Showups versus lineups: An evaluation using ROC analysis

Showups (a one-person identification) were compared to both simultaneous and sequential lineups that varied in lineup fairness and the position of the suspect in the lineup. We reanalyzed data from a study by Gronlund, Carlson, Dailey, and Goodsell (2009), which included simultaneous and sequential lineups, and using the same stimuli and procedures, collected new data using showup identifications. Performance was compared using ROC analysis, which is superior to traditional measures such as correct and false identification rates, and probative value measures. ROC analysis showed that simultaneous lineups consistently produced more accurate identification evidence than showups, but sequential lineups were sometimes no more accurate than showups, and were never more accurate than simultaneous lineups. These results supported prior suppositions regarding the suggestiveness of showups, revealed a misconception about the superiority of sequential lineups, and demonstrated why eyewitness identification procedures need to be evaluated using ROC analyses.     

Eyewitness identification discriminability: ROC analysis versus logistic regression

To reach conclusions regarding the respective accuracy of two conditions, eyewitness researchers evaluate correct and false identification rates computed across participants. Two approaches typically are employed. One approach relies on ratio-based probative value measures; but Wixted and Mickes (2012) and Gronlund, Wixted, and Mickes (2014) showed that these measures fail to disentangle an assessment of accuracy (i.e., discriminability between guilty and innocent suspects) from response bias (i.e., a willingness to make a response). Our focus is on a second approach, logistic regression analyses of the correct and of the false identification rates. Logistic regression also fails to disentangle discriminability from bias. Therefore, it only can denote the most accurate condition in limited circumstances. The best approach for reaching the proper conclusion regarding which condition is most accurate is to use receiver operator characteristic (ROC) analysis. Simulated ROC data illustrate the problem with a reliance on logistic regression to assess accuracy.     

What would it take for electrophysiology to become clinically useful?

In this article we discuss the procedures that should be followed in order to develop diagnostic tests based on electrophysiologic parameters that would be useful to practicing psychiatrists in their efforts to diagnose mental disorders. To do this, we start by giving an overview of receiver operating characteristic (ROC) analysis, with which a candidate diagnostic test can be characterized mathematically. This methodology allows for an estimate of the overall discriminating power of the diagnostic test and thus can be used to compare the performance of one diagnostic test with that of another. However, ROC analysis cannot be used for optimizing a given diagnostic test (ie, determining the "best" cut-off) and, because it does not incorporate Bayes' theorem, it cannot be used to compare the performances of diagnostic tests when it is given to different risk groups for the target disorder. Both of these problems can be solved by using the concept of information theory. The equation for information gain automatically takes Bayes' theorem into consideration and also provides an intrinsic criterion for finding the cut-off that best discriminates between individuals who do and those who do not have the target disorder. Neither ROC analysis nor information theory are model dependent; however, if the equation for the frequency distribution of the electrophysiologic variable is known for the disease-positive and disease-negative populations, the calculations are greatly simplified. Therefore, the assumption is often made that both of these distributions (or transformations of the distributions) are Gaussian. However, studies have shown that the results of ROC analysis are quite robust to deviations from normality of the underlying distributions.     

A philosophical critique of psychological studies of emotion: the example of jealousy

The aim of this article is to provide a critical review of recent writings about jealousy in psychology, as seen from a philosophical perspective. At a more general level of inquiry, jealousy offers a useful lens through which to study generic issues concerned with the conceptual and moral nature of emotions, as well as the contributions that philosophers and social scientists can make to understanding them. Hence, considerable space is devoted to comparisons of psychological and philosophical approaches to emotion research in general. It turns out that although (Aristotle-style) arguments about the necessary conceptual features of jealousy qua specific emotion, do carry philosophical mileage, they may fail to cut ice with psychologists who tend to focus on jealousy as a broad dimension of temperament. The review reveals a disconcerting lack of cross-disciplinary work on jealousy: the sort of work that has moved the discourse on other emotions (such as gratitude) forward in recent years.     

Some Artificial Intelligence Tools for Argument Evaluation: An Introduction

Even though tools for identifying and analyzing arguments are now in wide use in the field of argumentation studies, so far there is a paucity of resources for evaluating real arguments, aside from using deductive logic or Bayesian rules that apply to inductive arguments. In this paper it is shown that recent developments in artificial intelligence in the area of computational systems for modeling defeasible argumentation reveal a different approach that is currently making interesting progress. It is shown how these systems provide the general outlines for a system of argument evaluation that can be applied to legal arguments as well as everyday conversational arguments to assist a user to evaluate an argument.     

Darwin, Design and Dawkins’ Dilemma

Richard Dawkins has a dilemma when it comes to design arguments. On the one hand, he maintains that it was Darwin who killed off design and so implies that his rejection of design depends upon the findings of modern science. On the other hand, he follows Hume when he claims that appealing to a designer does not explain anything and so implies that rejection of design need not be based on the findings of modern science. These contrasting approaches lead to the following dilemma: if he claims that Darwinism is necessary for rejecting design, he has no satisfactory response to design arguments based on the order in the laws of physics or the fine-tuning of the physical constants; alternatively, if Humean arguments are doing most of the work, this would undermine one of his main contentions, that atheism is justified by science and especially by evolution. In any case, his Humean arguments do not provide a more secure basis for his atheism because they are seriously flawed. A particular problem is that his argument for the improbability of theism rests on a highly questionable application of probability theory since, even if it were sound, it would only establish that the prior probability of God’s existence is low, a conclusion which is compatible with the posterior probability of God’s existence being high.     

HOW TO CONFUSE ORGANISMS WITH MOUSETRAPS: MACHINE METAPHORS AND INTELLIGENT DESIGN

Why do design arguments—particularly those emphasizing machine metaphors such as “Organisms and/or their parts are machines”—continue to be so convincing to so many people after they have been repeatedly refuted? In this essay I review various interpretations and refutations of design arguments and make a distinction between rationally refuting such arguments (Refuting_R) and rendering them psychologically unconvincing (Refuting_P). Expanding on this distinction, I provide support from recent work on the cognitive power of metaphors and developmental psychological work indicating a basic human propensity toward attributing agency to natural events, to show that design arguments “make sense”unless one is cued to look more closely. As with visual illusions, such as the Müller‐Lyer arrow illusion, there is nothing wrong with a believer's cognitive apparatus any more than with their visual apparatus when they judge the lines in the illusion to be of unequal length. It takes training or a dissonance between design beliefs and other beliefs or experiences to play the role that a ruler does in the visual case. Unless people are cued to “look again” at what initially makes perfect sense, they are not inclined to apply more sophisticated evaluative procedures.     

Introduction to the Special Issue on Mediation Analyses: What If Planetary Scientists Used Mediation Analysis to Infer Causation?

Mediation analyses have become extremely popular in the social sciences generally, and in social psychology specifically, because they seem to grant the researcher the ability to draw causal conclusions from correlational data. But this is illusory. Correlation provides poor quality evidence of causation not only in the case of zero-order correlations but also in the case of more complex mediation analyses. The articles in this special issue provide compelling arguments as to why mediation analyses make a weak case for actual mediation. My goal is to cognitively prime the reader for these articles by presenting analyses pertaining to the mean orbital momentum, kinetic energy, and conversion energy of the eight planets of our solar system. Our solar system provides a dramatic case in point where mediation analyses provide blatantly wrong conclusions.     

Contextual Factors for Research on Psychological Therapies for Aboriginal Australians

This paper is to provide a commentary to Can cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) be effective for Aboriginal Australians? Perspectives of Aboriginal practitioners trained in CBT. It is inspiring that this study has found that CBT can play a useful role in therapy for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people but the outcomes need to be considered with caution. CBT can provide a useful tool when working with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, but in itself is not adequate for a number of reasons. Firstly, it is not culturally responsive but can be part of an approach that might be culturally appropriate. The authors are compelled at this point to give a history of mental health and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people to provide a background context to the discussion and to illustrate why some psychological approaches such as CBT can only ever be part of the tools that might be used in a broader framework, that is required to address and strengthen Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people's well‐being.     

论证的基于标记的论据状态(英文)

本文针对抽象论证体系中的论据状态给出了一种基于标记的定义方法。与基于扩张的传统方法相比,此定义能够更加细致准确地描述论据状态。同时,本文对论据状态的等级进行了定义和区分,并把该等级作为接受或驳斥论据的依据。由于该方法基于标准论证体系定义,在实现上使用了已有的基于论证的证明方法,因此,该定义与以往的抽象论证体系是完全兼容的。     

Is a quantitative approach useful in the comparison of spontaneous movements in fullterm and preterm infants?

Spontaneous motility in the first six months of infancy has been examined over the last few decades using both qualitative and quantitative techniques. The major focus of the quantitative research has been to investigate a dynamic systems approach to understanding motor development, and has primarily examined normal development in fullterm infants. Recently, there have been several papers comparing spontaneous kicking in fullterm and preterm infants. These studies were designed to identify developmental differences that may indicate a risk of later motor disability. There has, however, been criticism that the quantitative approach fails to detect developmental differences that are useful in early identification of disability, unlike qualitative approaches which use the principles of Gestalt perception to examine the quality of the total movement pattern in young infants. The current paper describes both qualitative and quantitative techniques and reviews recent studies using motion analysis to compare early motor development in fullterm and preterm infants. New evidence is provided to suggest that the quantitative approach may not only be useful in detecting infants at risk of motor disability, but may also be useful in identifying the underlying processes that determine normal and abnormal motor outcomes.     

The hermeneutic circle and authoral intention in divine revelation

In his recent book on revelation, Jorge Gracia rejects the authorial intention view of textual interpretation, arguing that the only interpretation that makes sense for texts regarded as divinely revealed is theological interpretation. Both his position and the authorial view face the problem of the Hermeneutical Circle. I contend that the arguments he provides in his own defense do not successfully avoid the circularity present in his own view. His thesis about expected behavior might provide resources for a solution, but this thesis in turn can be used to respond to his own objections against the authorial intention view of interpreting divinely revealed texts.     

Experimental mathematics, computers and the a priori

In recent decades, experimental mathematics has emerged as a new branch of mathematics. This new branch is defined less by its subject matter, and more by its use of computer assisted reasoning. Experimental mathematics uses a variety of computer assisted approaches to verify or prove mathematical hypotheses. For example, there is “number crunching” such as searching for very large Mersenne primes, and showing that the Goldbach conjecture holds for all even numbers less than 2 × 1018. There are “verifications” of hypotheses which, while not definitive proofs, provide strong support for those hypotheses, and there are proofs involving an enormous amount of computer hours, which cannot be surveyed by any one mathematician in a lifetime. There have been several attempts to argue that one or another aspect of experimental mathematics shows that mathematics now accepts empirical or inductive methods, and hence shows mathematical apriorism to be false. Assessing this argument is complicated by the fact that there is no agreed definition of what precisely experimental mathematics is. However, I argue that on any plausible account of ’experiment’ these arguments do not succeed.     

‘Everyone’, consequences,and generalization arguments

This paper addresses issues raised by recent discussion in normative ethics which concern relations between properties of individual actions and of certain groups of actions. First, an ambiguity common to ‘everyone can’ and ‘everyone ought’ is examined. Next, a similar ambiguity in talk about consequences is studied; here several procedures for identifying and evaluating consequences are compared. Then a notation that untangles the ambiguities is presented. Next, this notation is employed in an analysis of Marcus Singer's deduction of his generalization argument. Finally, there is a study of the question as to whether or not conflicts are possible between Singer's generalization argument and the dictates of consequences of individual actions. The findings are that such conflicts are or are not possible depending upon how a certain restriction on generalization arguments is interpreted, and that in either case the proponent of generalization arguments is faced with problems.     

Two Conceptions of Conceptualism and Nonconceptualism

Though it enjoys widespread support, the claim that perceptual experiences possess nonconceptual content has been vigorously disputed in the recent literature by those who argue that the content of perceptual experience must be conceptual content. Nonconceptualism and conceptualism are often assumed to be well-defined theoretical approaches that each constitute unitary claims about the contents of experience. In this paper I try to show that this implicit assumption is mistaken, and what consequences this has for the debate about perceptual experience. I distinguish between two different ways that nonconceptualist (and conceptualist) proposals about perceptual content can be understood: as claims about the constituents that compose perceptual contents or as claims about whether a subject’s undergoing experiences with those contents requires them to possess the concepts that characterize those contents. I maintain that these ways of understanding conceptualism and nonconceptualism are orthogonal to one another. This is revealed by the conceptual coherence of positions in which the contents of experiences have both conceptual and nonconceptual features; positions which possess their own distinctive sources of philosophical motivation. I argue that the fact that there is a place in conceptual space for such positions, and that there may be good reason for theorists to adopt them, creates difficulties for both the central argument for nonconceptualism and the central argument for conceptualism. I set out each of these arguments; the Argument from Possession-Independence and the Epistemically-Driven Argument. I then try to show how the existence of mixed positions about perceptual content derived from a clear distinction between compositional and possessional considerations constitutes a significant obstacle for those arguments as they stand. The takehome message of the paper is that unless one clearly acknowledges the distinction between issues about the composition of perceptual content and issues about how subject’s capacities to undergo certain experiences relates to their possession of concepts one runs the risk of embracing unsatisfying philosophical arguments in which conclusions relevant to one conception of nonconceptual and conceptual content are grounded on arguments that concern only the other; arguments that cannot, in themselves, sustain them.     

Abstract argumentation and explanation applied to scientific debates

Abstract argumentation has been shown to be a powerful tool within many fields such as artificial intelligence, logic and legal reasoning. In this paper we enhance Dung’s well-known abstract argumentation framework with explanatory capabilities. We show that an explanatory argumentation framework (EAF) obtained in this way is a useful tool for the modeling of scientific debates. On the one hand, EAFs allow for the representation of explanatory and justificatory arguments constituting rivaling scientific views. On the other hand, different procedures for selecting arguments, corresponding to different methodological and epistemic requirements of theory evaluation, can be formulated in view of our framework.     

Predicting the Outcomes of Disputes: Consequences for Disputant Reactions to Procedures and Outcomes1

Third parties in dispute settings often make predictions to disputants regarding the likely outcome of their dispute at arbitration. However, virtually no research has examined the impact of predictions on disputant satisfaction with dispute resolution procedures and outcomes. One explanation for the lack of attention to this variable may be that current theorizing regarding dispute resolution procedures is too narrowly stated to incorporate this procedural variation. Theories about predictability from nondispute settings are used to generate hypotheses regarding the consequences of such outcome prediction. In a laboratory setting, disputants prepared arguments in anticipation of an arbitration hearing. Prior to the arbitrator's decision, the experimenter read the disputants' arguments and made a prediction regarding the arbitrator's decision. Their arguments were then presented to an arbitrator who imposed a binding decision. Dependent measures include the disputants' anxiety while awaiting the arbitrator's decision, and their postdecision satisfaction with dispute resolution procedures and outcomes. Internal analyses support the hypothesis that outcome prediction has benefits for disputants' predecision coping, ratings of procedural fairness, and satisfaction judgments. Also, as hypothesized, correct predictions produced greater postdecision satisfaction with outcomes and decision-makers than did incorrect predictions.     

Clinically useful,research validated assessment of persons with alcohol problems

Advances in treatment approaches available for persons with alcohol problems, particularly the advent of cognitive behavioral and motivational approaches, have made systematic assessment of these problems more important than ever for clinicians. There is a plethora of assessment instruments available, and it is a difficult task for clinicians to conceptualize, select and use these instruments in a coherent fashion. Particularly important in this task is the identification of research validated instruments that provide both clinically useful and psychometrically sound data. This paper presents a model of alcohol assessment and reviews selected research validated instruments that can be assembled into an assessment battery that provides useful data to guide treatment of alcohol problems while also addressing practical concerns encountered by clinicians in practice.     

Uncovering the richness of the stimulus: structure dependence and indirect statistical evidence

The poverty of stimulus argument is one of the most controversial arguments in the study of language acquisition. Here we follow previous approaches challenging the assumption of impoverished primary linguistic data, focusing on the specific problem of auxiliary (AUX) fronting in complex polar interrogatives. We develop a series of corpus analyses of child-directed speech showing that there is indirect statistical information useful for correct auxiliary fronting in polar interrogatives and that such information is sufficient for distinguishing between grammatical and ungrammatical generalizations, even in the absence of direct evidence. We further show that there are simple learning devices, such as neural networks, capable of exploiting such statistical cues, producing a bias toward correct AUX questions when compared to their ungrammatical counterparts. The results suggest that the basic assumptions of the poverty of stimulus argument may need to be reappraised.