Reflecting on diachronic Dutch books

Conditionalization governs how to reallocate credence in light of new evidence. One prominent argument in favor of Conditionalization holds that an agent who violates it is vulnerable to a diachronic Dutch book: a series of acceptable bets offered at multiple times that inflict a sure loss. van Fraassen argues that an agent who violates the Principle of Reflection is likewise vulnerable to a diachronic Dutch book. He concludes that agents should conform to both Conditionalization and Reflection. Some authors reply that Reflection is implausible and hence that there must be something wrong with diachronic Dutch book arguments. Other authors try to isolate a principled difference between the Dutch book argument for Conditionalization and the Dutch book argument for Reflection, such that the former argument may succeed even though the latter fails. I pursue a version of this strategy. I contend that, once we properly elucidate the notion of sure loss, non-reflectors are not vulnerable to a sure loss. An agent who violates Reflection is not thereby subject to a diachronic Dutch book. Appearances to the contrary result from an unmotivated focus upon an overly narrow set of gambling scenarios.     

Intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity in preadolescence and adolescence: Effect on psychological adjustment

The aim of this study was to determine the prevalence of expectation of secondary gain among first-generation immigrant Turkish patients referred to a psychiatric hospital and whether this prevalence differs from that of Dutch outpatients. The study was carried out in the outpatient department of a Dutch psychiatric hospital. Expectation of secondary gain was assessed by directly asking the patients, via questionnaires whether they hoped to gain specific “benefits” from being in therapy. The study found that 31.7% of the Turkish patients reported holding expectations of secondary gain while being in therapy versus 42.2% of the Dutch patients. Our finding of a large proportion of Turkish patients with expectations of secondary gain is consistent with the results of an earlier study of Dutch patients. However, in contrast to the findings of empirical research, Turkish immigrants were not found more than Dutch patients to have expectations of secondary gain. In fact, such expectations were more common among Dutch patients.     

Beauty and the Bets

In the Sleeping Beauty problem, Beauty is uncertain whether the outcome of a certain coin toss was heads or tails. One argument suggests that her degree of belief in heads should be 1/3, while a second suggests that it should be 1/2. Prima facie, the argument for 1/2 appears to be stronger. I offer a diachronic Dutch Book argument in favor of 1/3. Even for those who are not routinely persuaded by diachronic Dutch Book arguments, this one has some important morals.     

Subjective probabilities and betting quotients

This paper addresses the problem of why the conditions under which standard proofs of the Dutch Book argument proceed should ever be met. In particular, the condition that there should be odds at which you would be willing to bet indifferently for or against are hardly plausible in practice, and relaxing it and applying Dutch book considerations gives only the theory of upper and lower probabilities. It is argued that there are nevertheless admittedly rather idealised circumstances in which the classic form of the Dutch Book argument is valid.Probability is the very guide of life' (Bishop Butler).     

After the slippery slope: Dutch experiences on regulating active euthanasia

"When a country legalizes active euthanasia, it puts itself on a slippery slope from where it may well go further downward." If true, this is a forceful argument in the battle of those who try to prevent euthanasia from becoming legal. The force of any slippery slope argument, however, is by definition limited by its reference to future developments which cannot empirically be sustained. Experience in the Netherlands--where a law regulating active euthanasia was accepted in April 2001--may shed light on the strengths as well as the weaknesses of the slippery slope argument in the context of the euthanasia debate. This paper consists of three parts. First, it clarifies the Dutch legislation on euthanasia and explains the cultural context in which it originated. Second, it looks at the argument of the slippery slope. A logical and an empirical version are distinguished, and the latter, though philosophically less interesting, proves to be most relevant in the discussion on euthanasia. Thirdly, it addresses the question whether Dutch experiences in the process of legalizing euthanasia justify the fear of the slippery slope. The conclusion is that Dutch experiences justify some caution.     

Personhood and future belief: two arguments for something like Reflection

This paper offers two new arguments for a version of Reflection, the principle that says, roughly, that if one knew now what one would believe in the future, one ought to believe it now. The most prominent existing argument for the principle is the coherence-based Dutch Strategy argument advanced by Bas van Fraassen (and others). My two arguments are quite different. The first is a truth-based argument. On the basis of two substantive premises, that people’s beliefs generally get better over time and that being a person requires having knowledge of this fact, it concludes that it is rational to treat your future selves as experts. The second argument is a transcendental one. Being a person requires being able to engage in plans and projects. But these cannot be meaningfully undertaken unless one has Reflection-like expectations about one’s future beliefs. Hence, satisfaction of Reflection is necessary for being a person. Together, the arguments show that satisfaction of Reflection is both rational and necessary for persons.

Diachronic Dutch Books and Sleeping Beauty

Hitchcock advances a diachronic Dutch Book argument (DDB) for a 1/3 answer to the Sleeping Beauty problem. Bradley and Leitgeb argue that Hitchcock’s DDB argument fails. We demonstrate the following: (a) Bradley and Leitgeb’s criticism of Hitchcock is unconvincing; (b) nonetheless, there are serious reasons to worry about the success of Hitchcock’s argument; (c) however, it is possible to construct a new DDB for 1/3 about which such worries cannot be raised.     

An investigation of the relationship between teachers’ expectations and teachers’ perceptions of student attributes

Little is known about factors other than students’ abilities and background variables that shape teachers’ achievement expectations. This study was aimed at investigating the role of teachers’ perceptions of students attributes (working habits, popularity, self-confidence, student–teacher relationships, and classroom behavior) in shaping teachers’ expectations. The sample analyzed consisted of 5316 students and 469 classes in grade 6 in Dutch primary education. Teachers had higher expectations for students who they perceived as self-confident and having positive work habits. Differences in expectations between boys and girls could partly be explained by the teachers’ perceptions of students’ work habits. Teachers differed in the extent to which they let their perceptions of student attributes shape their expectations.     

On the Expected Utility Objection to the Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism*

The Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism assumes Ramsey's Thesis (RT), which determines the prices an agent is rationally required to pay for a bet. Hedden (2013) argues that Ramsey's Thesis is wrong. He claims that Maximise Subjective Expected Utility (MSEU) determines those prices, and it often disagrees with Ramsey's Thesis. I suggest two responses to Hedden's objection. First, we might be permissive: agents are permitted to pay any price that is required or permitted by RT, and they are permitted to pay any price that is required or permitted by MSEU. This allows us to give a revised version of the Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism, which I call the Permissive Dutch Book Argument. Second, I suggest that even Hedden should admit that RT gives the correct answer in certain very limited cases, and I show that, together with MSEU, this very restricted version of RT gives a new pragmatic argument for Probabilism, which I call the Bookless Pragmatic Argument.     

The puzzle of the hats

The Puzzle of the Hats is a betting arrangement which seems to show that a Dutch book can be made against a group of rational players with common priors who act in the common interest and have full trust in the other players’ rationality. But we show that appearances are misleading—no such Dutch book can be made. There are four morals. First, what can be learned from the puzzle is that there is a class of situations in which credences and betting rates diverge. Second, there is an analogy between ways of dealing with situations of this kind and different policies for sequential choice. Third, there is an analogy with strategic voting, showing that the common interest is not always served by expressing how things seem to you in social decision-making. And fourth, our analysis of the Puzzle of the Hats casts light on a recent controversy about the Dutch book argument for the Sleeping Beauty.     

Cleaving automatic processes from strategic biases in phonological priming

In a phonological priming experiment using spoken Dutch words, Dutch listeners were taught varying expectancies and relatedness relations about the phonological form of target words, given particular primes. They learned to expect that, after a particular prime, if the target was a word, it would be from a specific phonological category. The expectancy either involved phonological overlap (e.g., honk-vonk, "base-spark"; expected related) or did not (e.g., nest-galm, "nest-boom"; expected unrelated, where the learned expectation after hearing nest was a word rhyming in -alm). Targets were occasionally inconsistent with expectations. In these inconsistent expectancy trials, targets were either unrelated (e.g., honk-mest, "base-manure"; unexpected unrelated), where the listener was expecting a related target, or related (e.g., nest-pest, "nest-plague"; unexpected related), where the listener was expecting an unrelated target. Participant expectations and phonological relatedness were thus manipulated factorially for three types of phonological overlap (rhyme, one onset phoneme, and three onset phonemes) at three interstimulus intervals (ISIs; 50, 500, and 2,000 msec). Lexical decisions to targets revealed evidence of expectancy-based strategies for all three types of overlap (e.g., faster responses to expected than to unexpected targets, irrespective of phonological relatedness) and evidence of automatic phonological processes, but only for the rhyme and three-phoneme onset overlap conditions and, most strongly, at the shortest ISI (e.g., faster responses to related than to unrelated targets, irrespective of expectations). Although phonological priming thus has both automatic and strategic components, it is possible to cleave them apart.     

“Prematurity stereotype” in a sample of Dutch mothers: Do researchers suffer from a “prejudiced parent stereotype”?

This paper reports a Dutch replication of North American research on the “prematurity stereotype” among mothers. In a rating task, infants labeled as “premature” were given less favorable scores on a number of dimensions. A questionnaire study also showed negative expectations concerning premature infants. Associations with the mothers' number of children and level of education were found. Methodological problems of this type of research are discussed. To a large extent, the effects found can be ascribed to the “demand characteristics” of the experiment and the normal effects of expectations on perception. It is argued that researchers should not automatically label such behavior as “stereotyping”: There must also be evidence of a failure to adapt expectations in the face of conflicting evidence. Recommendations are made concerning future research in this area, and the importance of providing clear and complete information for the public on the effects of prematurity is stressed.     

Qeauty and the books: a response to Lewis’s quantum sleeping beauty problem

In his 2007 paper “Quantum Sleeping Beauty”, Peter Lewis poses a problem for the supporters’ of the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics appeal to subjective probability. Lewis’s argument hinges on parallels between the traditional “sleeping beauty” problem in epistemology and a quantum variant. These two cases, Lewis argues, advocate different treatments of credences even though they share important epistemic similarities, leading to a tension between the traditional solution to the sleeping beauty problem (typically called the “thirder” solution) and Everettian quantum mechanics. In this paper I examine the metaphysical and epistemological differences between Lewis’s two cases, and, in particular, I show how diachronic Dutch book arguments support both the thirder solution in the traditional case and the Everettian’s solution in the variant case. These Dutch books, I argue, reveal an important disanalogy between Lewis’s two cases such that Lewis’s argument does not reveal an inconsistency in either the Everettian’s or the thirder’s assignment of credences.     

The communicative function of ambiguity in language

We present a general information-theoretic argument that all efficient communication systems will be ambiguous, assuming that context is informative about meaning. We also argue that ambiguity allows for greater ease of processing by permitting efficient linguistic units to be re-used. We test predictions of this theory in English, German, and Dutch. Our results and theoretical analysis suggest that ambiguity is a functional property of language that allows for greater communicative efficiency. This provides theoretical and empirical arguments against recent suggestions that core features of linguistic systems are not designed for communication.     

The parent analogy: a reassessment

According to the parent analogy, as a caretaker’s goodness, ability and intelligence increase, the likelihood that the caretaker will make arrangements for the attainment of future goods that are unnoticed or underappreciated by their dependents also increases. Consequently, if this analogy accurately represents our relationship to God, then we should expect to find many instances of inscrutable evil in the world. This argument in support of skeptical theism has recently been criticized by Dougherty. I argue that Dougherty’s argument is incomplete, for there are two plausible ways of construing the parent analogy’s conclusion. I supplement Dougherty’s case by offering a new argument against the parent analogy based on failed expectations concerning the amount of inscrutable evils encountered in the world. Consequently, there remains a significant empirical hurdle for skeptical theism to overcome if it is to maintain its status as a defeater for our reliability when tracking gratuitous evils.     

Comparing the Actual and Expected Persuasiveness of Evidence Types: How Good are Lay People at Selecting Persuasive Evidence?

Whereas there are many publications in which argumentation quality has been defined by argumentation theorists, considerably less research attention has been paid to lay people’s considerations regarding argument quality. Considerations about strong and weak argumentation are relevant because they can be compared with actual persuasive success. Argumentation theorists’ conceptions have to some extent been shown to be compatible with actual effectiveness, but for lay people such compatibility has yet to be determined. This study experimentally investigated lay people’s expectations about the persuasiveness of anecdotal, statistical, causal, and expert evidence, and compared these expectations with the actual persuasiveness of these evidence types. Dutch and French participants (N = 174) ranked four types of evidence in terms of their expected persuasiveness for eight different claims. Both cultural groups expected statistical evidence to be the most persuasive type of evidence to other people, followed by expert, causal, and, finally, anecdotal evidence. A comparison of these rankings with the results of Hornikx and Hoeken (Communication Monographs 74, 443–463, 2007, Study 1) on the actual persuasiveness of the same evidence types reveals that people’s expectations are generally accurate: How relatively persuasive they expect evidence types to be often corresponded with their actual persuasiveness.

Retracted:Staff,miter, book,share: how attributes of Saint Nicholas induce normative behavior

In three studies the hypothesis was tested that for young Dutch children, who associate Saint Nicholas with the norm to share one's wealth with others, attributes of Saint Nicholas (miter, book, and staff) would spontaneously activate the “sharing norm” and subsequent sharing behavior. The results confirmed our expectations. In two studies, young Dutch children share more candy with others after being primed with attributes of Saint Nicholas compared to being primed with a dwarf in the control condition. In a third study, children evaluate sharing more positively after being primed with attributes of Saint Nicholas, and more negatively after being primed with the Toys R Us logo, compared to being primed with a dwarf. This is the first empirical evidence that attributes of normative symbols can induce normative behavior and change norm judgments. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

SHOULD WE FEAR QUANTUM TORMENT?

The prospect, in terms of subjective expectations, of immortality under the no‐collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics is certain, as pointed out by several authors, both physicists and, more recently, philosophers. The argument, known as quantum suicide, or quantum immortality, has received some critical discussion, but there hasn't been any questioning of David Lewis's point that there is a terrifying corollary to the argument, namely, that we should expect to live forever in a crippled, more and more damaged state, that barely sustains life. This is the prospect of eternal quantum torment. Based on some empirical facts, I argue for a conclusion that is much more reassuring than Lewis's terrible scenario. 1