Challenges confronting cross-sex friendships: “Much ado about nothing?”

This research was an investigation into four challenges purported to confront cross-sex friends. One hundred and thirty eight individuals (females = 86, males = 52) completed two surveys designed to explore the extent to which the sexual, emotional bond, audience, and equality challenges were present in their cross-sex friendships. Over 98% of the participants were heterosexual, 99% were Caucasian, and approximately 5% were Hispanic. Data gathered from the first survey were analyzed using a three-way analysis of variance, with gender, type of friendship, and romantic status as the independent variables, and three of the four challenges as the dependent variables. The first survey also included open-ended questions designed to explore the nature and existence of the challenges. The second survey was in a diary format. Respondents kept a frequency count for three weeks of discussions they had with their cross-sex friend concerning the challenges, and thoughts that they had as individuals concerning those challenges. Results from both surveys indicate that though the challenges exist and have powerful effects on a small percentage of individuals in cross-sex friendships, for the majority of participants the challenges are not perceived as salient.     

Much ado about nothing? Why going non-semantic is not merely semantics

This paper argues that deciding on whether the cognitive sciences need a Representational Theory of Mind matters. Far from being merely semantic or inconsequential, the answer we give to the RTM-question makes a difference to how we conceive of minds. How we answer determines which theoretical framework the sciences of mind ought to embrace. The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 1 outlines Rowlands’s (2017) argument that the RTM-question is a bad question and that attempts to answer it, one way or another, have neither practical nor theoretical import. Rowlands concludes this because, on his analysis, there is no non-arbitrary fact of the matter about which properties something must possess in order to qualify as a mental representation. By way of reply, we admit that Rowlands’s analysis succeeds in revealing why attempts to answer the RTM-question simpliciter are pointless. Nevertheless, we show that if specific formulations of the RTM-question are stipulated, then it is possible, conduct substantive RTM debates that do not collapse into merely verbal disagreements. Combined, Sections 2 and 3 demonstrate how, by employing specifying stipulations, we can get around Rowlands’s arbitrariness challenge. Section 2 reveals why RTM, as canonically construed in terms of mental states exhibiting intensional (with-an-s) properties, has been deemed a valuable explanatory hypothesis in the cognitive sciences. Targeting the canonical notion of mental representations, Section 3 articulates a rival nonrepresentational hypothesis that, we propose, can do all the relevant explanatory work at much lower theoretical cost. Taken together, Sections 2 and 3 show what can be at stake in the RTM debate when it is framed by appeal to the canonical notion of mental representation and why engaging in it matters. Section 4 extends the argument for thinking that RTM debates matter. It provides reasons for thinking that, far from making no practical or theoretical difference to the sciences of the mind, deciding to abandon RTM would constitute a revolutionary conceptual shift in those sciences.     

Gender stereotyping in medical advertising: Much ado about something?

Gender bias in medical advertising may be one factor contributing to differential treatment of women and men by physicians. Four hundred forty advertisements from three prominent medical journals were analyzed. Significantly more male, compared to female, recipient ads were found overall as well as for cardiovascular drugs. Males and females were both portrayed stereotypically in the ads, but this trend was especially true for males. The facial expressions of men were more likely to be serious/neutral whereas the facial expressions of women were more often judged to be pleasant. Females tended to be younger than the males that were depicted. Since heart disease is the number one killer of both men and women, underrepresentation of women in cardiovascular ads was questioned. Stereotypical portrayals as well as differences in facial expressions and age of depicted recipients may contribute to physicians being less likely to take the complaints of women, compared to men, seriously.     

Size overestimation among anorexics: much ado about very little?

Research on size overestimation among anorexics has failed to control for the effects of actual body size on estimated size. We obtained estimates of the size of 3 body sites from 3 groups: 13 anorexic women; 13 non-eating disordered women matched with the anorexics on actual body size; and 13 non-eating disordered women of average size. The anorexic and size-matched normal subjects did not differ in the extent to which they overestimated their body size, but both displayed significantly greater overestimation than did the subjects of average size. Both groups also estimated the actual size of their body sites to be larger than did average-size normal subjects. These findings illustrate the need for appropriate control procedures when considering body image disturbances among persons with eating disorders, and they raise questions about the psychological significance of disturbances in the perceptual component of body image.     

Preexisting knowledge versus on-line learning: what do young infants really know about spatial location?

Contemporary knowledge of infant cognition relies heavily on violation-of-expectation experiments. However, there are two ways to conceptualize what occurs in such studies. Babies may react to anomalous test events because of preexisting world knowledge. Alternatively, they may react because they have learned about events during the familiarization period. One way to distinguish these possibilities is to contrast familiarization with everyday versus anomalous events. In the studies we report here, we used this method to probe the nature of 5-month-olds' expectations about the locations of objects hidden in sand and later revealed. In Experiment 1, infants who initially saw everyday events did react to anomalous ones, as found previously, whereas infants who initially saw anomalous events did not react to everyday events. In Experiment 2, two alternative explanations of this pattern were ruled out. We conclude that by the age of 5 months, infants have expectations regarding the location of objects in continuous space.     

Diffusion versus linear ballistic accumulation: different models but the same conclusions about psychological processes?

Quantitative models for response time and accuracy are increasingly used as tools to draw conclusions about psychological processes. Here we investigate the extent to which these substantive conclusions depend on whether researchers use the Ratcliff diffusion model or the Linear Ballistic Accumulator model. Simulations show that the models agree on the effects of changes in the rate of information accumulation and changes in non-decision time, but that they disagree on the effects of changes in response caution. In fits to empirical data, however, the models tend to agree closely on the effects of an experimental manipulation of response caution. We discuss the implications of these conflicting results, concluding that real manipulations of caution map closely, but not perfectly to response caution in either model. Importantly, we conclude that inferences about psychological processes made from real data are unlikely to depend on the model that is used.     

Looking good versus doing good: which factors take precedence when children learn about new tools?

We present two experiments exploring whether individuals would be persuaded to imitate the intentional action of an adult model whose actions suggest that the correct way to complete a task is with an inefficient tool. In Experiment 1, children ages 5–10 years and a group of adults watched an adult model reject an efficient tool in favor of one that was inefficient, but claim it was “made for” the task. Results indicated low rates of imitation of the model’s intentional choice until 9 and 10 years of age. In Experiment 2, children ages 3–11 years again watched a model reject a functional tool in favor of a nonfunctional one. This time, the demonstration took place on video. For half of the participants, the model from the video was present to offer a choice between the two tools (high-pressure condition), and for the other half, she was absent (low-pressure condition). Children also completed a social desirability questionnaire to explore relationships between imitation choices and personality. Results indicated that rates of imitation were associated with higher scores on the social desirability scale among children ages 3–7 years. Among 8- to 11-year-olds – and especially among 9- and 10-year-olds – the decision to copy the model’s intentional choice was more likely when the model was present than when she was absent. The findings reveal the contributions of age, personality, and social pressure to differences in imitation.     

Openness to experience and creativity: When does global citizenship matter?

The relationship between the openness to experience trait (OTE) and creativity has been well documented in previous research. Likewise, the global citizenship construct has theoretical overlap with both OTE and creativity. We hypothesised global citizenship would make a unique contribution to explaining variance in five types of creativity (self/everyday, scholarly, performance, mechanical/scientific and artistic), above and beyond the contribution of OTE. Participants were predominantly female, European American, traditionally aged college students (N = 407). Global citizenship prosocial outcomes explained unique variance in self/everyday (sr² = .10), scholarly (sr² = .03) and mechanical/scientific (sr² = .03) creativity. Results are discussed in terms of dual processes theories of cognition.     

Much Ado About Nothing?

Mary Lee Smith. Sex bias in counseling and psychotherapy Bernard E. Whitley, Jr. Sex roles and psychotherapy: A current appraisal     

Individualism versus collectivism or versus authoritarianism?

Although there has been progress in the definition, antecedents, and consequences of individualism and collectivism, there are some fundamental issues that need to be resolved. This study examined two such issues: the dimensionality of individualism and collectivism, and the relationship of these constructs to authoritarianism. Thirty-eight American undergraduates judged the similarity among 15 concepts that have previously been shown to be reflective of elements of individualism, collectivism, and authoritarianism. Multidimensional scaling revealed two dimensions: individualism versus authoritarianism and active collectivism versus withdrawal from group involvement. Unlike the conception by Hofstede (1980) that individualism and collectivism are opposites, these results strongly suggest they are orthogonal. Furthermore, authoritarianism was construed as the opposite of individualism. Implications of these findings for future research are discussed.     

On Bayne and Chalmers’ Phenomenal Unity Thesis (or: Much Ado about Nothing)

Philosophia - According to the Phenomenal Unity Thesis (“PUT”) – most prominently defended by Tim Bayne and David Chalmers – necessarily, any set of phenomenal states of a...     

How Much for the Child?

In this paper we explore what sacrifices you are morally required to make to save a child who is about to die in front of you. It has been argued that you would have very demanding duties to save such a child (or any adult who is in similar circumstance through no fault of their own, for that matter), and some examples have been presented to make this claim seem intuitively correct. Against this, we argue that you do not in general have a moral requirement to bear more than moderate cost to save even a child who is just in front of you. Moreover, we explain why you have a much more demanding moral requirement in certain cases by appealing to the notions of undue risk and cost sharing.     

Internalism about reasons: sad but true?

Internalists about reasons following Bernard Williams claim that an agent’s normative reasons for action are constrained in some interesting way by her desires or motivations. In this paper, I offer a new argument for such a position—although one that resonates, I believe, with certain key elements of Williams’ original view. I initially draw on P.F. Strawson’s famous distinction between the interpersonal and the objective stances that we can take to other people, from the second-person point of view. I suggest that we should accept Strawson’s contention that the activity of reasoning with someone about what she ought to do naturally belongs to the interpersonal mode of interaction. I also suggest that reasons for an agent to perform some action are considerations which would be apt to be cited in favor of that action, within an idealized version of this advisory social practice. I then go on to argue that one would take leave of the interpersonal stance towards someone—thus crossing the line, so to speak—in suggesting that she do something one knows she wouldn’t want to do, even following an exhaustive attempt to hash it out with her. An internalist necessity constraint on reasons is defended on this basis.     

Overoptimism about future knowledge: Early arrogance?

Abstract

Three studies explored whether young children (5–7 years) have more optimistic views of their future knowledge than older children (8–12 years) and adults. In Study 1, younger children were more likely than older children and adults to expect greater knowledge in both young and mature protagonists. Both groups of children saw knowledge rising at a faster rate into adulthood than adult participants did. All ages judged moral knowledge as much easier to acquire than other types of knowledge, such as artifacts. In Study 2, all children saw their own future knowledge in especially optimistic terms in comparison to ratings by adults, and the older children exhibited a self-enhancement bias. Study 3 found an overall preference for the acquisition of positively valenced future knowledge, particularly for the 8- to 12-year olds and in the domain of morality, suggesting pragmatic underpinnings for these judgments.     

Constructionism versus what?

Constructionism is a theoretical perspective with great potential usefulness for the study of religion. However, the theory is often assumed rather than clarified, and it is often reduced to its extreme relativistic versions. As a result, its value has stagnated even as talk of constructs has proliferated. Constructionism has been portrayed as the other of religion's two realisms: theological and phenomenological. It has been cast in the role of a conveniently discounted counter-position. Constructionist work in the study of religion, by failing to clarify its theoretical basis adequately and by too often accepting the role of antagonist to realism, shares responsibility for this misleading and detrimental characterisation. Lack of due attention to theory has obscured the status and claims of constructionism. This theoretical perspective is not necessarily reductionist or radically relativist, and it is not simply the opposite of realist or sui generis approaches to religion. Constructionism can help us understand how historically and culturally contingent religious phenomena arise from the raw materials of our physical and social worlds.The first two sections of this article present a brief sketch of the development and key characteristics of constructionism, illustrating something of its breadth and variety. In the third section a consideration of constructionism in religious studies demonstrates the need to clarify three key issues. First, constructionist approaches are not necessarily anti-realist and so can be consistent with critical theological or sui generis perspectives. Second, the overwhelming lack of explicitly developed theory has obscured and obstructed the usefulness of constructionism in religious studies. Third, the relationship between constructionism and other theoretical positions needs to be clarified.