共查询到19条相似文献，搜索用时 46 毫秒
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《逻辑学研究》2013,(1):84-84
《逻辑学研究》是中山大学和中国逻辑学会主办,由教育部高等院校人文社会科学重点研究基地中山大学逻辑与认知研究所承办的学术刊物,旨在积极推动我国逻辑学及相关学科的学术研究水平,增进海内外逻辑学及相关领域学术同行的交流。《逻辑学研究》是当前我国在逻辑学领域内唯一正式出版的专业刊物,采用中英双语发表论文。《逻辑学研究》目前为季刊,逢每季度第三个月的18日出版。自2011年起,中英文分开隔期出版。《逻辑学研究》征稿的内容将主要包括下述方向：符号逻辑、非形式逻辑、逻辑与哲学、逻辑与认知、逻辑与语言、逻辑与文化等。《逻辑学研究》不但欢迎原创的高水平的逻辑学研究论文,而且提倡逻辑学与其它学科的交往互动;不但主张对逻辑学的各传统基本领域如数理逻辑、数学基础、逻辑哲学、中外逻辑史等展开深入研究;也欢迎对哲学逻辑各分支的探究,以及有关人工智能逻辑、归纳逻辑、语言逻辑、非形式逻辑等各方面的工作。不但关注逻辑学在认知科学、数学、计算机科学、法律推理、决策理论等相关学科中的应用;也探究逻辑学与认识论、语言和心灵哲学、符号学等领域的沟通,同时还欢迎对逻辑学与思维方式、逻辑与文化及社会的关系等方面具有真知灼见的思考。 相似文献
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《逻辑学研究》2013,(2):F0003-F0003
《逻辑学研究》是中山大学和中国逻辑学会主办,由教育部高等院校人文社会科学重点研究基地中山大学逻辑与认知研究所承办的学术刊物,旨在积极推动我国逻辑学及相关学科的学术研究水平,增进海内外逻辑学及相关领域学术同行的交流。《逻辑学研究》是当前我国在逻辑学领域内唯一正式出版的专业刊物,采用中英双语发表论文。《逻辑学研究》目前为季刊,逢每季度第三个月的18日出版。自2011年起,中英文分开隔期出版。《逻辑学研究》征稿的内容将主要包括下述方向：符号逻辑、非形式逻辑、逻辑与哲学、逻辑与认知、逻辑与语言、逻辑与文化等。《逻辑学研究》不但欢迎原创的高水平的逻辑学研究论文,而且提倡逻辑学与其它学科的交往互动;不但主张对逻辑学的各传统基本领域如数理逻辑、数学基础、逻辑哲学、 相似文献
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Ema Sullivan‐Bissett 《European Journal of Philosophy》2017,25(3):721-731
If belief has an aim by being a (quasi) intentional activity, then it ought to be the case that the aim of belief can be weighed against other aims one might have. However, this is not so with the putative truth aim of belief: from the first‐person perspective, one can only be motivated by truth considerations in deliberation over what to believe (exclusivity). From this perspective then, the aim cannot be weighed. This problem is captured by David Owens's Exclusivity Objection to belief having an aim (2003). Conor McHugh (2012; 2013) has responded to this problem by denying the phenomenon of exclusivity and replacing it with something weaker: demandingness. If deliberation over what to believe is characterised by demandingness and not exclusivity, this allows for the requisite weighing of the truth aim. I argue against such a move by suggesting that where non‐evidential considerations play a role in affecting what we believe, these considerations merely change the standards required for believing in a particular context, they do not provide non‐evidential reasons for forming or withholding belief, which are considered as such from the deliberative perspective. Exclusivity thus remains, and so too does Owens's objection. 相似文献
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Leonard Kahn 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2012,15(5):631-646
Rule consequentialism (RC) holds that the rightness and wrongness of actions is determined by an ideal moral code, i.e., the set of rules whose internalization would have the best consequences. But just how many moral codes are there supposed to be? Absolute RC holds that there is a single morally ideal code for everyone, while Relative RC holds that there are different codes for different groups or individuals. I argue that Relative RC better meets the test of reflective equilibrium than Absolute RC. In particular, I contend that Relative RC is superior because it accommodates our convictions about costless benefits. Some have charged that Relative RC threatens our convictions about the generality of moral codes and that it leads inevitably to what Brad Hooker calls “runaway relativism.” I argue that Relative RC has principled reasons for stopping this imagined slide down the slippery slope. 相似文献