论行政人员的伦理自主性建构

行政人员是与公共权力紧密联系在一起的特殊职业群体,其与普通社会公众最大的区别在于,作为行政人员必须坚持公共利益效忠优先原则,而社会公众依法追求自我利益是其行为的基本原则,这是公共领域与私人领域价值标准的差异.     

我国现行宪法道德性探析

我国现行宪法因其对公民权利的广泛设定和对国家政治制度最合理的规定,而成为一部具有高度道德合理性的宪法.但是由于我国宪法当前只具有立法上的指导作用,存在非适用性和非程序性,因而致使其道德性缺失.为了实现和完善我国宪法的道德性,就必须克服宪法的非适用性和非程序性,建立和完善我国的违宪审查制度,并允许将宪法适用于司法判断,使宪法进入司法程序.     

古代埃及神庙祭司考略

神庙祭司是古代埃及祭司群体的一个重要组成部分,在古埃及的世俗社会和宗教领域内产生过重大影响.但学界对神庙祭司的内部组织结构却没有一个清晰的认识.本文通过对布列斯特德的<埃及古代文献>(5卷)、李希泰姆的<古代埃及文献>(3卷)和库明、戴维斯的<18王朝晚期埃及历史文献>(6册)等埃及古代铭文资料中有关神庙祭司资料的整合,从祭司衔号入手,对其构成和等级进行了全新的考察,从一个侧面反映出神庙祭司之于古埃及社会的重大影响.     

Constitution and Similarity

Whenever an object constitutes, makes up orcomposes another object, the objects inquestion share a striking number of properties. This paper is addressed to the question of whatmight account for the intimate relation andstriking similarity between constitutionallyrelated objects. According to my account, thesimilarities between constitutionally relatedobjects are captured at least in part by meansof a principle akin to that of strongsupervenience. My paper addresses two mainissues. First, I propose independentlyplausible principles by means of which todelineate, in a non-ad-hoc, non-stipulative andnon-circular fashion, those properties whichcan be expected to be shared amongconstitutionally related objects in virtue oftheir being so related from those which ingeneral cannot be expected to be shared, orwhich are shared for other reasons. Secondly,I spell out in detail the nature of thesupervenience-principle at work in thiscontext. My account thus aims at isolating, ina methodologically responsible fashion, theparticular sort of restricted indiscernibilityprinciple which is a component of theconstitution-relation.     

Constitution and Kind Membership

Philosophical Studies -     

在宪政与民主之间——从2000年大选透析美国宪政的二元个性

2000年大选暴露了美国宪政制度的危机.究其实质,这一危机是宪政与民主的冲突加剧的外在表现.由这一次大选提供的个案入手,本文分析了美国宪政的传统与改革的进程,并对最高法院与民主的关系做了一个审视.本文认为,宪政与民主的冲突与均衡在政治制度和政治意识等多个方面构造了美国政治文明的二元个性.     

Monism and Material Constitution

Are the sculpture and the mass of gold which permanently makes it up one object or two? In this article, we argue that the monist, who answers ‘one object’, cannot accommodate the asymmetry of material constitution. To say ‘the mass of gold materially constitutes the sculpture, whereas the sculpture does not materially constitute the mass of gold’, the monist must treat ‘materially constitutes’ as an Abelardian predicate, whose denotation is sensitive to the linguistic context in which it appears. We motivate this approach in terms of modal analyses of material constitution, but argue that ultimately it fails. The monist must instead accept a deflationary, symmetrical use of ‘materially constitutes’. We argue that this is a serious cost for her approach.     

Necessities of Origin and Constitution

The once deeply held conviction that all necessary truths are known a priori is now widely, although by no means universally agreed to have been subjected to penetrating, if not devastating criticism. Scott Soames, for example, on behalf of Saul Kripke, and indirectly of Hilary Putnam, argues that in respect of natural kinds, the introduction of basic essentialist assumptions grounded in our pre-theoretical habits of thinking and speaking – for example, that atomic or molecular structure provides the underlying essence of a substance – allows a sentence like "water = H₂0," in which the identity sign is flanked by rigid designators to express a metaphysically necessary truth. Yet doubts and puzzlement remain over the status of a posteriori necessities, including those relating to an individual's origin. This paper considers some prominent criticisms that have been made of the Kripke–Putnam approach by A. J. Ayer and Frank Ebersole among others and reveals in what respects they are valid, where they are misplaced, and, perhaps more importantly, why the most valuable aspect of this approach can be seen to reflect aspects of our scientific procedures that do indeed point towards an application for a distinction that roughly mirrors that between epistemic and metaphysical possibility, yet one that is grounded instead in the nature of our actual practices.     

Husserl and Haugeland on Constitution

Both Husserl and Haugeland develop an account ofconstitution to address the question of howour mental episodes can beabout physical objects and thus, through the intentionalrelation, bridge the gap betweenthe mental and the physical. The respectivetheories of the two philosophers of very differentbackground show not only how mentalepisodes can have empirical content, but also howthis content is shaped by pastexperiences or a holistic background of other mentalepisodes. In this article I first outlineand then contrast their positions in order to showhow the notion of constitution can beadopted to address major problems of contemporaryphilosophy of mind, especially thequestion of how the mind can be related to itsphysical environment.     

胡塞尔的起源观初探——从现象学还原与先验构造的关系入思

文章以现象学"相关性先天"论题为切入点,借助"纯粹现象"概念在现象学思义开端处所具歧义性的考察而导向现象学还原之本性的探讨.具体的讨论分别着力于对"相关性先天"论题和明见性概念的构造性阐释,籍此,揭示现象学还原与构造观念的内在关联,凸显出先验现象学向最终起源回溯的运思路向.     

Communitarianism 'Social Constitution,' and Autonomy

Communitarians defend what we may call the 'social constitution thesis,' that participation in society makes us what we are. This claim, however, is ambiguous. In an attempt to shed some light on it and to better understand the impact its truth would have on our beliefs regarding autonomy, I offer four possible ways it could be understood and four corresponding senses of individual independence and autonomy. I also indicate what senses liberals can accept that we are socially constituted and in what sense I take communitarians to argue we are socially constituted.     

Material Objects,Constitution, and Mysterianism

It is sometimes claimed that ordinary objects, such as mountains and chairs, are not material in their own right, but only in virtue of the fact that they are constituted by matter. As Fine puts it, they are “only derivatively material” (2003, 211). In this paper I argue that invoking “constitution” to account for the materiality of things that are not material in their own right explains nothing and renders the admission that these objects are indeed material completely mysterious. Although there may be metaphysical contexts in which mysterianism can be accepted with equanimity, I further argue, the question of the materiality of quotidian objects is not one of them.     

Constitution,Over Determination and Causal Power

Kim's exclusion argument threatens to show that irreducible constituted objects are epiphenomenal. Kim's arguments are examined and found to be unconvincing; that a constituted cause requires its constituent to be a cause is not an adequate reason to reject the causation of the constituted object (event or property‐instance). However, I introduce and argue for, the Causal Power Uniqueness Condition (CPUC). I argue that CPUC and the causal closure of the physical, implies that constituted objects or property‐instances are not novel causal powers.