WILLIAM JAMES ON REASONING

James looked for general principles in terms of which reasoning could be understood, and, in doing so, he sought to understand what it was about human beings that made them human.     

WILLIAM JAMES AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF EMOTION

The theory of emotion was a centerpiece of William James' Principles of Psychology. It introduced the notion that complex phenomena, such as the experience of emotion, could be derived (constructed) from a combination of more basic processes or behaviors. Despite their shortcomings, James' views on emotion shaped research on emotion for the succeeding century, and laid the groundwork for constructivist approaches in psychological theory.     

WILLIAM JAMES AND HYPNOSIS: A Centennial Reflection

Like many other early psychologists, William James was fascinated by hypnosis and related phenomena. For James, hypnosis was both an experimental technique for creating divisions of consciousness, and a laboratory model of naturally occurring disorders of awareness. James' treatment of consciousness in hypnosis presages contemporary interests in dissociation and implicit cognition, and underscores the role of the self in conscious mental life. At the same time. James recognized the complexity of hypnosis as an interpersonal process. In the end. James' views suggest how a rapprochement between the cognitive and social approaches to hypnosis might be achieved.     

INQUIRY, CONVERSATION AND THEISTIC BELIEF: WILLIAM JAMES AND RICHARD RORTY GET RELIGION

This essay examines William James' view that pragmatic philosophy allows for theistic belief and compares it to Richard Rorty's argument that theistic belief is fundamentally incompatible with pragmatic philosophy. Theism is permissible for James because it is commensurate with his view of philosophy as inquiry . Theism is impermissible for Rorty because it incommensurate with his view of philosophy as conversation . James' arguments are shown to be too generic in their conception of the God in whom theistic belief may be placed, and Rorty's arguments against the desirability of theistic belief are shown to run afoul of his own philosophical program.     

LOCKE ON THE SEMANTIC AND EPISTEMIC ROLE OF SIMPLE IDEAS OF SENSATION

Abstract: This paper argues that Locke has a representative theory of sensitive knowledge. Perceivers are immediately aware of nothing but sensory ideas in the mind; yet perceivers think of real external substances that correspond to and cause those ideas, and they are warranted in believing that those substances exist (at that time). The theory poses two questions: what warrants the truth of such beliefs? What is it in virtue of which sensory ideas represent external objects and how do they make perceivers think of those objects? Both the epistemic and semantic issues need to be addressed. This paper urges that Locke's basic account of warrant is roughly reliabilist. The causal origin of sensory ideas assures that, in general, sense based beliefs are true. Locke defines the limit of this warrant by the theoretical point that we cannot discuss skeptical doubt without assuming the truthfulness of our perceptual faculty. Turning to the semantic question, the paper argues that ideas are mental modifications or entities. They are not intrinsically representative (satisfiable), but rather represent only by virtue of their causal origin. They merely “track” the presence of substances and their qualities. Ideas nevertheless prompt perceivers to think of their causes. This is roughly because sensory ideas have a specific mental role, namely, to serve as marks for distinguishing substances and their respective qualities for purposes of action. The paper suggests that, for Locke, the challenge posed by the semantic veil of ideas is to explain this externally directed marking function within bounds of his anti‐innatism. But it concludes that his answers to the twin questions fit together reasonably well.     

LOCKE ON IDEAS OF SUBSTANCE AND THE VEIL OF PERCEPTION

Abstract: John Yolton has argued that Locke held a direct realist position according to which sensory ideas are not perceived intermediaries, as on the representational realist position, but acts that take material substances as objects. This paper argues that were Locke to accept the position Yolton attributes to him he could not at once account for appearance‐reality discrepancies and maintain one of his most important anti‐nativist arguments. The paper goes on to offer an interpretation of Locke's distinction between ideas of substances and modes, a distinction that helps Locke to explain appearance‐reality discrepancies, although not in a large enough range of cases to strengthen Yolton's interpretation.     

VALUE AND SIZE PERCEPTION

A detailed review is presented of studies related to the accentuation hypothesis of Bruner & Goodman (1947). It is found that the results from (1) coin studies, (2) symbol studies, and (3) other studies are conflicting and do not substantiate the hypothesis. Through an analysis of this hypothesis and a specification of the concept of perception, the various designs are found to be inadequate for demonstrating perceptual accentuation of size. The hypothesis is forwarded that value asserts an influence upon imaginary processes related to the experience of size.     

THOMAS REID ON ACQUIRED PERCEPTION

Thomas Reid's distinction between original and acquired perception is not merely metaphysical; it has psychological and phenomenological stories to tell. Psychologically, acquired perception provides increased sensitivity to features in the environment. Phenomenologically, Reid's theory resists the notion that original perception is exhaustive of perceptual experience. James Van Cleve has argued that most cases of acquired perception do not count as perception and so do not pose a threat to Reid's direct realism. I argue that acquired perception is genuine perception and as direct as original perception. Perception is grounded in a productive and developing relationship between the mind and world.     

ON PERCEPTION OF DEPICTED ORIENTATION

La perception de l'orientation picturale. — Les deux expériences décrites ici indiquent qu'en matière de perception picturale, les individus de certaines cultures, outre celles qui sont relatives à la perception de la profondeur, rencontrent des difficultés pour percevoir correctement l'orientation. La grandeur des erreurs relativement à l'interprétation de l'orientation dans les dessins semble dépendre de l'angle sous lequel l'ensemble des stimulus est représenté, la position des sujets relativement à l'appareil et la signification implicite de l'ensemble représenté.