When is an error not a prediction error? An electrophysiological investigation

A recent theory holds that the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) uses reinforcement learning signals conveyed by the midbrain dopamine system to facilitate flexible action selection. According to this position, the impact of reward prediction error signals on ACC modulates the amplitude of a component of the event-related brain potential called the error-related negativity (ERN). The theory predicts that ERN amplitude is monotonically related to the expectedness of the event: It is larger for unexpected outcomes than for expected outcomes. However, a recent failure to confirm this prediction has called the theory into question. In the present article, we investigated this discrepancy in three trial-and-error learning experiments. All three experiments provided support for the theory, but the effect sizes were largest when an optimal response strategy could actually be learned. This observation suggests that ACC utilizes dopamine reward prediction error signals for adaptive decision making when the optimal behavior is, in fact, learnable.     

Perl and Schroeder’s presuppositional error theory

Philosophical Studies - Ronald Dworkin charges that the error theory is a position in first-order moral theory that should be judged by the standards that are appropriately used in evaluating...     

Are errors detected before they occur? Early error sensations revealed by metacognitive judgments on the timing of error awareness

Errors in choice tasks are not only detected fast and reliably, participants often report that they knew that an error occurred already before a response was produced. These early error sensations stand in contrast with evidence suggesting that the earliest neural correlates of error awareness emerge around 300 ms after erroneous responses. The present study aimed to investigate whether anecdotal evidence for early error sensations can be corroborated in a controlled study in which participants provide metacognitive judgments on the subjective timing of error awareness. In Experiment 1, participants had to report whether they became aware of their errors before or after the response. In Experiment 2, we measured confidence in these metacognitive judgments. Our data show that participants report early error sensations with high confidence in the majority of error trials across paradigms and experiments. These results provide first evidence for early error sensations, informing theories of error awareness.     

Spinoza’s error: Memory for truth and falsity

Two theoretical frameworks have been proposed to account for the representation of truth and falsity in human memory: the Cartesian model and the Spinozan model. Both models presume that during information processing a mental representation of the information is stored along with a tag indicating its truth value. However, the two models disagree on the nature of these tags. According to the Cartesian model, true information receives a “true” tag and false information receives a “false” tag. In contrast, the Spinozan model claims that only false information receives a “false” tag, whereas untagged information is automatically accepted as true. To test the Cartesian and Spinozan models, we conducted two source memory experiments in which participants studied true and false trivia statements from three different sources differing in credibility (i.e., presenting 100% true, 50% true and 50% false, or 100% false statements). In Experiment 1, half of the participants were informed about the source credibility prior to the study phase. As compared to a control group, this precue group showed improved source memory for both true and false statements, but not for statements with an uncertain validity status. Moreover, memory did not differ for truth and falsity in the precue group. As Experiment 2 revealed, this finding is replicated even when using a 1-week rather than a 20-min retention interval between study and test phases. The results of both experiments clearly contradict the Spinozan model but can be explained in terms of the Cartesian model.     

Is there a disposition to avoid the fundamental attribution error?

Two studies investigated the possibility that personality variables might relate to the magnitude of the cognitive attributional error. In the first, participants received either a pronuclear or anti-nuclear weapons essay, and were asked to rate the writer's personal beliefs (attitude attribution). As expected, certain Myers-Briggs Type Indicator indices of cognitive processing preferences did not predict variations in attribution in the Choice condition, but did so in the Constraint condition. In the Constraint condition, subjects expressing the Intuitive Thinking preference showed no significant attributional error (i.e., no tendency to rate in line with essay content). Other subjects in this condition showed the usual attributional error. These findings were generally replicated in the second study, which used the Constraint condition only. The Self-Monitoring scale was added as a predictor; it did not relate to the attributional error. It was suggested that measures of cognitive processing style may be more relevant to attribution than the various measures of sensitivity to environmental variation.     

Feelings of error in reasoning—in search of a phenomenon

Recent research shows that in reasoning tasks, subjects usually produce an initial intuitive answer, accompanied by a metacognitive experience, which has been called feeling of rightness. This paper is aimed at exploring the complimentary experience of feeling of error (FOE), that is, the spontaneous, subtle sensation of cognitive uneasiness arising from conflict detection during thinking. We investigate FOE in two studies with the “bat-and-ball” (B&B) reasoning task, in its standard and isomorphic control versions. Study 1 is a generation study, in which participants are asked to generate their own response. Study 2 is an evaluation study, in which participants are asked to choose between two conflicting answers (normative vs. intuitive). In each study, the FOE is measured by the FOE questionnaire. Results show that the FOE is significantly present in the standard B&B task when participants give a wrong answer, that our questionnaire can measure it, and furthermore, that it is diagnostic of genuine error.     

Born to be biased? Unrealistic optimism and error management theory

When individuals display cognitive biases, they are prone to developing systematically false beliefs. Evolutionary psychologists have argued that rather than being a flaw in human cognition, biases may actually be design features. In my paper, I assess the claim that unrealistic optimism is such a design feature because it is a form of error management. Proponents of this theory say that when individuals make decisions under uncertainty, it can be advantageous to err on the side of overconfidence if the potential gains through success are high and the costs of failure are low. I argue that there are a number of conceptual problems in matching the theory with the existing data. I also show that there is empirical evidence against the error management hypothesis.     

Mirrors, mirrors on the wall…the ubiquitous multiple reflection error

Participants decided when somebody, Janine, could see their face in a horizontal row of adjacent mirrors mounted flat on the same wall. They saw real mirrors and a shop-dummy representing Janine. Such coplanar mirrors reflect different, non-overlapping areas of a scene. However, almost everybody made an unexpected error: they claimed that Janine would see her face reflected in multiple mirrors simultaneously. They therefore responded as if each mirror showed similar information and thus grossly overestimated how much each mirror revealed. Further studies established that this multiple reflection error also occurred for vertical rows of mirrors and for different areas of a single, large mirror. The error was even common if the participant themselves sat in front of a set of covered-up mirrors and indicated where they would be able to see their own reflection. In the latter case, people often made multiple reflection errors despite having seen all the mirrors uncovered immediately before they responded. People's gross overestimation of how much of a scene a mirror reflects and their inability to learn to correct this false belief explains why, despite a lifetime's experience of mirrors, they incorrectly think they will see themselves in all nearby mirrors.     

Behind the wheel: What drives the effects of error handling?

Existing research comparing error management (a strategy focusing on increasing the positive and decreasing the negative consequences of errors) to error prevention (a strategy focusing on working faultlessly), has identified error management as beneficial for multiple outcomes. Yet, due to various methodological limitations, it is unclear whether the effects previously found are due to error prevention, error management, or both. We examine this in an experimental study with a 2 (error prevention: yes vs. no) × 2 (error management: yes vs. no) factorial design. Error prevention had negative effects on cognition and adaptive transfer performance. Error management alleviated worry and boosted one’s perceived self-efficacy. Overall, the results show that error prevention and error management have unique outcomes on negative affect, self-efficacy, cognition, and performance.     

Transient error or specificity? An alternative to the staggered equivalent split-half procedure

The data-based partial and complete reliability coefficients defined by G. Becker (2000) in his staggered equivalent split-half procedure (SESHP) were compared with the model-based specificity and consistency reliability coefficients defined by R. Steyer, M. J. Schmitt, and M. Eid (1999) in their latent state-trait model (LSTM). Partial reliability is based on coefficient alpha, which contains transient error. State and trait anxiety, measured using the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory on 2 occasions among French adults, illustrated both approaches. Theoretical and empirical analyses demonstrated that the specificity and consistency coefficients offer a testable alternative to the SESHP coefficients. In addition, dynamics of the state residual variance could be modeled and estimated in LSTM.     

How important is transient error in estimating reliability? Going beyond simulation studies

This article introduces a procedure for estimating reliability in which equivalent halves of a given test are systematically created and then administered a few days apart so that transient error can be included in the error calculus. The procedure not only estimates complete reliability (taking into account both specific-factor error and transient error) but also can estimate partial reliability (taking into account only specific-factor error). Scores from 6 different measuring instruments were analyzed with the procedure. The results indicate that the magnitude of transient error in real data can range from nonexistent to very large. It follows that traditional reliability estimates, using nonstaggered procedures, are inflated to the extent that transient error is present.     

Is temporal spacing of tests helpful even when it inflates error rates?

The occurrence of errors is often thought to impede associative learning. This was tested in 2 studies, each of which involved 2 sessions. In Session 1, subjects learned foreign vocabulary (Experiment 1) or obscure English words (Experiment 2) and received 2 tests (each with corrective feedback) separated by a variable lag. Greater lags drastically reduced performance on the 2nd test. However, they dramatically improved performance in a Session-2 test given 1 day (Experiment 1) or 1 week later (Experiment 2). This pattern held even for items that elicited errors on the 1st test of Day 1. Evidently, the benefit of spacing overwhelms any possible harmful effect of producing errors. The results have clear and nonobvious implications for computer-aided instruction.     

Does the A-not-B error in adult pet dogs indicate sensitivity to human communication?

Recent dog-infant comparisons have indicated that the experimenter's communicative signals in object hide-and-search tasks increase the probability of perseverative (A-not-B) errors in both species (Topál et al. 2009). These behaviourally similar results, however, might reflect different mechanisms in dogs and in children. Similar errors may occur if the motor response of retrieving the object during the A trials cannot be inhibited in the B trials or if the experimenter's movements and signals toward the A hiding place in the B trials ('sham-baiting') distract the dogs' attention. In order to test these hypotheses, we tested dogs similarly to Topál et al. (2009) but eliminated the motor search in the A trials and 'sham-baiting' in the B trials. We found that neither an inability to inhibit previously rewarded motor response nor insufficiencies in their working memory and/or attention skills can explain dogs' erroneous choices. Further, we replicated the finding that dogs have a strong tendency to commit the A-not-B error after ostensive-communicative hiding and demonstrated the crucial effect of socio-communicative cues as the A-not-B error diminishes when location B is ostensively enhanced. These findings further support the hypothesis that the dogs' A-not-B error may reflect a special sensitivity to human communicative cues. Such object-hiding and search tasks provide a typical case for how susceptibility to human social signals could (mis)lead domestic dogs.     

On the question of self-disclosure by the analyst: error or advance in technique?

The question of self-disclosure by the analyst and its uses in treatment is an issue widely debated today. In this paper, the author reviews this controversial technique from historical and contemporary points of view, delineates several forms of self-disclosure, and, by means of several clinical examples, discusses the effects on the patient and the analytic process of utilizing one or another kind of self-disclosure in these particular situations.     

Is comprehension necessary for error detection? A conflict-based account of monitoring in speech production

Despite the existence of speech errors, verbal communication is successful because speakers can detect (and correct) their errors. The standard theory of speech-error detection, the perceptual-loop account, posits that the comprehension system monitors production output for errors. Such a comprehension-based monitor, however, cannot explain the double dissociation between comprehension and error-detection ability observed in the aphasic patients. We propose a new theory of speech-error detection which is instead based on the production process itself. The theory borrows from studies of forced-choice-response tasks the notion that error detection is accomplished by monitoring response conflict via a frontal brain structure, such as the anterior cingulate cortex. We adapt this idea to the two-step model of word production, and test the model-derived predictions on a sample of aphasic patients. Our results show a strong correlation between patients’ error-detection ability and the model’s characterization of their production skills, and no significant correlation between error detection and comprehension measures, thus supporting a production-based monitor, generally, and the implemented conflict-based monitor in particular. The successful application of the conflict-based theory to error-detection in linguistic, as well as non-linguistic domains points to a domain-general monitoring system.     

Peripheral visual acuity and refractive error: Evidence for “two visual systems”?

Experiments conducted in two independent laboratories indicate that the correction of refractive errors does not improve peripheral visual acuity. This finding contrasts with previous results for motion detection and other visual functions in the periphery. The “two visual systems” hypothesis provides a heuristic means of interpreting this apparent discrepancy.     

Why do we slow down after an error? Mechanisms underlying the effects of posterror slowing

People often become slower in their performance after committing an error, which is usually explained by strategic control adjustments towards a more conservative response threshold. The present study tested an alternative hypothesis for explaining posterror slowing in terms of behavioural interferences resulting from error monitoring by manipulating stimulus contrast and categorization difficulty in a choice reaction time task. The response-stimulus interval (RSI) was either short or long, using a between-subject (Experiment 1) and a within-subject design (Experiment 2). Posterror slowing was larger and posterror accuracy lower in short than in long RSI situations. Effects of stimulus contrast disappeared in posterror trials when RSI was short. At long RSIs, stimulus contrast was additive with posterror slowing. The results support the idea that at least two mechanisms contribute to posterror slowing: a capacity-limited error-monitoring process with the strongest influence at short RSIs and a criterion adjustment mechanism at longer RSIs.