Pretense, imagination, and belief: the Single Attitude theory

A popular view has it that the mental representations underlying human pretense are not beliefs, but are ??belief-like?? in important ways. This view typically posits a distinctive cognitive attitude (a ??DCA??) called ??imagination?? that is taken toward the propositions entertained during pretense, along with correspondingly distinct elements of cognitive architecture. This paper argues that the characteristics of pretense motivating such views of imagination can be explained without positing a DCA, or other cognitive architectural features beyond those regulating normal belief and desire. On the present ??Single Attitude?? account of imagination, propositional imagining just is a form of believing. The Single Attitude account is also distinguished from ??metarepresentational?? accounts of pretense, which hold that both pretending and recognizing pretense in others require one to have concepts of mental states. It is argued, to the contrary, that pretending and recognizing pretense require neither a DCA nor possession of mental state concepts.     

What It Is to Pretend

Pretense is a topic of keen interest to philosophers and psychologists. But what is it, really, to pretend? What features qualify an act as pretense? Surprisingly little has been said on this foundational question. Here I defend an account of what it is to pretend, distinguishing pretense from a variety of related but distinct phenomena, such as (mere) copying and practicing. I show how we can distinguish pretense from sincerity by sole appeal to a person's beliefs, desires, and intentions – and without circular recourse to an ‘intention to pretend’ or to a sui generis mental state of ‘imagining.’     

Pretend Play as Twin Earth: A Social-Cognitive Analysis

Pretend play appears to be important to a theory of mind, but exactly how or why has been controversial. One widely entertained hypothesis about why pretense is important to understanding minds is termed the Metarepresentational Model. According to this model, children knowingly consider and manipulate mental representations during pretense. Children appreciate these mental representations as such and later come to apply their understanding of mental representation outside of pretense domains. This article reviews evidence relevant to the metarepresentational model, and it is concluded that the evidence does not support it. Alternative models of the relationship between pretense and theory of mind are reviewed, culminating in a proposed developmental model of the relation. The Twin Earth model proposes specific relations between pretend play and understanding minds, from the ontogenesis of pretense to the later emergence of role play and mental representational understandings of pretense. Central to the proposal is the supposition that pretend play functions for children in much the way that Twin Earth functions for philosophers—by allowing for participation in and reasoning about nonactual situations.     

The Development of Representations of Pretend Object Substitutions

Many theories of how pretense is mentally represented have been posited, but none have been effectually empirically tested to date. This research is the first to explore how children and adults mentally process simple pretend actions, specifically pretend object substitutions, and whether this representation changes with age. Preschoolers, older children, and undergraduates heard or read about a variety of pretend object substitutions, and their reaction time to name an image related to the object's real identity, pretend identity, or an unrelated image was measured. To test what is unique to pretense, these reaction times were compared to those from participants who responded to the same images after reading about nonpretend versions of the same actions. Results suggest that preschoolers inhibit reality when representing a pretend action, older children activate an object's real and pretend identities equally, and adults activate the object's real identity more than the pretend one. Implications for current theories of pretense representation are discussed.     

Is young children’s recognition of pretense metarepresentational or merely behavioral? Evidence from 2- and 3-year-olds’ understanding of pretend sounds and speech

When young children observe pretend-play, do they interpret it simply as a type of behavior, or do they infer the underlying mental state that gives the behavior meaning? This is a long-standing question with deep implications for how “theory on mind” develops. The two leading accounts of shared pretense give opposing answers. The behavioral theory proposes that children represent pretense as a form of behavior (behaving in a way that would be appropriate if P); the metarepresentational theory argues that children instead represent pretense via the early concept PRETEND. A test between these accounts is provided by children’s understanding of pretend sounds and speech. We report the first experiments directly investigating this understanding. In three experiments, 2- and 3-year-olds’ listened to requests that were either spoken normally, or with the pretense that a teddy bear was uttering them. To correctly fulfill the requests, children had to represent the normal utterance as the experimenter’s, and the pretend utterances as the bear’s. Children succeeded at both ages, suggesting that they can represent pretend speech (the requests) as coming from counterfactual sources (the bear rather than the experimenter). We argue that this is readily explained by the metarepresentational theory, but harder to explain if children are behaviorists about pretense.     

Mothers' behavior modifications during pretense and their possible signal value for toddlers

An important issue for understanding early cognition is why very young children's real-world representations do not get confused by pretense events. One possible source of information for children is the pretender's behaviors. Pretender behaviors may vary systematically across real and pretend scenarios, perhaps signaling to toddlers to interpret certain events as not real. Pretender behaviors were examined in 2 experiments in which mothers were asked both to pretend to have a snack and really to have a snack with their 18-month-olds. Episodes were analyzed for condition differences in verbal and nonverbal behaviors, including smiling, looking, laughter, and functional movements. Reliable differences were found across conditions for several variables. In a 3rd experiment, children's apparent understanding of pretense in relation to their mothers' behaviors was examined, and significant associations were found with some of the mothers' behavioral changes but not others. This work provides a first inroad into the issue of how children learn to interpret pretense acts as pretense.     

The informative value of emotional expressions: 'social referencing' in mother-child pretense

Mothers begin to pretend with their children during the second year, when children still have much to learn about the real world. Although it would be easy to confuse what is pretend with what is real, children at this young age often demonstrate comprehension during pretense situations. It is plausible that social referencing, in which the child uses the mother's emotional expression as a guide to behavior, might facilitate this emerging knowledge by signaling to the child not to take the pretend situation seriously. Data from 32 pairs of mothers and their 18-month-olds who had engaged in pretend and real snack behaviors were subjected to a sequential analysis to investigate a social referencing interpretation. Consistent with our hypothesis, behaviors suggestive of a baby's understanding pretense were more likely to follow a specific combination of behaviors consistent with social referencing than other combinations of behaviors. These results provide support for the possibility that children use information obtained through social referencing to assist understanding during pretense interactions.     

Observers' proficiency at identifying pretense acts based on behavioral cues

Discriminating what is pretense from what is real is a fundamental problem in development. Research has addressed the proficiency with which adults and children discriminate between play fighting and real fighting, and yet none (to our knowledge) has investigated discrimination of other kinds of pretense and real acts. In addition, little is known about what aspects of pretender behavior (as opposed to pretend content) might cue pretense interpretations. In two experiments, 8-20 s clips showing pretense and real snack behaviors were presented to adult and child participants. All participants distinguished between pretense and real behaviors at better than chance level. Furthermore, certain features (specific looking patterns and mistimed behaviors) were most prominent in the videotapes that were most often correctly identified. This provides empirical support for the suggestion that these cues, as opposed to more commonly cited cues, like smiles, might serve as important indicators of pretense for children and adults.     

Holding in Mind Conflicting Information: Pretending,Working Memory,and Executive Control

Preschoolers' recall of the true and pretend identities of an object in pretense was examined along with a battery of executive functioning and working memory tasks. We expected that children would retain separate identities, as well as a link between them, after observing episodes of pretense, and that memory for pretense would be related to executive functioning and working memory. Children (aged 37–59 months) recalled the true identity of an object better than its pretend identity. Children's recall of at least one identity was correlated with executive functioning and “dual” working memory tasks, independent of age and verbal ability. Memory for both identities was only correlated with executive functioning. The findings are generally supportive of the claim that children form separate representations of the true and pretend identities of objects. The results extend findings of well-established relations between false belief tasks and executive functioning and working memory.     

Recognition of pretend and real actions in play by 1- and 2-year-olds: Early success and why they fail

We compared 1- and 2-year-old children's performance on Pretend and Reality tasks. Pretend tasks involved the comprehension of a pretend scenario, whereas Reality tasks did not. For example, the experimenter pretends to drink water from an empty cup, she fills another cup with imaginary water and then invites the child to drink. In the Reality version, the experimenter uses real water in making exactly the same actions and the same request to the child. Our aim was to verify when very young children understand pretense, and to determine whether failures to understand pretense are the result of difficulties specific to pretense or not. Results showed that starting from 16 months, children begin to understand pretense. At no time did performance differ between Pretend and Reality tasks, suggesting that young children's difficulties with pretense may not arise from causes specific to pretense.     

Children’s understanding of the mind’s involvement in pretense: do words bend the truth?

Many have thought that children have an early appreciation of the role of the mind in pretense, fitting with the notion that pretend play is, in general, a ‘zone of proximal development’ ( Vygotsky, 1978 ). Although results from several experiments are against this hypothesis, the evidence from that line of research has been questioned because the experiments thus far have always used the word ‘pretend’. Young children might have a perfectly clear understanding that pretense involves the mind, but have mismapped the word ‘pretend’ onto non‐mental correlates of pretending, like action and costume. Two experiments tested this possibility. Four‐year‐olds were shown videos of people engaging in real and pretend activities and asked questions regarding the role of mind; for half the children the word ‘pretend’ was used to describe the activity, and for half it was not. Contrary to the hypothesis, even when the word ‘pretend’ was not used, roughly half of the 4‐year‐olds failed to designate pretense as involving mental activity. Consistent with prior work, more children of this age were cognizant of the mind’s involvement in pretense than were cognizant of the mind’s involvement in physical actions.     

Play on: Retrospective Reports of the Persistence of Pretend Play Into Middle Childhood

Piaget (1962) asserted that children stop engaging in pretend play when they enter the concrete operational stage because they become able to accommodate reality and no longer need to assimilate it to their wishes. Consistent also with the views of Vygotsky, discussion of pretend play in developmental psychology is typically confined to early childhood, yet the activity itself does not seem to be so confined. As a preliminary investigation of pretend play in middle childhood, undergraduates were asked to complete a retrospective questionnaire about their childhood pretend play. The questionnaire items queried them about the content and context of their prior pretense engagements, when and why they stopped pretending, and personality characteristics relevant to pretense and fantasy. On average, respondents reported ceasing to pretend around 11 years of age. Among the statistically significant predictors of participants’ reported ages of ceasing to pretend were gender, childhood environs, siblings’ ages, belief in fantastical entities as a child, and participants involved in the last pretend memory. This preliminary study lays a foundation for future studies exploring the role of pretending in middle childhood. Although this study suggests that pretending is still widespread in middle childhood, it sheds no light on its function. This is an important issue across all ages that future research should address.     

从假装到心理表征理论:假装认识训练的影响

研究探究假装情境及假装认识对幼儿心理理论(Theory of mind)发展的影响。实验一考察60名3~4岁幼儿在假装情境下的信念认识任务中的表现,发现幼儿对假装的早期认识的出现要早于对信念的认识的出现,假装情境对幼儿的信念认识没有直接促进作用。实验二对42名在信念认识任务上表现不佳的幼儿进行假装认识训练,结果发现假装认识训练促进了幼儿的信念认识,促进效应须经历一段时间才显现。研究支持假装认识在心理理论发展中具有重要作用的假设,但潜在作用机制仍有待进一步探究。     

The development of pretend language: Toward an understanding of the child's theory of mind

Is has been suggested that there exists a linkage between the mental representation of pretense, the acquisition of the cognitive internal state lexicon, and the development of theory of mind. Using an empirically derived taxonomy of pretend language, predictions derivable from such a relationship were tested. In three related studies, the pretend lexicons of 4 1/2- to 5-year-old children and the adults who interacted with them in home and school situations were examined for evidence of sophisticated pretend language use, for parallels in child and adult pretend language, and for connections between pretend and other mental state words. Results did not support the hypothesis that pretense and the language associated with it were linked to mental state language acquisition. However, the findings that are reported provide converging evidence for the claim that pretense in young children is a form of acting-as-if behaivor rather than a form of mental represetnational activity.     

A note on pretense and co-reference

Anna Pautz has recently argued that the pretense theory of thought about fiction cannot explain how two people can count as thinking about the same fictional character. This is based on conflating pretending and the serious thought that can be based on pretend. With this distinction in place, her objections are groundless.     

Influence of motivated reasoning on saving and spending decisions

The decision to save enhances well-being in the long-term but it conflicts with the desire to spend money to gain immediate gratification. In this research, we examine the influence of having single versus multiple accounts on individuals’ savings and spending decisions. We find that individuals save more with a single account than with multiple liquid accounts. Utilizing work on motivated reasoning and fuzzy-trace theory, we suggest that multiple accounts engender fuzzy gist representations, making it easier for people to generate justifications to support their desired spending decisions. However, a single account reduces the latitude for distortion and hinders generation of justifications to support desirable spending decisions. Across four studies that provide participants with the opportunity to earn, spend, and save money, we demonstrate the proposed effect and test the underlying process.     

Sex in the Head

Abstract Recent philosophical writing on sexual desire divides broadly into two camps. Reductionists take sexual desire to aim at an essentially physical bodily pleasure, whereas intentionalist accounts take a focus upon the reciprocal interaction of the mental states of the partners to be crucial for understanding the phenomenon. I argue that the apparent plausibility of reductionism rests upon the flawed assumption that sexual pleasure has the same uniform bodily character in all sexual encounters, which rests in turn upon flawed assumptions in the philosophy of mind. Drawing on an Aristotelian understanding of persons as essentially embodied minds, I outline an alternative account of sexual desire, showing how the nature of the sexual pleasure we take in the body of another can be transformed by the significance the person or situation has for us. I proceed to show that my account of sexual desire is able to accommodate the entire range of sexual phenomena, including those that seem to undermine standard intentionalist accounts as well as those that reductionists have difficulty in fully explaining. Finally I make some brief remarks about the implications of my account of sexual desire for sexual morality, suggesting some reasons why it casts doubt on the view that universal participant consent is sufficient for a sexual act to be morally unproblematic.     

‘Mommy,You are the Princess and I am the Queen’: How Preschool Children's Initiation and Language Use During Pretend Play Relate to Complexity

The present study investigated the relationship between complexity of pretend play, initiation of pretense activities, and mental state utterances used during play. Children 3 to 4 years of age were videotaped while engaging in pretend play with a parent. The videotapes were coded according to mental state utterances (i.e. desire, emotion, cognitive, and modulations of assertion), and pretend play complexity (i.e. interaction with parent, object use, theme, and role transformation). Children who initiated the pretend activities exhibited more complex play behaviours than those whose parents initiated the activities. Children's increased use of cognitive mental state terms was related to increased pretend play complexity, while parents' increased use of cognitive terms was related to decreased levels of complexity. The results provide support for using a guided participation approach to interacting with preschool children to enhance independence and complexity in play. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Preschooler's Understanding of the Role of Mental States and Action in Pretense

This research investigated 3- to 5-year-old's understanding of the role of intentional states and action in pretense. There are two main perspectives on how children conceptualize pretense. One view is that children understand the mental aspects of pretending (the rich interpretation). The alternative view is that children conceptualize pretense as "acting-like" and do not appreciate that the mind is crucial to pretense (the lean interpretation). The experiments in this article used a novel approach to test these two interpretations. Children were presented with two types of videotaped scenarios. In Experiment 1, children were presented with a scenario in which people wanted to be like something else (e.g., a kangaroo) and either acted like it or did not act like it. Children were asked whether the protagonists were pretending and whether they were thinking about the pretend entity. In Experiment 2, children were presented with the Experiment 1 scenarios and also with a scenario in which a person had the intention to do something else (e.g., look for her keys) but whose actions were similar to those of a pretend entity (e.g., a bear). Children were asked about the pretense, thoughts, and the intentions of the protagonists. Experiment 3 tested for the effect of asking an open-ended versus a forced-choice question on the Experiment 2 tasks. The results of this study suggest that in certain facilitating conditions (e.g., intention information salient, forced-choice question) children have an early understanding of the role of mind in pretense.