Unconditional Self Acceptance and Self Esteem in Relation to Frustration Intolerance Beliefs and Psychological Distress

The present study examines the moderating role of unconditional self acceptance and self esteem in relation to frustration intolerance beliefs and psychological distress. Participants were one hundred and fifty student (aged 18–25) studying at three universities (COMSATS Institute of Information Technology, University of Management Sciences, and University of Central Punjab) of Lahore, Pakistan. They completed a demographic information sheet, the Frustration Discomfort Scale (Harrington in Clin Psychol Psychother 12:374–387, 2005a), the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg in Society and the adolescent self image. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1965), the Unconditional Self Acceptance Questionnaire (Chamberlain and Haaga in J Ration Emotive Cogn Behav Ther 19:163–176, 2001a), and the General Health Questionnaire (Goldberg in Manual of the General Health Questionnaire. NFERNelson, Great Britain, 1972). The results demonstrated the moderating effects of unconditional self acceptance and self esteem in the relationship between frustration intolerance beliefs (entitlement, achievement, emotional intolerance, and discomfort intolerance) and psychological distress . The present findings highlight the importance unconditional self acceptance that reduces the emotional problems of students hindering their educational and personal growth.     

The Relationship Between Frustration Intolerance,Unhealthy Emotions,and Assertive Behaviour in Italian Students

The aim of the present research was to investigate the relationship between frustration intolerance and emotional-behavioural problems. Specifically, the study explored whether frustration intolerance beliefs were associated with difficulties in assertive behaviour, anxiety, depression, and anger in a non-clinical student sample (N = 250). For this purpose an Italian version of the Frustration Discomfort Scale (FDS) was developed. The findings supported a multidimensional model of frustration intolerance and the relationship between specific frustration intolerance beliefs and emotional-behavioural problems. Regarding unhealthy emotions, structural equation modeling (SEM) analyses (model A) indicated that discomfort intolerance and emotional intolerance had a significant relationship with state anxiety, trait anxiety, and depression. The discomfort intolerance and entitlement sub-scales had a significant relationship with state anger and trait anger, while entitlement directly predicted trait anger. Regarding assertiveness, SEM analyses (model B) indicated that emotional intolerance had a significant relationship with distress when being assertive. More generally, the FDS full scale score (model C) was significantly related to unhealthy emotions and (model D) unassertive behaviour (distress). The present study provided evidence of the cross-cultural applicability of the FDS.     

Measuring Need Satisfaction and Frustration in Educational and Work Contexts: The Need Satisfaction and Frustration Scale (NSFS)

The satisfaction and frustration of the psychological needs for autonomy, relatedness and competence predict well-being and ill-being outcomes. However, research within educational and work contexts is stifled by the lack of an exhaustively validated measure. Following extensive preparatory and pilot work, the present three studies (total N = 762) aimed to develop such a measure and validate it against the Basic Need Satisfaction at Work Scale (Deci et al. in Personal Soc Psychol Bull 27(8):930–942, 2001) and an adapted version of the Balanced Measure of Psychological Needs (Sheldon and Hilpert in Motivation Emot 36(4):439–451, 2012). The Need Satisfaction and Frustration Scale demonstrated a better factor structure and internal reliability than its predecessors, and good criterion validity. This improvement was due to the exclusion of ambiguous items and items measuring antecedents of need satisfaction and frustration. The results also strengthen current evidence showing that need satisfaction and frustration are distinct but related constructs, and each better predicts well-being and psychological health problems, respectively.     

The Italian Validation of Singelis’s Self-Construal Scale (SCS): a Short 10-Item Version Shows Improved Psychometric Properties

This study validates an Italian version of Singelis’s Independent and Interdependent Self-Construal Scale (SCS; Singelis in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20, 580–591, 1994; Singelis et al. in Cross-Cultural Research, 29, 240–275, 1995), a scale intended to measure individuals' feelings of connectedness to and separateness from social situations. Results of the Italian validation, carried out through three studies involved a total of 803 Italian university students, has led to a short 10-item version, with two 5-item orthogonal factors respectively reflecting independent self-construal and interdependent self-construal. The new short version of Singelis’s scale, as examined through exploratory and confirmatory factorial analyses, shows a more stable factor structure than the original version, maintaining the same internal consistency and obtaining improved indexes of concurrent validity for the Interdependent Self-Construal Scale, as explored by investigating the relationships with self-esteem.     

The Relationship of a Measure of Frustration Intolerance with Emotional Dysfunction in a Student Sample

This study extended earlier research (Harrington in Cong Ther Res 30:699–709, 2006) on the relationship of the multidimensional Frustration Discomfort Scale (FDS) with measures of depressed mood, anxiety and anger, independent of self-esteem. The study employed a non-clinical student sample (N = 323) and measures of both state and trait anger and anxiety. In addition, the Unconditional Self-Acceptance Questionnaire (USAQ) was also used to specifically assess REBT self-acceptance beliefs regarding self-worth, as well as a measure of self-esteem. A Serbian version of the FDS was developed for use in the study. Consistent with the earlier research, significant predictive relationships were found, whilst controlling for self-worth, between entitlement and anger, emotional intolerance and anxiety, and discomfort intolerance with depressed mood. Emotional intolerance also proved to be a significant positive predictor of depression, whilst achievement frustration had a negative relationship with depression. Overall, the FDS dimensions had a weaker relationship with emotional states than traits. The results are discussed in regard to the relationship between FDS dimensions and dysfunctional emotions in a non-clinical sample.     

God’s Melancholia

Donald Capps’s (Capps 1997, 2001, 2002a, b) male melancholia theory has been of interest to me during the past few years (Carlin 2003, 2006, 2007), and Capps (2004, 2007a, b) himself has been publishing more on the topic. In his psychobiographical book on Jesus, Capps (2000) notes that psychologists of religion have been reluctant to psychoanalyze Jesus, and here I note that even fewer have been willing to diagnose God, one recent exception being J. Harold Ellens (2007). In this article, I explore the melancholia issue further, this time applying the theory to God by means of theological concepts that deal with the Trinity and the passion of God. And while this article is playful (Pruyser 1974; cf. Dykstra 2001), the upshot is more serious: If men are incurably religious and melancholic, as Capps argues, and if men, by and large, are the creators of religion, wouldn’t one expect to find traces of this melancholy in religion, particularly in its sacred texts and doctrines? By identifying these tendencies in religion, especially in God, the pastoral psychologist, I believe, is helping contemporary Christian men—especially fathers and sons—recognize their own melancholy selves and, perhaps, helping them get along a little better.     

Glymour and Quine on Theoretical Equivalence

Glymour (1970, 1977, 1980) and Quine (1975) propose two different formal criteria for theoretical equivalence. In this paper we examine the relationships between these criteria.     

Hyperbole,abstract motion and spatial knowledge: sequential versus simultaneous scanning

Hyperbole is an interesting trope in the perspective of Space Grammar, since it is related to the displacing of a limit (Lausberg in Elemente der literarischen Rhetorik. M.H. Verlag, Munchen 1967; see the Ancient Greek meaning ‘to throw over’ > ‘exaggerate’). Hyperbole semantic mechanisms are related to virtual scanning (Holmqvist and P?uciennik in Imagery in language. Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main, pp 777–785, 2004). Basic concepts of SIZE and QUANTITY, related image-schemas (IS) and conceptual metaphors (UP IS MORE; IMPORTANT IS BIG: Lakoff 1987, Johnson 1987) are implied in hyperbole processing. The virtual scanning is the simulation of a perceptual domain (here, the vertically oriented space). The virtual limit is defined by expected values on the relevant scale. Since hyperbole is a form of intensification, its linguistic interest lies in cases involving the extremes of a scale, for which a limit can be determined (Schemann 1994). In this experimental study, we analyze the concept of ‘limit’ in terms of ‘abstract motion’ and ‘oriented space’ domains (Langacker 1990) with respect to hyperboles expressed by Italian Verbs of movement. The IS considered are PATH and SOURCE-PATH-GOAL. The latter corresponds to a virtual scale whose limit is arrived at, or overcome, in hyperboles.     

Mental Illness Publications in Major Pastoral Care Journals from 1950 to 2003

The issue of mental illness has been of considerable interest to both of us over the past several years. The first author has taught a course on the subject for a decade, and his recent publications on the subject include several articles on John Nash (Capps, 2003b, 2004a,b, 2005b), a book on mental illness for pastoral care professionals (2005a), and an article on whether William James was a patient at McLean Hospital (2007). The second author has had experience with the mentally ill through his pastoral work at Trenton Psychiatrist Hospital in Trenton, New Jersey, a mental hospital with a rather checkered history (see Scull, 2005), and in Scotland and has also written an article on John Nash (Carlin, 2006). This shared interest, together with evidence that serious mental illness in America has been steadily increasing (Torrey &; Miller, 2001, pp. 295–299), caused us to wonder what sort of attention mental illness has received in our major journals of pastoral care from 1950 to the present. Specifically, has this attention kept pace with the increase in mental illness?     

How Linearity and Structural Complexity Interact and Affect the Recognition of Italian Derived Words

The majority of words in most languages consist of derived poly-morphemic words but a cross-linguistic review of the literature (Amenta and Crepaldi in Front Psychol 3:232–243, 2012) shows a contradictory picture with respect to how such words are represented and processed. The current study examined the effects of linearity and structural complexity on the processing of Italian derived words. Participants performed a lexical decision task on three types of prefixed and suffixed words and nonwords differing in the complexity of their internal structure. The processing of these words was indeed found to vary according to the nature of the affixes, the order in which they appear, and the type of information the affix encodes. The results thus indicate that derived words are not a uniform class and the best account of these findings appears to be a constraint-based or probabilistic multi-route processing model (e.g., Kuperman et al. in Lang Cogn Process 23:1089–1132, 2008; J Exp Psychol Hum Percept Perform 35:876–895, 2009; J Mem Lang 62:83–97, 2010).     

Validation of a Brief Version of the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS-18) in Five Samples

The field of affective clinical science has expanded dramatically over the past several decades (Rottenberg and Gross 2003; Tracy et al. 2014). An important part of this research is understanding emotion regulation and dysregulation, in particular, how individuals differ in their ability to identify, accept, and manage their emotional experiences. One of the most common and widely cited measures of emotion dysregulation is the Difficulties with Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS; Gratz and Roemer 2004), which has been extensively used to facilitate understanding of how emotion dysregulation is associated with psychiatric symptoms, other emotion-related constructs, and treatment progress. While this scale has contributed greatly to our understanding of emotion regulation problems, its length makes its inclusion in brief study protocols difficult, limiting its utility and increasing participant burden. In order to address this issue, we developed a short form version of the DERS (DERS-18) composed of the strongest items from each of the measure’s six subscales from the original DERS publication (Gratz and Roemer 2004), and then validated this measure in five datasets that vary in age and sample type. Our results demonstrate that an 18-item short-form of the DERS exhibits a similar structure as the original 36-item DERS, demonstrates excellent reliability and validity, and performs similarly to the original DERS despite comprising half the items. The DERS-18 has the potential to improve and expand emotion regulation assessment while reducing demands on research participants.     

The personal and the subpersonal in the theory of mind debate

It is a widely accepted assumption within the philosophy of mind and psychology that our ability for complex social interaction is based on the mastery of a common folk psychology, that is to say that social cognition consists in reasoning about the mental states of others in order to predict and explain their behavior. This, in turn, requires the possession of mental-state concepts, such as the concepts belief and desire. In recent years, this standard conception of social cognition has been called into question by proponents of so-called ‘direct-perception’ approaches to social cognition (e.g., Gallagher 2001, 2005, 2007, 2012; Gallagher and Hutto 2008; Zahavi 2005, 2011) and by those who argue that the ‘received view’ implies a degree of computational complexity that is implausible (e.g., Bermúdez 2003; Apperly and Butterfill 2009). In response, it has been argued that these attacks on the classical view of social cognition have no bite at the subpersonal level of explanation, and that it is the latter which is at issue in the debate in question (e.g., Herschbach 2008; Spaulding 2010, 2015). In this paper, I critically examine this response by considering in more detail the distinction between personal and subpersonal level explanations. There are two main ways in which the distinction has been developed (Drayson 2014). I will argue that on either of these, the response proposed by defenders of the received view is unconvincing. This shows that the dispute between the standard conception and alternative approaches to mindreading is a dispute concerning personal-level explanations - what is at stake in the debate between proponents of the classical view of social cognition and their critics is how we, as persons, navigate our social world. I will conclude by proposing a pluralistic approach to social cognition, which is better able to do justice to the multi-faceted nature of our social interactions as well as being able to account for recent empirical findings regarding the social cognitive abilities of young infants.     

Modus Ponens Under the Restrictor View

There is a renewed debate about modus ponens. Strikingly, the recent counterexamples in Cantwell (Theoria, 74, 331–351 2008), Dreier (2009) and MacFarlane and Kolodny (The Journal of Philosophy, 107, 115–143 2010) are generated by restricted readings of the ‘if’-clause. Moreover, it can be argued on general grounds that the restrictor view of conditionals developed in Kratzer (1986) and Lewis (1975) leads to counterexamples to modus ponens (cp. Charlow Synthese, 190, 2291–2323 2013; Khoo Philosophical Studies, 166, 153–64 2013). This paper provides a careful analysis of modus ponens within the framework of the restrictor view. Despite appearances to the contrary, there is a robust sense in which modus ponens is valid, owing to the fact that conditionals do not only allow for restricted readings but have bare interpretations, too.     

Deference,respect and intensionality

This paper is about the standard Reflection Principle (van Fraassen in J Philos 81(5):235–256, 1984) and the Group Reflection Principle (Elga in Nous 41(3):478–502, 2007; Bovens and Rabinowicz in Episteme 8(3):281–300, 2011; Titelbaum in Quitting certainties: a Bayesian framework modeling degrees of belief, OUP, Oxford, 2012; Hedden in Mind 124(494):449–491, 2015). I argue that these principles are incomplete as they stand. The key point is that deference is an intensional relation, and so whether you are rationally required to defer to a person at a time can depend on how that person and that time are designated. In this paper I suggest a way of completing the Reflection Principle and Group Reflection Principle, and I argue that so completed these principles are plausible. In particular, they do not fall foul of the Sleeping Beauty case (Elga in Analysis 60(2):143–147, 2000), the Cable Guy Paradox (Hajek in Analysis 65(286):112–119, 2005), Arntzenius’ prisoner cases (Arntzenius in J Philos, 100(7):356–370, 2003), or the Puzzle of the Hats (Bovens and Rabinowicz in Episteme 8(3):281–300, 2011).     

Lost in Translation: Religion in The Public Sphere

This paper proposes a Wittgenstein-inspired critique of the prism of translation that frames the recent literature about the debate between Rawls and Habermas on the role of religious reasons in the public sphere (Habermas 2008; Weithman 2006; Wolterstorff 1997). This debate originates with the introduction of Rawls’s proviso in his conception of the public use of reason (Rawls The University of Chicago Law Review, 64(3), 765-807, 1997), which consists in the “translation” of religious reasons into secular ones, which he thinks is necessary in order for religious reasons to be legitimate in the public sphere (Courtois Dialogue, 49, 91-112, 2010; Loobuyck and Rummens Ars disputandi: The Online Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 5, 237–249, 2011; Sikka The Review of Politics, 78, 91-116, 2016). Even though Wittgenstein is not himself concerned with religious pluralism as a political issue, there are numerous scholars who have discussed the political implications of his remarks (Gunnell Contemporary Political Theory, 12 80-101, 2013; Livingston Philosophy and Social Criticism, 33(6), 691–715, 2007; Moore Philosophy and Social Criticism, 36(9), 1113-1136 2010; Pohlhaus and Wright Political Theory, 30(6), 800–27, 2002). The thesis of this paper is that the interpretation proposed by Cora Diamond (2000) in regards to ethical and religious questions turns out to be a suitable way out of the “translation requirement”. According to this solution, if there is to be an understanding between secular and religious citizens on the basis of religious reasons, it should not rely on a “translation” but rather on mutual self-representation.     

Why the Canberra plan won’t help you do serious metaphysics

Jackson (From metaphysics to ethics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998) argues that conceptual analysis plays a modest, albeit crucial, role in ‘serious metaphysics’: roughly, the project of demystifying phenomena we take to be mysterious by locating them in the natural world. This defence of conceptual analysis is associated with ‘the Canberra Plan’, a philosophical methodology that has its roots in the works of both Lewis (J Philos 67(13):427–446, 1970, Australas J Philos 50:249–258, 1972) and Jackson (Monist 77:93–110, 1994, 1998). There is, however, a distinction to be drawn between conceptual analysis, as it is typically employed in the Canberra plan, and a version of it defended by Jackson himself. In this paper, I elucidate this distinction, and employ examples from the history of science to argue the use of the former, but not the latter, incurs certain problems of conceptual change. Moreover, I also argue neither can be used to undertake serious metaphysics—the former because of the aforementioned problems, and the latter due to the machinery it employs to solve them.     

Solving Smullyan Puzzles with Formal Systems

Solving numeric, logic and language puzzles and paradoxes is common within a wide community of high school and university students, fact witnessed by the increasing number of books published by mathematicians such as Martin Gardner (popular books as old as Gardner in Aha! insight. W. H. Freeman & Co., London, 1978, Wheels, life and other mathematical amusements. W H Freeman & Co., London, 1985), Douglas Hofstadter [in one of the best popular science books on paradoxes (Hofstadter in Godel, escher, bach: an eternal golden braid, Penguin, London, 2000)], inspired by Gödel’s incompleteness theorems), Patrick Hughes and George Brecht (see Hughes and Brecht in Vicious circles and infinity, an anthology of paradoxes. Penguin Books, London, 1993) and Raymond M. Smullyan (the most well known being Smullyan in Forever undecided, puzzle guide to godel. Oxford Paperbacks, Oxford 1988, To Mock a Mockingbird and other logic puzzles. Oxford Paperbacks, Oxford 2000, The lady or the tiger? And other logic puzzles. Dover Publications Inc., Mineola 2009), inter alia. Books by Smullyan (such as Smullyan 1988, 2000) are, however, much more involved, since they introduce learning trajectories and strategies across several subjects of mathematical logic, as difficult as combinatorial logic (see, e.g., Smullyan 2000), computability theory (see Smullyan 1988), and proof theory (see Smullyan 1988, 2009). These books provide solutions to their suggested exercises. Both statements and their solutions are written in the natural language, introducing some informal algorithms. As an exercise in Mathematics we wonder if an easy proof system could be devised to solve the amusing equations proposed by Smullyan in his books. Moreover, university students of logic could well train themselves in constructing deductive systems to solve puzzles instead of a non-uniform treatment one by one. In this paper, addressing students, we introduce one such formal systems, a tableaux approach able to provide the solutions to the puzzles involving either propositional logic, first order logic, or aspect logic. Let the reader amuse herself or himself!     

Animal Morality: What It Means and Why It Matters

It has been argued that some animals are moral subjects, that is, beings who are capable of behaving on the basis of moral motivations (Rowlands 2011, 2012, 2017). In this paper, we do not challenge this claim. Instead, we presuppose its plausibility in order to explore what ethical consequences follow from it. Using the capabilities approach (Nussbaum 2004, 2007), we argue that beings who are moral subjects are entitled to enjoy positive opportunities for the flourishing of their moral capabilities, and that the thwarting of these capabilities entails a harm that cannot be fully explained in terms of hedonistic welfare. We explore the implications of this idea for the assessment of current practices involving animals.     

Asymptotically Correct Standardization of Person-Fit Statistics Beyond Dichotomous Items

The \(l_z\) statistic (Drasgow et al. in Br J Math Stat Psychol 38:67–86, 1985) is one of the most popular person-fit statistics (Armstrong et al. in Pract Assess Res Eval 12(16):1–10, 2007). Snijders (Psychometrika 66:331–342, 2001) derived the asymptotic null distribution of \(l_z\) when the examinee ability parameter is estimated. He also suggested the \(l^*_z\) statistic, which is the asymptotically correct standardized version of \(l_z\). However, Snijders (Psychometrika 66:331–342, 2001) only considered tests with dichotomous items. In this paper, the asymptotic null distribution of \(l_z\) is derived for mixed-format tests (those that include both dichotomous and polytomous items). The asymptotically correct standardized version of \(l_z\), which can be considered as the extension of \(l^*_z\) to such tests, is suggested. The Type I error rate and power of the suggested statistic are examined from several simulated datasets. The suggested statistic is computed using a real dataset. The suggested statistic appears to be a satisfactory tool for assessing person fit for mixed-format tests.     

A Geometric Analysis of When Fixed Weighting Schemes Will Outperform Ordinary Least Squares

Many researchers have demonstrated that fixed, exogenously chosen weights can be useful alternatives to Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation within the linear model (e.g., Dawes, Am. Psychol. 34:571–582, 1979; Einhorn &; Hogarth, Org. Behav. Human Perform. 13:171–192, 1975; Wainer, Psychol. Bull. 83:213-217, 1976). Generalizing the approach of Davis-Stober, Dana, and Budescu (Psychometrika 75:521–541, 2010b), I present an analytic method to determine when a choice of fixed weights will incur less mean squared error than OLS as a function of sample size, error variance, and model predictability. Geometrically, I solve for the region of population β that favors a choice of fixed weights over OLS. I derive closed-form upper and lower bounds on the volume of this region, giving tight bounds on the proportion of population β favoring a choice of fixed weights. I illustrate this methodology with several examples and provide a MATLAB^© (The MathWorks, Matlab software, version 2009b, 2010) programming implementation of the major results.