The response of counsellors to apartheid: A comment on nicholas (1993)

In response to Nicholas (1993), it is suggested that more direct confrontation on the response of counsellors to apartheid is needed. The relevance of the debate to counsellors outside South Africa, and the need to deconstruct the implicit political agendas within their own world views, is noted.     

Parts of activities: reply to Fellbaum and Miller (1990)

If people believe that one activity is a kind of another, they also tend to believe that the second activity is a part of the first. For example, they assert that deciding is a kind of thinking and that thinking is a part of deciding. Fellbaum and Miller's (1990) explanation for this phenomenon is based on the idea that people interpret part of in the domain of verbs as a type of logical entailment. Their explanation, however, suffers from at least 2 deficiencies. First, it fails to account for parallel effects with nouns (e.g., a contest is a kind of an activity, and an activity is a part of a contest). Second, it contains a flaw that incorrectly predicts many activities to be parts of each other (e.g., coming is part of going and going part of coming). However, a hypothesis Rips and Conrad (1989) originally proposed for the kind-part reciprocal effect avoids both of these difficulties.     

The response of South African professional psychology associations to apartheid

Professional psychology associations in South Africa have overtly and covertly furthered the aims of apartheid. Guidance about the ethical obligations of psychologists in the South African context has been singularly lacking, and as a result blacks have not been attracted to the profession of psychology in sufficient numbers to administer to psychological needs of the client population. The political dimension of psychological practice in South Africa needs to be addressed directly so that healing strategies relevant to the burgeoning racial conflict in South Africa can be implemented.     

Benefits of response time-extended multinomial processing tree models: A reply to Starns (2018)

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review - In his comment on Heck and Erdfelder (2016, Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 23, 1440–1465), Starns (2018, Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 25,...     

In defense of the right and left audiograms: a reply to Coren (1989) and Coren and Hakstian (1990)

Coren (1989) noticed that the various air-conduction pure-tone thresholds obtained from one ear of an individual in quiet tend to display a high correlation. In addition, Coren and Hakstian (1990) reported a consistently high correlation between pure-tone thresholds in the two ears of the same individual. On the basis of these observations, these authors proposed that pure-tone thresholds measured at audiometric frequencies in one ear, and those measured in both ears of an individual, be collapsed into a single average threshold value. The present paper disputes the usefulness and the appropriateness of such a proposal.     

Jealousy reconsidered: A reply to DeSteno (2010)

In a recent commentary, DeSteno (2010) critiqued the work of Levy and Kelley (2010) which investigated the relationship of attachment style to the sex difference in jealousy. This commentary addresses the concerns raised by DeSteno; I briefly review some of the literature that was not addressed by DeSteno's commentary and discuss directions that future research may take.     

The lengthening effect revisited: A reply to Prinzmetal and Wilson (1997) and Masin (1999)

In the present study, the lengthening phenomenon (Tsal & Shalev, 1996), namely, the increase in perceived length of unattended lines, was reexamined in light of criticisms by Prinzmetal and Wilson (1997) and Masin (1999). Prinzmetal and Wilson suggested that the effect was not due to attentional factors but to the spatial interaction between the attended line and the cue used to direct attention. We have replicated the lengthening effect when both attended and unattended lines are preceded by cues at a nearby location, showing that the effect is not caused by spatial cues per se, but instead reflects an inherent property of the attentional system. Masin argued that the lengthening effect is not robust, because it occurs for some but not for all participants. In the present study, the lengthening effect was highly reliable, occurring for each participant for a variety of line lengths.     

Inaccurate reporting and inappropriate variables: a reply to Vecchio's (1990) examination of cognitive resource theory.

In an article in the Journal of Applied Psychology, Vecchio (1990) purported to test cognitive resource theory (Fiedler, 1986; Fiedler & Garcia, 1987). We present evidence that Vecchio's article seriously misrepresented previous work on cognitive resource theory and also contained several flaws in methodology that call into question his conclusions regarding the validity of cognitive resource theory.     

The cognitive model of depression and mood-induction procedures: A reply to Clark (1983)

In a recent article on mood-induction procedures, Clark (1983) concluded that the Velten Mood Induction Procedure (VMIP; Velten, 1968) produces a good analog state of mild, naturally occurring, retarded depression that is not explicable in terms of experimental demand characteristics. Clark concluded, however, that it is erroneous to view the relative success of the VMIP in simulating the effects of depression as support for cognitive theories of depression. While we agree with the first of Clark's conclusions, we disagree with his second conclusion that the VMIP is not a cognitive manipulation. The purpose of the present article is to argue that his ideas regarding the impact of the VMIP on mood and behavior are not supported by the existing data. Therefore, the VMIP results can be used to support Beck's (1976) cognitive theory of depression.     

Facts and findings: A reply to Powell and Nettelbeck (2014)

In their recent article Powell and Nettelbeck (2014) question the predictive validity of intellectual curiosity for academic performance. We discuss here three issues we found with their report.     

The dynamic events that capture visual attention: A reply to Abrams and Christ (2005)

We recently demonstrated that, contrary to previous findings, some types of irrelevant motion are capable of capturing our attention (Franconeri & Simons, 2003). Strikingly, whereas sitmulated looming (a dynamic increase in object size) captured attention, simulated receding (a decrease in object size) did not. Abrams and Christ (2003, 2005) have provided a different interpretation of this evidence, arguing that in each case attention was captured by the onset of motion rather than by motion per se. They argued that the only published finding inconsistent with their motion onset account is our evidence that simulated receding motion failed to capture attention. Abrams and Christ (2005) presented a receding object stereoscopically and found that it did capture attention, leading them to conclude that the motion onset account explains existing data more parsimoniously than our account does. Our reply has three parts. First, we argue that evidence of capture by receding motion is interesting but irrelevant to the debate over whether capture by motion requires a motion onset. Second, we show that the original empirical evidence in support of the motion onset claim (Abrams & Christ, 2003) put the motion-only condition at a critical disadvantage. We present a new experiment that demonstrates strong capture by motion in the absence of a motion onset, showing that motion onsets are not necessary for attention capture by dynamic events. Finally, we outline what is known about the set of dynamic events that capture attention.     

The finesse of logotherapy reply to Kovacs (1999)

Kovacs (1999) raises several important points in his discussion of logotherapy. The practical dimension (applicability) of logotherapy has always been its most valuable asset. Patients on their own may recognize voids in their lives even without having any explicit knowledge of Frankl's thought.     

Conscious awareness of methodological choices: A reply to Milberg and McGlinchey (2010)

Milberg and McGlinchey (2010) claim that the conclusions we reach in "Perceptual Grouping Operates Independently of Attentional Selection: Evidence From Hemispatial Neglect" are unwarranted. Specifically, it is asserted that insufficient methodological control was exerted over the attentional status of the patients and that partial attention to the contralesional field could have resulted in the congruency effects we observe. Although we agree with their methodological cautions in general, we argue that our investigation is, in fact, methodologically sound. In particular, we reiterate and highlight that our investigation is unprecedented in the characterization of a patient sample with multiple clinical, psychophysical, and experimental measures; in our use of a stringent, rigidly controlled paradigm specifically designed for investigating perceptual grouping without awareness; in our modification of the experimental procedure to make it even more stringent; and in our specific methodological choices for comparison/control conditions within this experimental paradigm. We also demonstrate that partial attention to the contralesional left cannot support the robust congruency effects we observe. In light of this, we remain confident of our interpretation of our findings and suggest that perceptual grouping can indeed operate in the absence of attention.     

Negative priming and stimulus repetition: A reply to Neill and Joordens (2002)

Negative priming is reliably obtained with repeated items, but not with novel items. Here, we review why these stimulus repetition effects raise problems for memorybased theories of negative priming. Furthermore, we provide empirical evidence casting doubt on Neill and Joordens’s (2002) claim that perceptual facilitation masks the effects of episodic retrieval with novel items. Finally, we discuss several theoretical and methodological issues raised in the reply by Neill and Joordens. We conclude that a more straightforward interpretation of these stimulus repetition effects is one based on activation-sensitive inhibition.     

Negative priming and multiple repetition: A reply to Grison and Strayer (2001)

Strayer and colleagues (Grison & Strayer, 2001; Malley & Strayer, 1995; Strayer & Grison, 1999) have reported experiments in which negative priming by ignored stimuli occurred only for stimuli that were repeatedly sampled from small sets. These results were argued to be inconsistent with episodic/mismatch accounts of negative priming. We show here that a dependence of negative priming on multiple repetition is wholly consistent with such theories. Furthermore, we argue that the inhibitory theory proposed by Strayer and colleagues cannot account for major findings regarding negative priming and that anomalies in the data reported by Grison and Strayer are more parsimoniously explained by episodic/mismatch accounts.     

Missing the target: A reply to Koehler & Macchi (2009)

Koehler and Macchi 2009 criticize the experiments presented in Newell, Mitchell, and Hayes 2008 as being “virtually irrelevant” to exemplar cuing theory. This reply addresses that interpretation and argues that the experiments dealt with issues at the heart of the theory and provided evidence highly relevant to understand how people think about low‐probability events. The role of the ‘target’ in probabilistic statements is examined, highlighting the need for further theoretical and empirical clarification of the concept. The remaining specific criticisms raised in the commentary are discussed as well. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.