Eye movements reveal rapid concurrent access to factual and counterfactual interpretations of the world

Imagining a counterfactual world using conditionals (e.g., If Joanne had remembered her umbrella . . .) is common in everyday language. However, such utterances are likely to involve fairly complex reasoning processes to represent both the explicit hypothetical conjecture and its implied factual meaning. Online research into these mechanisms has so far been limited. The present paper describes two eye movement studies that investigated the time-course with which comprehenders can set up and access factual inferences based on a realistic counterfactual context. Adult participants were eye-tracked while they read short narratives, in which a context sentence set up a counterfactual world (If . . . then . . .), and a subsequent critical sentence described an event that was either consistent or inconsistent with the implied factual world. A factual consistent condition (Because . . . then . . .) was included as a baseline of normal contextual integration. Results showed that within a counterfactual scenario, readers quickly inferred the implied factual meaning of the discourse. However, initial processing of the critical word led to clear, but distinct, anomaly detection responses for both contextually inconsistent and consistent conditions. These results provide evidence that readers can rapidly make a factual inference from a preceding counterfactual context, despite maintaining access to both counterfactual and factual interpretations of events.     

Sentential and discourse topic effects on lexical ambiguity processing: an eye movement examination

Models of lexical ambiguity resolution posit a role for context, but this construct has remained relatively undefined in the literature. The present study isolated two different forms of contextual constraint and examined how these sources of information might differentiate between a selective access and a reordered access model of ambiguity processing. Eye movements were monitored as participants read passages that contained either a balanced or a biased ambiguous word. The sentence containing the ambiguous word was held constant and instantiated either the subordinate meaning (Experiment 1) or the dominant meaning (Experiment 2) through the use of local context. These sentences were embedded in passages in which the topic was consistent, inconsistent, or neutral with respect to the meaning biased by the critical sentence. Experiment 1 provided evidence suggesting that the subordinate meaning of an ambiguous word was not selectively accessed even when sentence and discourse topic information biased that meaning. The data from Experiment 2 provided evidence that even the dominant meaning was not selectively accessed. These contextual sources of information were evaluated in terms of the roles they play in models of lexical ambiguity resolution.     

前后语境在汉语成语义识别中的作用

通过自定步速阅读实验研究发现,语境前后位置对成语义识别有显著性影响,且影响方式和程度存在差异,符合多义词重组通达模型。根据动态自组织模式,句子中的成语义识别至少包括多种潜在词义启动和与语境倾向义匹配两个过程。前置语境对成语比喻义通达具有预设作用,加速或抑制成语比喻义通达;而后置语境则在句子语义整合过程中对成语比喻义起到返查纠偏的作用。     

Biasing thematic contexts for ambiguous sentences in a dichotic listening experiment

In an experiment derived from Lackner and Garrett (1972) 80 subjects were given a dichotic listening task where they were presented with ambiguous sentences to an attended ear and disambiguating sentences to the other, unattended, ear. Each of the sentences was preceded by a thematic context that was biased for one meaning of the ambiguous sentence. In one-half of the instances the contexts biased a meaning consistent with that of the disambiguating sentence, and in the remaining one-half they biased the meaning of the ambiguous sentence in a way that was inconsistent with the meaning of the ambiguous sentence. The meanings of the ambiguous sentences the subjects perceived tended to be those that were consistent with the biasing context, even when that meaning was inconsistent with the meaning of the disambiguating sentence. Therefore, when ambiguous sentences are preceded by a thematic context, a single-reading explanation of the processing is more appropriate than a multiple-reading explanation.     

The Representation of Changing Emotions in Reading Comprehension

The ability of readers to represent protagonists' changing emotions was explored. In Experiment 1, subjects read stories in a cumulative version (all the events biased the same emotion) or in a shifting version (the first part biased an emotion and the second part suggested another one). An emotional sentence (e.g. Ann felt proud of her decision) placed at two different loci was either consistent or inconsistent with the first part of the story. In the cumulative context, inconsistent targets were read slower in any locus. In the shifting context, inconsistent sentences were read slower in the first locus, and faster in the second locus, indicating that readers had updated the protagonist's emotion. In Experiments 2 and 3 subjects read versions of the stories with a first part that biased one of two alternative emotions (e.g. proud or guilty), followed by neutral sentences and then the target sentence. The consistency effect was obtained again, demonstrating that the representation of the initial emotion was highly accessible beyond the local context. The results indicate that readers built updatable mental models of protagonists' emotions.     

The Relation Between Factual and Counterfactual Conditionals

What is the relation between factual conditionals: If A happened then B happened, and counterfactual conditionals: If A had happened then B would have happened? Some theorists propose quite different semantics for the two. In contrast, the theory of mental models and its computer implementation interrelates them. It postulates that both can have a priori truth values, and that the semantic bases of both are possibilities: states that are possible for factual conditionals, and that were once possible but that did not happen for counterfactual conditionals. Two experiments supported these relations. Experiment 1 showed that, like factual conditionals, certain counterfactuals are true a priori, and others are false a priori. Experiment 2 replicated this result and showed that participants selected appropriate paraphrases, referring, respectively, to real and to counterfactual possibilities, for the two sorts of conditional. These results are contrary to alternative accounts of conditionals.     

句子阅读理解过程中句意的建构时间

一般语言学理论认为, 在句子阅读理解过程中, 句子意义建构是基于词汇语义整合的, 其反映在N400之上, 开始于词语呈现后约250 ms。然而, 近年关于语义P600效应的研究却提示句意建构可能存在多通道或方式, 读者甚至可能在N400反映的加工出现之前就已建立了初步句意。为探明在句子阅读理解过程中是否存在比N400反映的加工更早的句意建构, 以及如果存在这样的句意建构, 其是从何时开始的, 本研究开展了四个实验。实验1发现被试在句末双字词呈现200 ms后已将其联系到上文语义表征而建立了句意, 提示句意建构开始于N400反映的加工出现之前。实验2与3进一步发现, 读者开始建立句意的时间约在句末词呈现了150 ms之时。实验4排除了实验1~3效应的其他一些可能解释, 提升了实验1~3结果的可靠性。总体上, 本研究提示：在句子阅读理解过程中, 读者在句末双字词呈现了约150 ms之时就已建立了句意; 可能存在比N400反映的加工更早的句意建构。     

READING SKILL AND SUPPRESSION REVISITED

Abstract— In a previous issue of Psychological Science, we (Gernsbacher, 1993) reported that less skilled readers are less able than more skilled readers to quickly suppress irrelevant information (e.g., the contextually inappropriate meaning of a homonym, such as the playing-card meaning of spade, in the sentence He dug with the spade, or the inappropriate form of a homophone, such as patience, in the sentence He had lots of patients). In the current research, we investigated a ramification of that finding. If less skilled readers are less able to suppress a contextually inappropriate meaning of a homonym, perhaps less skilled readers might be better than more skilled readers at comprehending puns. However, intuition and previous research suggest the contrary, as do the results of the research presented here. On a task that required accepting, rather than rejecting, a meaning of a homonym that was not implied by the sentence context, more skilled readers responded more rapidly than less skilled readers. In contrast, on a task that required accepting a meaning of a homonym that was implied by the sentence context, more and less skilled readers performed equally well. We conclude that more skilled readers are more able to rapidly accept inappropriate meanings of homonyms because they are more skilled at suppression (which in this case involves suppressing the appropriate meanings).     

Global context effects on processing lexically ambiguous words: Evidence from eye fixations

Readers' eye movements were monitored as they read biased ambiguous target words in the context of a short paragraph. Two aspects of context were manipulated. The global context was presented in the topic sentence of the paragraph and instantiated either the dominant or the subordinate meaning of biased ambiguous target words (those with highly dominant meanings). Local contextual information either preceded or followed the target word and was always consistent with the subordinate interpretation. Consistent with prior research, we obtained a subordinate bias effect wherein readers looked longer at the ambiguous words than control words when the preceding context instantiated the subordinate meaning. More importantly, the magnitude of the subordinate bias effect was the same when global context alone, local context alone, or local and global context combined were consistent with the subordinate meaning of the ambiguous word. The results of this study indicate that global contextual information (1) has an immediate impact on lexical ambiguity resolution when no local disambiguating information is available, (2) has no additional effect when it is consistent with local information, but (3) does have a slightly delayed effect when inconsistent with local information.     

Canceling updating in the comprehension of counterfactuals embedded in narratives

Participants were given counterfactual sentences--for example, "If Mary had won the lottery she would have bought a Mercedes car"--or factual sentences--for example, "Because Mary won the lottery, she bought a Mercedes car"--embedded in short narratives. Reading times showed that readers were immediately sensitive to the special status of counterfactual information (Experiment 1). In addition, probe-recognition latencies demonstrated that old information was more accessible in counterfactual than in factual stories, and new information was equally accessible in both kinds of stories (Experiment 2). However, after reading additional clauses, new information became less accessible in counterfactual than in factual stories (Experiment 3). These results suggest that counterfactual events are momentarily represented but are later suppressed and the readers' attention goes back to previous events in the story.     

Language comprehenders retain implied shape and orientation of objects

According to theories of embodied cognition, language comprehenders simulate sensorimotor experiences to represent the meaning of what they read. Previous studies have shown that picture recognition is better if the object in the picture matches the orientation or shape implied by a preceding sentence. In order to test whether strategic imagery may explain previous findings, language comprehenders first read a list of sentences in which objects were mentioned. Only once the complete list had been read was recognition memory tested with pictures. Recognition performance was better if the orientation or shape of the object matched that implied by the sentence, both immediately after reading the complete list of sentences and after a 45-min delay. These results suggest that previously found match effects were not due to strategic imagery and show that details of sensorimotor simulations are retained over longer periods.     

How expert witnesses' counterfactuals influence causal and responsibility attributions of mock jurors and expert judges

Past research has shown that counterfactual (“If…then…”) thoughts influence causal and responsibility attribution in the judicial context. However, little is known on whether and how the use of counterfactuals in communication affects lay jurors' and judges' evaluations. In two studies, we asked mock lay jurors (Study 1) and actual judges (Study 2) to read a medical malpractice case followed by an expert witness report, which included counterfactuals focused on either the physician, the patient, or external factors. Results showed that counterfactual focus had a strong effect on both lay jurors' and judges' causal and responsibility attributions. Counterfactual focus also moderated the effect of outcome foreseeability on responsibility attribution. Discussion focuses on how counterfactual communication can direct causal and responsibility attribution and reduce the importance of other factors known to influence judicial decision‐making. The potential implications of these findings in training programs and debiasing interventions are also discussed.     

Is Complex Visual Information Implicated During Language Comprehension? The Case of Cast Shadows

Previous research showed that sensorimotor information affects the perception of properties associated with implied perceptual context during language comprehension. Three experiments addressed a novel question of whether perceptual context may contribute to a simulation of information about such out-of-sight objects as cast shadows. In Experiment 1, participants read a sentence that implied a particular shadow cast on a target (blinds vs. an open window) and then verified the picture of the object onto which a shadow was cast. Responses were faster when the shadow of blinds cast on the object matched that implied by the sentence. However, the data did not show the same matching effect for pictures with cast shadows from an open window. In Experiments 2 and 3, we found that verification times for pictures with no cast shadows were faster when preceded by an “open window” sentence, thus suggesting that reading the sentence does not elicit a visual simulation of any specific shadow. Experiment 3 showed that the objects superimposed with a cast shadow of the blinds and blinds themselves were verified faster after reading a “blinds” sentence. However, the results of an order analysis showed the temporal stability of the “blinds shadows” effect, but the disappearance of the “blinds” effect in the second half of the data. We conclude that the results are compatible, to a lesser or greater extent, with multiple accounts, and discuss our findings in the context of a mental imagery view, a mental simulation view, and an amodal representation view.     

Pragmatic skills predict online counterfactual comprehension: Evidence from the N400

Counterfactual thought allows people to consider alternative worlds they know to be false. Communicating these thoughts through language poses a social-communicative challenge because listeners typically expect a speaker to produce true utterances, but counterfactuals per definition convey information that is false. Listeners must therefore incorporate overt linguistic cues (subjunctive mood, such as in If I loved you then) in a rapid way to infer the intended counterfactual meaning. The present EEG study focused on the comprehension of such counterfactual antecedents and investigated if pragmatic ability—the ability to apply knowledge of the social-communicative use of language in daily life—predicts the online generation of counterfactual worlds. This yielded two novel findings: (1) Words that are consistent with factual knowledge incur a semantic processing cost, as reflected in larger N400 amplitude, in counterfactual antecedents compared to hypothetical antecedents (If sweets were/are made of sugar). We take this to suggest that counterfactuality is quickly incorporated during language comprehension and reduces online expectations based on factual knowledge. (2) Individual scores on the Autism Quotient Communication subscale modulated this effect, suggesting that individuals who are better at understanding the communicative intentions of other people are more likely to reduce knowledge-based expectations in counterfactuals. These results are the first demonstration of the real-time pragmatic processes involved in creating possible worlds.     

Linguistic Context and the Priming of Semantic Information

Two experiments were carried out to demonstrate that linguistic context (in the form of a sentence) influences the interpretation of unambiguous words. Experiment I established that subjects read a sentence which primes a particular aspect of the meaning of one of the words it contains faster than they read a sentence which primes no particular aspect of the word's meaning. It also showed that subjects produce semantic characteristics of the word faster following the priming sentence than following the sentence that primes no particular semantic component. Experiment II corroborated these results using a task in which subjects read a sentence and then answered a question about the meaning of a word that occurred in it. Given a particular question, responses were faster when it followed a sentence that primed a characteristic relevant to the question than when it followed a sentence that primed no particular characteristic of the word. Responses were reliably slowest when the question followed a sentence that primed a characteristic that was not relevant to the question. Semantic priming is known to affect the identification of words and their disambiguation; the present study confirms that it also affects the specific interpretation of words.     

Perceptual representation as a mechanism of lexical ambiguity resolution: An investigation of span and processing time

In 2 experiments, the authors investigated the ability of high- and low-span comprehenders to construe subtle shades of meaning through perceptual representation. High- and low-span comprehenders responded to pictures that either matched or mismatched a target object's shape as implied by the preceding sentence context. At 750 ms after hearing the sentence describing the target object, both high- and low-span comprehenders had activated a contextually appropriate perceptual representation of the target object. However, only high-span comprehenders had perceptually represented the contextually appropriate meaning immediately upon hearing the sentence, whereas low-span comprehenders required more processing time before the perceptual representation was activated. The results are interpreted in a framework of co-occurring lexical representations and perceptual-motor representations.     

Discourse-based emotional consistency modulates early and middle components of event-related potentials

In this study, participants read stories describing emotional episodes with either a positive or negative valence (Experiment 1). Following each story, participants were exposed to short sentences referring to the protagonist, and the event-related potential (ERP) for each sentence's last word was recorded. Some sentences described the protagonist's emotion, either consistent or inconsistent with the story; others were neutral; and others involved a semantically anomalous word. Inconsistent emotions were found to elicit larger N100/P200 and N400 than consistent emotions. However, when participants were exposed to the same critical sentences in a control experiment (Experiment 2) in which the stories had been removed, emotional consistency effects disappeared in all ERP components, demonstrating that these effects were discourse-level phenomena. By contrast, the ordinary N400 effect for locally anomalous words in the sentence was obtained both with and without story context. In conclusion, reading stories describing events with emotional significance determines strong and very early anticipations of an emotional word.     

汉语同形歧义词歧义消解的过程

实验采用启动范式,利用句子语境探讨同形歧义词（homographs）歧义消解的过程。结果表明：与语境一致的歧义词的主要意义首先得到通达,与语境一致的次要意义随后才被激活,与语境不一致的歧义词的意义没有得到激活,语境敏感模型可以较好地解释本实验的结果。     

On catching on to idiomatic expressions

These experiments concern the comprehension of idiomatic expressions. The hypothesis was that there are distinct idiomatic and literal modes of processing sentences. In two experiments, 414 undergraduates read a series of sentences containing either literal or idiomatic ambiguities and then a test which had both a literal and an idiomatic meaning. Ss recorded, which meaning they perceived first. Taken together, the experiments indicate that inducing a set to perceive idioms can increase the proportion of people seeing the idiomatic meaning of test sentence first and a set to perceive literal meanings can reduce this proportion compared to a no-set baseline. Since the procedures to induce set did not involve grammatical or semantic information relevant to comprehension of the test sentence, these results suggest the existence of distinct literal and idiomatic processing strategies.