Hegel after Nancy: Sensibility,Singularity, and the Problem of the … x

This article takes up two models of punishment in Hegel, one that is underdeveloped in the Phenomenology of Spirit and one more fully developed in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Both models focus on the notions of law and the legality of personhood. I argue that beyond this, they share a common concept of singularity as an excess over and above the ethical-political order. This concept opens up to what Jean-Luc Nancy calls the “event” of freedom in Hegel. This point about excess lets me deploy Lacan and then Nancy to underscore how, for Hegel, problems concerning the question “what is law?” might be a clue as to how the bad infinite is opposed to the good or “actual” infinite. I take this up in the context of Hegel’s theory of “value,” including the value of the “good.” Altogether this analysis reveals that Hegel’s method allows for a more complex humanism than is typically understood, since his points about law and punishment lead to a more radicalized notion of intentionality and forgiveness than usually derived from the logic of recognition.     

The “Gongfu Finger” and Learning in the Analects

After having discussed three main features of Ni Peimin’s understanding of the gongfu orientation in reading the Analects, this essay examines the first of the key terms in the whole of the book, i.e., xue/”learning” (學) and critically elaborates how our understanding of Confucius could be deepened and enriched under the guidance of this new orientation which Ni calls the “gongfu finger.”     

The Meaning of Xing 形and Moral Transformation in Wuxing

The popular reading of xing yu nei 形於內 (being actualized from the internal) in Wuxing creates a predicament in the understanding of “xing 行 (behaviors)” which is not xing yu nei. As stated in Wuxing and other early Confucian texts, including The Doctrine of the Mean, The Great Learning, the Mencius and Xunzi, xing 形 is a process involving multidimensional content including not only deliberated decisions and actions, but also attitudes, facial expressions, and even the charisma that possesses power to transform the world. Xing 形 always operates in an effortless natural style, rather than under cognitive control. Xing yu nei signifies that virtues are possessed to a perfectly deep degree. Therefore, “not xing yu nei” does not mean that “behaviors” are forced by external pressure and thus hypocritical, but rather that although they also originate from internal virtues, the virtues in this case are not deep enough to enable multidimensional and natural manifestations. Xing 行, representing the way of the “human,” is the approach to and is on a continuum with “de zhi xing 德之行 (the behavior of Virtue),” which matches the way of Heaven. Shendu 慎 獨requires paying close attention to and regulating the intentions and emotions emerging at the heart/mind, which is the fundamental work when making the effort of “xing” towards “de zhi xing.”     

The Chinese Understanding of Wittgenstein’s Mysticism in the Tractatus

Wittgenstein’s mysticism has been one of the focuses of critics and commentators of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Two prevailing readings hold different attitudes towards it. The classical reading commits to the mysticism in the Tractatus, while the therapeutic reading rejects it amid its interpretation of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. In this paper, I will argue against both by discussing how the Chinese reading understands the Tractatus. I will show that the ineffable in the Tractatus is not any type of mysticism, and that the Chinese reading of the Tractatus is a metaphysical one without any mysticism.     

Motivation to Act in Confucianism and Christianity: In Matteo Ricci’s The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven (Tianzhu Shiyi 天主實義)

The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven (Tianzhu Shiyi 天主實義) is a Chinese text of the 17th century written by the Italian sinologist and missionary Matteo Ricci. It contains, among other topics, a discussion between a Confucian scholar and a Christian about the motivation to act. For Confucianism a good action should be performed for its own sake, without any thought of future reward. For Christianity it seems that good actions are performed in order to go to Heaven. Ricci argues that human actions are complex. The ultimate motivation for goodness comes from a relation with God. The Confucian scholar claims that actually not all actions need a motive. Sometimes things “just happen.” Also, a good tradition can move people to behave properly. Dealing with topics such as soul, eternal life, causes, descendants, tradition, happiness and proper behavior, this dialogue offers a great insight of the meeting of two great traditions: Confucianism and Christianity.     

Book Review of Health and the Construction of the Individual. J. Ogden. London: Routledge, 2002. i–viii + 130 pages ISBN 0415233070

Abstract

Recent theoretical and empirical research has challenged the assumption of health psychologists employing social cognitive models that beliefs can confidently be inferred on the basis of questionnaire responses. It is charged that responses to questionnaires are a function of the intelligibility of the items, constructs and theoretical framework to survey participants. To investigate this contention, cognitions specified by Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) were measured with respect to intentions to use a condom and intentions to use dental floss. Three alternative formats of a questionnaire which varied the order of presentation of PMT items were distributed to student samples. Analyses showed that while questionnaire format did not affect the reliability of cognition measures, there was some variation in the significance and strength of correlations between PMT cognitions across formats. Individual differences in social desirability and salience of the target behaviour had small and predictable effects upon reliabilities and intercorrelations. Implications for the measurement of health beliefs and the status of questionnaire responses are outlined and suggestions are made for controlling bias associated with respondents' capacity to “read” a questionnaire.     

Xiong Shili on the Nature,the Mind and the Origin of Badness as Evidenced in Ming Xin Pian 明心篇 (Explaining the Mind )

The question of the origin of badness is a core problematic in New Confucian philosopher Xiong Shili’s 熊十力 (1885–1968) Ming Xin Pian明心篇 (Explaining the Mind; 1959), a work representative of his thought towards the end of his life. In this essay, I examine how Xiong uses the concepts of the nature (xing 性) and the mind (xin 心) to explain the origin of moral badness. Xiong asserts that the Buddhists never concerned themselves with the problem of the origin of ignorance and delusion, afflictions that in turn lead to suffering and wrongdoing. Xiong sets out to redress what he claims the Buddhists had failed to do. I argue that the conceptual structure of both Xiong Shili’s and Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 (1130–1200) theoretical approaches to this problem are isomorphic. The isomorphism is significant because it suggests that Xiong consciously drew on Zhu Xi and/or the Buddhist models that Zhu in turn drew on. I provide evidence to show that even as late as 1959, and despite his increasingly entrenched criticisms of Buddhism, Xiong continued to draw on key concepts and models drawn from Buddhist philosophy of mind.     

‘Allah has spoken to us: we must keep silent.’ In the folds of secrecy,the Holy Book of the Druze

This article explores the cultural dynamics of bond and separateness created around the Book of Wisdom (kitâb ?l-?ikma), the Druze Holy Book. The Text, unrevealable to Druze non-believers or foreigners, is shrouded in a collective pact to ‘keep quiet’. I assert that this alliance aims to protect Druze intimacy rather than highlight their separateness from others. It is rooted in the Druze premise that meaning is both corporeal and feminine, that it pertains to an ineffable interiority. I thereby distance myself from anthropological analyses that consider the so-called Druze secret around the Book as static content solely related to language.