Differences in spatial knowledge acquired from maps and navigation

Models of the spatial knowledge people acquire from maps and navigation and the procedures required for spatial judgments using this knowledge are proposed. From a map, people acquire survey knowledge encoding global spatial relations. This knowledge resides in memory in images that can be scanned and measured like a physical map. From navigation, people acquire procedural knowledge of the routes connecting diverse locations. People combine mental simulation of travel through the environment and informal algebra to compute spatial judgments. An experiment in which subjects learned an environment from navigation or from a map evaluates predictions of these models. With moderate exposure, map learning is superior for judgments of relative location and straight-line distances among objects. Learning from navigation is superior for orienting oneself with respect to unseen objects and estimating route distances. With extensive exposure, the performance superiority of maps over navigation vanishes. These and other results are consonant with the proposed mechanisms.     

The mental representation of countries

Three studies were conducted to describe adults' knowledge of the countries of the world. Undergraduates from a selective liberal arts college recognised nearly two-thirds of nations, and about one-third were produced in a free-recall task. The use of information related to countries' locations was an important determinant of order of recall. Contiguity in free-recall output, responses in a free-association task, and the prediction of recall from recognition also provided evidence of other relations between countries, including semantic and phonetic links and membership in groups of countries. The number of times a country was mentioned in the news was a consistent predictor of recognition and recall. The relative prosperity, population density, and geographic area of countries also influenced recall.     

The mental representation of countries

Three studies were conducted to describe adults’ knowledge of the countries of the world. Undergraduates from a selective liberal arts college recognised nearly two-thirds of nations, and about one-third were produced in a free-recall task. The use of information related to countries’ locations was an important determinant of order of recall. Contiguity in free-recall output, responses in a free-association task, and the prediction of recall from recognition also provided evidence of other relations between countries, including semantic and phonetic links and membership in groups of countries. The number of times a country was mentioned in the news was a consistent predictor of recognition and recall. The relative prosperity, population density, and geographic area of countries also influenced recall.     

The representation of explicit motor sequence knowledge

Much research has investigated the representation of implicitly learned motor sequences: Do subjects learn sequences of stimuli, responses, response locations, or some combination? Most of the work on this subject indicates that when sequences are learned implicitly, it is in terms of response locations. The present work investigated the representation of explicitly learned motor sequences. In four experiments, we found consistent evidence that explicitly learned sequences are represented in terms of stimulus locations. This conclusion held true for both self-report measures (subjects said that they learned stimuli) and performance measures, but when stimuli changed, performance degraded. We interpret these data in a multiple-memory-systems framework.     

The accuracy of spatial information from temporally and spatially organized mental maps

The way a space is learned can result in a mental mapthat is either temporally or spatially organized (Curiel & Radvansky, 1998). The present study examined the availability of spatial information under maplearning conditions where either temporal or spatial organization has been previously observed. The finding was that people were fairly accurate in tasks that explicitly required the use of spatial information. However, there was a particular advantage for having a spatially organized mental mapin a direction judgment task, especially for short distances where fine-grained knowledge was required. In contrast, there was no clear advantage for either group in a distance estimation task. These data are interpreted in the context of Huttenlocher’s category adjustment model.     

Individual differences in procedures for knowledge acquisition from maps

This study investigated the procedures subjects use to acquire knowledge from maps. In Experiment 1, three experienced and five novice map users provided verbal protocols while attempting to learn a map. The protocols suggested four categories of processes that subjects invoked during learning: attention, encoding, evaluation, and control. Good learners differed from poor learners primarily in their techniques for and success at encoding spatial information, their ability to accurately evaluate their learning progress, and their ability to focus attention on unlearned information. An analysis of the performance of experienced map users suggested that learning depended on particular procedures and not on familiarity with the task. In Experiment 2, subjects were instructed to use (a) six of the effective learning procedures from Experiment 1, (b) six procedures unrelated to learning success, or (c) their own techniques. The effective procedures set comprised three techniques for learning spatial information, two techniques for using self-generated feedback to guide subsequent study behaviors, and a procedure for partitioning the map into sections. Subjects using these procedures performed better than subjects in the other groups. In addition, subjects' visual memory ability predicted the magnitude of the performance differential.     

Reasoning and mental representation

Four experiments exploring the effects of the coherence of a mental representation of material on reasoning performance are presented. Each employs a simple task that allows most subjects at some stage to solve the problem. We postulate that the crucial factor influencing performance is a unified representation of the material. In Experiment 1 we use an authorization of a kind familiar in daily life, and in Experiments 2, 3 and 4 we use sentences describing simple objects in different ways. In each case performance was enhanced when the material could be given a unified representation.     

Medieval theories of mental representation

Throughout most of the Middle ages, it was generally held that stored mental representations of perceived objects or events preserved the forms or species of such objects. This belief was consistent with a metaphor used by Plato. It was also consistent with the medieval belief that a number of cognitive processes took place in the ventricles of the brain and with the phenomenology of afterimages and imagination itself. In the 14th century, William of Ockham challenged this belief by claiming that mental representations are not stored but instead constructed in the basis of past learned experiences.     

The breakdown of semantic knowledge: insights from a statistical model of meaning representation

Investigations of patients with semantic category-specific deficits have revealed a wide range of performance and variability in categories that are impaired or spared; this variability presents a challenge to accounts of category specificity. Accounts based only on impairment to semantic features of a particular type (e.g., visual), as well as accounts based only on featural properties (e.g., feature intercorrelations), are insufficient to explain the variability of patients' performance. A first goal of the paper is to discuss how a hybrid account incorporating both a level of organization according to feature types (a level of nonlinguistic conceptual representations) and a level of organization dictated by featural properties may provide a more comprehensive account of the cases reported in the literature. The second and most novel goal of the study reported here is to derive from our hybrid account a series of novel predictions concerning the representation and impairment of a different domain of knowledge: knowledge of actions and events, a domain of knowledge that has received remarkably little attention to date.     

The mental representation of music notation: notational audiation

This study investigated the mental representation of music notation. Notational audiation is the ability to internally "hear" the music one is reading before physically hearing it performed on an instrument. In earlier studies, the authors claimed that this process engages music imagery contingent on subvocal silent singing. This study refines the previously developed embedded melody task and further explores the phonatory nature of notational audiation with throat-audio and larynx-electromyography measurement. Experiment 1 corroborates previous findings and confirms that notational audiation is a process engaging kinesthetic-like covert excitation of the vocal folds linked to phonatory resources. Experiment 2 explores whether covert rehearsal with the mind's voice also involves actual motor processing systems and suggests that the mental representation of music notation cues manual motor imagery. Experiment 3 verifies findings of both Experiments 1 and 2 with a sample of professional drummers. The study points to the profound reliance on phonatory and manual motor processing--a dual-route stratagem--used during music reading. Further implications concern the integration of auditory and motor imagery in the brain and cross-modal encoding of a unisensory input.     

The mental representation of causal conditional reasoning: mental models or causal models

In this paper, two experiments are reported investigating the nature of the cognitive representations underlying causal conditional reasoning performance. The predictions of causal and logical interpretations of the conditional diverge sharply when inferences involving pairs of conditionals—such as if P₁then Q and if P₂then Q—are considered. From a causal perspective, the causal direction of these conditionals is critical: are the P_icauses of Q; or symptoms caused byQ. The rich variety of inference patterns can naturally be modelled by Bayesian networks. A pair of causal conditionals where Q is an effect corresponds to a “collider” structure where the two causes (P_i) converge on a common effect. In contrast, a pair of causal conditionals where Q is a cause corresponds to a network where two effects (P_i) diverge from a common cause. Very different predictions are made by fully explicit or initial mental models interpretations. These predictions were tested in two experiments, each of which yielded data most consistent with causal model theory, rather than with mental models.     

Representing logical and semantic structure of knowledge acquired from discourse

A network model of logical and semantic structures from which speakers or writers generate linguistic messages at the discourse level is presented. While linguistic structures were considered in developing the model, the semantic and logical networks are defined without reference to linguistic structures and thus may be used to represent knowledge structures acquired from both linguistic and nonlinguistic sources. A second problem addressed is that of determining what logical and semantic information is acquired when a text is understood. To assess acquired knowledge, a procedure is presented for coding a subject's verbal reconstruction of knowledge acquired from a presented text (or other input) against the logical and semantic structure from which the text (or other input) was derived. The procedures are illustrated using data obtained from children who were asked to “retell” simple narrative stories.     

The mental representation of ordinal sequences is spatially organized

In the domain of numbers the existence of spatial components in the representation of numerical magnitude has been convincingly demonstrated by an association between number magnitude and response preference with faster left- than right-hand responses for small numbers and faster right- than left-hand responses for large numbers (Dehaene, S., Bossini, S., & Giraux, P. (1993) The mental representation of parity and number magnitude. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 122, 371-396). Because numbers convey not only real or integer meaning but also ordinal meaning, the question of whether non-numerical ordinal information is spatially coded naturally follows. While previous research failed to show an association between ordinal position and spatial response preference, we present two experiments involving months (Experiment 1) and letters (Experiment 2) in which spatial coding is demonstrated. Furthermore, the response-side effect was obtained with two different stimulus-response mappings. The association occurred both when ordinal information was relevant and when it was irrelevant to the task, showing that the spatial component of the ordinal representation can be automatically activated.