WILLIAM JAMES AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF EMOTION

The theory of emotion was a centerpiece of William James' Principles of Psychology. It introduced the notion that complex phenomena, such as the experience of emotion, could be derived (constructed) from a combination of more basic processes or behaviors. Despite their shortcomings, James' views on emotion shaped research on emotion for the succeeding century, and laid the groundwork for constructivist approaches in psychological theory.     

A SEARCH FOR PRINCIPLES IN PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY

Principles of Psychology was published as an introductory textbook, with the contemporary virtue of having chapters that "can he assigned in any order." It is a compendium of speculation, with very few connecting threads to tie materials together. This article reports one psychologist's travels through thex Principles, in search of latent organizing structure, using as a guidebook the methodological and substantive content of two recent articles (Kimble. 1989. 1990a). The journey had its low and high points: The methodology encountered was hardly worth the trip. The exciting moments were the views of correspondences between James' insights and what we know today.     

Natural Realism or Transactionalism: On the Relationships between Putnam and Two Pragmatists,James and Dewey

The relationships between Hilary Putnam and the pragmatists (especially William James and John Dewey) are obvious but subtle.To shed some light on this issue,the author will explore a key issue that not only stands as Putnam's main inheritance from the pragmatists,but that also illuminates the relationships between them more clearly than any other issues.This key issue is the understanding of perception and the philosophical position that arises from this understanding.The author argues that in adopting Dewey's transactionalism (or interactionalism),Putnam advances from James' insight to Dewey's,a shift that is particularly manifest in Putnam's attempt to add another layer of meaning to what he refers to as the second na(i)veté that he detects and appreciates in James' natural realism.     

ON SPLITTING THE UNIVERSE

Although many aspects of James' theorizing about the self have been enormously influential, his notion of the self as the central object in mental life has been largely ignored. He believed that the fundamental psychological processes–attention, perception, emotion, conception, reasoning, will, consciousness–could not be understood without an appreciation of the nature and functioning of the self The value of reclaiming this idea is discussed.     

詹姆斯心理学的现象学阐释

必须从詹姆斯的人格和他的思想作为整体及其统一性的背景出发,才能有效地理解詹姆斯心理学的真髓。詹姆斯思想的内核是彻底经验主义。他以彻底经验主义为基础的心理学思考,与胡塞尔的现象学思考作为思想态度是同质的,因而表现出明确的现象学特征。文章指出了对詹姆斯心理学进行现象学阐释的根据,并结合心理学史探讨了詹姆斯的思想方法对心理学作为整体而言的理论意义。     

Methodological concerns in the psychology of religion: Continuities, losses and transforming perspectives

This article seeks solutions to what has recently been called the ‘crisis’ in the psychology of religion by returning to the programs of its founding fathers. It explores some of the methodological debates that followed the translation of William James' The Varieties of Religious Experience into German. More was at stake than the commonly drawn distinction between empirical and hermeneutical approaches to religion, or between quantitative and qualitative methods. What was at stake was the need for another kind of psychology in general. This article pays special attention to Wilhelm Wundt's fundamental criticism of James and of others in the psychology of religion. Despite the problems inherent in both James' and Wundt's aborted general psychology programs, each nonetheless contains approaches that may yet serve as an impetus to contemporary research on religion. Contemporary developments in cultural psychology in particular complement current research in the psychology of religion.     

INQUIRY, CONVERSATION AND THEISTIC BELIEF: WILLIAM JAMES AND RICHARD RORTY GET RELIGION

This essay examines William James' view that pragmatic philosophy allows for theistic belief and compares it to Richard Rorty's argument that theistic belief is fundamentally incompatible with pragmatic philosophy. Theism is permissible for James because it is commensurate with his view of philosophy as inquiry . Theism is impermissible for Rorty because it incommensurate with his view of philosophy as conversation . James' arguments are shown to be too generic in their conception of the God in whom theistic belief may be placed, and Rorty's arguments against the desirability of theistic belief are shown to run afoul of his own philosophical program.     

A short history of ideo-motor action

The ideo-motor theory, which is currently receiving heightened interest in cognitive psychology, looks back on a long history. Essentially two historical roots can be presented. A British one, initiated by Laycock (1845) and Carpenter (1852), which was developed in order to explain ideo-motor phenomena by means of cerebral reflex actions. A second and older root is the German one by Herbart (1816, 1825), Lotze (1852), and Harless (1861), which considered the ideo-motor principle a fundamental mechanism of all intentional human behaviour. Both roots converged in James' (1890) Principles of Psychology before they fell into oblivion due to the dominance of behaviorism in the first half of the 20th century. The few empirical ideo-motor studies of the early 20th century are briefly described. Finally, similarities and differences in the history of the ideo-motor theory are delineated and a perspective is given covering research questions that could be examined in the future.     

Shadworth Hodgson and William James's formulation of space perception: Phenomenology and perceptual realism

This paper has two related goals. First, it seeks to show that the theory of perception found in William James's Principles of Psychology is thoroughly consistent if it is approached through the framework of perceptual realism versus constructionism rather than the nativism versus empiricism debate. As such, this paper offers an alternative to Nicholas Pastore's claim that there are two contradictory theories of perception in the Principles. James's commitment to perceptual realism is articulated within the contexts of his (1) critique of constructionist perception theories, (2) notion of the spatial quale, and (3) formulation of the role of knowledge in adult perception. The second goal of this paper deals with the historical development of James's perceptual realism. Here it is argued that Shadworth Hodgson's method of reflection–an anticipation of Husserl's phenomenological reduction–served as the basis of James's commitment to perceptual realism.     

What really separates casuistry from principlism in biomedical ethics

Since the publication of the first edition of Tom Beauchamp and James Childress’s Principles of Biomedical Ethics there has been much debate about what a proper method in medical ethics should look like. The main rival for Beauchamp and Childress’s account, principlism, has consistently been casuistry, an account that recommends argument by analogy from paradigm cases. Admirably, Beauchamp and Childress have modified their own view in successive editions of Principles of Biomedical Ethics in order to address the concerns proponents of casuistry and others have had about principlism. Given these adjustments to their view, some have claimed that principlism and casuistry no longer count as distinct methods. Even so, many still consider these two conceptions of bioethical methodologies as rivals. Both accounts of the relationship between casuistry and principlism are wrong. These two conceptions of methodology in biomedical ethics are significantly different, but the differences are not the ones pointed out by those who still claim that they are distinct positions. In this article, I explain where the real similarities and differences lie between these two views.     

The significance of William James' ideas for modern psychotherapy

The functional psychology first developed by William James in 1890 exerts a strong but unrecognized influence on the thinking of most modern psychotherapists. Indeed, in many ways, clinical functionalism is the hidden philosophy which holds together the mainstream of eclectic psychotherapy. This article considers the general impact of James' point of view on modern psychotherapy and the specific relevance of James' ideas about emotions and consciousness.     

The analysis of drivers’ hazard detecting ability using Empathizing–Systemizing model

Since there are drivers who repeatedly have accidents, this research postulated that the lack of hazard perception which is a primary cause of accidents might be determined by individual differences in cognitive traits. The Empathizing–Systemizing (E–S) model was used for the cognitive traits, with Empathizing expected to correspond to ability at hazard perception and fewer accidents and/or incidents (near-accidents). On the other hand, Systemizing was not expected to contribute to them. A web questionnaire was conducted to collect data of accidents and incidents experienced during ordinary driving, and this was analyzed. The results showed that drivers with higher Empathy Quotient (EQ) experienced fewer accidents and incidents. The Systemizing Quotient (SQ) had no significant effect on these experiences. However, the experience of incidents by drivers with high Systemizing Quotient increased when their Empathy Quotient was low. Based on these results, it was suggested that drivers who have a stronger Empathizing function may have a stronger ability at hazard perception. On the other hand, the Systemizing function may weaken hazard perception ability when Empathizing is weak, although it does not have an independent effect.     

WILLIAM JAMES AND HYPNOSIS: A Centennial Reflection

Like many other early psychologists, William James was fascinated by hypnosis and related phenomena. For James, hypnosis was both an experimental technique for creating divisions of consciousness, and a laboratory model of naturally occurring disorders of awareness. James' treatment of consciousness in hypnosis presages contemporary interests in dissociation and implicit cognition, and underscores the role of the self in conscious mental life. At the same time. James recognized the complexity of hypnosis as an interpersonal process. In the end. James' views suggest how a rapprochement between the cognitive and social approaches to hypnosis might be achieved.     

Principlism and its alleged competitors.

Principles that provide general normative frameworks in bioethics have been criticized since the late 1980s, when several different methods and types of moral philosophy began to be proposed as alternatives or substitutes. Several accounts have emerged in recent years, including: (1) Impartial Rule Theory (supported in this issue by K. Danner Clouser), (2) Casuistry (supported in this issue by Albert Jonsen), and (3) Virtue Ethics (supported in this issue by Edmund D. Pellegrino). Although often presented as rival methods or theories, these approaches are consistent with and should not be considered adversaries of a principle-based account.     

A constructivist model of infant cognition

We propose six Information-Processing Principles (IPPs) that together describe a constructive, hierarchical system by which infants come to understand objects and events in the world around them. We then demonstrate the applicability of these principles to four specific domains of infant perception and/or cognition, (i.e., form perception, object unity, complex pattern perception, and understanding of causal events). In each case empirical developmental changes appear to be consistent with the IPPs. We then present the Constructivist Learning Architecture, a computational model of infant cognitive development. This model is based on the IPPs, and uses self-organizing, neurally based techniques from Kohonen (1997) and Hebb (1949). We then apply the model to the complex domain of infant understanding of causal events, and replicate many of the developmental changes found empirically. Finally, we discuss the applicability of this constructivist approach to infant cognitive development in general.     

Visual attention modulates audiovisual speech perception

Speech perception is audiovisual, as demonstrated by the McGurk effect in which discrepant visual speech alters the auditory speech percept. We studied the role of visual attention in audiovisual speech perception by measuring the McGurk effect in two conditions. In the baseline condition, attention was focused on the talking face. In the distracted attention condition, subjects ignored the face and attended to a visual distractor, which was a leaf moving across the face. The McGurk effect was weaker in the latter condition, indicating that visual attention modulated audiovisual speech perception. This modulation may occur at an early, unisensory processing stage, or it may be due to changes at the stage where auditory and visual information is integrated. We investigated this issue by conventional statistical testing, and by fitting the Fuzzy Logical Model of Perception (Massaro, 1998) to the results. The two methods suggested different interpretations, revealing a paradox in the current methods of analysis.     

Fear detection and visual awareness in perceiving bodily expressions

Many research reports have concluded that emotional information can be processed without observers being aware of it. The case for perception without awareness has almost always been made with the use of facial expressions. In view of the similarities between facial and bodily expressions for rapid perception and communication of emotional signals, we conjectured that perception of bodily expressions may also not necessarily require visual awareness. Our study investigates the role of visual awareness in the perception of bodily expressions using a backward masking technique in combination with confidence ratings on a trial-by-trial basis. Participants had to detect in three separate experiments masked fearful, angry and happy bodily expressions among masked neutral bodily actions as distractors and subsequently the participants had to indicate their confidence. The onset between target and mask (Stimulus Onset Asynchrony, SOA) varied from -50 to +133 ms. Sensitivity measurements (d-prime) as well as the confidence of the participants showed that the bodies could be detected reliably in all SOA conditions. In an important finding, a lack of covariance was observed between the objective and subjective measurements when the participants had to detect fearful bodily expressions, yet this was not the case when participants had to detect happy or angry bodily expressions.     

Functional consequences of perceiving facial expressions of emotion without awareness

A substantial body of research has established that even when we are not consciously aware of the faces of others we are nevertheless sensitive to, and impacted by their facial expression. In this paper, we consider this body of research from a new perspective by examining the functions of unconscious perception revealed by these studies. A consideration of the literature from this perspective highlights that existing research methods are limited when it comes to revealing possible functions of unconscious perception. The critical shortcoming is that in all of the methods, the perceived facial expression remains outside of awareness. This is a problem because there are good reasons to believe that one important function of unconsciously perceived negative faces is to attract attention so that they are consciously perceived; such conscious perception, however, is never allowed with existing methodologies. We discuss recent studies of emotional face perception under conditions of visual search that address this issue directly. Further, we suggest that methodologies that do not examine cognitive processes as they occur in more natural settings may result in fundamental misunderstandings of human cognition.     

Going with your gut: How William James' theory of emotions brings insights to risk perception and decision making research

The basic premise of William James' theory of emotions – that bodily changes lead to emotional feelings – ignited debate about the relative importance of bodily processes and cognitive appraisals in determining emotions. Similarly, theories of risk perception have been expanding to include emotional and physiological processes along with cognitive processes. Taking a closer look at The Principles of Psychology, this article examines how James' propositions support and extend current research on risk perception and decision making. Specifically, James (1) described emotional feelings and their related cognitions in ways similar to current dual processing models; (2) defended the proposition that emotions and their expressions serve useful and adaptive functions; (3) suggested that anticipating an emotion can trigger that emotion due to associations learned from past experiences; and (4) highlighted individual differences in emotional experiences that map on well with individual differences in risk-related decision making.