All in the mind's eye? Anger rumination and reappraisal

Research on rumination has demonstrated that compared with distraction, rumination intensifies and prolongs negative emotion. However, rumination and distraction differ both in what one thinks about and how one thinks about it. Do the negative outcomes of rumination result from how people think about negative events or simply that they think about them at all? To address this question, participants in 2 studies recalled a recent anger-provoking event and then thought about it in 1 of 2 ways: by ruminating or by reappraising. The authors examined the impact of these strategies on subsequent ratings of anger experience (Study 1) as well as on perseverative thinking and physiological responding over time (Study 2). Relative to reappraisal, rumination led to greater anger experience, more cognitive perseveration, and greater sympathetic nervous system activation. These findings provide compelling new evidence that how one thinks about an emotional event can shape the emotional response one has.     

Compulsive perseveration: empirical criticism on the mood-as-input model

It has been proposed that the "Mood as Input" model provides an explanation of the perseverative nature of Obsessive Compulsive (OC) behaviour (MacDonald, B. C., & Davey, G. C. L. (2005). A mood-as-input account of perseverative checking: The relationship between stop rules, mood and confidence in having checked successfully. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 43, 69-91). The model implies that task perseveration occurs when individuals (a) experience a bad mood and (b) ask themselves "did I do as much as I can?" In two earlier experiments with healthy participants (MacDonald, B. C., & Davey, G. C. L. (2005). A mood-as-input account of perseverative checking: The relationship between stop rules, mood and confidence in having checked successfully. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 43, 69-91) it was found that when the allegedly critical conditions were met (negative mood and "did I as much as I can?" stop rule) perseveration occurred on a complex text-correction task. This finding was held to support a "mood as input" explanation of compulsive perseveration. It is important to note, however, that perseveration in clinical samples occurs for very simple "tasks" (e.g. closing a door or washing ones hands) and perseveration does not increase efficacy of performance. In the present study we compared the effects of the original task to effects of text correction tasks that were simpler and more OCD-like. The original effects were replicated: the combination of negative mood and the "did I do as much as I can" stop rule provoked perseveration. Meanwhile, "perseveration" was highly functional: the more "perseveration" the more text-errors were detected. Secondly, to the degree that tasks became simpler and more OCD-like, less checking occurred and the effects of the "did I do as much as I can?" stop rule on detection of errors became smaller. The findings raise questions about the validity of the paradigm as a model of OC perseveration.     

The role of perceptual similarity of the task environments in children’s perseverative responding

Perseverative responding is often seen in children’s performance in a variety of contexts. One such context is symbolic comprehension in which 2- and 2½-year-olds demonstrate difficulty in appreciating the association of symbols (pictures and scale models) and their referents and show a high proportion of perseverative responding. Representational-level explanations of perseveration were explored in the current studies via examination of the impact of perceptual similarity of visual environments across trials. Across two experiments, children saw either a picture (Experiment 1) or a scale model (Experiment 2) of a hiding location of a room and were then encouraged to recover the toy from an identical room. Manipulating the perceptual similarity of the environments across successive trials affected performance and perseverative responding. These results highlight the critical role played by perceptual information not only in symbolic tasks but also in many other tasks and have important implications for theories of perseveration.     

原因调节与反应调节的情绪变化过程

采用生理心理实验法研究忽视、抑制、重视、宣泄等方式调节负情绪的情绪变化过程,发现忽视有效减弱了主观感受和表情行为,并引起R-R问期更大的增加;抑制不能减弱主观感受,并引起手指脉搏血容振幅更大的增幅;重视增强了主观感受;宣泄增强了主观感受,并相对地减弱了生理激活水平。研究表明原因调节可以更有效地调整负情绪主观感受,反应调节使负情绪成分变化出现“水压模型”式循环动力特点;情绪调节过程实现着情绪在心理适应中的促进(或阻碍)作用。     

Riding a wave of self-esteem: Perseverative tendencies as dispositional forces

Traits, defined in terms of dispositional forces, should be more consequential to the extent that the person favors old, activated behaviors to new ones. On the basis of this idea, the current studies measured individual differences in perseveration, defined in terms of tendencies toward response facilitation (i.e., RT speedup) when consecutive trials of choice reaction time tasks require repeated (versus switched) responses. Using global self-esteem as the trait measure of interest, we predicted and found that correlations between self-esteem and relevant outcome measures were particularly strong among individuals high in perseverative tendencies and particularly weak among individuals low in perseverative tendencies. The findings, involving three studies and 208 participants, provide a mechanism by which traits produce trait-relevant outcomes. Specifically, such trait-outcome relations are particular to those who display a tendency to repeat past responses in their cognitive transactions with the environment.     

认知固执导致持续应激的认知与神经机制

认知固执(Perseverative Cognition, PC)是一种重复或长期的消极认知表征,既能够使用量表测量,也可以通过实验诱发。认知固执会导致持续应激反应,进而影响个体的身心健康。其导致持续应激反应的认知机制体现在个体难以识别安全信号,高认知固执个体会表现出低心率变异性的显著特征;在脑机制方面主要表现为前额叶的抑制控制功能失调、杏仁核与前扣带回的病理性改变以及前额叶-杏仁核的连接减弱。未来研究应深入探讨认知固执的影响因素以及干预措施,同时需要进一步分析内隐认知固执的测量方式及其对个体的影响。     

Perseverative and compulsive-like staring causes uncertainty about perception

Earlier studies have found that perseverative checking provokes memory distrust for checked stimuli, suggesting that compulsive checking is a counter-productive strategy to increase memory confidence. Obsessive Compulsive (OC) uncertainty also occurs for functions other than memory, like perception. Uncertainty about perception in OC patients gives rise to prolonged attending to the issues that patients feel uncertain about. In an experiment with 40 healthy volunteers, it was tested whether OC-like, perseverative (visual) attending induces OC-like experiences of dissociation and perceptual uncertainty. Participants had to look at an object (a gas stove or a light bulb) during a pre-test and a post-test. In between these tests, participants in the experimental condition were asked to stare at an object that was the same as the to-be-looked-at object during the pre/post-tests. Participants in the control condition stared at an object that was different from the object they looked at during pre/post-test. Both in the experimental and control conditions, dissociation was observed; the effects were equally strong. Critically, with regards to OC-like perceptual uncertainty, the effects were significantly stronger in the experimental condition. The findings indicate that OC-like perseveration induces distrust, not only about memory, but also about perception. To explain the results, we suggest that perseveration interferes with spreading of activation and that cognitive uncertainty (and possibly derealisation) is the experiential end-product of perseveration. It is suggested that all forms of OC perseveration share such interference and that all undermine confidence in cognitive operations.     

I'm sitting here feeling aphasic! A study of recurrent perseverative errors elicited in unimpaired speakers

In this study, the recurrent perseverative errors produced by 44 speakers without impairment were examined in picture naming and reading aloud tasks under a fast response deadline. The proportion of perseverative relative to non-perseverative errors was greater in picture naming, the more error-prone task, than in reading aloud. Additionally, although perseverative errors were less likely to be related to the target than non-perseverative errors, the overall distribution of perseverative and non-perseverative errors in each task was similar. It is concluded that the perseverative errors produced by the participants reflected both the degree and level at which language processing efficiency was reduced in each task. This is consistent with a more recent account of perseveration as a result of normally existing persistent activation overcoming weakened activation of a target at any level of language processing. These results are compared with recent studies of recurrent perseverative errors produced by people with aphasia in light of the cognitive neuropsychological assumption that speakers with and without impairment utilise a common language processing system.     

A mood-as-input account of perseverative checking: the relationship between stop rules, mood and confidence in having checked successfully

The present paper reports the results of two experiments designed to test predictions from the mood-as-input account of perseverative checking. Using an analogue checking task, both experiments showed that perseveration, as indicted by a range of measures relevant to compulsive checking, was affected by the configuration of the stop rule for the task and mood at the outset of checking. Perseveration was most significant in the condition that most closely resembled the characteristics of obsessive-compulsive checkers (negative mood combined with a stop rule that specifies that the task should be done as thoroughly as possible--namely, an 'as many as can' stop rule). The studies also indicated that confidence at having completed the checking task successfully was (1) significantly related to the use of 'as many as can' stop rules at the outset of checking, (2) mood ratings at the end of checking, and (3) checking perseveration generally. These findings provide support for a mood-as-input explanation of perseverative psychopathologies such as compulsive checking, and begin to cast some light on how anxiety-reduction and 'confidence' models of compulsive checking, might be explained within broader mechanisms of perseveration.     

Editorial: Studies of the Development of Emotion-Cognition Relations

Abstract

This issue of Cognition and Emotion is devoted to studies of the development of emotion-cognition relations. children's knowledge of the causes of emotions, and the relations of that knowledge to expectations or anticipations of emotion experiences. The studies show that infants of seven months display different expressive behaviours to confirmed and disconfirmed expectations; that the first words of 13-month-olds are not coordinated with expressions of joy or negative emotions and 19-month-olds vocabulary spurts contain very few emotion labels; that 3- to 7-year-olds can label their emotions and understand relations among beliefs, desires, and emotion experiences; and that understandings of relations among causal attributions and emotion experiences are stable over the life span. These findings suggest interesting possibilities for research on developmental processes that integrate emotion, cognition, and action.     

Mood as input and perseverative worrying following the induction of discrete negative moods

Previous research has demonstrated that a combination of negative mood and rigorous "as many as can" stop rules can be used to help explain a range of perseverative psychopathologies such as pathological worrying, compulsive checking, and depressive rumination (known as the mood-as-input hypothesis). The aim of the present study was to extend this work and examine whether specific emotions of the same valence will have similar or differential effects on task perseveration. The study experimentally induced discrete moods and manipulated task stop rules in an analog population. Results showed that perseveration at a worry-based interview task conformed to standard mood-as-input predictions in which perseveration was significantly greater when an "as many as can" stop rule was paired with a negative mood or a "feel like continuing" stop rule was paired with a positively valenced mood. The pattern of results revealed no significant inherent differences in processing depending on the type of discrete negative mood being experienced. These findings support a view of mood-as-input effects where overall valency is the important factor in determining perseveration.     

Response perseveration in psychopaths: Interpersonal/affective or social deviance traits?

In order to clarify the role of the two broad components of psychopathy (interpersonal/affective and social deviance; R. D. Hare, 2003) in explaining maladaptive response perseveration in psychopaths, as well as the role of reflection after punished responses in this deficit, the authors administered a card perseveration task to 47 Spanish male inmates assessed using the Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R; R. D. Hare, 1991). Hierarchical regressions showed that psychopaths' maladaptive perseveration (more cards played and less money earned) was uniquely predicted by the social deviance features of psychopathy (PCL-R Factor 2)--particularly by its impulsive and irresponsible lifestyle facet (PCL-R Facet 3)--and not by its interpersonal/affective features (PCL-R Factor 1). Moreover, perseveration was related to a lack of reflection both after punishment and after reward feedback. The authors' results, in conjunction with previous evidence indicating perseverative deficits in several impulse control disorders, suggest that response perseveration may not be specific to psychopathy but rather is associated more generally with the externalizing dimension of psychopathology.     

Routine cognitive errors: a trait-like predictor of individual differences in anxiety and distress

Five studies (N=361) sought to model a class of errors--namely, those in routine tasks--that several literatures have suggested may predispose individuals to higher levels of emotional distress. Individual differences in error frequency were assessed in choice reaction-time tasks of a routine cognitive type. In Study 1, it was found that tendencies toward error in such tasks exhibit trait-like stability over time. In Study 3, it was found that tendencies toward error exhibit trait-like consistency across different tasks. Higher error frequency, in turn, predicted higher levels of negative affect, general distress symptoms, displayed levels of negative emotion during an interview, and momentary experiences of negative emotion in daily life (Studies 2-5). In all cases, such predictive relations remained significant with individual differences in neuroticism controlled. The results thus converge on the idea that error frequency in simple cognitive tasks is a significant and consequential predictor of emotional distress in everyday life. The results are novel, but discussed within the context of the wider literatures that informed them.     

Mood-as-input and depressive rumination

This article describes a test of mood-as-input theory predictions as applied to a rumination task in a nonclinical population. An experimenter-controlled interview was used to allow participants to reflect on a personal period of depression while in an experimentally-induced mood state (either negative or positive) or while deploying a specific stop rule for the task (either an “as many as can” or “feel like continuing” stop rule). As predicted by mood-as-input theory, persistence at the rumination task was greatest in the group experiencing negative mood while deploying an “as many as can” stop rule, and this suggests a mechanism that may contribute to perseverative depressive rumination. It is argued that the variables that contributed to perseveration in this study are already known to be characteristic of ruminative thinkers (e.g. negative mood and positive metacognitive beliefs about rumination that will command the deployment of “as many as can” stop rules for rumination). It is also argued that mood-as-input processes may provide a common mechanism for perseverative rumination and perseverative worry, and this common mechanism may account for many of the similarities between these two functionally-distinct activities.     

The contribution of “cool” and “hot” components of decision-making in adolescence: Implications for developmental psychopathology

Impairments in either “cool” or “hot” processes may represent two pathways to deficient decision-making. Whereas cool processes are associated with cognitive and rational decisions, hot processes are associated with emotional, affective, and visceral processes. In this study, 168 boys were administered a card-playing task at ages 13 and 14 years to assess response perseveration. This task was designed to initially reward playing and gradually associate playing with punishment. Measures of subjective ordering (cool processes) and neuroticism (hot processes) at age 13 years were used to examine how these individual characteristics relate to perseveration over time. A decrease in perseveration from age 13 to 14 was associated with cool processes whereas hot processes were associated with response perseveration only over time. A complementary but simultaneous assessment of cool and hot processes, such as neuropsychological and personality tests, could facilitate treatment planning of children with behavioral problems.     

Perseverative thoughts and subjective health complaints in adolescence: Mediating effects of perceived stress and negative affects

Stable tendency to perseverative thoughts such as trait rumination and worry can influence somatic health. The purpose of the study was to investigate the relationship between perseverative thoughts and somatic complaints, and the possible mediating effects of perceived stress, negative and positive affectivity in adolescence. Having an acute or a chronic condition was also assessed to be controlled for and to reveal their effects on symptom reporting. Three hundred and six adolescents from 7th to 12th grade with mean age of 16.33 (SD = 1.29) participated in the study. Mediation analysis suggested that impact of trait-like perseverative thoughts on complaints were mediated by perceived stress and negative affectivity. Having an acute condition had also an effect on symptom reporting through increased negative affectivity. Our results highlight that ruminations or worry as stable intrapersonal characteristics are relevant processes in health and can be potential targets in prevention programmes in adolescence.     

Emotion processing effects on interference resolution in working memory

The interaction between emotion and working memory maintenance, load, and performance has been investigated with mixed results. The effect of emotion on specific executive processes such as interference resolution, however, remains relatively unexplored. In this series of studies, we examine how emotion affects interference resolution processes within working memory by modifying the Recency-probes paradigm (Monsel, 1978) to include emotional and neutral stimuli. Reaction time differences were compared between interference and non-interference trials for neutral and emotional words (Studies 1 & 3) and pictures (Study 2). Our results indicate that trials using emotional stimuli show a relative decrease in interference compared with trials using neutral stimuli, suggesting facilitation of interference resolution in the former. Furthermore, both valence and arousal seem to interact to produce this facilitation effect. These findings suggest that emotion facilitates response selection amid interference in working memory.     

Rule selection versus rule execution in preschoolers: an error-detection approach.

In 2 experiments, an error-detection approach was used to determine whether 3-year-olds' perseverative errors on the postswitch phase of the Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS) are due to lack of response control or representational inflexibility. In Experiment 1, 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds watched a puppet sort perseveratively on the postswitch phase and evaluated its responses. Most 4- and 5-year-olds detected the puppet's perseverative errors, whereas most 3-year-olds failed to do so despite detecting errors on a simpler card sort. Experiment 2 revealed that 3-year-olds who failed to correctly evaluate the puppet's behavior tended to fail their own DCCS. Results imply that perseveration on the DCCS cannot be attributed to difficulty inhibiting prepotent motor responses. Instead, changes in rule use between 3 and 5 years of age are interpreted in terms of the development of representational flexibility.     

Inflated responsibility and perseverative checking: the effect of negative mood

This article reports the results of 2 experiments designed to test predictions from the mood-as-input hypothesis on the role of inflated responsibility in perseverative checking. Through the use of an analog checking task in both experiments, the authors showed that perseveration, as indicated by a range of measures relevant to compulsive checking, was affected by a combination of the level of inflated responsibility and the valency of mood at the outset of checking. In particular, inflated responsibility significantly facilitated checking perseveration only in the context of a negative mood and was not a sufficient condition for checking perseveration to occur. These effects of the various configurations of inflated responsibility and mood valency are predicted by the mood-as-input hypothesis.