology, hence, means analyzing the ‘total psychological situation’ (legacy of Kurt Lewin). This may for instance include analyzing how people live, what they consider important and worth preserving, what must be changed, what are their core values and how do institutional arrangements contribute to keeping up that which is valued or to changing that which is not, etc. Meaning may be viewed the lived-out experience—the domain of self-generativity in human life.     

The contingency argument—A reply

Conclusion Brian Medlin has excluded the possibility of something being self-explanatory in anything but a logical sense. Hence any non-logical necessity has always to be in terms of something other than the explicand. In this context, the principle of sufficient reason cannot escape contraction to a form so patently useless that no proponent of the contingency argument would want to employ it. Many of the objections in Section 4 have point, however, only against an argument which uses such an unacceptable form of the principle. The objections in Section 5 are directed against an argument framed in the only other way allowable under Medlin’s dichotomy, but which is of no use to the theist, for the simple-reason that its conclusion is not existential in the required (present actuality) sense. Objections against such an argument would concern the theist only if their validity were so wide as to embrace a truly existential argument as well. As we have-seen it is in just that case that they break down. In neither Section 4 nor 5, therefore, does the article come to grips with the contingency argument. The objections leave it untouched, because neither of Medlin’s notions of contingency and necessity corresponds to that which is operative in the argument.