Cognitive complexity and cognitive-affective integration: related or separate domains of adult development?

This study used a latent variable approach to describe two broad domains of adult development and their interrelations. One domain was cognitive complexity, defined by crystallized intelligence, fluid intelligence, and reflective cognition: the other domain was cognitive-affective integration, operationalized in terms of integrated and defensive coping. It was hypothesized that these 2 domains are related to each other and that they imply different developmental correlates. Structural relations among the latent variables supported a model in which integrated coping showed positive relations with crystallized intelligence and reflective cognition, whereas defensive coping showed negative relations to these cognitive factors. Age and education were significant predictors of the cognitive complexity factors, whereas evaluations of the climate in one's current family and family of origin were related to the factors of cognitive-affective integration.     

Cognitive Developmental Theory and Spiritual Development

Traditional conceptions of cognitive development have failed to account for changes in adult cognition as well as more subjective and intuitive features of human experience. This paper reviews recent theories and research in cognitive development and spirituality with the aim of providing connections between the two domains. Neo-Piagetian and postformal theories of cognitive development suggest that advances in cognition are domain-specific, dependent on individual experience, and can occur at any point in the lifespan. However, theories of spiritual development have not adequately addressed these points. Thus, a novel account of spiritual development is presented that addresses these features with respect to individuals' changing conceptions of their relation to an External Power.     

Intelligence and the rest of cognition

Cognitive psychologists have become enamored with intelligence. Increasingly, the theories, findings, and methods of what is known as the information processing approach are being used in attempts to explain intelligence related phenomena. This article examines intelligence from a different perspective, which emphasizes domain-specific constraints on knowledge structures. It is argued that conceptions of what intelligence is and how it relates to the rest of cognition can vary considerably when viewed from the vantage points of these two perspectives. The constraints approach views intelligence as being closely related to a special subset of all of our cognitive abilities and as having unique distinguishing properties. It is also argued that the evaluation of any cognitive ability as being intelligent depends crucially on a prior specification of the formal constraints on the domain or domains of knowledge from which that ability originates.     

Neuromodulation of behavioral and cognitive development across the life span

Among other mechanisms, behavioral and cognitive development entail, on the one hand, contextual scaffolding and, on the other hand, neuromodulation of adaptive neurocognitive representations across the life span. Key brain networks underlying cognition, emotion, and motivation are innervated by major transmitter systems (e.g., the catecholamines and acetylcholine). Thus, the maturation and senescence of neurotransmitter systems have direct implications for life span development. Recent progress in molecular genetics has opened new avenues for investigating neuromodulation of behavioral and cognitive development. This special section features 6 selected reviews of recent cognitive genetic evidence on the roles of dopamine and other transmitters in different domains of behavioral and cognitive development, ranging from temperament, executive control, and working memory to motivation and goal-directed behavior in different life periods.     

Everyday cognition: age and intellectual ability correlates

The primary aim of this study was to examine the relationship between a new battery of everyday cognition measures, which assessed 4 cognitive abilities within 3 familiar real-world domains, and traditional psychometric tests of the same basic cognitive abilities. Several theoreticians have argued that everyday cognition measures are somewhat distinct from traditional cognitive assessment approaches, and the authors investigated this assertion correlationally in the present study. The sample consisted of 174 community-dwelling older adults from the Detroit metropolitan area, who had an average age of 73 years. Major results of the study showed that (a) each everyday cognitive test was strongly correlated with the basic cognitive abilities; (b) several basic abilities, as well as measures of domain-specific knowledge, predicted everyday cognitive performance; and (c) everyday and basic measures were similarly related to age. The results suggest that everyday cognition is not unrelated to traditional measures, nor is it less sensitive to age-related differences.     

关于幼儿对损人行为的道德判断及有关情绪预期的初步研究

以幼儿易于理解的有关享用财物的小故事,对４、５、６岁儿童作个别随访,综合考察其已获得的道德知识和道德认知的特点,以及相关情绪预期的情况。结果表明：１．幼儿已经获得了有关社会道德的最初步的知识,并能运用这些日常概念水平的知识对行为作道德判断,其道德认知已出现关心他人利益的成分,自我中心主义不突出;２．幼儿假设自己作为损人者的情绪预期与对故事中损人者的情绪预期之间存在明显差异,道德认知与道德情感脱节的现象在前者未有明显表现,却在后者中显现出来。     

Neuropsychological functioning in early hydrocephalus: review from a developmental perspective.

Children with hydrocephalus have deficits in several neuropsychological domains. The most notable are motor, visuoperceptual, and visuomotor function. These deficits are multiply determined and depend on the etiology and severity of the hydrocephalus to a large extent. Corpus callosum abnormalities resulting from stretching of callosal fibers and other cortical white matter tracts are implicated as contributory to these deficits. Enlarged ventricles and associated compression of posterior cortical areas also correlate with cognitive impairment. Distinguishing which cognitive domain negatively impacts on the child's functioning and which domains influence behavior in isolation or in combination has been the subject of numerous studies. Developmentally, we know little about the emergence of neuropsychological functioning in children with hydrocephalus. Study of the effects of hydrocephalus at different stages of development is useful to clinicians and researchers interested in the impact of diffuse neurophysiological damage on cognition in the developing brain. The medical and neuropsychological literature have begun to inform about these effects. The core deficits in hydrocephalus have yet to be explicated and a focus on investigations that answer these questions is required. This review summarizes the current knowledge about neurocognitive sequelae of hydrocephalus.     

Neuropsychological Functioning in Early Hydrocephalus: Review From a Developmental Perspective

Children with hydrocephalus have deficits in several neuropsychological domains. The most notable are motor, visuoperceptual, and visuomotor function. These deficits are multiply determined and depend on the etiology and severity of the hydrocephalus to a large extent. Corpus callosum abnormalities resulting from stretching of callosal fibers and other cortical white matter tracts are implicated as contributory to these deficits. Enlarged ventricles and associated compression of posterior cortical areas also correlate with cognitive impairment. Distinguishing which cognitive domain negatively impacts on the child’s functioning and which domains influence behavior in isolation or in combination has been the subject of numerous studies. Developmentally, we know little about the emergence of neuropsychological functioning in children with hydrocephalus. Study of the effects of hydrocephalus at different stages of development is useful to clinicians and researchers interested in the impact of diffuse neurophysiological damage on cognition in the developing brain. The medical and neuropsychological literature have begun to inform about these effects. The core deficits in hydrocephalus have yet to be explicated and a focus on investigations that answer these questions is required. This review summarizes the current knowledge about neurocognitive sequelae of hydrocephalus.     

Scattered naive theories:: why the human mind is isomorphic to the internet web

This paper constitutes an attempt to derive the epistemological consequences of what is known in cognitive, developmental, and social psychology on the nature of naive theories. The process of cognitive development and knowledge acquisition is such that uncoordinated knowledge must result. There is no process active in long-term memory to harmonize inconsistent parts. Coordination takes place in working memory (WM), and cognitive psychology has long established its extreme exiguity. Units of explanation and domains of coherence are therefore small. This is, indeed, a limitation of our cognition, but it is tenable pragmatically. Naive theories, on any one issue, do not form, psychologically, cognitively, a natural kind. These theses about how our knowledge is acquired, organized, accessed, and used help to bring out how one should think about naive theories.     

Experience-dependent structural plasticity in the adult human brain

Contrary to assumptions that changes in brain networks are possible only during crucial periods of development, research in the past decade has supported the idea of a permanently plastic brain. Novel experience, altered afferent input due to environmental changes and learning new skills are now recognized as modulators of brain function and underlying neuroanatomic circuitry. Given findings in experiments with animals and the recent discovery of increases in gray and white matter in the adult human brain as a result of learning, the old concept of cognitive reserve, that is the ability to reinforce brain volume in crucial areas and thus provide a greater threshold for age-dependent deficits, has been reinforced. The challenge we face is to unravel the exact nature of the dynamic structural alterations and, ultimately, to be able to use this knowledge for disease management. Understanding normative changes in brain structure that occur as a result of environmental changes and demands is pivotal to understanding the characteristic ability of the brain to adapt.     

生成认知：理论基础与实践走向

生成认知是具身认知思潮中的一个新取向。它主张认知是通过身体活动“生成的” (enacted)。认知的起点不是一个怎样精确表征世界的信息加工问题, 而是行动者在情境中怎样利用知觉来指导自己的行动。认知不是通过精确的心理表征“恢复”世界, 而是通过知觉引导的行动“生成”或“造就”一个自己的世界。认知是具身的行动, 认知结构形成于经常和反复出现的感觉运动模式, 与身体构造和身体活动具有深刻连续性。梅洛·庞蒂的身体现象学对生成认知具有深刻影响。同时, 詹姆斯、杜威等人的实用主义哲学对于实践行动的强调也深刻影响了生成认知。这种认知观强调了“行动”对心智的意义, 引发许多争议, 也促进了心理学研究范式的转变。     

Action,the foundation for cognitive development

It is argued that action constitutes the foundation for cognitive development. Action is a principal component of all aspects of cognitive development including social understanding. It reflects the motives of the child, the problems to be solved, the goals to be attained, and the constraints and possibilities of the child’s body and sensory‐motor system. Actions are directed into the future and their control is based on knowledge of what is going to happen next. The child’s sensory‐motor system is especially designed to facilitate the extraction of this knowledge. In addition, the infant is endowed with motives that ensure that these innate predispositions are transformed into a system of knowledge for guiding actions. By acting on the world, infants develop their cognition.     

Core knowledge

Compex cognitive skills such as reading and calculation and complex cognitive achievements such as formal science and mathematics may depend on a set of building block systems that emerge early in human ontogeny and phylogeny. These core knowledge systems show characteristic limits of domain and task specificity: Each serves to represent a particular class of entities for a particular set of purposes. By combining representations from these systems, however, human cognition may achieve extraordinary flexibility. Studies of cognition in human infants and in nonhuman primates therefore may contribute to understanding unique features of human knowledge.     

How similar are fluid cognition and general intelligence? A developmental neuroscience perspective on fluid cognition as an aspect of human cognitive ability

This target article considers the relation of fluid cognitive functioning to general intelligence. A neurobiological model differentiating working memory/executive function cognitive processes of the prefrontal cortex from aspects of psychometrically defined general intelligence is presented. Work examining the rise in mean intelligence-test performance between normative cohorts, the neuropsychology and neuroscience of cognitive function in typically and atypically developing human populations, and stress, brain development, and corticolimbic connectivity in human and nonhuman animal models is reviewed and found to provide evidence of mechanisms through which early experience affects the development of an aspect of cognition closely related to, but distinct from, general intelligence. Particular emphasis is placed on the role of emotion in fluid cognition and on research indicating fluid cognitive deficits associated with early hippocampal pathology and with dysregulation of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis stress-response system. Findings are seen to be consistent with the idea of an independent fluid cognitive construct and to assist with the interpretation of findings from the study of early compensatory education for children facing psychosocial adversity and from behavior genetic research on intelligence. It is concluded that ongoing development of neurobiologically grounded measures of fluid cognitive skills appropriate for young children will play a key role in understanding early mental development and the adaptive success to which it is related, particularly for young children facing social and economic disadvantage. Specifically, in the evaluation of the efficacy of compensatory education efforts such as Head Start and the readiness for school of children from diverse backgrounds, it is important to distinguish fluid cognition from psychometrically defined general intelligence.     

Dissociable learning processes in comparative psychology

Comparative and cognitive psychologists interpret performance in different ways. Animal researchers invoke a dominant construct of associative learning. Human researchers acknowledge humans’ capacity for explicit-declarative cognition. This article offers a way to bridge a divide that defeats productive cross-talk. We show that animals often challenge the associative-learning construct, and that it does not work to try to stretch the associative-learning construct to encompass these performances. This approach thins and impoverishes that important construct. We describe an alternative approach that restrains the construct of associative learning by giving it a clear operational definition. We apply this approach in several comparative domains to show that different task variants change—in concert—the level of awareness, the declarative nature of knowledge, the dimensional breadth of knowledge, and the brain systems that organize learning. These changes reveal dissociable learning processes that a unitary associative construct cannot explain but a neural-systems framework can explain. These changes define the limit of associative learning and the threshold of explicit cognition. The neural-systems framework can broaden empirical horizons in comparative psychology. It can offer animal models of explicit cognition to cognitive researchers and neuroscientists. It can offer simple behavioral paradigms for exploring explicit cognition to developmental researchers. It can enliven the synergy between human and animal research, promising a productive future for both.     

Cognitive reserve and cognitive function in healthy older people: a meta-analysis

The associations between proxy measures of cognitive reserve (CR) and cognition vary across studies and cognitive domains. This meta-analysis aimed to assess the relationship between CR and cognition in multiple domains (memory, executive function, visuospatial ability, and language). CR was considered in terms of three key proxy measures – educational level, occupational status, and engagement in cognitively stimulating activities – individually and in combination. One-hundred and thirty-five studies representing 128,328 participants were included. Of these, 109 used a measure of education, 19 used a measure of occupation, 31 used a measure of participation in cognitively stimulating activities, and 6 used a combination of these. All three proxy measures had a modest positive association with cognition; occupational status and cognitive activities showed the most variation across cognitive domains. This supports the view that the commonly used proxy measures of CR share an underlying process but that each additionally provides a unique contribution to CR.     

CRITICAL REMARKS ON THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF RELIGION

Cognitive explanations of religious beliefs propose an evolutionary past in which humans had to possess certain cognitive adaptations to survive. The aim of this article is to show that some cognitive accounts may overvalue the putative role of cognition. One such cognitive idea is an assumption that cognition has been evolutionarily shaped only, or most importantly, in the Pleistocene. This idea seems common among writers on the cognitive science of religion (CSR), but is mistaken. Cognition has been shaped throughout evolution. Another idea is that components of religion could not have been produced by natural selection (the hypothesis that religion is a by-product). But the article suggests that there are some domains in the field of religion and religious components that could be acquired and transmitted despite or even against alleged cognitive biases. The aim of this article is to argue for an extended approach that combines a cognitive account with functional naturalistic approaches, including an adaptationist one. Such distinction could imply that cognition is not functional. Obviously, this is not the case since cognition is the process of knowing, and surely knowledge is functional. However, the main argument for such a distinction lies in the key idea of the cognitive account that as far as cognition is functional and adaptive, religious components are not. Functionalism or “adaptivism” concerning cognition contradicts functionalism concerning religion. Numbers of scholars who consider themselves part of CSR seem also to consider both cognition and religion adaptive. However, in regard to components of religion, their adaptive, functional power is only secondary. The article concludes that the study of religion—as the study of cultural evolution in general—should include a pluralistic methodology combining cognitive and evolutionary accounts with the specificity of cultural evolution.     

Introduction: Developmental Processes in Adulthood—European Research Perspectives

The main objective of this Special European Issue is to investigate some topical aspects of recent research on adult development in Europe. More specifically, the issue offers a detailed discussion of questions involved in complex forms of adult cognition, scientific thinking, responses to the demands of everyday life, the effects of various life events on well-being, and the construction of an integrated model of the cognitive, social, and personality domains. Theo- retically, the articles are based on various viewpoints such as the neo-Piagetian perspectives on thinking, although others have connections with the Vygotskian approach to learning. In conclusion, we assert that the developmental processes of adulthood should always be viewed multidimensionally, contextually, and holistically, as the articles themselves clearly demonstrate.     

Bridging cognition and personality in education: the role of style in performance and development

In an attempt to illuminate the interrelatedness of noncognitive and cognitive domains—or, more pointedly, of affection, conation, and cognition—emphasis is placed on variables that not only operate across these domains but are also potentially integrative. Prominent among such variables are personal styles, particularly cognitive styles. The properties and problems of cognitive styles are examined, with special emphasis on field independence versus field sensitivity and on two stylistic dimensions of attentional scanning. The role of cognitive styles as both competence variables and performance variables is addressed, along with the difficulty of disentangling style from ability because of reciprocal determinism in their development. The educational implications of cognitive styles are explored, especially as they bear on the problem of the match between student characteristics and educational experiences and on the value-laden nature of style-based pedagogical decisions.