Forgiveness and recidivism

The teaching of Jesus on limitless forgiveness is a difficult one with which to reckon, especially when an offense is repeated again and again (recidivism), sometimes by the same offender. This article finds in the gospel of Matthew (Matt. 18:15–17) and Paul's letters to the Corinthians (I Cor 5:2–11 and II Cor 2:5–8) a model of forgiveness that is assertive, confrontative and direct in style, pastoral in application and reconciling in spirit.Dr. Donnelly (Ph.D. Claremont Graduate School) is an Associate Professor of Theology and Spirituality at St. John's University, New York, and a Visiting Lecturer at Princeton Theological Seminary, Princeton, New Jersey. She has published over a dozen articles on the subject of forgiveness and reconciliation as well as two books:Learning to Forgive (Macmillan 1979; Abingdon, 1982) andPutting Forgiveness into Practice (Argus, 1982).     

愤恨、惩罚与正义——亚当·斯密惩罚理论的一种解读

愤恨是人性中必不可少的组成部分.在斯密看来,这种通常似乎令人憎恶的激情,其基于合宜性的表达却成为捍卫社会正义与平等的心理机制.作为立即和直接促使人们去惩罚的情感,尽管需要怀疑其合理性,但合宜的愤恨不仅成为社会惩罚的基础,也是正义的保证.它所确立的正义感,肯定惩罚的正当性而确认正义的法则体系,其所衍生的功过赏罚的报偿结构,也将促成人性的完善和社会公正的实现.     

Forgiveness and Standing

Despite broad agreement that forgiveness involves overcoming resentment, the small philosophical literature on this topic has made little progress in determining which of the many ways of overcoming resentment is forgiveness. In a recent paper, however, Pamela Hieronymi proposed a way forward by requiring that accounts of forgiveness be “articulate” and “uncompromising.” I argue for these requirements, but also claim that Hieronymi’s proposed articulate and uncompromising account must be rejected because it cannot accommodate the fact that only some agents have the standing to forgive. I end by sketching an alternative account which, I claim, explains the phenomenon of standing.     

论儒家的"忠恕"与基督教的"宽恕"

真正、本源意义的恕是一种创生力量,这一创生力量使被恕者从过与罪的萎颓中毅然决然地抽身而返,返至一种中正、至善、洁静的创化中.无论儒家"恕",还是基督教的"恕"都具有这一力量.二种文化恕的方式与路经不同,但殊途同归,儒家与基督教的恕皆能使被恕者劈碎自己生命中的嚣浮不实、剔除内心非诚、非仁、非智的虚伪蔽障,从而过一种真切笃实、修德进业的生活.     

集体主义背景下的宽恕研究及其对心理治疗的启示

以往的宽恕理论和宽恕干预的方法多是基于西方个人主义文化背景的, 缺乏集体主义背景下的相关研究。在集体主义背景下, 被冒犯者应对伤害的方式、宽恕的策略以及影响宽恕的人格特质都与个人主义有明显的区别。此外, 跨文化的宽恕模型也从不同角度描述了集体主义背景下的宽恕, 决定性宽恕和情绪性宽恕模型区分了不同形式的宽恕在不同文化中的表现; 基于自我和人格特质的宽恕模型描述了不同背景下影响宽恕的人格因素; 宽恕的动态过程模型描述了宽恕过程中的文化影响因素。对于这些内容的总结也对集体主义背景下的宽恕干预具有一定的启示作用。     

Public Confession and Forgiveness

ABSTRACT In this article, we report investigations of four role-playing experiments and one laboratory manipulation that examine the effects of confession on forgiveness and other related judgments. The basic paradigm in the simulation studies was to reveal that a political figure or student in a class confessed either following or not following an accusation, or denied personal responsibility for the act. Among the variables manipulated were the attributions for the wrongdoing and the spontaneity of the confession. The dependent variables in one or more investigations included the perceived personal character of the trangressor, attributions of responsibility for the act, affective reactions of sympathy and anger, forgiveness, and behavioral judgments such as sanctioning and voting likelihood. In the laboratory manipulation study, a mixed-motive game setting was used in which a confederate confessed to having prior knowledge that resulted in his winning the game. We then examined whether this admission influenced subsequent cooperation and competition, as well as the other players' perceptions of the confederate's personality and character. Confession was found to have strong beneficial effects, particularly when given without a prior accusation and in ambiguous causal situations.     

Accepting Forgiveness

Forgiving wrongdoers who neither apologized, nor sought to make amends in any way, is controversial. Even defenders of the practice agree with critics that such “unilateral” forgiveness involves giving up on the meaningful redress that victims otherwise justifiably demand from their wrongdoers: apology, reparations, repentance, and so on. Against that view, I argue here that when a victim of wrongdoing sets out to grant forgiveness to her offender, and he in turn accepts her forgiveness, he thereby serves some important ends of apology and reparation, no matter what else he did—or did not do—by way of repair. Although much overlooked, the simple act of accepting forgiveness joins victim and offender in affirming and acting upon some important shared background assumptions, including many of those expressed in standard apologies. Perhaps more surprisingly, I argue that accepting forgiveness also fulfills the duty to counteract any concrete harm wrongfully inflicted. The argument helps explain some otherwise puzzling features of forgiveness, including that a victim can change her offender’s normative status, making him a less fitting target of the resentment, indignation and shunning of others, and even his own guilt pangs, simply by forgiving him.

     

Inarticulate Forgiveness

Influentially, Pamela Hieronymi has argued that any account of forgiveness must be both articulate and uncompromising. It must articulate the change in judgment that results in the forgiver's loss of resentment without excusing or justifying the misdeed, and without comprising a commitment to the transgressor's responsibility, the wrongness of the action, and the transgressed person's self‐worth. Non‐articulate accounts of forgiveness, which rely on indirect strategies for reducing resentment (for example, reflecting on the transgressor's bad childhood), are said to fail to explain forgiveness. This paper argues that the articulateness condition is not a necessary condition for forgiveness. It responds to numerous objections advanced against non‐articulate accounts, including the claim that the resentment‐mitigating practices they involve amount to excusing. Appealing to P. F. Strawson's distinction between objective and participant attitudes, it argues that forgivers can take transgressors to be detrimentally causally shaped by their past while holding them to be morally responsible.     

Forgiveness and Brokenness Confronted

Pastoral Psychology -     

Forgiveness and defense style

Within the literature on the psychology of forgiveness, researchers have hypothesized that the 1st stage in the process of being able to forgive is the role of psychological defense. To examine such a hypothesis, the authors explored the relationship between forgiveness and defense style. The 304 respondents (151 men, 153 women) completed measures of forgiveness (likelihood, presence of positive forgiveness, absence of negative forgiveness) and defense style. Among respondents, all measures of forgiveness shared a significant negative association with a neurotic defense style. The finding is discussed within the context of the consequences for those who may be experiencing barriers to forgiveness when dealing with conflict resolution in interpersonal situations.     

Forgiveness and Moral Development

Forgiveness is clearly an important aspect of our moral lives, yet surprisingly Kant, one of the most important authors in the history of Western ethics, seems to have very little to say about it. Some authors explain this omission by noting that forgiveness sits uncomfortably in Kant’s moral thought: forgiveness seems to have an ineluctably ‘elective’ aspect which makes it to a certain extent arbitrary; thus it stands in tension with Kant’s claim that agents are autonomous beings, capable of determining their own moral status through rational reflection and choice. Other authors recognise that forgiveness plays a role in Kant’s philosophy but fail to appreciate the nature of this duty and misrepresent the Kantian argument in support of it. This paper argues that there is space in Kant’s philosophy for a genuine theory of forgiveness and hopes to lay the grounds for a correct interpretation of this theory. I argue that from a Kantian perspective, forgiveness is not ‘elective’ but, at least in some cases, morally required. I claim that, for Kant, we have an imperfect duty of virtue to forgive repentant wrongdoers that have embarked on a project of self-reflection and self-reform. I develop a novel argument in support of this duty by drawing on Kant’s theory of rational agency, the thesis of radical evil, Kant’s theory of moral development, and the formula of humanity. However, it must be noted that this is a conditional duty and Kant’s position also entails that absence of repentance on the part of the wrongdoer should be taken as evidence of a lack of commitment to a project of self-reflection and self-reform. In such cases, Kant claims, we have a perfect duty to ourselves not to forgive unrepentant wrongdoers. I argue that this duty should be understood as one of the duties of self-esteem, which involves the duty to respect and recognise our own dignity as rational beings.     

La Caze on Envy and Resentment

Abstract

Marguerite La Caze has recently published a stimulating analysis of the emotions of envy and resentment in which she argues that to envy others for a benefit they have received or to resent them for such a reason can be ethically acceptable in cases where that benefit has been unjustly obtained (La Caze, 2001). I question this on the ground that the judgement that the benefit has been unjustly obtained plays a more complex role in the structure of envy and resentment than La Caze allows and should alter the nature of the feeling that is evoked. From the perspective of virtue ethics there is nothing creditable about still feeling envy or resentment in such circumstances.