What kind of attention modulates the Stroop effect?

An intersection of three literatures (skilled word recognition, spatial attention, and the Stroop effect) is addressed in a series of four experiments. The results, in conjunction with other observations, are taken to suggest that (1) thedefault value for spatial attention in visual word recognition is distributed across the word, (2) precuing a single letter position serves to narrow the focus of spatial attention, and (3) this reduces or prevents activation in the word recognition system. Consequently, the Stroop effect is reduced in magnitude or eliminated, depending on details of the context. Contrary to the widespread view that it reflects automatic processing, the Stroop effect is better conceptualized as reflecting the action of default settings in the word recognition and attentional systems. Some relations between consciousness, context, and control are noted.     

What is the nature of increased Stroop interference in schizophrenia?

In comparison to controls, patients with schizophrenia classically display (1) an overall slowing in response times (RTs) and (2) a disproportionate slowing in RTs in the conflict condition of the Stroop color/word interference task. These two effects appear repeatedly in the card version of the Stroop task but were not replicated in a number of studies using a computer item-by-item version of the task. The present study was aimed at understanding the exact nature of the increased interference classically found in the performance of patients with schizophrenia in the card version of the Stroop task. We used a computer trial-by-trial version in which we investigated the effects of two major methodological differences between the two versions: (1) blocked (card version) versus mixed (computer version) presentation of the neutral, congruent and conflict conditions and (2) presence (card version) versus absence (computer version) of distractors in the spatial surrounding of the target. We found an overall slowing in performance and a disproportionate slowing in the conflict condition for patients with schizophrenia but only when the target was surrounded by distractors (in Experiments 2 and 3). The data are discussed in terms of a deficit in selective attention and inhibitory processes in schizophrenia.     

The SNARC effect: an instance of the Simon effect?

Our aim was to investigate the relations between the Spatial-Numerical Association of Response Codes (SNARC) effect and the Simon effect. In Experiment 1 participants were required to make a parity judgment to numbers from 1 to 9 (without 5), by pressing a left or a right key. The numbers were presented to either the left or right side of fixation. Results showed the Simon effect (left-side stimuli were responded to faster with the left hand than with the right hand whereas right-side stimuli were responded to faster with the right hand), and the SNARC effect (smaller numbers were responded to faster with the left hand than with the right hand, whereas larger numbers were responded to faster with the right hand). No interaction was found between the Simon and SNARC effects, suggesting that they combine additively. In Experiment 2 the temporal distance between formation of the task-relevant non-spatial stimulus code and the task-irrelevant stimulus spatial code was increased. As in Experiment 1, results showed the presence of the Simon and SNARC effects but no interaction between them. Moreover, we found a regular Simon effect for faster RTs, and a reversed Simon effect for longer RTs. In contrast, the SNARC effect did not vary as a function of RT. Taken together, the results of the two experiments show that the SNARC effect does not simply constitute a variant of the Simon effect. This is considered to be evidence that number representation and space representation rest on different neural (likely parietal) circuits.     

The locus of semantic interference in the “Stroop” color-naming task

In two experiments, introductory psychology students responded in two ways to three lists of 60 words printed in different colors. The lists consisted of color words and two sets of words associated with the colors (e.g., SKY, BLOOD, etc.). When the subjects responded by naming the color in which each word was printed, it took longer for the color word list than for either list of associates, i.e., the classical Stroop interference effect. The other response required the subjects to say words from one of the association lists which corresponded to the color in which each word was printed, e.g., they saw the word BLACK (or NIGHT, or COAL) printed inred ink, and had to respond by saying “blood.” Using this response, it took longest for the subjects to complete the list of words which were the same as those required as responses. Color words were somewhat less difficult, and the other association words were completed most quickly. The results do not pinpoint the locus of interference, but clarify additional assumptions which must be accepted to maintain alternative hypotheses.     

Stroop其人和Stroop效应

Ｓｔｒｏｏｐ其人和Ｓｔｒｏｏｐ效应王才康（华南师大心理系）当命名用红墨水写成的有意义刺激“绿”和无意义刺激“××”的颜色时,会发现前者的颜色命名时间比后者要长得多．这种同一刺激的颜色信息（红色）和词义信息（绿）相互发生干扰现象,就是著名的Ｓｉｒｏｏｐ...     

Stroop and picture—word interference are two sides of the same coin

This article presents a cognitive model that reconciles a surprising observation in the picture—word interference (PWI) paradigm with the general notion that PWI is a form of Stroop interference. Dell’Acqua, Job, Peressotti, and Pascali (2007) assessed PWI using a psychological refractory period (PRP) paradigm, and concluded that the locus of interference in PWI is during the perceptual encoding stage. Stroop interference, on the other hand, is generally attributed to response selection. Based on these findings it was argued that PWI is not a Stroop effect. The present article discusses an alternative interpretation of these results. We assume that both effects are caused by the same interference mechanism, but that the processing speed associated with the different stimuli (colors vs. words) accounts for the previously reported differences. We support this argument by presenting a single computational model that accounts for both PWI and Stroop phenomena in single task and PRP settings.     

On the origin of the “cumulative semantic inhibition” effect

We investigated whether the cumulative semantic inhibition effect found by Howard, Nickels, Coltheart, and Cole-Virtue (2006) provides information about semantic representations. By applying more sensitive statistical analyses to the original data set, we found a significant variation in the magnitude of the effect across categories. This variation cannot be explained by the naming speed of each category. In addition, using a subsample of the data, a second cumulative effect arouse for newly defined supracategories, over and above the effect of the original ones. We discuss these findings in terms of the representations that drive lexical access and show that they favor featural or distributed hypotheses.     

What is the role of affect in the spacing effect?

In Experiments 1 and 2, after studying a list containing connotatively neutral words that were presented once or were presented at various spacing intervals, subjects either attempted free recall or made affective judgments of the study-list targets along a pleasant/unpleasant dimension. Spacing effects occurred in recall, and massed items were judged to be more unpleasantthan once-presented and spaced words. In the third experiment, subjects studied homogeneous lists composed of either connotatively good words or connotativelybad ones. Spacing effects were absent in the recall of both types of words because massed-practice words were recalled at a high level, one that was about the same as that for spaced-practice words. Affective judgments were unrelated to presentation condition, and both good and bad massed words were judged to be positive in affect. Although the data suggest that different study conditions can lead to different affective reactions, the results are moot with regard to the relationship between affect and the magnitude of spacing effects.     

Is there an effect of handedness on the position of the egocentric reference?

Forty normal subjects (20 left-handed; 20 right-handed) were submitted to a proprioceptive straight ahead pointing task while blindfolded to study the effect of the hand used and of the hand preference on the estimation of the subjective sagittal middle. Results showed that left-handed and right-handed subjects both deviated to the left of the objective sagittal middle and presented an effect of the hand used and of the starting point affecting their straight ahead performance in a similar way. In all subjects whatever their manual preference, using the left hand and starting 30 degrees to left induced a tendency to deviate to the same side, whereas using the right hand and starting 30 degrees to right induced a tendency to place the subjective middle to the right of the objective middle. These results are interpreted with regard to the hypothesis of a cortical control of the position of the egocentric reference.     

On the timescale of stimulus-based action–effect learning

When performing an action, people pick up associations between their actions and the resulting consequences of that action, a phenomenon that has been termed response (R)–effect (E) learning. In the present study, we investigated incidental R–E learning in a forced-choice—that is, a stimulus (S)-based—acquisition mode. Specifically, the study examined at which timescale R–E learning evolves—that is, how many encounters are actually needed to form stable R–E associations. The learning of R–E associations was assessed in a subsequent test phase via effect-based response priming. Experiment 1 tested 4 different numbers of S–R–E repetitions for a 2–2–2 S–R–E mapping. Experiment 2 disentangled the contributions of S–E and R–E associations to the facilitating impact of effect-based response priming by means of a 4–2–4 S–R–E mapping. Experiment 3 investigated whether R–E associations can be picked up even when a given E cannot be unequivocally predicted based on the antecedent S in case of inconsistent S–R–E couplings. Together, the results of the present study clearly show that R–E learning occurs in a stimulus-based action mode and that it evolves very rapidly after only 12 S–R–E repetitions. Moreover, the present findings suggest that at least in this initial phase of learning, complete S–R–E consistency seems to be relevant for R–E learning.     

Music in the moment? Revisiting the effect of large scale structures

The psychological relevance of large-scale musical structures has been a matter of debate in the music community. This issue was investigated with a method that allows assessing listeners' detection of musical incoherencies in normal and scrambled versions of popular and contemporary music pieces. Musical excerpts were segmented into 28 or 29 chunks. In the scrambled version, the temporal order of these chunks was altered with the constraint that the transitions between two chunks never created local acoustical and musical disruptions. Participants were required (1) to detect on-line incoherent linking of chunks, (2) to rate aesthetic quality of pieces, and (3) to evaluate their overall coherence. The findings indicate a moderate sensitivity to large-scale musical structures for popular and contemporary music in both musically trained and untrained listeners. These data are discussed in light of current models of music cognition.     

Does the asymmetry effect inflate the temporal expansion of odd stimuli?

Tse et al. (Percept Psychophys 66:1171–1189, 2004) reported that participants tend to overestimate the duration of an oddball stimulus. The size of this effect was much larger than the one reported by Ulrich et al. (Psychol Res 70:77–87, 2006). More crucially, the effect in the study of Tse et al. already emerged at short standard durations, arguing against the arousal account proposed by Ulrich et al. This study investigated whether the oddball effect reported by Tse et al. was inflated by an asymmetry effect, that is, by an asymmetrical distribution of physical comparison durations around the duration of the standard. Experiment 1 demonstrated that an asymmetry effect could mimic an oddball effect. Therefore, we conducted Experiment 2 to replicate the results by Tse et al. employing not only their original procedure but also an adaptive procedure that rather avoids an asymmetry effect. Both psychophysical procedures in this experiment revealed an oddball effect, which, however, was of smaller size than the one reported by Tse et al. Furthermore, this effect emerged only at longer standard durations, which is in agreement with the arousal account as the underlying mechanism of this robust temporal illusion.     

Who discovered the Flynn effect? A review of early studies of the secular increase of intelligence

Flynn has been credited with having discovered the increase in IQs that has been reported in a number of countries during most of the twentieth century and that has come to be known as “the Flynn effect”. This paper documents and discusses a number of reports of increases in IQs that were published from 1936 onwards before the phenomenon was rediscovered by  and . These early reports showed that the Flynn effect is fully present in pre-school children, does not increase during the school age years, and is greater for non-verbal abilities than for verbal abilities.     

What causes the effect of age of acquisition in lexical processing?

Three hypotheses for effects of age of acquisition (AoA) in lexical processing are compared: the cumulative frequency hypothesis (frequency and AoA both influence the number of encounters with a word, which influences processing speed), the semantic hypothesis (early-acquired words are processed faster because they are more central in the semantic network), and the neural network model (early-acquired words are faster because they are acquired when a network has maximum plasticity). In a regression study of lexical decision (LD) and semantic categorization (SC) in Italian and Dutch, contrary to the cumulative frequency hypothesis, AoA coefficients were larger than frequency coefficients, and, contrary to the semantic hypothesis, the effect of AoA was not larger in SC than in LD. The neural network model was supported.     

Time estimation: does the reference memory mediate the effect of knowledge of results?

This study presents evidence for the role of knowledge of results (KR) in the estimation of medium time intervals (4-12 s durations). Experiment 1 tested the hypothesis that KR operates at the same stage of temporal processing as attention. The absence of an interaction of attention and KR is taken as evidence against this hypothesis. Experiments 2 and 3 further studied the effects of KR in a reproduction and a production task, respectively. The effects of KR were small in the reproduction and substantial in the production task. The results are interpreted in terms of a clock-based timing model and the findings taken together converge on the interpretation that KR affects the reference memory (RM), rather than the other components of the model.     

Does quality of sleep mediate the effect of depression on hopelessness?

The objectives of the study were to evaluate the relationship between sleep quality, depression, and hopelessness in advanced cancer patients and whether sleep quality mediated the effect of depression on hopelessness. The final sample consisted of 102 advanced cancer patients under palliative treatment. Patients completed the Greek Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index, a sleep quality instrument, the Greek Beck Depression Inventory for measuring depression, and finally the Beck Hopelessness Scale. Patients' performance status was assessed by their overall physical functioning, as defined by the Eastern Cooperative Oncology Group. Depression was highly associated with hopelessness (r = .52, p<.001). Statistically significant associations were found between sleep quality with hopelessness (r = .37, p<.001), as well as with depression (r = .36, p<.001). Mediation analyses indicated that depression influenced hopelessness directly as well as indirectly by its effect on sleep quality. About 14.58% of the variation in hopelessness was explained by depression; 4% of the variance in hopelessness explained by depression was accounted for by the mediation pathway indicating that sleep quality mediated the relationship between depression and hopelessness. Similarly, in the reverse mediation analysis, depression mediated the relationship between sleep quality and hopelessness; 43% of the variation in hopelessness was explained by sleep quality. In conclusion, some of the effect of depression on hopelessness was mediated by sleep quality, but depression had a direct effect on hopelessness as well. Additionally, some of the effect of sleep quality on hopelessness was mediated by depression. The current findings are important because improving sleep quality by treating depression may contribute to decreased hopelessness scores and vice versa: Treating depression by improving sleep quality may also contribute to lower hopelessness scores.     

What causes the effect of age of acquisition in lexical processing?

Three hypotheses for effects of age of acquisition (AoA) in lexical processing are compared: the cumulative frequency hypothesis (frequency and AoA both influence the number of encounters with a word, which influences processing speed), the semantic hypothesis (early-acquired words are processed faster because they are more central in the semantic network), and the neural network model (early-acquired words are faster because they are acquired when a network has maximum plasticity). In a regression study of lexical decision (LD) and semantic categorization (SC) in Italian and Dutch, contrary to the cumulative frequency hypothesis, AoA coefficients were larger than frequency coefficients, and, contrary to the semantic hypothesis, the effect of AoA was not larger in SC than in LD. The neural network model was supported.