Human Becoming: Cognitive and Moral Enhancement Inside the Imago Dei Narrative

Abstract

With advancements in human enhancement technologies and sciences, the reality of moral/cognitive enhancements is close upon us. In light of recent advances in the fields of cognitive science of religion (CSR), neurotheology and philosophy of technology this paper follows the contemporary neuroethics debate on the subject of moral bioenhancement and engages it inside an imago Dei narrative. To explore this possibility we first establish some major points in the contemporary imago Dei debate, especially the substantial and relational aspect and some of its important interpretations. We then move to an exploration of the very possibility of moral/cognitive bioenhancement, as well as some concrete pitfalls and opportunities, inside the imago Dei narrative. Lastly, we try to portray a wider theological picture in which we engage humanity as both sacred and technological being living in a dynamic cosmic environment we are called to sanctify through the election offered to us by the Reedemer. To establish this we contemplate on the relationship between our eschatological fulfillment, the process of theosis, and the being and role of technology itself.     

Modal Personhood and Moral Status: A Reply to Kagan's Proposal

Kagan argues that human beings who are neither persons nor even potential persons — if their impairment is independent of genetic constitution — are modal persons: individuals who might have been persons. Moreover, he proposes a view according to which both (actual) personhood and modal personhood are sufficient for counting more, morally, than nonhuman animals. In response to this proposal, I raise one relatively minor concern about Kagan's reasoning — that he judges too quickly that insentient beings can have interests — before engaging the appeal to modal personhood. I challenge the thesis that modal personhood is relevant to one's moral status, first, by way of analogy to a kicker who misses a field goal though he might have made it; second, by casting doubt on implications for two impaired infants (only one of whom might have been a person); and, finally, by examining implications for dogs who would count as modal persons when genetic enhancements are capable of transforming them into persons.     

Moral Enhancement

abstract   Opponents of biomedical enhancement often claim that, even if such enhancement would benefit the enhanced, it would harm others. But this objection looks unpersuasive when the enhancement in question is a moral enhancement — an enhancement that will expectably leave the enhanced person with morally better motives than she had previously. In this article I (1) describe one type of psychological alteration that would plausibly qualify as a moral enhancement, (2) argue that we will, in the medium-term future, probably be able to induce such alterations via biomedical intervention, and (3) defend future engagement in such moral enhancements against possible objections. My aim is to present this kind of moral enhancement as a counter-example to the view that biomedical enhancement is always morally impermissible.     

Moral Enhancement and Mental Freedom

Promotion of pro‐social attitudes and moral behaviour is a crucial and challenging task for social orders. As traditional ways such as moral education have some, but apparently and unfortunately only limited effect, some authors have suggested employing biomedical means such as pharmaceuticals or electrical stimulation of the brain to alter individual psychologies in a more direct way — moral bioenhancement. One of the salient questions in the nascent ethical debate concerns the impact of such interventions on human freedom. Advocates argue that moral bioenhancements do not pose a serious threat to freedom. This contention, however, is based on an overly narrow, if not impoverished, sense of freedom, which comprises only freedom of action and freedom of will. Mind‐altering interventions primarily affect another sense of freedom: freedom of mind, a concept that has not received much attention although it should rank among the most important legal and political freedoms. The article introduces three senses of mental freedom potentially infringed upon by moral bioenhancement and places it in a broader perspective. Ignorance of mental freedom has far‐ranging consequences for the shape of the political and legal order at large. As many advocates are apparently not aware of the freedoms they seek to undermine, their calls for moral enhancement programmes are dangerously premature.     

Cognitive Enhancement and the Value of Cognitive Achievement

Cognitive enhancement has an increasingly wider influence on our life. The main issue that concerns epistemologists is what its epistemological implications are. Adam Carter and Duncan Pritchard argue that cognitive enhancement improves cognitive achievement, but this view faces axiological objections. A worry exists that cognitive enhancement undermines achievements and erodes intellectual character. Crucially, two parties seem to talk past each other because the nature of cognitive enhancement and the value of cognitive enhancement are not clearly distinguished. To end the stand‐off between the two parties, I take insight from Gwen Bradford’s work and argue that, other things being equal, cognitive enhancement either decreases the value of cognitive achievement or undermines cognitive achievement. In the face of this threat, I further submit that we could learn to live with cognitive enhancement in an integrated way so that the lost value can be restored.     

The Perils of Cognitive Enhancement and the Urgent Imperative to Enhance the Moral Character of Humanity

abstract   As history shows, some human beings are capable of acting very immorally. ¹ Technological advance and consequent exponential growth in cognitive power means that even rare evil individuals can act with catastrophic effect. The advance of science makes biological, nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction easier and easier to fabricate and, thus, increases the probability that they will come into the hands of small terrorist groups and deranged individuals. Cognitive enhancement by means of drugs, implants and biological (including genetic) interventions could thus accelerate the advance of science, or its application, and so increase the risk of the development or misuse of weapons of mass destruction. We argue that this is a reason which speaks against the desirability of cognitive enhancement, and the consequent speedier growth of knowledge, if it is not accompanied by an extensive moral enhancement of humankind. We review the possibilities for moral enhancement by biomedical and genetic means and conclude that, though it should be possible in principle, it is in practice probably distant. There is thus a reason not to support cognitive enhancement in the foreseeable future. However, we grant that there are also reasons in its favour, but we do not attempt to settle the balance between these reasons for and against. Rather, we conclude that if research into cognitive enhancement continues, as it is likely to, it must be accompanied by research into moral enhancement.     

A Cognitive Prototype Model of Moral Judgment and Disagreement

Debates about moral judgments have raised questions about the roles of reasoning, culture, and conflict. In response, the cognitive prototype model explains that over time, through training, and as a result of cognitive development, people construct notions of blameworthy and praiseworthy behavior by abstracting out salient properties that lead to an ideal representation of each. These properties are the primary features of moral prototypes and include social context interpretation, intentionality, consent, and outcomes. According to this model, when the properties are uniform and coherent, they depict a promoral or immoral prototype, relative to the orientations of the properties. A promoral prototype is represented by an action that is supported by the culture, intentionally benevolent or other-regarding, consensual, and resulting in positive outcomes. An immoral prototype is an action that is condemned by the culture, intentionally malevolent or self-serving, lacking consent, and resulting in negative outcomes. It is hypothesized that moral prototypes will result in a high level of agreement and require effortless processing. Alternatively, when properties conflict or the situation deviates from the prototype, a nonprototype will result. It is hypothesized that nonprototypical situations will act as a source of moral disagreement and may require more effortful processing.     

Cognitive Enhancement and Academic Misconduct: A Study Exploring Their Frequency and Relationship

We investigated the acceptability and use frequency of cognitive enhancement medication and three different types of academic misconduct (plagiarism, cheating, and falsifying/fabricating data). Data collected from a web-based survey of German university students were used in our analysis. Moral acceptability of cognitive enhancers was relatively low and moderate for academic misconduct. The correlation between these measures was moderately weak. The use frequency of cognitive enhancers was lower than for academic misconduct and was (very) lightly correlated with the occurrences of reported plagiarism and fabrication/falsification. A higher acceptability of each act was associated with a higher use frequency of each act.     

Thinking Without Global Generalisations: A Cognitive Defence of Moral Particularism1

In their article entitled “Ethical Particularism and Patterns”, Frank Jackson, Philip Pettit, and Michael Smith (JPS henceforth) argue that moral particularism is a cognitively implausible theory since it appears to entail the view that one might have a skill that is not grounded in an ability to recognise and represent natural patterns in the world. This charge echoes the complaints of computational theorists of cognition against their embodied cognition counterparts, namely that, theories of cognition that eschew talk of mental representation are implausible qua theories of cognition. In both debates, the cognitive role of generalisation is central to the discussion; however, contrary to the received wisdom, I want to suggest that the dispute is not between generalisation or mental representation on the one hand and no generalisation or mental representation on the other, but rather between what I will call global and local generalisation. Using the dialogue between JPS and Dancy (our paradigm particularist) to frame this discussion, I show that by replacing Dancy's connectionist model for particularist reasoning with a case‐based one, we not only vindicate his response to JPS, but we also gain insight into how it is the global/local distinction rather than the generalisation/no generalisation distinction that divides the two views.     

The Internet as Cognitive Enhancement

Science and Engineering Ethics - The Internet has been identified in human enhancement scholarship as a powerful cognitive enhancement technology. It offers instant access to almost any type of...     

Pharmacological Cognitive Enhancement in Schizophrenia

Cognitive impairments in schizophrenia are common and severe. These impairments are also related to functional disability in schizophrenia. As a result, efforts are underway to enhance cognition in schizophrenia through a variety of pharmacological mechanisms. As part of this effort, a designated research design has been developed for this process, through an extensive consensus and validation effort. This paper reviews the methods for pharmacological cognitive enhancement, as well as previous results of efforts in the pharmacological domains. These domains include cholinergic, noradrenergic, serotonergic, glutamatergic, and GABA-ergic mechanisms. While previous results have not been particularly encouraging, there are many challenges that need to be overcome and many of the reasons for past failures may be due to resolvable issues. It is likely that this will be an area of research that will be developing extensively over the next decade and expanding to other conditions as well.     

Crosswords to Computers: A Critical Review of Popular Approaches to Cognitive Enhancement

Cognitive enhancement strategies have gained recent popularity and have the potential to benefit clinical and non-clinical populations. As technology advances and the number of cognitively healthy adults seeking methods of improving or preserving cognitive functioning grows, the role of electronic (e.g., computer and video game based) cognitive training becomes more relevant and warrants greater scientific scrutiny. This paper serves as a critical review of empirical evaluations of publically available electronic cognitive training programs. Many studies have found that electronic training approaches result in significant improvements in trained cognitive tasks. Fewer studies have demonstrated improvements in untrained tasks within the trained cognitive domain, non-trained cognitive domains, or on measures of everyday function. Successful cognitive training programs will elicit effects that generalize to untrained, practical tasks for extended periods of time. Unfortunately, many studies of electronic cognitive training programs are hindered by methodological limitations such as lack of an adequate control group, long-term follow-up and ecologically valid outcome measures. Despite these limitations, evidence suggests that computerized cognitive training has the potential to positively impact one’s sense of social connectivity and self-efficacy.     

Converging Technologies: A Critical Analysis of Cognitive Enhancement for Public Policy Application

This paper investigates cognitive enhancement, specifically biological cognitive enhancement (BCE), as a converging technology, and its implications for public policy. With an increasing rate of technological advancements, the legal, social, and economic frameworks lag behind the scientific advancements that they support. This lag poses significant challenges for policymakers if it is not dealt with sufficiently within the right analytical context. Therefore, the driving question behind this paper is, “What contingencies inform the advancement of biological cognitive enhancement, and what would society look like under this set of assumptions?” The paper is divided into five components: (1) defining the current policy context for BCEs, (2) analyzing the current social and economic outcomes to BCEs, (3) investigating the context of cost-benefit arguments in relation to BCEs, (4) proposing an analytical model for evaluating contingencies for BCE development, and (5) evaluating a simulated policy, social, technological, and economic context given the contingencies. In order to manage the risk and uncertainty inherent in technological change, BCEs’ drivers must be scrutinized and evaluated.     

Cognitive Enhancement: Methods, Ethics, Regulatory Challenges

Cognitive enhancement takes many and diverse forms. Various methods of cognitive enhancement have implications for the near future. At the same time, these technologies raise a range of ethical issues. For example, they interact with notions of authenticity, the good life, and the role of medicine in our lives. Present and anticipated methods for cognitive enhancement also create challenges for public policy and regulation.     

维护共同利益：医学道德存在的现实基础

我们为什么需要医学道德 ?作为医务人员处理医患关系的行为准则 ,究竟是一种社会的外在要求 ,还是一种与行业生存、发展有关的内在要求 ,或者是两者兼而有之 ?要准确地回答这些问题并不容易 ,这需要我们去探讨医学道德的本质和存在的现实基础。搞清楚这些问题 ,或许能帮助我们解决在临床医疗道德实践中碰到的各种难题和困惑。1　临床医学道德实践中产生的问题在处理医患关系的矛盾和冲突时 ,社会和医疗管理部门会对医务人员提出这样或那样的道德要求。对此 ,有人常常会问 ,为什么在医患关系中总是要强调维护病人的利益 ?医生是一种职业 ,还…     

Genetic Enhancement and Moral Attitudes Toward the Given

Several authors, including Michael Sandel, distinguish between two different attitudes toward nature: mastery and giftedness. Giftedness is the superior attitude, Sandel argues, because it better accords with the values of humility, responsibility, and solidarity. And giftedness, in combination with these values, provides a rational basis for opposing the employment of genetic enhancement. Against this, I argue that talents and genetic endowment are more plausibly viewed as undeserved, that not everything undeserved is a gift, and that even if talents and endowment were gifts, this would not support a prohibition against pursuing genetic enhancement.