现象学伦理学的基础:意向性感受

E. Husserl’s reflections in Logical Investigations on “intentional feelings” and “non-intentional feelings” are significant in both his later ethical explorations and M. Scheler’s thought on ethics. Through the incorporation of the views of Husserl and Scheler, we find that the phenomenology of the intentional feeling-acts is not only the foundation of the non-formal ethics of values in Scheler’s phenomenology, but also at least the constitutive foundation of the ethics of Husserl’s first orientation. Translated by Yu Xin and Zhang Wei from Huazhong keji daxue xuebao 华中科技大学学报 (Journal of Huazhong University of Science and Technology), 2007, (6): 14–20     

The representational theory of phenomenal character: A phenomenological critique

According to a currently popular approach to the analysis of phenomenal character mandates that the phenomenal character of an experience is entirely determined by, and is in fact identical with, the experience’s representational content. Two underlying assumptions motivate this approach to phenomenal character: (1) that conscious experiences are diaphanous or transparent, in the sense that it is impossible to discern, via introspection, any intrinsic features of an experience of x that are not experienced as features of x; and (2) that the immediate objects of consciousness are not objects per se, but rather properties. This paper explores these assumptions, advancing the thesis that each is rejectable on phenomenological grounds.     

The theory of phenomenological description

Continental Philosophy Review -     

The psychology of anxiety: A phenomenological description

Abstract

The psychology of anxiety continues to be debated by researchers, as well as therapists. By investigating it with phenomenological methods, I have been able to determine its three existential preconditions; the way in which an anxious situation announces a crisis of one's efforts to surpass one's unacceptable incompleteness; being anxious as being impeded, if not fundamentally blocked, and moving beyond being anxious as either ambivalently reaffirming the viability of the projects and relations in which one was already invested, or as transformatively accepting those projects and relations as fundamentally uncertain and hence, as open to future determination.     

A phenomenological theory and critique of culture: A reading of Michel Henry's La Barbarie

Continental Philosophy Review -     

The psychology of anxiety: A phenomenological description

Abstract

The psychology of anxiety continues to be debated by researchers, as well as therapists. By investigating it with phenomenological methods, I have been able to determine its three existential preconditions; the way in which an anxious situation announces a crisis of one's efforts to surpass one's unacceptable incompleteness; being anxious as being impeded, if not fundamentally blocked, and moving beyond being anxious as either ambivalently reaffirming the viability of the projects and relations in which one was already invested, or as transformatively accepting those projects and relations as fundamentally uncertain and hence, as open to future determination.     

The functional role of consciousness: A phenomenological approach

In this paper, a theoretical account of the functional role of consciousness in the cognitive system of normal subjects is developed. The account is based upon an approach to consciousness that is drawn from the phenomenological tradition. On this approach, consciousness is essentially peripheral self-awareness, in a sense to be duly explained. It will be argued that the functional role of consciousness, so construed, is to provide the subject with just enough information about her ongoing experience to make it possible for her to easily obtain as much information as she may need. The argument for this account of consciousness' functional role will proceed in three main stages. First, the phenomenological approach to consciousness as peripheral self-awareness will be expounded and endorsed. Second, an account of the functional role of peripheral perceptual awareness will be offered. Finally, the account of the functional role of peripheral self-awareness will be obtained by straightforward extension from the functional role of peripheral perceptual awareness. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Validation of a phenomenological strain-gradient plasticity theory

Strain-gradient plasticity theories have been developed to account for the size effect in small-scale plasticity in metals. However, they remain of limited use in engineering, for example in standards for nanoindentation, because of their phenomenological nature. In particular, a key parameter, the characteristic length, can only be determined by fitting to experiment. Here, it is shown that the characteristic length in one such theory derives directly from known quantities through fundamental dislocation physics. This explains and validates the theory for use in engineering.     

The ontological foundation of Russell's theory of modality

Prominent thinkers such as Kripke and Rescher hold that Russell has no modal logic, even that Russell was indisposed toward modal logic. In Part I, I show that Russell had a modal logic which he repeatedly described and that Russell repeatedly endorsed Leibniz's multiplicity of possible worlds. In Part II, I describe Russell's theory as having three ontological levels. In Part III, I describe six Parmenidean theories of being Russell held, including: literal in 1903; universal in 1912; timeless in 1914; transcendental in 1918–1948. The transcendental theory underlies the primary level of Russell's modal logic. In Part IV, I examine Rescher's view that Russell and modal logic did not mix.The United States Naval Academy Research Council kindly provided a summer 1988 research grant for work on this essay. This essay was presented at the Bertrand Russell Society Meeting during the December 1988 Eastern Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association in Washington, D.C.     

The Jesus delusion: A theoretical and phenomenological look

The delusion of being Jesus Christ is examined theoretically with respect to etiology and purpose. An interview with a person who had this delusion for two years conveys the raw experience of living the Jesus delusion.     

Order,experience, and critique: The phenomenological method in political and legal theory

Continental Philosophy Review - The paper investigates phenomenology’s possibilities to describe, reflect and critically analyse political and legal orders. It presents a...