Undefeated dualism

In the standard thought experiments, dualism strikes many philosophers as true, including many non-dualists. This ‘striking’ generates prima facie justification: in the absence of defeaters, we ought to believe that things are as they seem to be, i.e. we ought to be dualists. In this paper, I examine several proposed undercutting defeaters for our dualist intuitions. I argue that each proposal fails, since each rests on a false assumption, or requires empirical evidence that it lacks, or overgenerates defeaters. By the end, our prima facie justification for dualism remains undefeated. I close with one objection concerning the dialectical role of rebutting defeaters, and I argue that the prospects for a successful rebutting defeater for our dualist intuitions are dim. Since dualism emerges undefeated, we ought to believe it.     

Why the Standard View of Ignorance Prevails

Rik Peels has forcefully argued that, contrary to what is widely held, ignorance is not equivalent to the lack or absence of knowledge. In doing so, he has argued against the Standard View of Ignorance according to which they are equivalent, and argued for what he calls “the New View” according to which ignorance is equivalent (merely) to the lack or absence of true belief. In this paper, I defend the Standard View against Peels’s latest case for the New View.     

On Ignorance: A Vindication of the Standard View

Rik Peels has once again forcefully argued that ignorance is not equivalent to the lack or absence of knowledge. In doing so, he endeavors to refute the Standard View of Ignorance according to which they are equivalent, and to advance what he calls the “New View” according to which ignorance is equivalent (merely) to the lack or absence of true belief. I defend the Standard View against his new attempted refutation.     

Met aknowledge: Undefeated justification

Internalism and externalism are both false. What is needed to convert true belief into knowledge is the appropriate blend of subjective and objective factors to yield the appropriate sort of connection between mind and the world. The sort of knowledge explicated is calledmetaknowledge and is knowledge that involves the evaluation of incoming information in terms of a background system. It is proposed that knowledge is equivalent to undefeated justification which is justification on the basis of every system that eliminates or corrects any error in what a person accepts. The system of such system is called the ultrasystem of the person. This account appeals both to internal factors and external factors and involves appeal to both normative requirements and empirical constraints. Justification is defined in terms of a comparative notion of rationality adapted from Chisholm.Research for this paper was supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation and a fellowship from the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation. I am indebted to the members of the Summer Institute in the Theory of Knowledge, Boulder, Colorado, 1986, sponsored by the National Endowment for the Humanities under the auspices of the Council for Philosophical Studies for helpful criticism of the ideas contained in this paper as well as to Scott Sturgeon, Peter Klein, Steven Luper-Foy and to T. Kuys for a positive proposal cited below.     

Willful Ignorance

Michelle Moody-Adams suggests that “the main obstacle to moral progress in social practices is the tendency to widespread affected ignorance of what can and should already be known.” This explanation is promising, though to understand it we need to know what willful (affected, motivated, strategic) ignorance actually is. This paper presents a novel analysis of this concept, which builds upon Moody-Adams (1994) and is contrasted with a recent account by Lynch (2016).     

助推爱心：利用默认选项促进捐赠行为

本研究采用实验室和现场实验的方法检验了默认选项的助推策略是否能够促进慈善捐赠行为。结果发现：（1）相较于把被试费的“保留选项”设置为默认,把“捐献选项”设置为默认时,被试捐献的概率和金额更高;（2）在多个捐款选项情景中,默认选项的设置总体上提高了默认选项被选择的概率;将最大金额选项设置为默认选项有助于提高被试平均捐赠额。这些发现表明,应用默认选项的助推策略能够有效促进人们的捐赠行为。本研究结果对减少募捐成本、提高募捐效率有所启示。     

无知与奸诈

晋代葛洪(字稚川,号抱朴子,约公元284—364年)是一位著名的中医学家、儒家和道家,著有《抱朴子外篇》、《抱朴子内篇》、《金匮药方》、《肘后备急方》、《神仙传》、《隐逸传》、《集异》等书。受其生活年代的文化背景及现实的影响,葛洪是一位颇有成就的炼丹家,然而其对封建迷信的危害却有一定的认识,并力图破除一些迷信现象。今读到其中两则故事,遂生联想,乃作札记。     

Ignorance of ignorance

I discuss the question of when knowledge of higher order ignorance is possible and show in particular that, under quite plausible assumptions, knowledge of second order ignorance is impossible.     

Rational Moral Ignorance

What should a person do when, through no fault of her own, she ends up believing a false moral theory? Some suggest that she should act against what the false theory recommends; others argue that she should follow her rationally held moral beliefs. While the former view better accords with intuitions about cases, the latter one seems to enjoy a critical advantage: It seems better able to render moral requirements ‘followable’ or ‘action-guiding.’ But this tempting thought proves difficult to justify. Indeed, whether it can be justified turns out to depend importantly on the rational status of epistemic akrasia. Furthermore, it can be argued, from premises all parties to the moral ignorance debate should accept, that rational epistemic akrasia is possible. If the argument proves successful, it follows that a person should sometimes act against her rationally held moral convictions.     

Ignorance and Virtue

Abstract

Julia Driver has argued that there is a class of virtues that are compatible with or even require that an agent be ignorant in some respect. In this paper I argue for an alternative conception of the relationship between ignorance and virtue. The dispositions constitutive of virtue must include sensitivity to human limitations and fallibility. In this way the virtues accommodate ignorance, rather than require or promote it. I develop my account by considering two virtues in particular: tolerance (the paradigm for my account) and modesty (which Driver employs as the paradigm for her account). Although several philosophers have offered alternatives to Driver's account of modesty and others have discussed tolerance as a moral virtue, an adequate account of the role of ignorance in the specification of the virtues generally has yet to be provided. I believe that similarities between the two virtues are instructive for defining that role.     

也谈治贫必先治愚

当今中国社会,由漫长的农耕社会历史长河中衍生出来的封建迷信思想,愚昧落后的陈规陋俗,依然顽固地残存在人们的思想意识之中,流露在人们的生活习惯之上。它们虽然无力阻挡当今社会飞速前进的脚步,但时不时地在时代大潮中搅起一股股的逆流,激起一层层的浊浪,或多或少地干扰着社会发展的主旋律。     

Voting in Ignorance: The Politics of Smooth-Sounding Names

The purpose of this experiment was to determine whether the attractiveness of political candidates' names would influence voter preferences, both when only the names were known and when politically relevant information was provided. The names and platforms of candidates in an actual election in which victory was attributed to a name effect were used in a straw poll of undergraduate subjects. Results showed a clear name effect when only names were presented. However, abstention was also quite common in this condition. When candidates' issue positions were also described, the name effect faded to nonsignificance. The results highlight the efficacy of relevant information in overcoming spurious influences on decisions.     

无知、自由与法律

哈耶克从对无知的顿悟中洞见了自由特别是个人自由对于个人和社会发展与进步的必要性。而法律则构成了实现和保证这种自由的充要条件。因此,法律与自由具有同等价值。哈耶克对自由与法治的价值的注重和执着,既推动了人类认识的发展与进步,同时也给那些正在实践或追求自由与法治的社会留下警省和启示。     

A Logic for Disjunctive Ignorance

In this paper, we introduce a notion of ‘disjunctive ignorance’, which is a weak combination of two forms of ignorance in the literature. We propose a logical language with ‘disjunctive ignorance’ as a sole modality, explore the logical properties of this notion and its related notions, and axiomatize it over various frame classes. By finding suitable reduction axioms, we extend the results to the case of public announcements and apply it to Moore-like sentences.

     

Genetic Ignorance and Reasonable Paternalism

The question concerning an individual's rightto remain in ignorance regarding her owngenetic makeup is central to debates aboutgenetic information. Whatever is decided onthis matter has a weighty bearing on all of therelated third-party issues, such as whetherfamily members or employers should be toldabout an individual's genetic makeup. Thosearguing that no right to genetic ignoranceexists tend to argue from a viewpoint I havecalled in this paper reasonablepaternalism. It is an appealing position whichrests on widely shared intuitions on reasonablechoices, but which, in the end, smugglespaternalism back to medical practice.