Mental imagery and dyslexia: a deficit in processing multipart visual objects?

Dyslexic and normal control subjects memorized simple line patterns inside a grid and subsequently judged whether an "X" would have fallen on the pattern had it been present in an empty grid. The patterns were letters and novel shapes. The grids were presented to the left visual field, to the right visual field, or in central vision. Dyslexic subjects had difficulty generating images of multipart patterns, but this deficit was limited to letters. The findings suggest that dyslexics may have selective difficulty integrating visual information stored in long-term memory.     

Word and picture identification: Is representational parsimony possible?

Four experiments were conducted to evaluate the proposition that although prior exposure to a printed word facilitates identification of a corresponding picture, exposure to a picture does not facilitate subsequent word recognition (Durso & Johnson, 1979). Word identification was used, rather than naming latency, in order to avoid the range limitations in adult reading data. Word identification was facilitated by intermodal priming (prior exposure to a corresponding picture), although to a lesser extent than by intramodal (i.e., word-word) priming; the magnitude of intermodal priming was insensitive to strategy; and, as with priming from spoken to printed language, the major impact of word frequency occurred under intermodal, as distinct from intramodal, conditions. Following Scarborough, Gerard, and Cortese (1979), a fifth experiment compared word identification and episodic recognition. Intramodal performance was superior in word identification, whereas intermodal (i.e. picture-word) performance was superior in episodic recognition, a reversal which suggests that episodic recognition involves access to a distinct memory trace.     

Patents and ethics: Is it possible to be balanced?

In this presentation, principles of ethics are confronted with the desire of the inventor to make a profit. To this end the presentation is focused on patent protection. Patents should guarantee the return of an inventor’s investment and profit and, on the other side, ensure availability — by patent disclosure — of the invention for the society when the patent terminates. Recent patent applications made by inventors are infringing this principle and societies are paying an unexpected price for these practices. Patent claims are too broad and disclosures too poor. Extreme examples will be discussed. An earlier version of this paper was presented at an international conference, “The Ethics of Intellectual Property Rights and Patents,” held in Warsaw, Poland on 23–24 April, 2004.     

Is structural underdetermination possible?

Structural realism is sometimes said to undermine the theory underdetermination (TUD) argument against realism, since, in usual TUD scenarios, the supposed underdetermination concerns the object-like theoretical content but not the structural content. The paper explores the possibility of structural TUD by considering some special cases from modern physics, but also questions the validity of the TUD argument itself. The upshot is that cases of structural TUD cannot be excluded, but that TUD is perhaps not such a terribly serious anti-realistic argument.     

Is There Really Mental Disorder?

Proponents of the reality of mental disorder claim that mental disorder is ontologically real in the same sense that the variola virus and smallpox are ontologically real. The chief architect of the DSM-III revolution, Robert Spitzer (Zimmerman & Spitzer, 2005 Zimmerman , M. , & Spitzer , R. , L. ( 2005 ). Psychiatric classification . In B. J. Sadock & V. A. Sadock (Eds.), Comprehensive textbook of psychiatry (pp. 1003 – 1033 ). Philadelphia , PA : Lippincott, Williams, and Wilkins . [Google Scholar]), candidly admits that a diagnosis of primary mental disorder present must be arbitrary because the distress or social impairment under consideration could well be a normal-range reaction to stressful events. Based on Jerome Wakefield's harmful dysfunction thesis, Spitzer hopes that research in evolutionary psychology can solve the perennial “false positive” problem in psychiatric diagnosis. Interestingly, in 1988 Wakefield , J. ( 1988 ). Hermeneutics and empiricism . In S. B. Messer , L. A. Sass & R. L. Woolfolk (Eds.), Hermeneutics and psychological theory (pp. 131 – 150 ). New Brunswick , CT : Rutgers University Press . [Google Scholar] Wakefield argued that the study of meaning (i.e., human behavior and the products of human behavior, such as art and literature) could not be assimilated to empiricism (science), but evidently he subsequently changed his mind. The present paper sides with the 1988 Wakefield , J. ( 1988 ). Hermeneutics and empiricism . In S. B. Messer , L. A. Sass & R. L. Woolfolk (Eds.), Hermeneutics and psychological theory (pp. 131 – 150 ). New Brunswick , CT : Rutgers University Press . [Google Scholar] Wakefield. It is an illusion to hope that research in evolutionary psychology will reveal how people are supposed to react to stressful events and thereby rescue psychiatric diagnosis from the false positive problem. The identification of mental disorder will remain akin to the identification of pornography, i.e., a case of reification based on interpretation and moral reasoning. The fiction that mental disorder is real turns attention away from past and present conditions of living. This may serve some interests, but it is not likely to serve the patient's interests.     

Developing intelligence: Is a comprehensive theory possible?

This introduction first outlines the main issues and questions about mind and intelligence that need to be dealt with by disciplines such as differential, developmental, and cognitive, psychology. It then summarizes the major findings of the target article, the main points raised by the commentators, and the main points of the rejoinder. It ends up with a set of questions to be followed by future research.     

Is second order practice possible?

This paper looks at the difficulties in applying second order ideas to therapeutic practice. It considers, first, what second order ideas are and how they relate to one another, second, what second order practice looks like, and third, the problems these ideas create when trying to apply them. It is argued that their pure application is impossible given our strong moral beliefs, but that there are good ethical and aesthetic reasons for taking such ideas as far as we can.
'There are always people who possess a theory they cannot act on.'(Leih Tzu from The Book of Leih Tzu)     

What is primed in priming from imagery?

Priming from imagery is typically weaker than that from perception. This has been interpreted as resulting from weaker activation of perceptual processes. However, for imagery and perception, commonality is only half the story: Each is also characterized by specific processes. If priming can be due to both unshared and shared components of imagery and perception, then it should be possible to observe greater priming from imagery than from perception. Two new priming experiments were designed to test this hypothesis, while controlling incidental task differences. In both experiments, participants studied objects by counting their parts (from a mental image or a picture). Experiment 1 used a word-picture matching test task, which was hypothesized to depend on stimulus processing specific to perception, and Experiment 2 a size judgment test task, which was hypothesized to depend on retrieval and generation processes specific to imagery. As predicted, priming for perceived objects was greater than priming for imagined objects in the word-picture matching task. Conversely, in the size judgment task, more priming from imagery than from perception was observed. These results support the conclusions that (a) imagery and perception have substantial unshared processes, and (b) these processes contribute to priming.     

Is the sky 2? Contextual priming in grapheme-color synaesthesia

Grapheme-color synaesthesia is a neurological phenomenon in which particular graphemes, such as the numeral 9, automatically induce the simultaneous perception of a particular color, such as the color red. To test whether the concurrent color sensations in grapheme-color synaesthesia are treated as meaningful stimuli, we recorded event-related brain potentials as 8 synaesthetes and 8 matched control subjects read sentences such as "Looking very clear, the lake was the most beautiful hue of 7." In synaesthetes, but not control subjects, congruous graphemes, compared with incongruous graphemes, elicited a more negative N1 component, a less positive P2 component, and a less negative N400 component. Thus, contextual congruity of synaesthetically induced colors altered the brain response to achromatic graphemes beginning 100 ms postonset, affecting pattern-recognition, perceptual, and meaning-integration processes. The results suggest that grapheme-color synaesthesia is automatic and perceptual in nature and also suggest that the connections between colors and numbers are bidirectional.     

Is 'Normal Grief' a Mental Disorder?

I argue that grief (including 'normal grief') is a mental disorder. I discuss the main concepts involved briefly, and state the prima facie case in favour of the view that grief is a disorder. I consider objections that grief is not a disorder because (a) it is a normal response; (b) it is more healthy than failing to grieve; (c) it involves cognitive good; (d) it is a rational response; (e) it ought not to be medicalized or treated; (f ) it has a 'distinct sustaining cause'. Each objection is flawed, and I conclude that there is a strong case for regarding even 'normal' grief as a disorder. Alternatively, the arguments in this paper may be taken as attacking 'orthodoxrsquo; definitions of mental health (e.g., in DSM 4th edn) by providing an extended discussion of one particular counter-example.