Kierkegaard and Psychology as the Science of the “Multifarious Life”

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the actuality of some considerations around psychology made by the Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855). According to him psychology is about the “multifarious” life, which is a term that pinpoints the challenges psychology still have when it comes to including changes and genetic perspectives on its understanding of actual living. Yet Kierkegaard discusses psychology in relationship to metaphysics, which is an almost forgotten perspective. His understanding opens up for narrowing the definition of psychology down to the science of subjectivity, which at the same time elevates psychology to being the only science that focuses on the actual human life. Yet Kierkegaard’s most important contribution to psychology is to maintain a radical distinction between subjectivity and objectivity, and in this respect the psychology of today is challenged.     

Psychology as the Science of Self-Reports and Finger Movements: Whatever Happened to Actual Behavior?

ABSTRACT— Psychology calls itself the science of behavior, and the American Psychological Association's current "Decade of Behavior" was intended to increase awareness and appreciation of this aspect of the science. Yet some psychological subdisciplines have never directly studied behavior, and studies on behavior are dwindling rapidly in other subdisciplines. We discuss the eclipse of behavior in personality and social psychology, in which direct observation of behavior has been increasingly supplanted by introspective self-reports, hypothetical scenarios, and questionnaire ratings. We advocate a renewed commitment to including direct observation of behavior whenever possible and in at least a healthy minority of research projects.     

And the Winner is… Awards for the Integration of Science and Practice in Psychology

Psychotherapists from all fields perform difficult and challenging work, trying to help their clients gain insight into their problems and make lasting changes in their thoughts and behaviors. Unfortunately, too often the work of a psychotherapist is minimized, neglected, or disregarded. Where departmental or conference awards may be presented regularly, public recognition for evidence-based and clinically-relevant published work is lacking. The present paper aims to acknowledge the most valuable recent accomplishments in the field of mental health assessment and treatment. Nominations were accepted for works published during 2017, papers of enduring value, and most valuable psychologist, and votes were cast by a panel of judges. These valuable contributions are recommended for all psychotherapists who hope to improve their work with clients.     

The Future of Psychology： Evolutionary Approach to Scientific Psychology

＂Evolutionary psychology is an approach to psychology, in which knowledge and principles from evolutionary biology are put to use in research on the structure of the human mind＂ （Cosmides ＆ Tooby, 2001, p.1）. The approach can be used to study and to provide broad theoretical framing of nearly all of the issues and topics within the traditionally defined fields of psychology. The 19 papers included in this special issue on evolutionary psychology are written by leading scholars in the field and address topics that can be organized by the familiar divisions of cognitive, developmental, and social psychology.     

What is the Good Life? Positive Psychology and the Renaissance of Humanistic Psychology

Positive and humanistic psychology overlap in thematic content and theoretical presuppositions, yet positive psychology explicitly distances itself as a new movement, despite the fact that its literature implicitly references its extensive historical grounding within humanistic psychology. Consequently, humanistic psychologists both celebrate diffusion of humanistic ideas furthered by positive psychology, and resent its disavowal of the humanistic tradition. The undeniably close alignment of these two schools of thought is demonstrated in the embracing of eudaimonic, in contrast to hedonic, conceptions of happiness by positive psychology. Eudaimonic happiness cannot be purely value-free, nor can it be completely studied without using both nomethetic and idiographic (i.e., quantitative and qualitative) methods in addressing problems of value, which identifies positive psychology clearly as a humanistic approach, despite its protestations.     

From the Characterization of ‘European Philosophy of Science’ to the Case of Philosophy of the Social Sciences

How distinct is European philosophy of science? The first step is to characterize what is or might be considered as ‘European philosophy of science’. The second is to analyse philosophy of the social sciences as a relevant case in the European contribution to philosophy of science. (1) ‘European perspective’ requires some clarification, which can be done from two main angles: the historical approach and the thematic view. Thus, there are several structural and dynamic things to be considered in European philosophy of science and compare with other conceptions: (i) the topics discussed; (ii) the contents proposed; and (iii) the style of thought used. (2) The case of philosophy of the social sciences is relevant for the historical approach and for the thematic view. Historically, the Erklären–Verstehen methodological controversy arose in this continent, where the main authors and most of the influential approaches are located. Thematically, we can consider the contributions made by these European approaches to philosophy of the social sciences. They give us some distinctive features of European philosophy of science.     

Should Psychology Ignore the Language of the Brain?

ABSTRACT— Claims that neuroscientific data do not contribute to our understanding of psychological functions have been made recently. Here I argue that these criticisms are solely based on an analysis of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies. However, fMRI is only one of the methods in the toolkit of cognitive neuroscience. I provide examples from research on event-related brain potentials (ERPs) that have contributed to our understanding of the cognitive architecture of human language functions. In addition, I provide evidence of (possible) contributions from fMRI measurements to our understanding of the functional architecture of language processing. Finally, I argue that a neurobiology of human language that integrates information about the necessary genetic and neural infrastructures will allow us to answer certain questions that are not answerable if all we have is evidence from behavior.     

Psychology and Culture: Back to the Future?

Psychology has a poor record in addressing cultural phenomena. One response is to turn to ancient concepts from local traditions and to use these as alternative analytic categories to explain behavior. However, there are problems with such an approach. These concepts will be read from the vantage point of the present and interpreted differently so as to propose different diagnoses (and solutions) for contemporary social problems. As an alternative, rather than using ancient resources as analytic categories in the explanation of behavior, we could instead examine how they are used as categories of practice as people actively make sense of their social context and themselves. Attending to such contemporary ‘lay’ usage (and the contestation it entails) allows for a more dynamic conception of cultural processes than is typical in psychology. More generally, I believe that it is possible to use our psychological constructs so that we can see the distinctive particularities of the phenomena before us in new and interesting ways, and in ways that respect their cultural specificity. This claim is illustrated through reference to recent work using the concept of social identity to illuminate aspects of Hindu pilgrimage.     

The Psychology of the persecutor — With reference to Costa Gavras's film Music Box

This paper is based on the author's interpretation of the film Music Box by Costa Gavras. The external and internal preconditions in the development of a persecutor are discussed in an attempt to understand the process from a socio-psychological as well as psychoanalytic viewpoint. During crises of a social nature, earlier coping strategies lose their validity, resulting in a narcissistic blow to the individual's ego. Earlier repressed primitive aspects of the personality are reactivated. When the individual is exposed to a totalitarian ideology which promises salvation from anxiety, paranoid processes become anchored and may dominate.

The protagonist in the film is approached as a case-study. By reviewing his present and past actions, the process by which the young man became a persecutor is exemplified as well as the long-term effects upon his object relations.     

A Method Facilitating the Application of the χ2 Test to Certain Problems Arising in Social Psychology

Abstract

The relationship of generalized locus of control expectancies to the judgment of emotion from facial expressions by male and female American college students in the context of anticipating and not anticipating an interaction with a stranger was examined. Subjects were randomly assigned to either anticipatory or nonanticipatory conditions. As hypothesized, internals were more accurate than externals in overall judgment of emotion from standardized slide photographs of facial expressions. Male, but not female, externals responded poorly to the anticipated interaction with a stranger. Females were significantly more accurate than males at identifying fear expressions and tended to be more accurate overall.     

Locked into the System? Critical Community Psychology Approaches to Personal Debt in the Context of Crises of Capital Accumulation

The considerable and sustained boom in personal debt recently has in many countries around the world led to experiences of over‐indebtedness that are associated with very considerable distress and suffering. This article explores critical perspectives that situate personal debt, material deprivation and suffering, and specific ways of knowing and acting, within the context of recent political and economic practices. There is a need to focus on positioning people's experiences of debt within a broader matrix of factors of national and international practices and policies, including globalisation, changing labour markets, and poorly regulated financial industries. These factors appear to have allowed a network of international financial institutions to adopt practices that have proved successful in creating personal debt. Yet, an individualised discourse of financial capability has been propagated, configuring personal debt as a problem of irresponsible individual consumption. In order to explore ways of resisting reactionary and individualised modes of addressing personal debt, proposals will be made of alternative paradigms for responding to personal debt, defined by two dimensions of community psychological practice, with examples. This article aims to increase collective awareness of the systemic character of debt and the collective responses required. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What’s in It for the Historian of Science? Reflections on the Value of Philosophy of Science for History of Science

In this article, I explore the value of philosophy of science for history of science. I start by introducing a distinction between two ways of integrating history and philosophy of science: historical philosophy of science (HPS) and philosophical history of science (PHS). I then offer a critical discussion of Imre Lakatos’s project to bring philosophy of science to bear on historical interpretation. I point out certain flaws in Lakatos’s project, which I consider indicative of what went wrong with PHS in the past. Finally, I put forward my own attempt to bring out the historiographical potential of philosophy of science. Starting from Norwood Russell Hanson’s insight that historical studies of science involve metascientific concepts, I argue that philosophical reflection on those concepts can be (and, indeed, has been) historiographically fruitful. I focus on four issues (epistemic values, experimentation, scientific discovery and conceptual change) and discuss their significance and utility for historiographical practice.     

The Indigenisation of Psychology: Birth of a New Science or Rekindling of an Old One?

Les décennies récentes ont été témoins de crises récurrentes au sein même de la tradition de psychologie expérimental Euro-Méso-Nord Américaine et, l'extérieur, des critiques lui ont été addressées. Les problèmes relèvent, d'une part, du manque de sensibilityé aux cultures et écosystèmes et, d'autre part, de la généralisation sans discrimination des résultats à travers des cadres comportementaux. Basées sur la construction d'une nouvelle science qui intègre les modeles comportementaux et culturels, des réponses sont proposées à ce qui constitue les attributs humains universels et idéosyncra-siques et les comportements sociaux. l'indigenisation de la psychologie en général et de l'ethnopsychologie mexicaine en particulier sont présentées comme exemples de solution à la stagnation du courant principal fondé de manière ethnocentrique.
Recent decades have witnessed recurring crises within, and criticism from outside, the Euro-Meso-North-American scientific psychological tradition. The problems are traceable to the lack of cultural and ecosystemic sensitivity on the one hand, and an attempt to indiscriminately generalise findings across behavioural settings, on the other. Based on the construction of a new science, which integrates the behavioural and cultural models, answers are offered to the question of what constitutes universal and idiosyncratic human attributes and social behaviours. The indigenisation of psychology in general and Mexican ethnopsychology in particular are offered as examples of solutions to the stagnation of the ethnocentrically based mainstream.     

The Primary Process: Freud’s Profound Yet Neglected Contribution to the Psychology of Consciousness

ABSTRACT

The primary process model is part of Freud’s struggle to define and distinguish conscious and unconscious mental activity. He created two embryonic models of unconscious mind. One he derived from studying symptoms of dynamic repression or sequestration of content already capable of symbolic mental representation. The other, the primary process, is his landmark effort to define a mental activity different from reflective representational thought, derived from studying dreaming. He could not clearly separate the repression model, as it is also based on the primary process. He vacillated as to whether the primary process is qualitatively different from representational symbolic thought. His efforts to articulate preconscious mentation suggest an ambiguous gray area between conscious thought and the primary process. Although he concluded that the primary process is unconscious because it is not intrinsically reflective, its manifestations are psychologically conscious and directly evident except in the physiologically unconscious state of dreaming. Similar problems color the efforts of others including Klein, Matte-Blanco, and theorists of attachment and implicit learning to separate conscious and unconscious mind and to articulate a model of mental function different from reflective consciousness. A model of conscious mental activity different from reflective representational consciousness, called primordial consciousness, is proposed to account for a wide spectrum of human phenomena both normal and pathological that share characteristics of immediacy and belief. They include, in addition to dreaming, psychosis, creativity, spirituality, and mental process in non-western cultures.     

Analytical Psychology and Science: Adversaries or Allies?

This article examines C. G. Jung's relationship to science as a paradigm and the relationship between the Jungian community and science. The impact of Jungian “isolation” in terms of academic dialogue, cross-theoretical influence, and absence from the public sphere is also discussed. The author examines how findings from science can enhance our functioning as analytic clinicians and improve our ability to communicate the wealth found in analytical psychology to a variety of audiences outside Jungian circles. Finally, research on analytic interaction and analytic theories of the mind/psyche is explored as well as general research that has implications for analytical psychology and psychoanalytic theory.