Symbolic functioning in preschool children

An important goal of parents and preschool educators alike is to introduce young children to a variety of symbol systems, and to help children begin to master some of these crucial cultural tools. Our research indicates that, in spite of the importance that adults place on symbolization, adult intuitions about the acquisition of symbolic functioning and how to facilitate it are often poor. In this article we summarize research on toddlers' understanding of two kinds of symbols—models and pictures. We show that the initial insight that something is a symbol or representation of something else is extremely challenging for young children, and it is an insight that must be achieved with each symbol system they encounter. Two factors that contribute to the difficulty children have appreciating symbolic relations are discussed: dual representation (the ability to think about something in two different ways at the same time; specifically, the ability to think of something both as an object itself and a symbol for something else) and representational specificity (understanding that a symbol can stand for a specific reality). Implications of these factors for preschool practice are considered.     

Two‐year‐olds’ understanding of self‐symbols

This study investigated 48 2.5‐year‐olds’ ability to map from their own body to a two‐dimensional self‐representation and also examined relations between parents’ talk about body representations and their children's understanding of self‐symbols. Children participated in two dual‐representation tasks in which they were asked to match body parts between a symbol and its referent. In one task, they used a self‐symbol and in the other they used a symbol for a doll. Participants were also read a book about body parts by a parent. As a group, children found the self‐symbol task more difficult than the doll‐task; however, those whose parents explicitly pointed out the relation between their children's bodies and the symbols in the book performed better on the self‐symbol task. The findings demonstrate that 2‐year‐old children have difficulty comprehending a self‐symbol, even when it is two‐dimensional and approximately the same size as them, and suggest that parents’ talk about self‐symbols may facilitate their understanding.     

Common magnitude representation of fractions and decimals is task dependent

Although several studies have compared the representation of fractions and decimals, no study has investigated whether fractions and decimals, as two types of rational numbers, share a common representation of magnitude. The current study aimed to answer the question of whether fractions and decimals share a common representation of magnitude and whether the answer is influenced by task paradigms. We included two different number pairs, which were presented sequentially: fraction–decimal mixed pairs and decimal–fraction mixed pairs in all four experiments. Results showed that when the mixed pairs were very close numerically with the distance 0.1 or 0.3, there was a significant distance effect in the comparison task but not in the matching task. However, when the mixed pairs were further apart numerically with the distance 0.3 or 1.3, the distance effect appeared in the matching task regardless of the specific stimuli. We conclude that magnitudes of fractions and decimals can be represented in a common manner, but how they are represented is dependent on the given task. Fractions and decimals could be translated into a common representation of magnitude in the numerical comparison task. In the numerical matching task, fractions and decimals also shared a common representation. However, both of them were represented coarsely, leading to a weak distance effect. Specifically, fractions and decimals produced a significant distance effect only when the numerical distance was larger.     

Relations between 18-month-olds’ gaze pattern and target action performance: A deferred imitation study with eye tracking

Deferred imitation studies are used to assess infants’ declarative memory performance. These studies have found that deferred imitation performance improves with age, which is usually attributed to advancing memory capabilities. Imitation studies, however, are also used to assess infants’ action understanding. In this second research program it has been observed that infants around the age of one year imitate selectively, i.e., they imitate certain kinds of target actions and omit others. In contrast to this, two-year-olds usually imitate the model's exact actions. 18-month-olds imitate more exactly than one-year-olds, but more selectively than two-year-olds, a fact which makes this age group especially interesting, since the processes underlying selective vs. exact imitation are largely debated. The question, for example, if selective attention to certain kinds of target actions accounts for preferential imitation of these actions in young infants is still open. Additionally, relations between memory capabilities and selective imitation processes, as well as their role in shaping 18-month-olds’ neither completely selective, nor completely exact imitation have not been thoroughly investigated yet. The present study, therefore, assessed 18-month-olds’ gaze toward two types of actions (functional vs. arbitrary target actions) and the model's face during target action demonstration, as well as infants’ deferred imitation performance. Although infants’ fixation times to functional target actions were not longer than to arbitrary target actions, they imitated the functional target actions more frequently than the arbitrary ones. This suggests that selective imitation does not rely on selective gaze toward functional target actions during the demonstration phase. In addition, a post hoc analysis of interindividual differences suggested that infants’ attention to the model's social-communicative cues might play an important role in exact imitation, meaning the imitation of both functional and arbitrary target actions.     

Social Construction and Achieving Reference1

One influential view is that at least some putatively natural human kinds are actually social constructions, understood as some real kind of thing that is produced or sustained by our social and conceptual practices. Category constructionists share two commitments: they hold that human category terms like “race” (and racial terms) and “sex” (and sexual terms) and “homosexuality” and “perversion” actually refer to constructed categories, and they hold that these categories are widely but mistakenly taken to be natural kinds. But it is far from clear that these two commitments are consistent. The sort of mismatch between belief and underlying nature constructionists’ suppose is often taken to indicate a failure of reference. Reliance on a causal‐historical account of reference allows the preservation of reference, but unfortunately, constructionists' appropriation of causal historical accounts of reference is beset by difficulties that do not attend natural kind theorists’ appeals to such accounts. Here, I set out these difficulties, but argue that they can be answered, allowing terms for apparently natural human kinds refer to some sort of social construction about which there is massive error.     

Creativity and Aging: Personal Journals and the Creation of Self

This article considers the writing of personal journals as a process through which an individual constructs a linguistic representation of one's self, with the self constituting a narrative. Rather than a fixed narrative, one's life exists as a narrative subject to revision and reinterpretation. Through journal writing, then, one constructs and reconstructs his or her identity. Berman finds the value in personal journals not only in the themes that surface but also in the creative process they reveal. In this article, he examines passages from five journalists that demonstrate this process of creating and revising meaning in one's life.     

“Playing by the Book”: Determinants of Children's Preference for Replicating and Originating Play

Play is children's most important daily behavior and when children play, they do so in multiple ways. With two studies, this paper explores how children perceive a continuum of two play types, namely replicating play (in which models, guidelines, and examples are used to reach an intended result) and originating play (in which children create something from the mind, think freely about how they will play, are less restricted by given models, etc.). Study 1 (N = 56, M_age = 9) quantitatively shows that both play types occur and tests if children also describe the play types as we define them. Results show that children who play originating (vs. replicating) believe they follow less (vs. more) rules and do their own thing more (vs. less), which verifies the definitions of both types of play. Study 2 includes 16 in-depth semi-structured interviews (M_age = 10) and shows which determinants children identify as triggers for engaging in play that has more replicating or more originating elements.     

Additional Thoughts on Rethinking Research Ethics

Recently, bioethics has become interested in engaging with narrative, but in this engagement, narrative is usually viewed as a mere helpmate to philosophy. In this precis to his book The Fiction of Bioethics, Tod Chambers argues that narrative theory should not be simply a helpful addition to medical ethics but instead should be thought of as being as vital and important to the discipline as moral theory itself. The reason we need to rethink the relationship of medical ethics to narrative is that ethicists test their ideas by applying them to cases, and cases are a narrative genre. Recognizing the importance that cases have for the way medical ethicists do ethics is essential in order to appreciate the field as a form of applied philosophy. Like other forms of representation, narrative has distinct and defining features, which ethicists, in order to understand the data of their field, must learn to recognize and differentiate. Ethicists need to attend to the way decisions about the discourse of a narrative influences the kind of moral theories judged relevant to it. The author briefly examines six features of narrative discourse that rhetorically condition the way we understand medical ethics cases: filter, reportability, closure, characters, chronotope, and gender.     

Symbolic Representation by Pigeons

The capacity for symbolic representation is a prerequisite for the development of human language because words, the basic units of language, are symbols that represent things. But symbolic representation may also serve a nonlinguistic role of organizing events into categories having the same meaning, and such a capacity could have considerable survival value for many species. In a number of experiments, my co-workers and I have found that pigeons that are trained to treat two different stimuli similarly also learn that those stimuli are commonly represented and, thus, that they have the same meaning. We have demonstrated evidence for such common representations in a number of ways, but perhaps the most convincing is when pigeons learn a new association involving one of the presumed commonly represented stimuli, and without further training demonstrate that they have learned a similar association involving the other stimulus. Furthermore, we have found that when pigeons are trained to treat two stimuli similarly, one of those stimuli is represented in terms of the other. These results have implications not only for the generality of cognitive processes across species, but also for the generality of symbolic representation beyond language use.     

Re-inflating the Conception of Scientific Representation

This article argues for an anti-deflationist view of scientific representation. Our discussion begins with an analysis of the recent Callender–Cohen deflationary view on scientific representation. We then argue that there are at least two radically different ways in which a thing can be represented: one is purely symbolic, and therefore conventional, and the other is epistemic. The failure to recognize that scientific models are epistemic vehicles rather than symbolic ones has led to the mistaken (deflationary) view that whatever distinguishes scientific models from other representational vehicles must merely be a matter of pragmatics. It is then argued that even though epistemic vehicles also contain conventional elements, they do their job of demonstration (or showing) in spite of such elements.     

Children’s coding of human action: cognitive factors influencing imitaation in 3‐year‐old

We used imitation as a tool for investigating how young children code action. The study was designed to examine the errors children make in re‐enacting manual gestures they see. Thirty‐two 3‐year‐old children served as subjects. Each child was shown 24 gestures, generated by systematically crossing four factors: visual monitoring, spatial endpoint, movement path, and number of hands. The results showed no difference as a function of whether the children could visually monitor their own responses. Interestingly, children made significantly more errors when the adult's action terminated on a body part than they did when the same movement terminated near the body part. There were also significantly more errors when the demonstrated act involved crossing midline than when it did not, and more errors when it involved one hand rather than two hands. Our hypothesis is that human acts are coded in terms of goals. The goals are hierarchically organized, and because young children have difficulty simultaneously integrating multiple goals into one act they often re‐enact the goals that are ranked higher, which leads to the errors observed. We argue that imitation is an active reconstruction of perceived events and taps cognitive processing. We suggest that the goal‐based imitation in 3‐year‐olds is a natural developmental outgrowth of the perceptual–motor mapping and goal‐directed coding of human acts found in infancy.     

A beluga whale socialized with bottlenose dolphins imitates their whistles

The research on imitation in the animal kingdom has more than a century-long history. A specific kind of imitation, auditory–vocal imitation, is well known in birds, especially among songbirds and parrots, but data for mammals are limited to elephants, marine mammals, and humans. Cetaceans are reported to imitate various signals, including species–specific calls, artificial sounds, and even vocalizations from other species if they share the same habitat. Here we describe the changes in the vocal repertoire of a beluga whale that was housed with a group of bottlenose dolphins. Two months after the beluga’s introduction into a new facility, we found that it began to imitate whistles of the dolphins, whereas one type of its own calls seemed to disappear. The case reported here may be considered as an interesting phenomenon of vocal accommodation to new social companions and cross-species socialization in cetaceans.     

时间距离对记叙文倒叙信息表征的影响

采用移动窗口技术和探测——再认范式探讨了时间距离对记叙文倒叙信息表征的影响。本研究分为两个实验：实验1考察了在近时间距离条件下读者如何表征倒叙信息,结果发现读者会根据时间顺序,把倒叙信息整合到他们的表征中去,支持时间顺序假设;实验2考察了在远时间距离条件下读者如何表征倒叙信息,结果发现读者会根据文本叙述顺序,将倒叙信息作为背景信息整合到该事件中去,支持背景假设。上述结果表明,时间距离是影响读者如何对倒叙信息进行表征的重要因素。     

The analyst's narrative function: Inventing a possibility

This article describes a psychic function common to analysts that was gradually revealed through clinical work with children. It is a psychic quality derived from function α, which involves analysts’ capacity for reverie – their narrative function. The author presents two clinical situations where this function developed in the analytic field in relation to patients’ difficulty in symbolizing. In the first case there was an early traumatic experience unavailable for representation. The analyst lent the patient her ability to represent and produced a narrative that made it possible to create a world of phantasies and transform nightmares into ‘dreamable’ dreams. In other words, she removed the quality of unbearable, irrepresentable reality that characterized those raw experiences encrypted in the psyche. In the second case the analyst's narrative function sought to connect with the isolation, the shell that housed a child suffering from an autistic disorder whose ability to represent had not been established. The analyst provided meaning for the patient's repetitive, stereotyped play, thus weaving the child's subjectivity and gradually introducing a notion of alterity. The author seeks to show how this function, in the thematic construction of the session, facilitated both the working‐through of a traumatic situation (with the ability to share representations) and the constitution of the psychic fabric.     

生成认知与具身机能主义的比较——表征的取舍

在具身认知不同的思潮中，生成认知以其激进的观点反对表征和计算主义，可以称之为是具身认知思潮中的最为激进的一部分。另一方面，由于标准认知中表征和计算的解释力和影响力，具身认知诞生出各种不同程度上的“妥协”性理论，其中，以克拉克为代表的具身的“机能主义”为目前具身认知的主流观点。表征尽管在当前阶段中表现出强大的生命力，但依然无法在所有领域中都得到运用。随着表征的改造与发展，未来的激进具身认知工作者应该将更多的精力投入到具身认知与更多学科的融合研究中。     

The relation between mirror self-image reactions and imitation in 14- and 18-month-old infants

Previous research suggests that sensitivity to aspects of the self and others develop in tandem. We tested 14- and 18-month-olds’ imitative abilities and mirror self-image reactions (i.e., testing behavior and passing the mark test). Results showed that 14-month-olds’ imitation was closely related to the occurrence of testing behavior in front of the mirror, where they checked whether they could control the movements of the mirror image. Eighteen-month-olds, however, no longer showed this relation. Furthermore, in 18-month-olds, we found a high association between imitation and passing the mark test. These correlations suggest that infants’ mirror self-image reactions and imitation share the ability to detect and produce visual-motor contingencies.     

时间维度在记叙文理解中的作用

采用事件分割范式探讨了中文条件下时间维度在记叙文理解中的作用。实验1在中文条件下重复了Speer和Zacks(2005)年的研究,结果发现读者更多将时间短语所在位置作为分割边界,表明时间转换在情景模型更新中发挥了重要作用。实验2探讨了在没有时间短语条件下读者对文本分割的情况,结果发现读者主要是按照事件单元进行分割;实验3a和3b在文本的事件单元中插入时间短语,形成时间转换与事件转换分离的条件,探讨读者在这种时间转换与事件单元转换不一致的条件下所采用的分割策略,结果表明,读者更多仍然按照事件单元转换进行分割,而且对事件单元转换的依赖强于时间转换,但同时时间短语仍对文本的分割有一定影响。上述结果表明,事件单元作为建构记叙文心理表征的核心单元,时间维度作为事件单元转换的线索,只有在标识事件转换的情况下,才能引发读者情景模型的更新。     

Maps and Absent Symbols

absence is the claim that, if a symbol appears on a map, then absence of the symbol from some map coordinate signifies absence of the corresponding property from the corresponding location. This claim is highly intuitive and widely endorsed. And if it is true, then cartographic representation is strikingly different from linguistic representation. I argue, however, that absence is false of various maps and that we have no reason to believe it is true of any maps. The intuition to the contrary results from mistaking what a map simply conveys for what it literally represents.     

语言和情境对具体概念感知运动仿真的影响

具体概念加工中的感知运动仿真是概念表征的核心加工过程。本研究系统探讨了语言因素(语言类型：第一语言和第二语言)和情境因素(知觉情境：空间知觉情境和语义知觉情境)对具体概念加工中感知运动仿真的影响。实验1采用语义相关判断范式探讨了第二语言加工过程中是否存在感知运动仿真, 以及第二语言中的仿真和第一语言中的仿真是否存在差异。研究发现, 第二语言加工中依然存在感知运动仿真, 但是第一语言的感知运动仿真具有一定的优势。实验2采用语义相关判断范式及其变式, 通过2个分实验分别探讨了个体加工概念时空间知觉信息和语义知觉信息对于概念表征过程中感知运动仿真的影响。研究发现, 无论是在较弱的空间信息知觉条件下还是在较浅的语义信息知觉条件下, 具体概念加工过程中都产生了感知运动仿真。本研究的发现弥补了知觉符号理论未对第二语言中的感知运动仿真提出针对性预测的不足, 表明感知运动仿真具有一定的跨语言稳定性。同时, 具体概念加工中的感知运动仿真不受空间信息和语义信息的调节, 这表明感知运动仿真能在一定程度上自动化产生。     

言语理解中的知觉符号表征与命题符号表征

采用移动窗口技术探讨言语理解中信息表征的方式。被试为华南师范大学本科生96名。实验材料按照探测图画中物体的形状跟先前阅读的句子中描述的物体的隐含形状的关系总体上分为两类,一类是匹配版本,一类是不匹配版本。采用相关样本t检验分别对两种条件下图画再认的反应时间和正确率进行统计分析。实验1中被试读完句子以后马上进行图画探测任务,结果表明这时被试头脑中进行的是知觉符号表征。实验2中被试的阅读任务难度增大,结果表明这时被试头脑中进行的是命题符号表征。实验3中被试阅读的关键信息进入长时记忆以后再进行图画探测任务,结果表明这时被试头脑中进行的也是命题符号表征。总的实验结果表明言语理解中既存在知觉符号表征,也存在命题符号表征,知觉符号表征是信息表征的一种早期状态,人类头脑中最终的信息表征形式主要是命题符号表征。