The Micro-Category account of analogy

Here, we investigate how activation of mental representations of categories during analogical reasoning influences subsequent cognitive processing. Specifically, we present and test the central predictions of the "Micro-Category" account of analogy. This account emphasizes the role of categories in aligning terms for analogical mapping. In a semantic priming paradigm, a four-word analogy task was compared to two other four-word tasks. Stimuli were identical in all tasks; only the instructions given to participants differed. Participants were instructed to identify analogy relations, category relations, or conventionalized semantic relations in the four-word sets. After each four-word set, a single target word appeared and participants named this word aloud. Target words that referred to category relations in the preceding four-word sets were primed as strongly when participants identified analogies as when participants identified categories, suggesting that activation of category concepts plays an important role in analogical thinking. In addition, priming of category-referent words in the analogy and category tasks was significantly greater than priming of these words when participants identified conventionalized semantic relations. Since identical stimuli were used in all conditions, this finding indicates that it is the activation of category relations, distinct from any effect of basic semantic association, that causes analogical reasoning to prime category-referent words. We delineate how the "Micro-Category" account of analogy predicts these phenomena and unifies findings from diverse areas of research concerning analogical reasoning.     

The effects of relational structure on analogical learning

Relational structure is important for various cognitive tasks, such as analogical transfer, but its role in learning of new relational concepts is poorly understood. This article reports two experiments testing people’s ability to learn new relational categories as a function of their relational structure. In Experiment 1, each stimulus consisted of 4 objects varying on 2 dimensions. Each category was defined by two binary relations between pairs of objects. The manner in which the relations were linked (i.e., by operating on shared objects) varied between subjects, producing 3 logically different conditions. In Experiment 2, each stimulus consisted of 4 objects varying on 3 dimensions. Categories were defined by three binary relations, leading to six logically different conditions. Various learning models were compared to the behavioral data, based on the theory of schema refinement. The results highlight several shortcomings of schema refinement as a model of relational learning: (1) it can make unreasonable demands on working memory, (2) it does not allow schemas to grow in complexity, and (3) it incorrectly predicts learning is insensitive to relational structure. We propose schema elaboration as an additional mechanism that provides a more complete account, and we relate this mechanism to previous proposals regarding interactions between analogy and representation construction. The current findings may advance understanding of the cognitive mechanisms involved in learning and representing relational concepts.     

Detecting analogical resemblance without retrieving the source analogy

We examined whether people can detect analogical resemblance to an earlier experimental episode without being able to recall the experimental source of the analogical resemblance. We used four-word analogies (e.g., robin-nest/beaver-dam), in a variation of the recognition-without-cued-recall method (Cleary, 2004). Participants studied word pairs (e.g., robin-nest) and were shown new word pairs at test, half of which analogically related to studied word pairs (e.g., beaver-dam) and half of which did not. For each test pair, participants first attempted to recall an analogically similar pair from the study list. Then, regardless of whether successful recall occurred, participants were prompted to rate the familiarity of the test pair, which was said to indicate the likelihood that a pair that was analogically similar to the test pair had been studied. Across three experiments, participants demonstrated an ability to detect analogical resemblance without recalling the source analogy. Findings are discussed in terms of their potential relevance to the study of analogical reasoning and insight, as well as to the study of familiarity and recognition memory.     

Two facets of cognitive control in analogical mapping: The role of semantic interference resolution andgoal-driven structure selection

The study used scene analogies to investigate two component processes of analogical thinking: resolution of semantic interference, which emerges when the proper mapping between analogically matching objects is incoherent with their categorical features (e.g., stereotypical functions), and goal-driven selection of the key relational structure, by directing attention to the most promising objects which constitute that structure among many other candidate objects. We manipulated interference by placing in corresponding scenes the objects from one category in different relational roles. Selection was loaded by including additional, relationally irrelevant objects in a scene. We also manipulated relational complexity and the presence of salient objects (people) in relations. Increased load on both interference resolution and selection decreased the accuracy of analogical mapping, but these factors did not interact. Moreover, the factors yielded opposite patterns of interaction with relational complexity. Finally, salience eased selection, but tended to negatively influence interference resolution. In summary, inference resolution and selection seem to constitute two relatively independent facets of cognitive control involved in analogical thinking. Selection may act before mapping occurs, while interference influences analogy making only if an interfering object takes part in mapping.     

The role of causal models in analogical inference

Computational models of analogy have assumed that the strength of an inductive inference about the target is based directly on similarity of the analogs and in particular on shared higher order relations. In contrast, work in philosophy of science suggests that analogical inference is also guided by causal models of the source and target. In 3 experiments, the authors explored the possibility that people may use causal models to assess the strength of analogical inferences. Experiments 1-2 showed that reducing analogical overlap by eliminating a shared causal relation (a preventive cause present in the source) from the target increased inductive strength even though it decreased similarity of the analogs. These findings were extended in Experiment 3 to cross-domain analogical inferences based on correspondences between higher order causal relations. Analogical inference appears to be mediated by building and then running a causal model. The implications of the present findings for theories of both analogy and causal inference are discussed.     

Neuroscientific insights into the development of analogical reasoning

Analogical reasoning, or the ability to find correspondences between entities based on shared relationships, supports knowledge acquisition. As such, the development of this ability during childhood is thought to promote learning. Here, we sought to better understand the mechanisms by which analogical reasoning about semantic relations improves over childhood and adolescence (e.g. chalk is to chalkboard as pen is to…?). We hypothesized that age‐related differences would manifest as differences in the brain regions associated with one or more of the following cognitive functions: (1) controlled semantic retrieval, or the ability to retrieve task‐relevant semantic associations; (2) response control, or the ability to override the tendency to respond to a salient distractor; and/or (3) relational integration, or the ability to consider jointly two mental relations. In order to test these hypotheses, we analyzed patterns of fMRI activation during performance of a pictorial propositional analogy task across 95 typically developing children between the ages of 6 and 18 years old. Despite large age‐related differences in task performance, particularly over ages 6–10 but through to around age 14, participants across the whole age range recruited a common network of frontal, parietal and temporal regions. However, activation in a brain region that has been implicated in controlled semantic retrieval – left anterior prefrontal cortex (BA 47/45) – was positively correlated with age, and also with performance after controlling for age. This finding indicates that improved performance over middle childhood and early adolescence on this analogical reasoning task is driven largely by improvements in the ability to selectively retrieve task‐relevant semantic relationships.     

Children's development of analogical reasoning: insights from scene analogy problems

We explored how relational complexity and featural distraction, as varied in scene analogy problems, affect children's analogical reasoning performance. Results with 3- and 4-year-olds, 6- and 7-year-olds, 9- to 11-year-olds, and 13- and 14-year-olds indicate that when children can identify the critical structural relations in a scene analogy problem, development of their ability to reason analogically interacts with both relational complexity and featural distraction. Error patterns suggest that children are more likely to select a distracting object than to make a relational error for problems that present both possibilities. This tendency decreases with age, and older children make fewer errors overall. The results suggest that changes in analogical reasoning with age depend on the interplay among increases in relational knowledge, the capacity to integrate multiple relations, and inhibitory control over featural distraction.     

Chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) relational matching: playing by their own (analogical) rules

Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) have been known to exhibit rudimentary abilities in analogical reasoning (Flemming, Beran, Thompson, Kleider, & Washburn, 2008; Gillian, Premack, & Woodruff, 1981; Haun & Call, 2009; Thompson & Oden, 2000; Thompson, Oden, & Boysen, 1997). With a wide array of individual differences, little can be concluded about the species' capacity for analogies, much less their strategies employed for solving such problems. In this study, we examined analogical strategies in 3 chimpanzees using a 3-dimensional search task (e.g., Kennedy & Fragaszy, 2008). Food items were hidden under 1 of 2 or 3 plastic cups of varying sizes. Subsequently, chimpanzees searched for food under the cup of the same relative size in their own set of cups--reasoning by analogy. Two chimpanzees initially appeared to fail the first relational phase of the task. Meta-analyses revealed, however, that they were instead using a secondary strategy not rewarded by the contingencies of the task--choosing on the basis of the same relative position in the sample. Although this was not the intended strategy of the task, it was nonetheless analogical. In subsequent phases of the task, chimpanzees eventually learned to shift their analogical reasoning strategy to match the reward contingencies of the task and successfully choose on the basis of relative size. This evidence not only provides support for the analogical ape hypothesis (Thompson & Oden, 2000), but also exemplifies how foundational conceptually mediated analogical behavior may be for the chimpanzee.     

Systematicity as a selection constraint in analogical mapping

Analogy is often viewed as a partial similarity match between domains. But not all partial similarities qualify as analogy: There must be some selection of which commonalities count. Three experiments tested a particular selection constraint in analogical mapping, namely, systematicity. That is, we tested whether a given predicate is more likely to figure in the interpretation of and prediction from an analogy if the predicate participates in a common system of relations. In Experiment 1, subjects judged two matches to be included in an analogy: on isolated match, and a match embedded in a larger matching system. Subjects preferred the embedded match. In Experiments 2 and 3, subjects made analogical predictions about a target domain. Subjects predicted information that followed from a causal system that matched the base domain, rather than information that was equally plausible, but that created an isolated match with the base. Results support Gentner's (1983, 1989) structure-mapping theory in that analogical mapping concerns systems and not individual predicates, and that attention to shared systematic structure constrains the selection of information to include in an analogy.     

The role of inhibitory control in the development of analogical reasoning: From general to specific

This study examined the role of inhibitory control in the development of analogical reasoning using inter-task priming paradigms. In Experiment 1, 25 seven-year-olds, 27 nine-year-olds, and 27 adults completed Stroop tasks, which activated general inhibitory control ability, before analogical reasoning tasks. Children and adults performed faster on analogical reasoning tasks when they were primed by Stroop tasks. This priming effect was found to be stronger in children than in adults. In Experiment 2, 25 seven-year-olds, 28 nine-year-olds, and 28 adults completed relative number matching tasks, a more task-relevant inhibitory control task, before analogical reasoning tasks. The children and adults performed faster on analogical reasoning tasks when primed by relative number matching tasks. The priming effect was greater in seven-year-olds than in nine-year-olds and was greater in nine-year-olds than in adults. Thus, inhibitory control, whether assessed with general or specific tasks, played a priming role in analogical reasoning.     

Categorical target templates: Typical category members are found and identified quickly during word-cued search

What information do people use to guide search when they lack precise details about the appearance of their target? In this study, we employed categorical (word-cued) search and eye tracking, to examine how category typicality influences search performance. We found that typical category members were fixated and identified more quickly than atypical categories. This finding held when the participant was cued at the superordinate level (finding “clothing” among non-clothing items) or the basic level (finding a “shirt” among other clothing items). This suggests that categorical target templates may be constructed by piecing together features from the most typical category member(s).     

Associative responding versus analogical reasoning by children

Following upon work which showed that college and high school students' analogy solutions were predictable from ratings of the relatedness of the words comprising the analogy choices, this study extended those results to children's analogy solutions. Achenbach's Children's Associative Responding Test was used as the criterion to determine (1) whether analogy solutions by children were as related to word relatedness ratings as analogy solutions were in previous subject samples, (2) whether individual differences in using associative responding versus analogical reasoning processes could enhance the predictability estimates, and (3) whether associative priming can affect analogy solutions. Two correlational studies were done, one on an American and another on a Nigerian sample. A third study was an experimental manipulation of choices on analogy items on an American sample. The results suggest that the answer to questions (1) and (3) is yes, but the answer to question (2) is no.     

Resistance is futile: The unwitting insertion of analogical inferences in memory

Analogical inferences can modify people’s understanding, but can this occur even when the inferences are unpalatable? We report two experiments suggesting that this is the case. Participants read a source passage on the role and status of gay people in society. Half then read an analogy describing the historical persecution of left-handers. On a subsequent recognition test, the participants who read the analogy were more likely than the control participants to misrecognize analogical inferences as statements explicitly presented, but the two groups did not differ in recognition rates for other kinds of statements. A priori explicit attitudes toward gays did not moderate these findings, although the participants with more positive attitudes toward gays saw the analogy to left-handers as more sound. Our findings demonstrate that analogical inferences can be seamlessly integrated into mental representations of the target domain even when those inferences are unpalatable; in short, resistance to analogy is futile.     

The impact of anxiety on analogical reasoning

The effect of state anxiety on analogical reasoning was investigated by examining qualitative differences in mapping performance between anxious and non-anxious individuals reasoning about pictorial analogies. The working-memory restriction theory of anxiety, coupled with theories of analogy that link complexity of mapping with working-memory capacity, predicts that high anxiety will impair the ability to find correspondences based on relations between multiple objects relative to correspondences based on overlap of attributes between individual objects. Anxiety was induced in one condition by a stressful speeded subtraction task administered prior to the analogy task. Anxious participants produced fewer relational responses and more attribute responses than did non-anxious participants, both in the absence of explicit instructions to find relational mappings (Experiment 1) and after receiving such instructions (Experiment 2). The findings support the postulated links among anxiety, working memory, and the ability to perform complex analogical mapping.     

Relating derived relations as a model of analogical reasoning: reaction times and event-related potentials

The current study aimed to test a Relational Frame Theory (RFT) model of analogical reasoning based on the relating of derived same and derived difference relations. Experiment 1 recorded reaction time measures of similar-similar (e.g., "apple is to orange as dog is to cat") versus different-different (e.g., "he is to his brother as chalk is to cheese") derived relational responding, in both speed-contingent and speed-noncontingent conditions. Experiment 2 examined the event-related potentials (ERPs) associated with these two response patterns. Both experiments showed similar-similar responding to be significantly faster than different-different responding. Experiment 2 revealed significant differences between the waveforms of the two response patterns in the left-hemispheric prefrontal regions; different-different waveforms were significantly more negative than similar-similar waveforms. The behavioral and neurophysiological data support the RFT prediction that, all things being equal, similar-similar responding is relationally "simpler" than, and functionally distinct from, different-different analogical responding. The ERP data were fully consistent with findings in the neurocognitive literature on analogy. These findings strengthen the validity of the RFT model of analogical reasoning and supplement the behavior-analytic approach to analogy based on the relating of derived relations.     

The effect of Stroop interference on the categorical perception of color

In two experiments, we examined the effects of Stroop interference on the categorical perception (CP; better cross-category than within-category discrimination) of color. Using a successive two-alternative forced choice recognition paradigm (deciding which of two stimuli was identical to a previously presented target), which combined to-be-remembered colors with congruent and incongruent Stroop words, we found that congruent color words facilitated CP, whereas incongruent color words reduced CP. However, this was the case only when Stroop interference was presented together with the target color, but not when Stroop stimuli were introduced at the test stage. This suggests that target name, but not test name generation, affects CP. Target name generation may be important for CP because it acts as a category prime, which, in turn, facilitates cross-category discrimination.     

Accessing source information in analogical problem-solving

Several studies showed that people presented with source information fail to apply it to an analogous target problem unless they are instructed to use the source. Seven experiments were carried out to assess whether such a lack of spontaneous transfer occurs because individuals do not activate the source during the target task or because they do not realize the source-target relationship. Experiment 1 compared a condition in which the source was activated with no cue about the source-target connection to conditions in which subjects were informed about this connection. Results suggested that the lack of spontaneous transfer does not depend on failure in activating source information. Experiments 2, 3, and 4 were devised to falsify this finding by activating the source closer and closer to the target and by focusing participants' attention toward the relevant aspects of the source. Experiments 5, 6, and 7 were aimed at stressing source-target correspondences by introducing surface similarities. All experiments showed that the mere activation of the source does not facilitate analogical transfer. Results suggested that two processes should be distinguished in the access phase of analogical problem-solving: Source retrieval and identification of the source-target connection.     

Cross-domain analogies as relating derived relations among two separate relational networks

Contemporary behavior analytic research is making headway in analyzing analogy as the establishment of a relation of coordination among common types of trained or derived relations. Previous studies have been focused on within-domain analogy. The current study expands previous research by analyzing cross-domain analogy as relating relations among separate relational networks and by correlating participants' performance with a standard measure of analogical reasoning. In two experiments, adult participants first completed general intelligence and analogical reasoning tests. Subsequently, they were exposed to a computerized conditional discrimination training procedure designed to create two relational networks, each consisting of two 3-member equivalence classes. The critical test was a two-part analogical test in which participants had to relate combinatorial relations of coordination and distinction between the two relational networks. In Experiment 1, combinatorial relations for each network were individually tested prior to analogical testing, but in Experiment 2 they were not. Across both experiments, 65% of participants passed the analogical test on the first attempt. Moreover, results from the training procedure were strongly correlated with the standard measure of analogical reasoning.     

Higher-order structure and relational reasoning: contrasting analogical and thematic relations

A popular explanation of younger children's success in analogy tasks is that lower-level associative reasoning strategies are used. Younger children are said to have a primarily associative understanding of analogy, with the ability to coordinate sets of relations largely emerging later in development (Goldman, Pellegrino, Parseghian, & Sallis, 1982; Sternberg & Nigro, 1980). One way of testing the associative claim is to pit young children's emergent analogical abilities against thematic (associative) relations, which are known to play an important role in the knowledge structures of young children. The present experiments presented 4-, 5- and 9-year-old children with a:b::c:d analogies in a picture choice format, offering a choice between Analogy and Thematic responses. Only the Analogy responses were correct in terms of the higher-order structure of the analogies. The results showed that the Analogy responses were consistently preferred to the Thematic responses by children of all ages. It is concluded that analogy is an important building block for learning from an early age.