Current alexithymia research. Critical comments on the "instrumentalizing" critique

Referring to the paradigms of newly developed tests, split-brain research, and modern treatment strategies, Hoppe argues that Ahren's critique (1988) of research on alexithymia is onesided because it ignores incompatible research findings.     

Newtonian Supertasks: A Critical Analysis

In two recent papers Perez Laraudogoitia has described a variety of supertasks involving elastic collisions in Newtonian systems containing a denumerably infinite set of particles. He maintains that these various supertasks give examples of systems in which energy is not conserved, particles at rest begin to move spontaneously, particles disappear from a system, and particles are created ex nihilo. An analysis of these supertasks suggests that they involve systems that do not satisfy the mathematical conditions required of Newtonian systems at the time the supertask is due to be completed, or else they rely on the application of the time-reversal transformation to states which are not well-defined. Consequently, it is unjustified to conclude that the paradoxical results are arising from within the framework of Newtonian mechanics. In the last part of this article, we discuss various aspects of the physics of these supertasks.     

Critical Notices

Abstract

I argue that a practice can only be taken to be one of apparent rule following if it contains a practice of policing moves within the practice. So the existence of an apparently rule‐governed practice entails the existence of, what I call, a policing practice. I then argue that this entailment cannot be reconciled with a non‐factualist construal of the policing practice. Thus non‐factualism about the policing practice is false. Factualism about the policing practice entails realism about rules. So I conclude that we ought to be realists about rules. Finally I distinguish a position which I call ultra‐realism about rules and note that this too is a casualty of the view developed here.     

Infinity and a Critical View of Logic

Abstract

The paper explores the view that in mathematics, in particular where the infinite is involved, the application of classical logic to statements involving the infinite cannot be taken for granted. L. E. J. Brouwer’s well-known rejection of classical logic is sketched, and the views of David Hilbert and especially Hermann Weyl, both of whom used classical logic in their mathematical practice, are explored. We inquire whether arguments for a critical view can be found that are independent of constructivist premises and consider the entanglement of logic and mathematics. This offers a convincing case regarding second-order logic, but for first-order logic, it is not so clear. Still, we ask whether we understand the application of logic to the higher infinite better than we understand the higher infinite itself.     

The "what" and "where" of object representations in infancy

Four-month-olds' memory for surface feature and location information was tested following brief occlusions. When the target objects were images of female faces or monochromatic asterisks infants showed increased looking times following a change in identity or color but not following a change in location or combinations of feature and location information. When the target objects were images of manipulable toys, the infants showed increased looking times following a change in location but not identity or the binding of location and identity information. This evidence is consistent with the idea that young infants are unable to maintain the information processed separately in both the dorsal and ventral visual streams during occlusions. Our results suggest that it is the target's affordance for action that determines whether the dorsal or ventral information is selectively maintained during occlusion.     

一种实用主义的数学哲学观

作者在这篇文论中提出了一种实用主义的数学哲学观。其中的想法是,通过分析各种数学哲学思想对于数学实践的实际影响来比较它们的价值。为解释这种想法的可行性,作者将论证,正是数学的某些特性使得实用主义的方法能够被自然地运用于对数学哲学诸观点的分析。在之后的一节中,作者会给出一些案例分析以展示某些哲学观点是如何具体地影响数学研究的。文章的写作假设读者具备了一些关于经典逻辑和集合论的基础知识。     

Short-term memory for "surprising" versus "expected" unconditioned stimuli in Pavlovian conditioning.

Rabbits were trained via a Pavlovian eyelid-conditioning regime to respond differentially to a conditioned stimulus (CSR) depending on whether or not that stimulus was preceded several seconds earlier by a preparatory stimulus consisting of an electric shock otherwise employed as an unconditioned stimulus (UCS). Following training, differential responding to CSR varied systematically with the interval between the preparatory stimulus and CSR, consistent with assumptions concerning decay of information in short-term memory. The major finding, however, involved the test effects of announcing the preparatory stimulus by either a conditioned stimulus with which it had otherwise been paired (CS+) or a conditioned stimulus with which it had otherwise been systematically unpaired (CS-). The greater differential responding to the following CSR in the latter case is taken to support the notion that a "surprising" UCS is more likely to be retained (rehearsed) in short-term memory than is an "expected" UCS.     

The "Natural" and the "Formal"

The paper presents an argument against a metaphysical conception of logic according to which logic spells out a specific kind of mathematical structure that is somehow inherently related to our factual reasoning. In contrast, it is argued that it is always an empirical question as to whether a given mathematical structure really does captures a principle of reasoning. (More generally, it is argued that it is not meaningful to replace an empirical investigation of a thing by an investigation of its a priori analyzable structure without paying due attention to the question of whether it really is the structure of the thing in question.) It is proposed to elucidate the situation by distinguishing two essentially different realms with which our reason must deal: the realm of the natural, constituted by the things of our empirical world, and the realm of the formal, constituted by the structures that we use as prisms to view, to make sense of, and to reconstruct the world. It is suggested that this vantage point may throw light on many foundational problems of logic.     

错误后减慢理论模型述评

错误后减慢是指错误后正确反应与正确后正确反应相比反应时显著延长的现象.目前研究者已经发现错误后减慢、错误后正确率提高以及错误后干扰效应减少三种错误调控行为,其中错误后减慢是最稳定的错误后行为表现.早期研究主要从冲突监控理论、激活抑制假说、强化学习理论和失匹配理论等角度解释该现象,近年来,研究者又提出了注意朝向理论和评估适应假说.对于该领域未来的研究可以从错误类型、无意识加工、个体差异、新的分析技术的运用方面考虑,以便全面揭示错误后减慢现象的本质.     

How Mathematical Concepts Get Their Bodies

When the traditional distinction between a mathematical concept and a mathematical intuition is tested against examples taken from the real history of mathematics one can observe the following interesting phenomena. First, there are multiple examples where concepts and intuitions do not well fit together; some of these examples can be described as “poorly conceptualised intuitions” while some others can be described as “poorly intuited concepts”. Second, the historical development of mathematics involves two kinds of corresponding processes: poorly conceptualised intuitions are further conceptualised while poorly intuited concepts are further intuited. In this paper I study this latter process in mathematics during the twentieth century and, more specifically, show the role of set theory and category theory in this process. I use this material for defending the following claims: (1) mathematical intuitions are subject to historical development just like mathematical concepts; (2) mathematical intuitions continue to play their traditional role in today's mathematics and will plausibly do so in the foreseeable future. This second claim implies that the popular view, according to which modern mathematical concepts, unlike their more traditional predecessors, cannot be directly intuited, is not justified.     

Critical Thinking is Epistemically Responsible

Michael Huemer ( 2005 ) argues that following the epistemic strategy of Critical Thinking—that is, thinking things through for oneself—leaves the agent epistemically either worse off or no better off than an alternative strategy of Credulity—that is, trusting the authorities. Therefore, Critical Thinking is not epistemically responsible. This article argues that Reasonable Credulity entails Critical Thinking, and since Reasonable Credulity is epistemically responsible, the Critical Thinking that it entails is epistemically responsible too.     

Mathematical Explanation and Epistemology: Please Mind the Gap

This paper draws together two strands in the debate over the existence of mathematical objects. The first strand concerns the notion of extra‐mathematical explanation: the explanation of physical facts, in part, by facts about mathematical objects. The second strand concerns the access problem for platonism: the problem of how to account for knowledge of mathematical objects. I argue for the following conditional: if there are extra‐mathematical explanations, then the core thesis of the access problem is false. This has implications for nominalists and platonists alike. Platonists can make a case for epistemic access to mathematical objects by providing evidence in favour of the existence of extra‐mathematical explanations. Nominalists, by contrast, can use the access problem to cast doubt on the idea that mathematical objects play a substantive role in scientific explanation. 1     

"This is Simply What I Do"

Wittgenstein's discussion of rule‐following is widely regarded to have identified what Kripke called “the most radical and original sceptical problem that philosophy has seen to date”. But does it? This paper examines the problem in the light of Charles Peirce's distinctive scientific hierarchy. Peirce identifies a phenomenological inquiry which is prior to both logic and metaphysics, whose role is to identify the most fundamental philosophical categories. His third category, particularly salient in this context. pertains to general predication. Rule‐following scepticism, the paper suggests, results from running together two questions: “How is it that I can project rules?”, and, “What is it for a given usage of a rule to be right?”. In Peircean terms the former question, concerning the irreducibility of general predication (to singular reference), must be answered in phenomenology, while the latter, concerning the difference between true and false predication, is answered in logic. A failure to appreciate this distinction, it is argued, has led philosophers to focus exclusively on Wittgenstein's famous public account of rule‐following rightness, thus overlooking a private, phenomenological dimension to Wittgenstein's remarks on following a rule which gives the lie to Kripke's reading of him as a sceptic.     

The odd effect and multiple meanings in English of the words "odd" and "even"

Under a variety of conditions, people take longer to make judgments about odd than about even digits and digit names. In English the words "odd" and "even" have multiple meanings. Perhaps the multiple meanings of these words are responsible for the slowing of responses to odd stimuli. This hypothesis was tested using participants who spoke no English and in whose native language, Polish, the words for the mathematical concepts of odd and even do not have multiple meanings.     

Evidence,explanation and enhanced indispensability

In this paper I shall adopt a possible reading of the notions of ‘explanatory indispensability’ and ‘genuine mathematical explanation in science’ on which the Enhanced Indispensability Argument (EIA) proposed by Alan Baker is based. Furthermore, I shall propose two examples of mathematical explanation in science and I shall show that, whether the EIA-partisans accept the reading I suggest, they are easily caught in a dilemma. To escape this dilemma they need to adopt some account of explanation and offer a plausible answer to the following ‘question of evidence’: What is a genuine mathematical explanation in empirical science and on what basis do we consider it as such? Finally, I shall suggest how a possible answer to the question of evidence might be given through a specific account of mathematical explanation in science. Nevertheless, the price of adopting this standpoint is that the genuineness of mathematical explanations of scientific facts turns out to be dependent on pragmatic constraints and therefore cannot be plugged in EIA and used to establish existential claims about mathematical objects.     

Critical Inquiry: Considering the Context

In this paper we discuss the relevance of considering context for critical thinking. We argue that critical thinking is best viewed in terms of ‘critical inquiry’ in which argumentation is seen as a way of arriving at reasoned judgments on complex issues. This is a dialectical process involving the comparative weighing of a variety of contending positions and arguments. Using the model which we have developed for teaching critical thinking as critical inquiry, we demonstrate the role played by the following aspects of context: (1) knowledge of the dialectical context (the debate around an issue, both current and historical); (2) an understanding of the current state of practice and belief surrounding an issue; (3) an understanding of the intellectual, political, historical and social contexts in which an issue is embedded; (4) knowledge of the relevant disciplinary context; (5) information about the sources of an argument; (6) awareness of one’s own beliefs and biases.     

L. L. Thurstone: A new assessment

Most psychologists have heard of Thurstone, and know him as a pioneer of mathematical psychology and factor analysis. But his appearances in history books are rare and peripheral, as a man of technical prowess rather than intellectual achievement, and at best he is seen as a link in the tradition culminating in signal detection and mathematical learning theory. Nineteen eighty-seven is the centenary of his birth, so it is a timely moment to correct this picture. Thurstone was influenced by G. H. Mead, and his work is best placed within the pragmatist movement, not as moving towards the mechanistic psychology that now dominates psychology. Viewed in this way, his true status and the reasons for his relative neglect become apparent. This is illustrated by a detailed consideration of his mathematical learning models.     

The Higgs Boson: An Adventure in Critical Realism

Abstract

The search for the Higgs boson has been like the search of a pirate for buried gold. Like the pirate, the physicist has a map, a conceptual map—the Standard Model (SM) made up of mathematical formulas. Without the Higgs boson in the SM, fundamental particles would be massless. Where could the mass mechanism be? The conceptual map pointed in the right direction. On July 4, 2012 the pirates found their treasure with the help of the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) at CERN. In this article a physicist and theologian ask: could this be critical realism (CR) at work? Could CR constitute a set of presuppositions shared by both physicists and theologians who cannot see the object of their inquiry but employ conceptual models that presuppose the reality of its referent? What role could shared CR play in the creative mutual interaction between science and theology?     

Preschool children's mathematical knowledge: The effect of teacher "math talk."

This study examined the relation between the amount of mathematical input in the speech of preschool or day-care teachers and the growth of children's conventional mathematical knowledge over the school year. Three main findings emerged. First, there were marked individual differences in children's conventional mathematical knowledge by 4 years of age that were associated with socioeconomic status. Second, there were dramatic differences in the amount of math-related talk teachers provided. Third, and most important, the amount of teachers' math-related talk was significantly related to the growth of preschoolers' conventional mathematical knowledge over the school year but was unrelated to their math knowledge at the start of the school year.