How religion heals

This editorial is based on a lecture delivered at the Grosse Pointe, Michigan, Unitarian Church in October 1990, inaugurating an annual series to be called The Harry C. Meserve Lectures.     

How the mind works

by Steven Pinker, W.W. Norton & Co., 1997. $29.95 (xii+660 pages) ISBN 0 393 04535 8.     

How to share a mind: Reconsidering the group mind thesis

Standard accounts in social ontology and the group cognition debate have typically focused on how collective modes, types, and contents of intentions or representational states must be construed so as to constitute the jointness of the respective agents, cognizers, and their engagements. However, if we take intentions, beliefs, or mental representations all to instantiate some mental properties, then the more basic issue regarding such collective engagements is what it is for groups of individual minds to share a mind. Somewhat surprisingly, this very issue has not received much attention in the respective debates and when it has, typically the outlook has been skeptical or outright negative. In this paper, I argue that it is epistemologically possible for a group of individuals to literally share a single mental unit. In particular, I will put forward and defend what I shall call the zombie conception of group minds.     

心安与身安——《论语》“宰我问三年之丧”章疏解

《论语》"宰我问三年之丧"章中安字出现五次,可分为两组:"女安"之安、"居处不安"之安。解释史上有两说:一、两组安字都指"心安";二、女安之安指"心安",居处不安之安指"身安"。但它们都存在一些问题,值得考虑的是第三种解释:两组安字都指"身安",且这是涵盖心安的整个人之安、身心一体之安。而"不安"有两层含义:不会"安"(未安)、会"不安"(不忍安、耻于安)。从身心一体之"身安"角度,可使对此章所说的"仁—礼"关系有一新的认知。     

Conscious mind – conscious body

The incorporation of body awareness and touch techniques within analytic treatment is the main theme of this paper. Beginning with a personal experience of the oneness of body and psyche, the author considers Jung's observation of the physiological accompaniments of emotional reactions and his understanding of body as both shadow and ground. The author proposes a new model of analytic treatment that embraces both the verbal and imaginal as well as the non-verbal and somatic aspects of psyche. She describes the three elements of her approach: 1) reading what the body is saying about psyche; 2) using the body as an organ of perception; 3) using touch as a therapeutic tool. The effects of the taboo around touch are considered. Clinical examples throughout the paper demonstrate how somatic awareness and the use of touch promote the analytic process.     

How to stay safe while extending the mind

According to the extended mind thesis, cognitive processes are not confined to the nervous system but can extend beyond skin and skull to notebooks, iPhones, computers and such. The extended mind thesis is a metaphysical thesis about the material basis of our cognition. As such, whether the thesis is true can have implications for epistemological issues. Carter has recently argued that safety-based theories of knowledge are in tension with the extended mind hypothesis, since the safety condition implies that there is an epistemic difference between subjects who form their beliefs via their biological capacities and between subjects who have extended their cognition. Kelp, on the other hand, has argued that a safety-based theory of knowledge can be correct only if the extended mind thesis is true. While these claims are not logically inconsistent, they do leave the safety theorist in an uncomfortable position. I will argue that safety-based theories of knowledge are not hostage to the truth of the extended mind thesis, and that once the safety condition is properly understood it is not in tension with the extended mind thesis.

     

Disequilibrium in the mind,disharmony in the body

Although it is generally acknowledged that experiences of frustration, confusion, and anxiety are embodied phenomena, very little is known about how these processes modulate presumably unconscious, but constantly present, subtle bodily movement. We addressed this problem by tracking the low-level dynamics of body movement, using 1/f noise, pink noise, or “fractal scaling”, during naturalistic experiences of affect in two studies involving deep learning and effortful problem-solving. Our results indicate that body movement fluctuations of individuals experiencing cognitive equilibrium was characteristic of correlated pink noise, but there was a whitening of the signal when participants experienced states that are diagnostic of cognitive distress such as anxiety, confusion, and frustration. We orient our findings within theories that emphasise the embodied nature of cognition and affect and with perspectives that view affective and cognitive processes as emergent products of a self-organising dynamical system (the brain) that is inextricably coupled to the body.     

Disequilibrium in the mind, disharmony in the body

Although it is generally acknowledged that experiences of frustration, confusion, and anxiety are embodied phenomena, very little is known about how these processes modulate presumably unconscious, but constantly present, subtle bodily movement. We addressed this problem by tracking the low-level dynamics of body movement, using 1/f noise, pink noise, or "fractal scaling", during naturalistic experiences of affect in two studies involving deep learning and effortful problem-solving. Our results indicate that body movement fluctuations of individuals experiencing cognitive equilibrium was characteristic of correlated pink noise, but there was a whitening of the signal when participants experienced states that are diagnostic of cognitive distress such as anxiety, confusion, and frustration. We orient our findings within theories that emphasise the embodied nature of cognition and affect and with perspectives that view affective and cognitive processes as emergent products of a self-organising dynamical system (the brain) that is inextricably coupled to the body.     

It hurts both ways: How social comparisons harm affective and cognitive trust

Organizations often expect employees to collaborate with and trust the same coworkers with whom they compete for promotions and raises. This paper explores how social comparisons in self-relevant achievement domains influence affective and cognitive trust. We find that both upward and downward social comparisons harm trust. Upward comparisons harm affective trust and downward comparisons harm cognitive trust. We find no benefits of upward comparisons on cognitive trust, and we find no benefits of downward comparisons on affective trust.     

The roles of body and mind in abstract thought

How are people able to think about things they have never seen or touched? We demonstrate that abstract knowledge can be built analogically from more experience-based knowledge. People's understanding of the abstract domain of time, for example, is so intimately dependent on the more experience-based domain of space that when people make an air journey or wait in a lunch line, they also unwittingly (and dramatically) change their thinking about time. Further, our results suggest that it is not sensorimotor spatial experience per se that influences people's thinking about time, but rather people's representations of and thinking about their spatial experience.     

On matters of mind and body: regarding Descartes

In this paper the author considers Descartes’ place in current thinking about the mind‐body dilemma. The premise here is that in the history of ideas, the questions posed can be as significant as the answers acquired. Descartes’ paramount question was ‘How do we determine certainty?’ and his pursuit of an answer led to cogito ergo sum. His discovery simultaneously raised the question whether mind is separate from or unified with the body. Some who currently hold that brain and subjectivity are unified contend that the philosopher ‘split’ mind from body and refer to ‘Descartes’ error’. This paper puts forward that Descartes’ detractors fail to recognise Descartes’ contribution to Western thought, which was to introduce the Enlightenment and to give a place to human subjectivity. Added to this, evidence from Descartes’ correspondence with Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia supports the conclusion that Descartes did in fact believe in the unity of mind and body although he could not reconcile this rationally with the certainty from personal experience that they were separate substances. In this Descartes was engaged in just the same dilemma as that of current thinkers and researchers, a conflict which still is yet to be resolved.     

Catalyzing the dialogue between the body and the mind in a psychotic analysand

The author presents the analysis of a 23-year-old, obese, psychotic man who was dominated by sensations and unable to work through the different levels of psychic elaboration. He could not discriminate between words and concrete objects or between the perceptual functions of sense organs and the oral-cannibalistic level of instinct. Following the working through of these inabilities, it became possible to understand the patient's use of sensation and to make him aware of his emotions and conflicts. The author's discussion of this material emphasizes the role of the body-mind conflict and how this can be confronted in the analytic relationship. Possible links with neuroscience are also indicated.