A Puzzle About Reasons and Rationality

According to a guiding idea in metaethics, there is a necessary link between the concept of normative reasons and the concept of practical rationality. This notion brings up two issues: The exact nature of this link, and the nature of rationality. With regard to the first issue, the debate is dominated by a certain standard claim. With regard to the second issue, the debate is dominated by what I will refer to as ‘subjectivism’ and ‘objectivism’ about rationality, where the latter is assumed to be a necessary condition for the existence of categorical reasons. In this paper, it is argued that subjectivism is able capture an ordinary, non-technical, sense of ‘rational’ whereas objectivism is not. The basic reason is that objectivism fails to account for the essential connection between rationality, malfunctioning, and rational criticism. This means that we face a puzzle: While objectivism appears to be a necessary condition for the existence of categorical reasons, it fails to capture a central sense of ‘rational’. It is finally argued that this puzzle can be solved by abandoning the standard claim about the link between reasons and rationality.     

Rationality and autonomy from the Enlightenment and Islamic perspectives

Rationality and autonomy are foundational concepts in anglophone or ‘Western’ countries that originated primarily from the Enlightenment period. When compared with ‘Western’ ideologies, non-Western belief systems such as Islam may not appear, at first glance, to place as much emphasis on the value and attainment of rationality and autonomy. This may lead some people to conclude that Islam necessarily marginalises or even suppresses its believers’ development of rationality and autonomy. This article compares the concepts of rationality and autonomy from the Enlightenment and Islamic perspectives. It is argued that there exist Islamic traditions that promote the inculcation of ‘normal rationality’ and ‘normal autonomy’ within a convictional community from which beliefs develop. However, the extent to which Muslims are encouraged to cultivate and exercise their rationality and autonomy would depend, among other factors, on the specific interpretations of rationality and autonomy privileged by the Islamic tradition they belong to.     

Reconsidering Intentions

This paper argues that the principles of instrumental rationality apply primarily to extended action through time. Most philosophers assume that rational requirements and principles govern in the first instance momentary mental states, as opposed to governing extended intentional actions directly. In the case of instrumental rationality, the relevant mental states or attitudes would typically be preferences, decisions, or intentions. In fact, even those who recognize the extended nature of our agency still assume that rational requirements apply primarily to mental states at a moment in time. Such views try to do justice to the extended nature of our agency by postulating rational requirements that apply in the first instance to plans, policies, and intentions more generally. The paper focuses on the central case of requirements and reasons governing the reconsideration of intentions and argues that these requirements or reasons are either superfluous or invalid. I argue that a proper conception of instrumental reasoning that applies directly to actions turn out to have surprising consequences. In fact, this conception allows us to see that policies, projects and the like are best understood as instances of extended actions, and that the instrumental requirements that apply to projects and policies are exactly the same as the instrumental requirements that apply to ordinary extended actions. Finally, I argue that the resulting theory of instrumental rationality is a significant improvement over theories that rely on principles governing intentions.     

The Normative Source of Kantian Hypothetical Imperatives

Abstract

This paper offers a critique of Christine Korsgaard’s interpretation of Kantian instrumental reason. Korsgaard understands Kantian hypothetical imperatives to share a common normative source with the categorical imperative – namely self-legislating, human rational agency. However, her reading of Kantian hypothetical imperatives is problematic for three reasons. Firstly, Korsgaard’s agent-centred approach renders incoherent Kant’s analytic-synthetic division. Secondly, by minimising the dualistic framework of Kant’s practical philosophy the dialectical character of practical rationality is lost: norms of instrumental reasoning therefore become confused with those of moral reasoning. Thirdly, this in turn curtails the distinct critical authority of pure practical rationality over instrumental choice. The paper argues that we need to understand the normativity of instrumental rationality through the lens of Kant’s dualisms. An alternative interpretation is offered which highlights how the norms of hypothetical imperatives appeal to standards of theoretical cognition and practical efficiency rather than the self-legislative demands of pure practical reason.     

Ignorance, Instrumentality, Compensation, and the Problem of Evil

Some theodicists, skeptical theists, and friendly atheists agree that God-justifying reasons for permitting evils would have to have an instrumental structure: that is, the evils would have to be necessary to secure a great enough good or necessary to prevent some equally bad or worse evil. D.Z. Phillips contends that instrumental reasons could never justify anyone for causing or permitting horrendous evils and concludes that the God of Restricted Standard Theism does not exist—indeed, is a conceptual mistake. After considering Phillips’ and other objections in the neighborhood, I argue that the Expanded Theism of Christian theology does forward a God who ‘digs in’ and eternally answers for horrors.     

Belonging without commitment: the Christocentric view and the traditionist perspective on modern religion

This essentially theoretical article suggests a novel way to conceptualise the middle spaces of people whose link to religion is perceived as partial and fragmentary – the vast majority of the population in the world of the twenty-first century, who belong to a religious tradition but are quite selective in their observances. We first argue that current conceptualisation of the middle spaces suffers from a predisposition we view as ‘Christocentric’. As the key to an alternative and non-Christocentric approach, we suggest the concept of ‘traditionism’, which permits a new theoretical discussion of the meanings of religion for contemporary individuals who belong to a religious tradition but are not fully committed to its current authorities or affiliated with recognised denominations. As a case study to clarify the new, non-Christocentric conceptualisation, we suggest the religious identity of contemporary ‘Arab Jews’ – Jews whose families originated in the Muslim Middle East – to highlight the potential contribution of a certain Jewish perspective to an understanding of modern religion as tradition and of modern practitioners of religion who belong to no denomination as ‘traditionists’.     

Heidegger in the township

Imagine Heidegger in a township. Imagine you are able to translate his concept of ‘care’ to ‘the people’. Would they agree that in their ordinary experience people care? I argue not and contend that, instead, they would choose the term ‘struggle’. I analyse experiential aspects of ordinary life in the context of the township, which involves a significant part of people around the world, in order to argue that, at least in such contexts, it is a more common experience for people to struggle than to care. In this way I hope to show how a phenomenological analysis of everyday life experience such as Heidegger's can contribute to the understanding of contextual issues, but also how a context can induce the introduction of new concepts of thinking.     

What are the values of young people and how are these different from the values of older generations in Georgia?

This article examines the basic values of young people (aged 18 to 25) and analyses how, if at all, these are different from the values of older generations in Georgia. Based on Shalom H. Schwartz’s Theory of Basic Values (2012), the study uses quantitative (secondary analysis of the World Values Survey [WVS]) and qualitative (40 in-depth interviews) research methods to explore basic values, perceptions and attitudes, as well as tolerance towards different minority groups in Georgia. The research findings reveal that Schwartz’s higher-ordered values ‘conservation’ (including ‘conformity’ and ‘tradition’) and ‘self-transcendence’ (including ‘benevolence’ and ‘universalism’) are very important for all age groups in Georgia. In contrast, the values of ‘openness to change’ and ‘self-enhancement’ are assessed quite dissimilarly by young and older generations. In addition, the youth turned out to be more tolerant towards different minority groups, such as people of a different religion and race, immigrants and sexual minorities.     

Of Levinas’ ‘structure’ in address to his four ‘others’

It has long been accepted that one of Levinas’ major concerns is to establish an ethics of responsibility for the ‘other.’ Yet it has been deemed for decades, even by Levinasians, that his approach to that concern is ‘unsystematic’ and ‘not consistent.’ That situation arose because Levinas’ four terms for ‘other’ are difficult to translate, so his terms were first addressed by adopting English conventions. Such conventions have furthered Levinas scholarship, but our aim is to consider Levinas’ consistency: Hence we undertake the first English-language assessment of the rigour of Levinas’ approach in 1961 to the ‘other’ by means of all four terms. To do so, we follow a ‘formal structure’ that Levinas develops from the tradition of phenomenological logic—mostly Husserl’s. We hope the result will palliate worries about Levinas’ rigor, and allow new ways to engage with his work.     

Constructing 'God': a Contemporary Interpretation of Religion

To discuss the rationality of religious beliefs of the meaning of those beliefs must be made intelligible, sometimes to those who do not share our presuppositions. Is it possible to explain the meaning of such basic concepts as ‘Religion’, and ‘God’ without presupposing other religious concepts? The present paper is an attempt at such a radical interpretation of religion. This is done by wedding a full‐fledged constructivist epistemology with insights from the mystical traditions of the East and the West. How such an epistemology can account for both the unity and plurality of religions is also indicated. In the process I give not only a new interpretation of ‘God’ but also suggest the reasons for the failure of the “proofs” for the existence of God. Thus, a new way is opened up for discussing the rationality of religious beliefs.     

Confucianism,food, and sustainability

This paper addresses the issue of ecological sustainability and the dilemma between instrumental rationality and protection of the environment through a discussion of food production. In Confucianism, all human activities, including consumption of food, are seen as inseparable from problems of value. While Confucianism stresses the importance of healthy food, it rejects viewing nature as only having instrumental value. The Confucian view of sustainability can be seen from three parts: (1) Humans should follow the murmuring of their 'heart/mind' and seek to restrict the use of natural resources as much as possible to ‘let every being manifest its mandate to the full’; (2) Harmony with nature is a premise for sustaining humanity; and (3) Finally, taking care of the fundamental needs of the people is a premise for ecological sustainability.     

Liberating Language in Linji and Wittgenstein

Our aim in this paper is to explicate some unexpected and striking similarities and equally important differences, which have not been discussed in the literature, between Wittgenstein's methodology and the approach of Chinese Chan or Japanese Zen Buddhism. We say ‘unexpected’ similarities because it is not a common practice, especially in the analytic tradition, to invest very much in comparative philosophy. The peculiarity of this study will be further accentuated in the view of those of the ‘old school’ who see Wittgenstein as a logical positivist, and Zen as a religious excuse for militarism or sadomasochism. If the second claim were true, the following investigation would not only be futile but also impossible. That the first claim, concerning the ‘old school’ perspective on Wittgenstein, is incorrect, we will demonstrate in the ensuing discussion. By now more experts have come to accept this claim and we hope that our comparative perspective will add even more momentum.     

How Should I Be? A Defense of Platonic Rational Egoism

There has been a long tradition of interpreting Plato as a rational egoist. Over the past few decades, however, some scholars have challenged this reading. While Rational Egoism appeals to many ordinary folk, in sophisticated philosophical circles it has fallen out of favor as a general and complete account of the nature of reasons for action. I argue that while the theory of practical rationality that is often equated with rational egoism—a view that I call ‘Simple‐Minded Rational Egoism'—is neither plausible nor endorsed by Plato in his Republic, there is a more complex version of Rational Egoism to which Plato is indeed committed. Moreover, such a conception of practical rationality is not vulnerable to the standard set of objections that contemporary philosophers have made against Rational Egoism.     

Meaning of Social Inclusion to Young People Not in Employment,Education or Training

The ‘social inclusion’ of young people, particularly those who are ‘not in education, employment or training’, is a contemporary concern in policy discourses. However, it has been argued that the term ‘social inclusion’ is defined by adults and imposed on young people, and there is little understanding of what ‘social inclusion’ means to young people themselves. Using a participatory methodology, this study investigated what ‘being included’ meant to young people. A qualitative approach with a thematic analysis was used to explore the accounts of 11 participants and yielded three main themes. ‘“Acceptance”—the building blocks of inclusion’ reflected the power of interpersonal acceptance in determining young people's sense of inclusion. ‘“Learning why I don't matter”—when power and discourse shape inclusion’ illustrated how social discourses and power dynamics influenced young people's experience of inclusion. ‘“Keeping up or falling behind”—internalising the discourse of inclusion’ reflected how young people internalised some of these societal definitions of inclusion and responded to them. Those who felt ‘accepted’ or ‘included’ in a ‘mainstream’ sense articulated a sense of agency and hope. For those who did not, it appeared that agency dissolved as did a sense of hope for the future. Although the participants negotiated their ‘inclusion’ through close, trusting relationships with others, the application of the societal discourses of inclusion such as productivity, independence and career mindedness had the potential to leave them feeling excluded, isolated and distressed. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reasons for Action and Psychological Capacities

Most moral philosophers agree that if a moral agent is incapable of performing some act ф because of a physical incapacity, then they do not have a reason to ф. Most also claim that if an agent is incapable of ф-ing due to a psychological incapacity, brought about by, for example, an obsession or phobia, then this does not preclude them from having a reason to ф. This is because the ‘ought implies can’ principle is usually interpreted as a claim about physical, rather than psychological, capacities. In this paper I argue for an opposing view: if we don’t have reasons to do things that we are physically incapable of doing, then neither do we have reasons to do things we are psychologically incapable of doing. I also argue that extending the ‘ought implies can’ principle to psychological capacities makes the principle more attractive.     

Rational requirements and ‘rational’ akrasia

Can akrasia be rational? Can it be rational to resist the motivational force of your own practical judgment? While I do not believe that akrasia can be rational, I think there is something revealingly right in recent arguments for the proposition. I aim to defend that insight in a way that does not entail that akrasia can be rational but more fundamentally addresses the normative structure of rational requirements. The fundamental issue lies in the relationship between two conceptions of rationality. Previous treatments of ‘rational’ akrasia have tended to regard rationality as a responsiveness to reasons. Previous treatments of rational requirements have tended to regard rationality as an attitudinal coherence. I’ll reformulate the question of rational akrasia within a framework that construes rationality as coherence. And I’ll reformulate the question of rational coherence to admit the possibility of reasoning as the apparently rational akratic does—from failure to follow through on a judgment to abandonment of that judgment. I’ll argue that rational requirements codify an agential coherence that you negotiate through a dynamic of self-trust and self-mistrust. It is not reasoning to abandon your judgment through forgetfulness, confusion or perverse self-rebellion. But it can be reasoning to abandon your judgment through reasonable self-mistrust. The difference lies in how self-mistrust can manifest a sensitivity to the norm of rational coherence that gives normative force to rational requirements. The core insight of those who defend the possibility of ‘rational’ akrasia lies in their emphasis on the rational force of self-mistrust.     

Appearances,Rationality, and Justified Belief

One might think that its seeming to you that p makes you justified in believing that p. After all, when you have no defeating beliefs, it would be irrational to have it seem to you that p but not believe it. That view is plausible for perceptual justification, problematic in the case of memory, and clearly wrong for inferential justification. I propose a view of rationality and justified belief that deals happily with inference and memory. Appearances are to be evaluated as ‘sound’ or ‘unsound.’ Only a sound appearance can give rise to a justified belief, yet even an unsound appearance can ‘rationally require’ the subject to form the belief. Some of our intuitions mistake that rational requirement for the belief’s being justified. The resulting picture makes it plausible that there are also unsound perceptual appearances. I suggest that to have a sound perceptually basic appearance that p, one must see that p.     

‘It's not racist. It's common sense’. A critical analysis of political discourse around asylum and immigration in the UK

This paper looks at a political speech given by the leader of the opposition party during the run up to the UK elections in 2005. Using this speech as a starting point, we attempt to trace the path of ‘racism’ within a text that makes explicit claims to being ‘not racist’. Drawing on a number of theoretical and methodological resources, this paper approaches the analysis by focusing on a number of conceptually heterogeneous elements that, in relation with each other, function to produce, re‐produce and stabilize ‘racism’. One of the difficulties commonly encountered in social psychological work, we would suggest, is that an explicit statement of allegiance to a particular methodological and theoretical tradition can also result in a restriction of theorization to a particular ‘level of analysis’. That is to say, a methodological process that constructs a pre‐given category, presets the criteria by which ‘racism’ can be identified and fixes the ‘level of analysis’ at which it can be studied risks ignoring the multiple points of contact at which ‘racism’ can be made visible or made to disappear. The concern here it that such a process can work to reinscribe the very ‘racisms’ we aim to disrupt. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Functional analysis and the problem of rationality

Functional analysis rescued religion from the oblivion to which positiviste would have consigned it, by taking ‘society’ rather than the individual act as the unit of analysis. The history of functionalism has been a record of increasing concern with such holistic units as societies and social systems. One consequence of this shift away from social action (in the Weberian sense) is that the issue of rationality has become largely redundant. Yet the problem remains: How do we account for ‘contributions’ to the social system in terms that make sense of the perspectives of social actors? An examination of unit actions as they are understood by social actors suggests that functionalism in fact incorporated many of the tenets held by positivists, and that it makes untenable (and implicit) assumptions concerning the ‘objectivity’ of the scientific observer.     

What is it to lose hope?

This paper addresses the phenomenology of hopelessness. I distinguish two broad kinds of predicament that are easily confused: ‘loss of hopes’ and ‘loss of hope’. I argue that not all hope can be characterised as an intentional state of the form ‘I hope that p’. It is possible to lose all hopes of that kind and yet retain another kind of hope. The hope that remains is not an intentional state or a non-intentional bodily feeling. Rather, it is a ‘pre-intentional’ orientation or ‘existential feeling’, by which I mean something in the context of which certain kinds of intentional state, including intentional hope, are intelligible. I go on to discuss severe depression, lack of aspiration, demoralisation and loss of trust in the world, in order to distinguish some qualitatively different forms that loss of hope can take.