Social interaction skills and theory of mind in young children

Two studies explored relations between peer social skills and theory of mind in young children. In Study 1, a global teacher rating of social skills with peers, performance on a traditional false-belief task, a standardized assessment of auditory language comprehension, and a time sampling of amount of speech with peers were obtained. Positive, but moderate, zero-order correlations were observed between the false-belief measure and social skills, and false belief accounted for a significant amount of additional variance in social skills after covarying age and the 2 measures of language. Study 2 replicated the findings of Study 1 by using a larger sample and a standardized teacher questionnaire. The results are discussed with regard to the critical role of a mentalistic theory of behavior for human social interactions.     

Relations between theory of mind,mental state language and social adjustment in primary school children

The present study investigated the concurrent relations between theory of mind (ToM), mental state language (MSL) and social adjustment (assessed in terms of emotional instability, prosocial behaviour and aggressiveness) in a sample of 150 children between 8 and 11 years of age. The results showed no correlation between the performance on false belief tasks and the frequency of MSL in a narrative task. False belief understanding was unrelated with all measures of social adjustment, whereas the children’s use of MSL was negatively correlated with emotional instability and aggressiveness, above and beyond the influence of receptive language ability. These findings suggest that having a ToM ability is different from spontaneously using it during non-interactive narrative tasks, and that the two ToM measures are differently related to social competence in primary school children.     

Personal epistemology and theory of mind: deciphering young children's beliefs about knowledge and knowing

The beliefs that individuals hold about knowledge and knowing have been the focus of a growing body of work on “personal epistemology.” There has been general agreement among researchers about a developmental trajectory of epistemological understanding that takes place in adolescence and adulthood. Rarely has this research included children, however, and we know little about the origins of epistemological awareness or its early development. A separate group of researchers have investigated children's “theory of mind,” or the ability to understand others’ beliefs, actions, and desires, with primary attention to the onset of this cognitive achievement between the ages of 3 and 5. This article reviews the theoretical foundation for a proposed relation between these constructs, and reports on an exploratory investigation with 3–5 year olds, in which epistemological level was significantly related to theory of mind ability. Results are discussed in relation to a general timeline depicting the development of children's beliefs about knowledge and knowing, a process that involves an ongoing tension between objective and subjective perspectives. We propose that the trajectory of epistemological development be expanded to include an initial period of egocentric subjectivity that characterizes epistemological thinking prior to the achievement of theory of mind.     

The influence of language on theory of mind: a training study

This study investigated the role of language in the development of theory of mind. It was hypothesized that the acquisition of the syntactic and semantic properties of sentential complements would facilitate the development of a representational theory of mind. Sixty preschoolers who failed false belief and sentential complement pretests were randomly assigned to training on false belief, sentential complements, or relative clauses (as a control group). All the children were post-tested on a set of different theory of mind tasks, sentential complements and relative clauses. The main findings were that the group trained on sentential complements not only acquired the linguistic knowledge fostered by the training, but also significantly increased their scores on a range of theory of mind tasks. In contrast, false belief training only led to improved theory of mind scores but had no influence on language. The control group, trained on relative clauses, showed no improvement on theory of mind posttests. These findings are taken as evidence that the acquisition of sentential complements contributes to the development of theory of mind in preschoolers.     

Primary or "specific" language impairment and children learning a second language

We review empirical findings from children with primary or "specific" language impairment (PLI) and children who learn a single language from birth (L1) and a second language (L2) beginning in childhood. The PLI profile is presented in terms of both language and nonlinguistic features. The discussion of L2 learners emphasizes variable patterns of growth and skill distribution in L1 and L2 which complicate the identification of PLI in linguistically diverse learners. We then introduce our research program, designed to map out common ground and potential fault lines between typically developing children learning one or two languages, as compared to children with PLI.     

Relationships between Machiavellianism, emotional intelligence and theory of mind in children

The current study investigates the associations of Machiavellianism (Mach) with trait and ability emotional intelligence (EI), and theory of mind (ToM) in 109 primary school children. Consistent with previous research with adults, negative associations were found between Mach and social and emotional understanding. Subsequent multiple regression analyses for girls showed that being more adept at emotional and social understanding does not lead them to manipulate others in social encounters. This was not the case for boys. These findings are discussed in relation to other social and individual difference variables that impact on Mach, particularly amongst boys.     

Emergent verbal behavior in preschool children learning a second language

We evaluated the emergence of untaught second‐language skills following directly taught listener and intraverbal responses. Three preschool children were taught first‐language (English) listener responses (e.g., “Point to the horse”) and second‐language (Welsh) intraverbal responses (e.g., “What is horse in Welsh?” [ceffyl]). After intervention, increases in untaught second‐language tacts (e.g., “What is this in Welsh?” [ceffyl]) and listener responses (e.g., “Point to the ceffyl”) were observed for all 3 participants.     

Links between theory of mind and executive function in young children with autism: clues to developmental primacy

There has been much theoretical discussion of a functional link between theory of mind (ToM) and executive function (EF) in autism. This study sought to establish the relationship between ToM and EF in young children with autism (M = 5 years, 6 months) and to examine issues of developmental primacy. Thirty children with autism and 40 typically developing children, matched on age and ability, were assessed on a battery of tasks measuring ToM (1st- and 2nd-order false belief) and components of EF (planning, set shifting, inhibition). A significant correlation emerged between ToM and EF variables in the autism group, independent of age and ability, while ToM and higher order planning ability remained significantly related in the comparison group. Examination of the pattern of ToM-EF impairments in the autism group revealed dissociations in 1 direction only: impaired ToM with intact EF. These findings support the view that EF may be 1 important factor in the advancement of ToM understanding in autism. The theoretical implications of these findings are discussed.     

Testing joint attention, imitation, and play as infancy precursors to language and theory of mind

Various theoretical accounts propose that an important developmental relation exists between joint attention, play, and imitation abilities, and later theory of mind ability. However, very little direct empirical evidence supports these claims for putative “precursor” theory of mind status. A small sample (N=13) of infants, for whom measures of play, joint attention, and imitation had been collected at 20 months of age, was followed-up longitudinally at 44 months and a battery of theory of mind measures was conducted. Language and IQ were measured at both timepoints. Imitation ability at 20 months was longitudinally associated with expressive, but not receptive, language ability at 44 months. In contrast, only the joint attention behaviours of gaze switches between an adult and an active toy and looking to an adult during an ambiguous goal detection task at 20 months were longitudinally associated with theory of mind ability at 44 months. It is argued that joint attention, play, and imitation, and language and theory of mind, might form part of a shared social–communicative representational system in infancy that becomes increasingly specialised and differentiated as development progresses.     

The relationship between theory of mind and metaphor: Evidence from children with language impairment and autistic spectrum disorder

Happé (1993) proposed that theory of mind (ToM) understanding was necessary for comprehension of metaphorical expressions. The current study investigated the role of both ToM and language ability in metaphor understanding. Ninety‐four children aged 8–15 years with communication impairments were grouped according to language ability and autistic symptomatology in the first instance, and then according to ToM performance. Their performance on a metaphor task was compared to 34 typically developing age‐matched peers. These analyses showed that only children with language impairment, with or without concurrent autistic features, were impaired on the metaphor task. Furthermore, possession of first‐order ToM skills did not ensure metaphor comprehension. Instead, semantic ability was a stronger predictor of performance on the metaphor task. These results are considered with reference to the view that ToM understanding is necessary for the comprehension of metaphor.     

Socio-economic status,executive functions,and theory of mind ability in adolescents: Relationships with language ability and cortisol

Socio-economic status (SES) is linked to the development of cognitive abilities, particularly language and executive processes. It is unclear whether these represent a single or independent correlates. We studied 110 Ecuadorian youths aged 12–17 with measures of SES, language, executive function, and theory of mind (ToM), a.k.a. mentalizing. A subsample gave hair samples to estimate recent cortisol levels. Restricting analyses to reliable measures, SES was highly associated with language skill, and to a lesser extent with executive function and ToM performance. However, those latter associations were attenuated and non-significant when language ability was controlled for statistically. Systemic cortisol levels were not associated with SES, but were significantly and negatively correlated with ToM, independent of variation in language skills. We conclude that language development underlies most of the impact of SES on executive function and ToM ability of adolescents, but that stress-related cortisol may have an independent, direct effect on mentalizing.     

Reciprocal associations between young children's developing moral judgments and theory of mind

Associations between young children's developing theory of mind (ToM) and judgments of prototypical moral transgressions were examined 3 times across 1 year in 70 American middle class 2.5- to 4-year-olds. Separate path models controlling for cross-time stability in judgments, within-time associations, and children's age at Wave 1 indicated that across both 6-month intervals, children who evaluated moral acts as more wrong independent of authority had more mature ToM 6 months later; in addition, judgments of moral transgressions as less permissible at Wave 2 also led to more advanced ToM at Wave 3. Children with more advanced ToM judged that moral rules are more alterable, however, and rated moral transgressions as less deserving of punishment. Finally, more advanced ToM initially led to evaluations of moral transgressions as less independent of rules and then to judgments of moral transgressions as more independent of rules. During the preschool years, early moral judgments and theory of mind appear to develop as reciprocal, bidirectional processes.     

The development of reading in children who speak English as a second language

Patterns of reading development were examined in native English-speaking (L1) children and children who spoke English as a second language (ESL). Participants were 978 (790 L1 speakers and 188 ESL speakers) Grade 2 children involved in a longitudinal study that began in kindergarten. In kindergarten and Grade 2, participants completed standardized and experimental measures including reading, spelling, phonological processing, and memory. All children received phonological awareness instruction in kindergarten and phonics instruction in Grade 1. By the end of Grade 2, the ESL speakers' reading skills were comparable to those of L1 speakers, and ESL speakers even outperformed L1 speakers on several measures. The findings demonstrate that a model of early identification and intervention for children at risk is beneficial for ESL speakers and also suggest that the effects of bilingualism on the acquisition of early reading skills are not negative and may be positive.     

Mechanisms of theory formation in young children

Research suggests that by the age of five, children have extensive causal knowledge, in the form of intuitive theories. The crucial question for developmental cognitive science is how young children are able to learn causal structure from evidence. Recently, researchers in computer science and statistics have developed representations (causal Bayes nets) and learning algorithms to infer causal structure from evidence. Here we explore evidence suggesting that infants and children have the prerequisites for making causal inferences consistent with causal Bayes net learning algorithms. Specifically, we look at infants and children's ability to learn from evidence in the form of conditional probabilities, interventions and combinations of the two.     

Origins of a theory of mind

Twenty-two pairs of typically developing toddlers (M = 24.32 months) and their mothers were observed in a play-room solving puzzles during 30 min. The target of the observations was hand-taking gesture. Researchers have thought that this gesture is rare among typically developing children and is more frequent among autistic children. Ten in 22 children showed this gesture in only 30 min. They should know “I can not do it by myself, but my mother can do it.” When we can assume that children know others’ mental mechanism, it might be the origins of a theory of mind.