Units of episodic memory in perceptual recognition

Two studies examined the cognitive units of sentence memory using a perceptual recognition task. Four candidate cognitive units were considered: concepts, propositions, integrated propositions, and nonintegrated propositions. Subjects first received a list of acquisition sentences and then were asked to reproduce sentences presented under a white-noise mask. These masked sentences were replicas of the acquisition sentences, were formed of recombined clauses from the acquisition sentences, or were formed of recombined words from the acquisition sentences. Reproduction accuracy was employed as the dependent measure. Results supported propositions (operationalized by clauses) as cognitive units of episodic memory. No conclusive evidence was obtained for concepts, integrated propositions, or nonintegrated propositions as cognitive units. The utility of perceptual recognition tasks for studying the cognitive units of episodic memory is discussed.     

Recognition memory and awareness: Occurrence of perceptual effects in remembering or in knowing depends on conscious resources at encoding, but not at retrieval

We report four experiments in which a remember-know paradigm was combined with a response deadline procedure in order to assess memory awareness in fast, as compared with slow,recognition judgments. In the experiments, we also investigated the perceptual effects of study-test congruence, either for picture size or for speaker's voice, following either full or divided attention at study. These perceptual effects occurred in remembering with full attention and in knowing with divided attention, but they were uninfluenced by recognition speed, indicating that their occurrence in remembering or knowing depends more on conscious resources at encoding than on those at retrieval. The results have implications for theoretical accounts of remembering and knowing that assume that remembering is more consciously controlled and effortful, whereas knowing is more automatic and faster.     

Comparing effects of perceptual and reflective repetition on subjective experience during later recognition memory

Using the Remember/Know procedure, we compared the impact of a reflective repetition by refreshing (i.e., briefly thinking of a just-seen item) and a perceptual repetition (i.e., seeing an item again) on subjective experience during recognition memory. Participants read aloud words as they appeared on a screen. Critical words were presented once (read condition), immediately repeated (repeat condition), or followed by a dot signalling the participants to think of and say the just-previous word (refresh condition). In Experiments 1 and 2, Remember responses benefited from refreshing a word (in comparison with reading it). In Experiment 2, this benefit disappeared when participants had to refresh one of three active items. Perceptual repetition increased Remember responses in Experiment 1, but not in Experiment 2 regardless of whether participants had just previously seen 1- or 3-items. These findings indicate that under some circumstances, reflective and perceptual repetition may have different consequences for later subjective experience during remembering, suggesting differences in their underlying functional mechanisms.     

Long-term perceptual specificity effects in recognition memory: the transformed pictures paradigm.

The effects of a study/test mismatch in the viewing mode of natural scenes on recognition memory performance were examined. At both encoding and retrieval, scenes were presented either by being divided into quarters that were displayed in a sequential cumulative fashion or by scrolling the images through the screen, thereby gradually revealing the content of the images. Half of the participants were tested immediately after encoding and the other half after 48 hours. For both the immediate and delayed retrieval conditions, better recognition memory was demonstrated when viewing modes matched across study and test than when they mismatched. Implications for current processing and multiple systems views of memory are discussed.     

Effects of encoding the perceptual features of pictures on memory.

Four experiments investigated whether manipulations of type of encoding affects the likelihood of remembering pictures' visual details and their names. Using an incidental learning procedures, subjects were led to make judgments about pictures' colors, spatial orientations, or appropriateness in a scene. The results indicate that the nature of the memory test influences the effectiveness of different encoding conditions. Recall and recognition of pictures' names were best after subjects judged scene encodings, second best after they judged orientation, and poorest after they judged color. However, the results for the recognition of pictures' visual details were quite different. Analyses of d' suggested that type of encoding task had no effect on memory for visual details, whereas analysis of Pr (hit rate minus false-alarm rate) suggested that memory for visual details was impaired by conceptual encoding (judging the appropriateness of a picture in a scene). The results of one experiment demonstrated that these findings were not produced by variation in distinctiveness of the encoding questions. This pattern of findings implies that conceptual encoding facilitates retention of the names of the pictures at the cost of some loss in the ability to retain specific visual details.     

Response deadline and subjective awareness in recognition memory

Level of processing and generation effects were replicated in separate experiments in which recognition memory was tested using either short (500 ms) or long (1500 ms) response deadlines. These effects were similar at each deadline. Moreover, at each deadline these effects were associated with subsequent reports of remembering, not of knowing. And reports of both knowing and remembering increased following the longer deadline. These results imply that knowing does not index an automatic familiarity process, as conceived in some dual-process models of recognition, and that both remembering and knowing increase with the slower, more controlled processing permitted by the longer response time.     

The effects of attention on perceptual implicit memory

Reports on the effects of dividing attention at study on subsequent perceptual priming suggest that perceptual priming is generally unaffected by attentional manipulations as long as word identity is processed. We tested this hypothesis in three experiments by using the implicit word fragment completion and word stem completion tasks. Division of attention was instantiated with the Stroop task in order to ensure the processing of word identity even when the participant's attention was directed to a stimulus attribute other than the word itself. Under these conditions, we found that even though perceptual priming was significant, it was significantly reduced in magnitude. A stem cued recall test in Experiment 2 confirmed a more deleterious effect of divided attention on explicit memory. Taken together, our findings delineate the relative contributions of perceptual analysis and attentional processes in mediating perceptual priming on two ubiquitously used tasks of word fragment completion and word stem completion.     

Face recognition memory: The effects of exposure duration and encoding instruction

Two experiments test the effects of exposure duration and encoding instruction on the relative memory for five facial features. Participants viewed slides of Identi-kit faces and were later given a recognition test with same or changed versions of each face. Each changed test face involved a change in one facial feature: hair, eyes, chin, nose or mouth. In both experiments the upper-face features of hair and eyes were better recognized than the lower-face features of nose, mouth, and chin, as measured by false alarm rates. In Experiment 1, participants in the 20-second exposure duration condition remembered faces significantly better than participants in the 3-second exposure duration condition; however, memory for all five facial features improved at a similar rate with the increased duration. In Experiment 2, participants directed to use feature scanning encoding instructions remembered faces significantly better than participants following age judgement instructions; however, the size of the memory advantage for upper facial features was less with feature scanning instructions than with age judgement instructions. The results are discussed in terms of a quantitative difference in processing faces with longer exposure duration, versus a qualitative difference in processing faces with various encoding instructions. These results are related to conditions that affect the accuracy of eyewitness identification.     

Accurate forced-choice recognition without awareness of memory retrieval

Recognition confidence and the explicit awareness of memory retrieval commonly accompany accurate responding in recognition tests. Memory performance in recognition tests is widely assumed to measure explicit memory, but the generality of this assumption is questionable. Indeed, whether recognition in nonhumans is always supported by explicit memory is highly controversial. Here we identified circumstances wherein highly accurate recognition was unaccompanied by hallmark features of explicit memory. When memory for kaleidoscopes was tested using a two-alternative forced-choice recognition test with similar foils, recognition was enhanced by an attentional manipulation at encoding known to degrade explicit memory. Moreover, explicit recognition was most accurate when the awareness of retrieval was absent. These dissociations between accuracy and phenomenological features of explicit memory are consistent with the notion that correct responding resulted from experience-dependent enhancements of perceptual fluency with specific stimuli--the putative mechanism for perceptual priming effects in implicit memory tests. This mechanism may contribute to recognition performance in a variety of frequently-employed testing circumstances. Our results thus argue for a novel view of recognition, in that analyses of its neurocognitive foundations must take into account the potential for both (1) recognition mechanisms allied with implicit memory and (2) recognition mechanisms allied with explicit memory.     

Evidence for perceptual learning in pigeons' recognition memory for pictures

In two experiments, pigeons were trained on a recognition memory task, which required them to refrain from responding to a picture seen earlier that day. They learned this discrimination without detectable reliance on cues relating to the sequence of positive and negative trials. In both experiments, performance was significantly better when the same restricted set of stimuli was used each day than when an entirely novel set of stimuli was used each day, and in the former case there was less evidence of any significant decline in performance with increases in the interval between first and second presentations of a stimulus. The results suggest a powerful perceptual learning effect.     

On the relation between perceptual priming and recognition memory

Two experiments evaluated the hypothesis that perceptual fluency is used to infer prior occurrence. Subjects heard (Experiment 1) or saw (Experiment 2) a list of words and then were presented in the same modality with both these and other words twice in succession: first in a more or less impoverished fashion, and then in clear fashion. For the first of these two presentations, the subjects tried to identify the word; for the second, they gave a recognition judgement. As predicted by the perceptual fluency hypothesis, and as has been found in previous research, the recognition judgments were more positive for identified words than for unidentified words. However, degree of impoverishment, by which apparent perceptual fluency was brought under experimental control, did not affect the recognition judgments. The perceptual fluency hypothesis was therefore not supported, and the observed relation between identification and recognition was attributed to an item selection effect.     

Context-dependent repetition effects on recognition memory

One widely acknowledged way to improve our memory performance is to repeatedly study the to be learned material. One aspect that has received little attention in past research regards the context sensitivity of this repetition effect, that is whether the item is repeated within the same or within different contexts. The predictions of a neuro-computational model (O’Reilly & Norman, 2002) were tested in an experiment requiring participants to study visual objects either once or three times. Crucially, for half of the repeated objects the study context (encoding task, background color and screen position) remained the same (within context repetition) while for the other half the contextual features changed across repetitions (across context repetition). In addition to behavioral measures, event-related potentials (ERP) were recorded that provide complementary information on the underlying neural mechanisms during recognition. Consistent with dual-process models behavioral estimates (remember/know-procedure) demonstrate differential effects of context on memory performance, namely that recognition judgements were more dependent on familiarity when repetition occurs across contexts. In accordance with these behavioral results ERPs showed a larger early frontal old/new effect for across context repetitions as compared to within context repetitions and single presentations, i.e. an increase in familiarity following repetition across study contexts. In contrast, the late parietal old/new effect, indexing recollection did not differ between both repetition conditions. These results suggest that repetition differentially affects familiarity depending on whether it occurs within the same context or across different contexts.     

Visual-auditory events: cross-modal perceptual priming and recognition memory.

Modality specificity in priming is taken as evidence for independent perceptual systems. However, Easton, Greene, and Srinivas (1997) showed that visual and haptic cross-modal priming is comparable in magnitude to within-modal priming. Where appropriate, perceptual systems might share like information. To test this, we assessed priming and recognition for visual and auditory events, within- and across- modalities. On the visual test, auditory study resulted in no priming. On the auditory priming test, visual study resulted in priming that was only marginally less than within-modal priming. The priming results show that visual study facilitates identification on both visual and auditory tests, but auditory study only facilitates performance on the auditory test. For both recognition tests, within-modal recognition exceeded cross-modal recognition. The results have two novel implications for the understanding of perceptual priming: First, we introduce visual and auditory priming for spatio-temporal events as a new priming paradigm chosen for its ecological validity and potential for information exchange. Second, we propose that the asymmetry of the cross-modal priming observed here may reflect the capacity of these perceptual modalities to provide cross-modal constraints on ambiguity. We argue that visual perception might inform and constrain auditory processing, while auditory perception corresponds to too many potential visual events to usefully inform and constrain visual perception.     

The effects of elaboration on recognition memory

Two experiments were conducted to examine the effects of elaboration on recognition memory. Subjects were given either simple or complex sentences to learn and were tested for recognition of either an individual target word or the entire sentence. Complex sentences supported better recognition performance only when the test item allowed the subject to easily redintegrate the initial encoding context, either by re-presenting the encoded sentence as the test item or by constructing sentences such that the component words of the sentence could be easily redintegrated from an individual target item. It was suggested that complex, elaborate encoding established a richer trace, but that this richness can be utilized to enhance recognition only when the test conditions permit a reinstatement of the original encoding context.     

Aging effects on memory encoding in the frontal lobes

Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) was used to compare frontal-lobe activation in younger and older adults during encoding of words into memory. Participants made semantic or nonsemantic judgments about words. Younger adults exhibited greater activation for semantic relative to nonsemantic judgments in several regions, with the largest activation in the left inferior frontal gyrus. Older adults exhibited greater activation for semantic judgments in the same regions. but the extent of activation was reduced in left prefrontal regions. In older adults, there was a significant association between behavioral tests of declarative and working memory and extent of frontal activation. These results suggest that age-associated decreases in memory ability may be due to decreased frontal-lobe contributions to the initial encoding of experience.     

Effects of repetition priming on recognition memory: testing a perceptual fluency-disfluency model

Five experiments explored the effects of immediate repetition priming on episodic recognition (the "Jacoby-Whitehouse effect") as measured with forced-choice testing. These experiments confirmed key predictions of a model adapted from D. E. Huber and R. C. O'Reilly's (2003) dynamic neural network of perception. In this model, short prime durations pre-activate primed items, enhancing perceptual fluency and familiarity, whereas long prime durations result in habituation, causing perceptual disfluency and less familiarity. Short duration primes produced a recognition preference for primed words (Experiments 1, 2, and 5), whereas long duration primes produced a preference against primed words (Experiments 3, 4, and 5). Experiment 2 found prime duration effects even when participants accurately identified short duration primes. A cued-recall task included in Experiments 3, 4, and 5 found priming effects only for recognition trials that were followed by cued-recall failure. These results suggest that priming can enhance as well as lower familiarity, without affecting recollection. Experiment 4 provided a manipulation check on this procedure through a delay manipulation that preferentially affected recognition followed by cued-recall success.     

Feature frequency effects in recognition memory

Rare words are usually better recognized than common words, a finding in recognition memory known as the word-frequency effect. Some theories predict the word-frequency effect because they assume that rare words consist of more distinctive features than do common words (e.g., Shiffrin & Steyvers's, 1997, REM theory). In this study, recognition memory was tested for words that vary in the commonness of their orthographic features, and we found that recognition was best for words made up of primarily rare letters. In addition, a mirror effect was observed: Words with rare letters had a higher hit rate and a lower false-alarm rate than did words with common letters. We also found that normative word frequency affects recognition independently of letter frequency. Therefore, the distinctiveness of a word's orthographic features is one, but not the only, factor necessary to explain the word-frequency effect.     

Response set effects in recognition memory

In three experiments, Ss responded to individual digits or letters according to whether or not each was in some prememorized list. There were either two possible responses (yes-no condition) or a single response (yes-only and no-only conditions). With memory sets of one, two, or four digits, RT was a linear function of memory set size. The slope of the function was least under the yes-only condition and greatest under the yes-no condition. Nonspecific practice had little effect on any of the slopes. With memory sets of 4, 8, or 12 letters, the slopes under the yes-only and yes-no conditions did not seem to differ, and practice with specific sets flattened the function considerably in both cases. Overall, the errors under the yes-no condition were mostly false alarms, those under the no-only condition mostly misses, and those under the yes-no condition were divided about equally. The results are interpreted partially in terms of a multiple-observations model of decision time.     

On the contribution of perceptual fluency and priming to recognition memory

Repetition priming has been shown to be independent of recognition memory. Thus, the severely amnesic patient E.P. has demonstrated intact stem completion priming and perceptual identification priming, despite at-chance performance on recognition memory tasks. It has also been shown that perceptual fluency can influence feelings of familiarity, in the sense that items perceived more quickly tend to be identified as familiar. If studied items are identified more fluently, due to perceptual priming, and fluency leads to familiarity, why do severely amnesic patients perform no better than chance on recognition memory tasks? One possibility is that severely amnesic patients do not exhibit normal fluency. Another possibility is that fluency is not a sufficiently strong cue for familiarity. In two experiments, 2 severely amnesic patients, 3 moderately amnesic patients, and 8 controls saw words slowly clearing from a mask. The participants identified each word as quickly as possible and then made a recognition (old/new) judgment. All the participants exhibited fluency, in that old responses were associated with shorter identification times than new responses were. In addition, for the severely amnesic patients, priming was intact, and recognition memory performance was at chance. We next calculated how much priming and fluency should elevate the probability of accurate recognition. The tendency to identify studied words rapidly (.6) and the tendency to label these rapidly identified words old (.6) would result in 36% of the studied words being labeled old. Other studied words were identified slowly (.4) but were still labeled old (.4), resulting in an additional 16% of studied words labeled old. Thus, the presence of fluency increases the probability of accurate recognition judgments to only 52% (chance = 50%). This finding explains why amnesic patients can exhibit both priming and fluency yet still perform at chance on recognition tests.     

Stimulus suffix effects in recognition memory

Recall of auditory items can be disrupted by presentation of an irrelevant auditory stimulus (a stimulus suffix). Previous researchers have suggested that suffix effects are not found on recognition tests. Two experiments are presented here that demonstrate suffix effects on recognition tests. These results suggest that suffixes interfere with item information and that suffix effects cannot be attributed solely to retrieval processes.