词汇具体性对情绪名词效价加工影响的ERP研究

具体性和抽象性是词汇同一特性的两极, 是直接影响词汇加工过程的重要因素。本研究采用快速序列视觉呈现范式, 结合脑电技术探讨在有限注意资源内, 词汇具体性对情绪名词加工过程的影响。结果发现：名词加工早期和晚期阶段的ERP成分受到情绪效价的调节, 情绪词比中性词诱发了更大的N170和LPC波幅; 名词加工早期和晚期阶段的ERP成分也受到词汇具体性的调节, 具体词比抽象词诱发了更大的N170和LPC波幅; 词汇具体性影响情绪名词加工的晚期阶段, LPC波幅能够分辨出不同情绪效价的抽象词, 对于具体词仅能区分出情绪与非情绪, 这说明抽象词可能比具体词负载了更多的情绪信息, 反映出对情绪信息的精细加工过程。     

Language Processing Differences Between Blind and Sighted Individuals and the Abstract Versus Concrete Concept Difference

In the property listing task (PLT), participants are asked to list properties for a concept (e.g., for the concept dog, “barks,” and “is a pet” may be produced). In conceptual property norming (CPNs) studies, participants are asked to list properties for large sets of concepts. Here, we use a mathematical model of the property listing process to explore two longstanding issues: characterizing the difference between concrete and abstract concepts, and characterizing semantic knowledge in the blind versus sighted population. When we apply our mathematical model to a large CPN reporting properties listed by sighted and blind participants, the model uncovers significant differences between concrete and abstract concepts. Though we also find that blind individuals show many of the same processing differences between abstract and concrete concepts found in sighted individuals, our model shows that those differences are noticeably less pronounced than in sighted individuals. We discuss our results vis-a-vis theories attempting to characterize abstract concepts.     

语义表征具身理论:情绪在概念表征中的作用

概念如何被表征是认知科学的热点问题,其中抽象概念如何表征是当前具身认知最具争议性的话题之一。与前期概念隐喻理论(强调意象图式)和知觉符号理论(强调情境内省信息)的观点不同,语义表征具身理论强调情绪经验信息在抽象概念表征和加工中的作用。具体而言,具体概念的表征主要来自感觉运动信息,而抽象概念的表征主要来自情绪经验信息和语言信息。研究证明,抽象概念的高情绪经验信息能够促进词汇的加工,且这一促进作用受词汇情绪效价的调节。未来研究应进一步考虑影响情绪经验信息发挥作用的因素,比如语言信息的丰富性、情绪唤醒或个体的情绪状态等。     

Linking somatic and symbolic representation in semantic memory: the dynamic multilevel reactivation framework

Biological plausibility is an essential constraint for any viable model of semantic memory. Yet, we have only the most rudimentary understanding of how the human brain conducts abstract symbolic transformations that underlie word and object meaning. Neuroscience has evolved a sophisticated arsenal of techniques for elucidating the architecture of conceptual representation. Nevertheless, theoretical convergence remains elusive. Here we describe several contrastive approaches to the organization of semantic knowledge, and in turn we offer our own perspective on two recurring questions in semantic memory research: (1) to what extent are conceptual representations mediated by sensorimotor knowledge (i.e., to what degree is semantic memory embodied)? (2) How might an embodied semantic system represent abstract concepts such as modularity, symbol, or proposition? To address these questions, we review the merits of sensorimotor (i.e., embodied) and amodal (i.e., disembodied) semantic theories and address the neurobiological constraints underlying each. We conclude that the shortcomings of both perspectives in their extreme forms necessitate a hybrid middle ground. We accordingly propose the Dynamic Multilevel Reactivation Framework—an integrative model predicated upon flexible interplay between sensorimotor and amodal symbolic representations mediated by multiple cortical hubs. We discuss applications of the dynamic multilevel reactivation framework to abstract and concrete concept representation and describe how a multidimensional conceptual topography based on emotion, sensation, and magnitude can successfully frame a semantic space containing meanings for both abstract and concrete words. The consideration of ‘abstract conceptual features’ does not diminish the role of logical and/or executive processing in activating, manipulating and using information stored in conceptual representations. Rather, it proposes that the materials upon which these processes operate necessarily combine pure sensorimotor information and higher-order cognitive dimensions involved in symbolic representation.     

Hand Position and Response Assignment Modulate the Activation of the Valence‐Space Conceptual Metaphor

Conceptual metaphor is ubiquitous in language and thought, as we usually reason and talk about abstract concepts in terms of more concrete ones via metaphorical mappings that are hypothesized to arise from our embodied experience. One pervasive example is the conceptual projection of valence onto space, which flexibly recruits the vertical and lateral spatial frames to gain structure (e.g., good is up ‐bad is down and good is right ‐bad is left ). In the current study, we used a valence judgment task to explore the role that exogenous bodily cues (namely response hand positions) play in the allocation of spatial attention and the modulation of conceptual congruency effects. Experiment 1 showed that congruency effects along the vertical axis are weakened when task conditions (i.e., the use of vertical visual cues, on the one hand, and the horizontal alignment of responses, on the other) draw attention to both the vertical and lateral axes making them simultaneously salient. Experiment 2 evidenced that the vertical alignment of participants’ hands while responding to the task—regardless of the location of their dominant hand—facilitates the judgment of positive and negative‐valence words, as long as participants respond in a metaphor–congruent manner (i.e., up responses are good and down responses are bad). Overall, these results support the claim that source domain representations are dynamically activated in response to the context and that bodily states are an integral part of that context.     

感知运动信息在概念表征中的作用

研究概念的表征问题对理解概念的本质非常重要,传统认知和具身认知视角下的概念表征理论争议的焦点在于感觉运动信息在表征中的作用。传统认知视角下的离身认知认为感知觉运动信息会转化成抽象的符号,概念表征不包含感知觉运动信息。概念表征的具身观点认为感知觉运动信息是概念表征的基础。对感知运动信息在概念表征中起作用这一命题已经达成共识。未来研究应该关注感知运动信息起作用的机制,以及抽象概念表征等问题,进一步完善发展概念表征理论。     

Retrieval of pictures and words from long-term memory: Effects upon short-term memory

On each of a series of Brown-Peterson short-term memory (STM) tests, the presentation of a verbal to-be-remembered (TBR) item (a five-letter quintogram in Experiment 1 and an eight-letter octogram in Experiment 2) was followed immediately by a 10-sec retention interval. During the retention interval, subjects recalled and reproduced previously learned paired associate response triads that consisted of three concrete pictures, concrete words, abstract pictures, or abstract words. Following selective retrieval of one of the four types of response triads from long-term memory (LTM), subjects attempted to recall the TBR items from STM. In both experiments, the intervening retrieval of abstract words resulted in significantly poorer retention of the TBR items than did the intervening retrieval of concrete words; the retrieval of concrete words resulted, in turn, in significantly poorer retention of the TBR items than did the retrieval of concrete or abstract pictures. Retrieval of the latter two types of materials appeared not to interfere with the short-term retention of the TBR verbal material (i.e., the quintograms and octograms). The results reflect the occurrence of selective interference effects, and, except for one discrepant finding, appear to be consistent with Paivio’s 11971) dual-coding hypothesis and Shiffrin and Schneider’s (1977) general theory of memory.     

基于熟悉性的项目间语义关系再认

在项目间语义关系的熟悉性研究中, 一个关键问题是熟悉性效应依赖于哪种信息的加工, 关系概念还是抽象结构?研究通过两个实验, 借助无线索回忆再认范式(the recognition without cued recall paradigm, 简称RWCR范式)和四词类比材料, 采用混合设计, 直接分离与比较关系概念和抽象结构的加工对RWCR效应的影响。结果发现, 关系概念作为测验线索能够引发显著RWCR效应, 但仅仅学习关系概念却不能;只有学习关系概念的结构化材料时, 才能引发显著RWCR效应。该结果表明, 项目间语义关系的熟悉性过程与结构信息有关。     

Perceptual symbol systems

Prior to the twentieth century, theories of knowledge were inherently perceptual. Since then, developments in logic, statistics, and programming languages have inspired amodal theories that rest on principles fundamentally different from those underlying perception. In addition, perceptual approaches have become widely viewed as untenable because they are assumed to implement recording systems, not conceptual systems. A perceptual theory of knowledge is developed here in the context of current cognitive science and neuroscience. During perceptual experience, association areas in the brain capture bottom-up patterns of activation in sensory-motor areas. Later, in a top-down manner, association areas partially reactivate sensory-motor areas to implement perceptual symbols. The storage and reactivation of perceptual symbols operates at the level of perceptual components--not at the level of holistic perceptual experiences. Through the use of selective attention, schematic representations of perceptual components are extracted from experience and stored in memory (e.g., individual memories of green, purr, hot). As memories of the same component become organized around a common frame, they implement a simulator that produces limitless simulations of the component (e.g., simulations of purr). Not only do such simulators develop for aspects of sensory experience, they also develop for aspects of proprioception (e.g., lift, run) and introspection (e.g., compare, memory, happy, hungry). Once established, these simulators implement a basic conceptual system that represents types, supports categorization, and produces categorical inferences. These simulators further support productivity, propositions, and abstract concepts, thereby implementing a fully functional conceptual system. Productivity results from integrating simulators combinatorially and recursively to produce complex simulations. Propositions result from binding simulators to perceived individuals to represent type-token relations. Abstract concepts are grounded in complex simulations of combined physical and introspective events. Thus, a perceptual theory of knowledge can implement a fully functional conceptual system while avoiding problems associated with amodal symbol systems. Implications for cognition, neuroscience, evolution, development, and artificial intelligence are explored.     

The contributions of language and experience to the representation of abstract and concrete words: Different weights but similar organizations

In the present studies, we evaluated the contributions of language and sensorimotor information to the representation of abstract and concrete words and the possibility that the organizations of the two types of concepts follow different organizational principles: association, for abstract concepts, and semantic similarity, for concrete concepts. In Study 1, we examined the two strongest associates of concrete and abstract words from published free association norms. Study 2 then extended this analysis to individual data collected with a free association task. Language associations were more important for abstract than for concrete words, but for sensorimotor information no differences were observed between the two types of concepts. Also, no clear evidence was found for different qualitative organizational principles for abstract and concrete concepts. Multiple representational systems thus seem to be engaged in the conceptual processing of abstract and concrete concepts, while it remains to be investigated whether their representations follow different organizational principles.     

An asymmetric effect of relational integration on recognition memory

Two experiments assessed whether conceptual relations (e.g., contains: COOKIE JAR) facilitate the retrieval of concepts (e.g., COOKIE and JAR) from long-term memory. The CARIN model of nominal combination asserts that conceptual relations are represented with and selected from the modifier noun (COOKIE). Thus, the model predicts that relational integration will facilitate memory for modifiers but not for head nouns (JAR). In Experiment 1, concepts were studied in pairs and were then tested individually. Recognition accuracy was higher for modifiers than for head nouns. In Experiment 2, the studied concepts (e.g., COOKIE JAR) were tested in the context of a new pair that instantiated either the same relation (e.g., COOKIE plate) or a different relation (e.g., COOKIE crumb). Recognition was again better for modifiers than for head nouns, but only when the same conceptual relation was instantiated at both study and test. Thus, results indicate that conceptual relations (a) facilitate recognition memory, and (b) are associated more strongly with the modifier than with the head noun.     

Aging effects in sequential modulations of poorer-strategy effects during execution of memory strategies

In this study, we asked young adults and older adults to encode pairs of words. For each item, they were told which strategy to use, interactive imagery or rote repetition. Data revealed poorer-strategy effects in both young adults and older adults: Participants obtained better performance when executing better strategies (i.e., interactive-imagery strategy to encode pairs of concrete words; rote-repetition strategy on pairs of abstract words) than with poorer strategies (i.e., interactive-imagery strategy on pairs of abstract words; rote-repetition strategy on pairs of concrete words). Crucially, we showed that sequential modulations of poorer-strategy effects (i.e., poorer-strategy effects being larger when previous items were encoded with better relative to poorer strategies), previously demonstrated in arithmetic, generalise to memory strategies. We also found reduced sequential modulations of poorer-strategy effects in older adults relative to young adults. Finally, sequential modulations of poorer-strategy effects correlated with measures of cognitive control processes, suggesting that these processes underlie efficient trial-to-trial modulations during strategy execution. Differences in correlations with cognitive control processes were also found between older adults and young adults. These findings have important implications regarding mechanisms underlying memory strategy execution and age differences in memory performance.     

Processing of perceptual information is more robust than processing of conceptual information in preschool-age children: evidence from costs of switching

Is processing of conceptual information as robust as processing of perceptual information early in development? Existing empirical evidence is insufficient to answer this question. To examine this issue, 3- to 5-year-old children were presented with a flexible categorization task, in which target items (e.g., an open red umbrella) shared category membership with one test item (e.g., a folded umbrella) and perceptual characteristics with another test item (e.g., a red mushroom). Participants were instructed to either categorize stimuli by the same dimension (i.e., perceptual similarity or category membership) in both phases of the task, or switch from categorizing by one dimension to categorizing by the other dimension. Results pointed to a strong asymmetry in switch costs: conceptual switch costs were higher than perceptual switch costs. These results suggest that processing of perceptual information remains more robust than processing of conceptual information at least until 5 years of age.     

The Relative Effects of Abstract Versus Concrete Processing on Proactivity in Depression

Low levels of proactivity are characteristic of individuals with depression. Two studies were conducted to compare the relative effects of abstract versus concrete processing on proactivity in high dysphoric individuals. In Study 1, participants read information about an upcoming research study and were then randomly allocated to a writing task that induced them to think about participating in that study in either an abstract (e.g., Why you would participate in the study?; n = 25) or concrete (e.g., How you will participate in the study?; n = 25) way. Participants were then asked to indicate whether they would sign up to the study. As expected, more participants indicated that they would take part in the study in the concrete condition (76%) than in the abstract condition (36%). In Study 2, high dysphoric participants were asked to identify their ideal part-time job and were then randomly allocated to a writing task that induced them to think about applying for the job in an abstract (n = 26) or concrete (n = 25) way. There was no difference between conditions in self-reported intentions of proactivity. However, significantly more participants in the concrete condition opted to look at an employment assistance website and returned to the lab to collect a job application package. Overall, these findings suggest that abstract processing could contribute to low levels of proactivity in depression, and that facilitating the use of concrete processing could help to alleviate this problem. Our results also point to the need for greater conceptual clarification of the distinction between concrete processing about proactive behavior and implementation intentions (identifying specific steps for completing an action/goal).     

Red-hot: How colour and semantic temperature processing interact in a Stroop-like paradigm

Temperature concepts and colour are commonly associated (i.e., red is “hot” and blue is “cold”), although their direction of influence (unidirectional, bidirectional) is unknown. Semantic Stroop effects, whereby words like fire influence colour categorization, suggest automatic semantic processing influences colour processing. The experiential framework of language comprehension indicates abstract concepts like temperature words simulate concrete experiences in their representation, where expressions like “red-hot” suggest colour processing influences conceptual processing. Participants categorized both colour (Experiment 1: red, blue; Experiment 2: red, green, blue) and word-meaning with matched lists of hot and cold meaning words in each colour. In Experiments 1 and 2, semantic categorization showed congruency effects across hot and cold words, while colour categorization showed facilitation only with hot words in Experiment 2. This asymmetry reflects a more consistent influence of colour categorization on semantic categorization than the reverse, suggesting experiential grounding effects may be more robust than the effects of semantic processing on colour processing.     

The representation of abstract words: why emotion matters

Although much is known about the representation and processing of concrete concepts, knowledge of what abstract semantics might be is severely limited. In this article we first address the adequacy of the 2 dominant accounts (dual coding theory and the context availability model) put forward in order to explain representation and processing differences between concrete and abstract words. We find that neither proposal can account for experimental findings and that this is, at least partly, because abstract words are considered to be unrelated to experiential information in both of these accounts. We then address a particular type of experiential information, emotional content, and demonstrate that it plays a crucial role in the processing and representation of abstract concepts: Statistically, abstract words are more emotionally valenced than are concrete words, and this accounts for a residual latency advantage for abstract words, when variables such as imageability (a construct derived from dual coding theory) and rated context availability are held constant. We conclude with a discussion of our novel hypothesis for embodied abstract semantics.     

抽象概念表征的具身认知观

抽象概念是否通过感知经验来表征以及如何被感知经验表征是具身认知面临的一大问题.在抽象概念表征是否具有感知经验基础的问题上,具身认知理论认为抽象概念通过情境模拟或隐喻与感知经验发生联系.在抽象概念如何与感知经验表征发生联系的问题上,概念模拟理论强调情景或运动模拟在抽象概念表征中的直接作用;概念隐喻理论则侧重具体经验或具体经验与抽象概念之间的共同结构关系在抽象概念表征中的间接作用.未来研究应改变概念表征的稳定的心理实体观,从语言和抽象表征的关系、正常儿童和特殊群体的抽象概念表征差异入手,整合不同的具身认知观点.     

Lexical and conceptual factors in the naming of relations

Recent models of language production distinguish three main stages, the generation of a preverbal (or conceptual) message level representation, the stage of linguistic formulation processes (which access lexical items and generate the syntactic frames in which these items are inserted), and the stage of articulation. This means that at least two sources of difficulty in producing a lexical item must be distinguished. First, the difficulty can be due to properties of the message representation. So, for example, several concepts may compete for expression. Second, a given lexical item might be more difficult to access than another item because of differences in the complexity of the processes translating from conceptual to lexical representations. The present study presents evidence for these two sources of difficulty in producing lexical items for the domain of semantically unmarked versus marked dimensional adjectives (e.g., big versus small). The first set of experiments establishes an effect of semantic markedness in language production which is due to a difference in the difficulty of accessing unmarked versus marked lexical items. The second set of experiments shows that competition between concepts for expression can lead to incorrect selection of an (unintended) lexical item (as reflected in certain types of speech errors), or to a higher processing load for producing the correct (intended) lexical item. Together, these experiments support the distinction between a preverbal conceptual and a lexical level of representation in language production, and show that both levels contribute to the relative difficulty of producing lexical items.