You Must Have Thought This Book Was About You1: Reply to Daniel Dennett

Daniel Dennett's review 2 of my book, Human Nature and the Limits of Science, 3 was apparently conceived as part of a multiple review, anticipating an author's response, so I am grateful for the opportunity to satisfy this expectation. Indeed, Dennett uses this excuse to justify devoting his own contribution to responding to those parts of the book directed explicitly at his own work, leaving other imagined reviewers to take care of other issues. Since he has things to say about most of the topics in the book he evidently interpreted this remit widely, in fact taking the book as “presented as an antidote of sorts to [his] own world view” (p. 482). Let me begin, therefore, by reassuring Dennett that, while I certainly had some critical things to say about some of his views, the book most certainly was not intended as an ad hominem attack. The nine pages (out of 187) on which his work is cited fairly accurately reflects the extent to which his views figured in my thinking. Curiously, his ire seems most strongly aroused by my assault on his views on free will in which, apparently, I agree with nearly everything he says and, worse still, fail to cite him at all.     

Reply to Psarros: Popper and Chemistry

In this article I reply to criticism of my published work by N. Psarros (Journal for the General Philosophy of Science 28: 297–305,1997). I show that I had already answered the first criticism in my published work and not overlooked his supposed refutation. However I offer a plausible argument which he could have used to strengthen his claim. Psarros cites my work on Hopkins in his opening paragraph, but then makes no further reference to it in the text. I indicated to Psarros verbally at Ilkley 1994 (and reiterate the message here) that Hopkins' work on Vitamins is the exemplar of a Popperian historical episode and must require addressing by the opponents of critical rationalism. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Resistance in treatment as a means of avoiding inner conflict

It is not commonly known that, in his eighties, Michael Fordham sought the help of Donald Meltzer in what Dr Meltzer described as ‘more a weekly supervision of dreams than an analysis’. Dr Fordham is said to have commented that it was ‘a weekly supervision of my inner world - and you can't get closer to psychoanalysis than that’ He was greatly helped by these ‘supervisions’ and at the end of their work together, Meltzer suggested that Fordham wrote his memoirs. This resulted in The Making of an Analyst: Michael Fordham, published in 1993.

This fascinating account of Fordham's life and work contains much of interest about his personal development. He talks with candour about his confusions and passions in what is at times a surprisingly revealing manner. In particular Fordham talks openly about his closest relationships and how they affected him. The book was published, as he wanted it to be, after careful discussion with James Astor and Karl Figlio.

We are pleased to be able to publish the following contribution from Dr Meltzer about the book which he prompted. It is a mixture of personal responses on reading the book and memories of the man.     

Walter Bradford Cannon: Reflections on the man and his contributions

My father's early research was with X-rays and led him to a serendipity finding concerning the role of distress in the physiological responses of cats. This chance finding led to further studies of the effects of emotional stimuli on various organs and systems in the body. These studies were the foundation for Cannon's discovery of the fight-or-flight, or stress response, and the development of his companion notion of homeostasis, embodied inThe Wisdom of the Body. While being fond of William James from undergraduate coursework under him, Cannon challenged and refuted the validity of the James-Lange Theory of emotions during his research career. Always fascinated by the psychological and emotional realm of human functioning, Cannon enjoyed warm and close relationships with Robert Yerkes and Ivan Pavlov over the years. The only time in my father's life when he felt strong pressure to produce may have been during World War I when he was part of the Allied medical team solving the problem of traumatic shock experienced by Allied troops in Europe.     

A Review of Baum's Review of Conceptual Foundations of Radical Behaviorism

Baum expressed numerous concerns about my Conceptual Foundations of Radical Behaviorism in his review. If his review were an independent submission and I were an independent referee, I would recommend that his review be rejected and that he be encouraged to revise and resubmit, once he has studied the field a bit more and clarified for himself and journal readers several important matters. I outline two sets of concerns that he might usefully clarify in his revision: (a) the important contributions of B. F. Skinner to a book about radical behaviorism, and (b) the nature of private behavioral events. In particular, the methodological behaviorism inherent in Baum's position needs to be resolved.     

Humor and the Rebellious Spirit of the Early Adolescent Boy

In my companion article on the making of the reliably religious boy (D. Capps, 2006c) I presented my argument that, whereas the younger boy of three to five is becoming religious as a result of his emotional separation from his mother, the early adolescent boy (age 11–14) has become reliably religious in that he has developed a religious habit of mind, a habit reflected in his embrace of the religions of honor and hope. I presented myself as a case study in this regard. I noted, however, that there is a third form of religion, that of humor, and that it relativizes—and thereby preserves—the religions of honor and hope. I also noted that religion and spirituality are capable of being differentiated. I suggested that my own spirituality took the form of rebellion and that this spirit of rebellion fueled and was fueled by the religion of humor. Employing Freud’s writings on humor, I explain in this article how this works.     

The Intrinsic Value of Sport: A Reply to Culbertson

Leon Culbertson's recent contribution, ‘Does Sport Have Intrinsic Value?’ objects to the account of the value of sport as intrinsic value I had developed in my Sport, Rules and Values; in particular, as this occurs in my argument that the value of some sports resided in the possibility of their functioning as a moral laboratory. He identifies two accounts of intrinsic value; and shows that neither would fit my purposes seamlessly. He urges that my account of the place of normative reasons cannot generate intrinsic value: rather, the person whose reasons they are somehow imports that value. Yet he has misunderstood my particularist conception of values; and the place occupied by my contextualism – these, rather than a residual commitment to essentialism, are what generates an apparent inconsistency he identifies. But they also explain it away. As a result, much of his concern to find some exact account of the term ‘intrinsic’ is misplaced: we need to look contextually. Further, the project of my discussion was limited to showing, first, how the moral laboratory idea might explain the value of some sport (on the assumption that sport had intrinsic value); and, second, how failures of realisation of that intrinsic value might be traced to the distinction between motivating reasons and normative ones.     

Historical Knowledge: A Response to Hal Childs

In his book,The Myth of the Historical Jesus and the Evolution of Consciousness, Hal Childs undertakes to do something which is probably impossible. He wishes to show that my reconstruction of the historical Jesus is positivistic without becoming positivistic himself in his own reconstruction of the historical Crossan, a work which, unfortunately for him but fortunately for me, is still very much in process. Here I only use, as he does, publications up to 1995. That means, for example, that I do not cite either The Birth of Christianity or my recent memoir A Long Way from Tipperary. I discuss Hal's dissertation under three headings, moving from the less to the more fundamentally important.     

Clinical Commentary

Abstract

This paper is the narrative of a first-time father with a son born seven weeks early by Caesarean section. Against the anxiety and trauma of his infant's birth and his wife's illness, another inner darker drama is being relived. Michael shows all the wounds of a battered child. He asks two awesome questions - Will I be to my son as my father was to me? Will my son be to me as I was to my father? Fearful and at first unvoiced questions, the developing interviews gave them a voice. We respected Michael's sharing of the early and fearful days and nights when his infant first came home. We sometimes found it hard to empathize with his running away to hide in work, until we understood what he was hiding from. Most poignant was his struggle with his anger and hurt with his father and his desire to understand, ‘Why?’, so that he would not be like this to his son. We saw a sensitive revelation of life being born inside him anew, as he made contact with his real infant and his psychic infant within. Of particular interest was the therapeutic use of the research interview space and the interviewer.     

Response to Strenger

Despite certain apparently common values, Strenger's critique is addressed largely to an inaccurate account of my views. It is also internally contradictory in various ways. On one hand, for example, Strenger favors a dialectic of science and the humanities as they bear on psychoanalysis; on the other hand, he declares science to be the exclusive psychoanalytic “metaphysic.” Remarkably, he claims that my critique of technical rationality is tantamount to advocating a passive reflective stance on the analyst's part, precluding anything akin to “coaching” to foster change. But I've written consistently about the dialectic of proactive therapeutic influence and critical reflection on that very influence and its implications. What's unacceptable about technical rationality is its positivist confidence about the effectiveness of prescribed interventions based on allegedly scientific evidence. With his lengthy survey of extra-analytic studies, Strenger evades engaging my specific arguments since they are strictly about the unwarranted privileging of the findings of psychoanalytic process and outcome research relative to clinical experience. He mistakenly equates my repudiation of such privileging with rejection of the value of “science” altogether for psychoanalysis. Finally, Strenger's claim that my “dialectical constructivism” eschews formulating universal truths about human nature ignores my consideration of human potentials for both denying and confronting mortality and the associated challenge of human agency. Embracing that challenge constitutes a moral position for psychoanalysis that is unequivocally opposed to uncritical compliance with culturally shaped demands for various types of therapeutic services.     

Helplessness and the exercise of power in the analytic session

This paper describes a clinical situation in which the analyst may be provoked to become overactive if he feels that his attempts to reach his patient are frustrated. Lack of tolerance for feelings of helplessness may leave him unable to sustain a receptive stance, and he may be drawn into enactments which lead to a power struggle with his patient.
I will try to describe situations where such enactments were compelling. I will also consider what enabled me to extricate myself from the activity, at least intermittently, to re‐establish an analytic attitude in which understanding and containment were priorities.
From time to time I was able to recognize and accept my helplessness and relinquish my attempts to reach the patient. These moments of recognition led to a shift of atmosphere in which a feeling of sadness replaced the more familiar confrontational mood. In these sadder moods the patient felt I was more available, and he too seemed more able to contemplate loss.
Theoretical ideas that enabled me to recognize some of the mechanisms at play included an understanding of narcissistic mechanisms, a recognition of previous ideas of power and dominance such as Freud’s Bemächtigungstrieb, and the role of dominance in the resolution of the Oedipus complex. My previous work on the dread of humiliation allowed me to be sensitive to the way helplessness can come to be associated with being looked down on and humiliated.     

Coping with the Angry Patient

This patient is enacting two chronic maladaptive patterns. In one he alternates between the role of victim and abuser while inducing the therapist to play the counterrole. He tries to master the abuse he suffered passively as a child by becoming abusive with the therapist and having her experience what it feels like to be mistreated. My effort would be to interpret this pattern even while acknowledging and absorbing some degree of his anger. In a second pattern he acts like an angry, demanding child in an effort to extract nurturance and special treatment from the therapist. I would help him explore this posture in terms of his deprived background and its maladaptiveness in his current life. Finally, I present vignettes from my own practice to demonstrate how I work with patients' anger when it is expressed indirectly rather than in Mr. P's very direct manner.     

Relevant Robinson's arithmetic

In this paper two different formulations of Robinson's arithmetic based on relevant logic are examined. The formulation based on the natural numbers (including zero) is shown to collapse into classical Robinson's arithmetic, whereas the one based on the positive integers (excluding zero) is shown not to similarly collapse. Relations of these two formulations to R. K. Meyer's system R# of relevant Peano arithmetic are examined, and some remarks are made about the role of constant functions (e.g., multiplication by zero) in relevant arithmetic.This paper has been greatly influenced by the (largely unpublished) work of E. K. Meyer (cf. [7]) on relevant arithmetic, and I wish to thank him, and also N. D. Belnap, Jr. and D. Cohen for helpful advice. In fairness to Meyer it must be said that he finds my axioms 13 and 13(1) too strong (they are not theorems of his system R# - cf. §4 below). Meyer tells me be finds vindication for his view in my chief theorem of §2. For myself, I find the insights behind Meyer's work on R# to be both stable and fruitful, and if I now had to make a choice, I would follow Meyer in his rejection of my axioms. However, the systems I explore in this paper themselves have a surprising amount of internal consistency of motivation (cf. §5). Let a hundred formal systems bloom.     

Murakami,Connoisseur of Uncertainty: Commentary on Paper by Thomas Rosbrow

My discussion embroiders around Thomas Rosbrow's view of Murakami as a “trauma analyst.” I highlight the ways in which Murakami's writing reflects his keen sensitivity to existential uncertainty and how he seems to understand trauma, much as I do, as a shattering experience that destroys the certainties that organize psychological life and generates efforts at self restoration. Although I share Rosbrow's view that “After the Quake” depicts a character's awakening from the dissociative manifestations of trauma, I spell out how my perspective on this process differs from his.     

The self in Kierkegaard's pseudonyms

Conclusion This is essentially what I take to be Kierkegaard's ontological foundation of human existence. It is the structure which both makes possible and unifies the different modes of existing which he so fully describes in his pseudonyms. The further task is one of demonstrating concretely the relation of these modes (stages) of existing to his ontology.This essay will appear in my book, Being and Existence in Kierkegaard's Pseudonyms, to be published by Princeton University Press in 1975. I would like to thank the Princeton University Pres for permission to publish a portion of the book in this journal. I would also like to acknowledge my colleagues' helpful criticisms of the original draft of this paper which I read in a departmental seminar at Iowa State University last fall. Some of their suggestions were incorporated in the final draft.     

REALIZING PLEASANT GROVE: THE REAL PRESENCE OF THE ESCHATON IN THE LIFE OF STANLEY HAUERWAS

Taking my cue from Hannah's Child: A Theologian's Memoir, I discuss the struggles Stanley Hauerwas experiences in trying to identify a place he can call home. The memoir suggests that his academic endeavours have taken Hauerwas far from his hometown, Pleasant Grove, Texas. The book shows, however, that places such as Pleasant Grove function for Hauerwas as anticipations of the heavenly eschaton. To suggest that Christians have no home here on earth does not take into account sufficiently the “real presence” of the heavenly future in everyday realities, such as Stanley's love of Paula Gilbert and a person's appropriate affection of his country.     

In defence of a faith-like model of love: a reply to John Lippitt’s “Kierkegaard and the problem of special relationships: Ferreira,Krishek, and the ‘God filter”’

In his major work on love, Works of Love, Kierkegaard clearly and robustly affirms the moral superiority of neighbourly love, and approves preferential love on one condition: that it serve as an instance of neighbourly love. But can an essentially preferential love be an instance of the essentially non-preferential neighbourly love? John Lippitt seems to think it can. In his paper “Kierkegaard and the problem of special relationships: Ferreira, Krishek, and the ‘God filter”’ he defends Kierkegaard’s position in Works of Love against my criticism (as presented in my book Kierkegaard on Faith and Love); specifically, against my claim that in using Kierkegaard’s view of neighbourly love as a framework for understanding preferential love, one fails to account for the latter’s distinctive character. Lippitt claims that I misinterpret Kierkegaard’s position and, using what he calls ‘the God filter’, he attempts to show how adhering to Kierkegaard’s view of neighbourly love allows one to sustain the distinctiveness (and value) of preferential love. In what follows I will defend my interpretation of Kierkegaard’s position and explain why I take the view he presents in Works of Love to be problematic. Furthermore, in my aforementioned book I offer a Kierkegaardian model of love that does precisely what Lippitt seeks his ‘God filter’ model to do: namely, preserve the distinctiveness of preferential love while allowing its possible coexistence with neighbourly love. Thus, against the background of Lippitt’s criticism I will demonstrate this model again, in hope of clarifying the advantages this view offers.     

Making it Implicit: Brandom on Rule Following

In Making it Explicit , Brandom aims to articulate an account of conceptual content that accommodates its normativity—a requirement on theories of content that Brandom traces to Wittgenstein's rule following considerations. It is widely held that the normativity requirement cannot be met, or at least not with ease, because theories of content face an intractable dilemma. Brandom proposes to evade the dilemma by adopting a middle road—one that uses normative vocabulary, but treats norms as implicit in practices. I argue that this proposal fails to evade the dilemma, as Brandom himself understands it. Despite his use of normative vocabulary, Brandom's theory fares no better than the reductionist theories he criticises. I consider some responses that Brandom might make to my charges, and finally conclude that his proposal founders on his own criteria.     

The Ethics of Price Gouging

An analysis of the contemporary moral debate over price gouging can advance multiple readings of the challenging biblical episode which depicts Jacob's purchase of the birthright. Ethical considerations, such as the maximization of welfare, preservation of choice, and promotion of virtue are evaluated and then applied to the biblical text recounting the sale of Esau's birthright. Did Jacob act ethically in his purchase of ravenous Esau's birthright, or did he seize a propitious opportunity to exploit Esau's predicament? Is Esau responsible for spurning his birthright, or was he misled as he claims Jacob had “supplanted me these two times: he took away my birthright; and, behold, now he has taken away my blessing” (Genesis 27:36)? An ethical analysis of Jacob's and Esau's intentions and actions in the transaction uncovers the Bible's position on the sale and on the larger moral debate.