Negotiated belief structures and decision performance: An empirical investigation

When a group approaches a decision, each member may hold a schema for the information domain of the issue in question. A negotiated belief structure represents the politically enacted collection of schemata employed by the group in their deliberations. The aggregation of these schemata is marked by two structural properties—realized coverage and realized consensus. An examination of 713 product decisions made by 29 firms in a simulated business environment indicates that these structural properties are systematically related to product and firm performance.     

On the basis of belief in causal and diagnostic conditionals

According to the suppositional theory of conditionals, people assess their belief in a conditional statement of the form “if p then q” by conducting a mental simulation on the supposition of p in which they assess their degree of belief in q. This leads to them to the judge the probability of a conditional statement to be equal to the conditional probability, P(q|p). Evidence for this conditional probability hypothesis has been adduced in earlier studies for abstract, causal, and counterfactual conditionals. For the realistic conditionals, it is natural to assume that people perform such mental simulations by building causal mental models from prior causes to later effects. However, in the present study we show that the conditional probability hypothesis extends to diagnostic conditionals, which relate effects to causes. This new finding presents a major challenge for theoretical accounts of the mental processing of conditional statements.     

On the basis of belief in causal and diagnostic conditionals

According to the suppositional theory of conditionals, people assess their belief in a conditional statement of the form “if p then q” by conducting a mental simulation on the supposition of p in which they assess their degree of belief in q. This leads to them to the judge the probability of a conditional statement to be equal to the conditional probability, P(q|p). Evidence for this conditional probability hypothesis has been adduced in earlier studies for abstract, causal, and counterfactual conditionals. For the realistic conditionals, it is natural to assume that people perform such mental simulations by building causal mental models from prior causes to later effects. However, in the present study we show that the conditional probability hypothesis extends to diagnostic conditionals, which relate effects to causes. This new finding presents a major challenge for theoretical accounts of the mental processing of conditional statements.     

A problem for Russellian theories of belief

Russellianism is characterized as the view that ‘that’-clauses refer to Russellian propositions, familiar set-theoretic pairings of objects and properties. Two belief-reporting sentences, S and S*, possessing the same Russellian content, but differing in their intuitive truthvalue, are provided. It is argued that no Russellian explanation of the difference in apparent truthvalue is available, with the upshot that the Russellian fails to explain how a speaker who asserts S but rejects S* can be innocent of inconsistency, either in what she says or, at least, in what she implicates. Yet, while there is no semantic or pragmatic explanation of the substitution failure consistent with Russellianism, there remains the possibility of a purely psychological explanation that is, nonetheless, Russellian. This is an attractive option. It comes at a cost, however, since, in abandoning the project of providing a semantic or pragmatic explanation of anti-substitutivity intuitions, the Russellian is no longer in the business of explaining how a rational, well-informed speaker, with no incentive to mislead, can avoid inconsistency in reporting the facts as they appear.     

Mental illness and the mind-brain problem: Delusion,belief and Searle's theory of intentionality

Until recently there has been little contact between the mind-brain debate in philosophy and the debate in psychiatry about the nature of mental illness. In this paper some of the analogies and disanalogies between the two debates are explored. It is noted in particular that the emphasis in modern philosophy of mind on the importance of the concept of action has been matched by a recent shift in the debate about mental illness from analyses of disease in terms of failure of functioning to analyses of illness in terms of failure of action. The concept of action thus provides a natural conduit for two-way exchanges of ideas between philosophy and psychiatry. The potential fruitfulness of such exchanges is illustrated with an outline of the mutual heuristic significance of psychiatric work on delusions and philosophical accounts of Intentionality.     

The empirical basis of color perception

Rationalizing the perceptual effects of spectral stimuli has been a major challenge in vision science for at least the last 200 years. Here we review evidence that this otherwise puzzling body of phenomenology is generated by an empirical strategy of perception in which the color an observer sees is entirely determined by the probability distribution of the possible sources of the stimulus. The rationale for this strategy in color vision, as in other visual perceptual domains, is the inherent ambiguity of the real-world origins of any spectral stimulus.     

The effect of superstitious belief on performance following an unsolvable problem

Two experiments investigated the hypothesis that performance is not impaired following instances of uncontrollability when superstitious beliefs are invoked. In Experiment 1, undergraduates worked on an anagrams task following exposure to either a solvable or unsolvable word puzzle. Level of superstitious belief was assessed using Tobacyk, 1988 revised Paranormal Belief Scale. Following the unsolvable problem, students with a high level of superstitious belief solved more anagrams than students with a low level of superstitious belief. In Experiment 2, level of superstitious belief was assessed both before and after working on a solvable or unsolvable puzzle. Reported level of superstitious belief increased following exposure to unsolvable, but not solvable problems. These studies support the hypothesis that participants invoke superstitious beliefs during instances of uncontrollability, which may prevent or interrupt subsequent performance impairment.     

The interference problem for the betting interpretation of degrees of belief

The paper’s target is the historically influential betting interpretation of subjective probabilities due to Ramsey and de Finetti. While there are several classical and well-known objections to this interpretation, the paper focuses on just one fundamental problem: There is a sense in which degrees of belief cannot be interpreted as betting rates. The reasons differ in different cases, but there’s one crucial feature that all these cases have in common: The agent’s degree of belief in a proposition A does not coincide with her degree of belief in a conditional that A would be the case if she were to bet on A, where the belief in this conditional itself is conditioned on the supposition that the agent will have an opportunity to make such a bet. Even though the two degrees of belief sometimes can coincide (they will coincide in those cases when the bet has no expected causal bearings on the proposition A and the opportunity to bet have no evidential bearings on that proposition), it is the latter belief rather than the former that guides the agent’s rational betting behaviour. The reason is that this latter belief takes into consideration potential interferences that bet opportunities and betting itself might create with regard to the proposition to be betted on. It is because of this interference problem that the agent’s degree of belief in A cannot be interpreted as her betting rate for A.     

The problem of empirical redundancy of constructs in organizational research: An empirical investigation

Construct empirical redundancy may be a major problem in organizational research today. In this paper, we explain and empirically illustrate a method for investigating this potential problem. We applied the method to examine the empirical redundancy of job satisfaction (JS) and organizational commitment (OC), two well-established organizational constructs. Analysis based on responses from a sample of 292 employees collected at two occasions showed that: (a) the construct-level correlation between JS and OC was very high (.91) and (b) both JS and OC are similarly related to positive affectivity and negative affectivity. These results suggest that the constructs may be empirically indistinguishable, despite their well-established conceptual distinction. These findings illustrate the problem of empirical redundancy of organizational constructs and provide a basis for a possible movement towards parsimony in the realm of constructs that could open the way to more rapid advances in knowledge in organizational research.     

Acting and planning on the basis of a false belief: its effects on 3-year-old children's reasoning about their own false beliefs

This study examined 3-year-olds' explanations for actions of theirs that were premised on a false belief. In Experiment 1, children stated what they thought was inside a crayon box. After stating "crayons," they went to retrieve some paper to draw on. Children were then shown that the box contained candles and were asked to (a) state their initial belief and (b) explain their action of getting paper. Children who were unable to retrieve their false belief were unable to correctly explain their action. Experiments 2 and 3 ruled out several alternative interpretations for these findings. In Experiment 4, children planned and acted on their false belief. Again, children who were unable to retrieve their false belief were unable to correctly explain their action.     

The possibility of pragmatic reasons for belief and the wrong kind of reasons problem

In this paper I argue against the stronger of the two views concerning the right and wrong kind of reasons for belief, i.e. the view that the only genuine normative reasons for belief are evidential. The project in this paper is primarily negative, but with an ultimately positive aim. That aim is to leave room for the possibility that there are genuine pragmatic reasons for belief. Work is required to make room for this view, because evidentialism of a strict variety remains the default view in much of the debate concerning normative reasons for belief. Strict versions of evidentialism are inconsistent with the view that there are genuine pragmatic reasons for belief.

Assessment of coping: an empirical illustration of the problem of inapplicable items

The prevalence and effects of inapplicable items on the Ways of Coping Questionnaire (WOC) were studied. Three hundred seventy-six college students completed the WOC twice, referring to both heterogeneous (i.e., different types of) and homogeneous (the same) stressors. In addition to the standard procedure for administering this questionnaire, subjects were asked to identify items that were inapplicable to the stressors with which they were coping. Item inapplicability ranged from 2.1% to 83.9%, with a mean of 21.5% inapplicability across all WOC items. Application of a correction for item inapplicability demonstrated that situational effects are confounded by this phenomenon and may not hold up when the correction is applied. Implications of these findings include the possibility that previous research has over- or misidentified situational effects on coping.     

Experience and problem representation in statistics

This research investigated experience level differences in problem representation in statistics. A triad judgment task was designed so that source problems shared either surface similarity (story narrative) or structural (inferential level) features (t test, correlation, or chi-square) with the target problem. Graduate students with varying levels of experience in statistics were asked to choose which source problem "goes best" with the target problem for each triad. Given a choice between a problem that shares surface-level characteristics and one that shares inferential-level characteristics, students who had taken 0 to 4 courses in statistics tended to represent problems on the basis of surface-level features. Students who had more than 4 courses did not consistently make choices on the basis of surface-level features, nor did they consistently rely on structural features. However, all students with statistics course backgrounds noticed structural features when competition between different types of features was eliminated. The role of surface and structural features in determining problem representations is discussed.