When it's not easy to do the right thing: Developmental changes in understanding cost drive evaluations of moral praiseworthiness

Recent work identified a shift in judgments of moral praiseworthiness that occurs late in development: adults recognize the virtue of moral actions that involve resolving an inner conflict between moral desires and selfish desires. Children, in contrast, praise agents who do the right thing in the absence of inner conflict. This finding stands in contrast with other work showing that children incorporate notions of cost and effort into their social reasoning. Using a modified version of Starmans and Bloom's (2016) vignettes, we show that understanding the virtue of costly moral action precedes understanding the virtue of resolving inner conflict. In two studies (N = 192 children, range = 4.00–9.95 years; and N = 193 adults), we contrasted a character who paid a personal cost (psychological in Study 1, physical in Study 2) to perform a moral action with another who acted morally without paying a cost. We found a developmental progression; 8- and 9-year-old children and adults recognized the praiseworthiness of moral actions that are psychologically or physically costly. Six- and 7-year-old children only recognized the praiseworthiness of moral actions that are physically costly, but not actions that are psychologically costly. Moreover, neither adults nor children inferred that paying a cost to act morally required having a moral desire or resolving inner conflict. These results suggest that both adults and children conceptualize obligation as a direct motivational force on actions. They further suggest that costly choice—a hallmark of moral agency—is implicated in judgments of praiseworthiness early in development.     

学龄前儿童社会善念理解的发展与心理理论的关系

本文探究了4~6岁儿童社会善念理解的发展及其与心理理论的关系。研究测量了100名4~6岁儿童的社会善念理解、心理理论、亲社会性和执行功能。结果发现, 随着年龄增长, 儿童愈加在社会评价和朋友偏好上倾向于社会善念人物, 并且此社会善念理解能力与心理理论的发展呈显著正相关, 且此相关在控制了年龄、执行功能及亲社会性后依然稳定存在, 但社会善念理解与亲社会性并不相关。此结果表明, 心理理论可能对社会善念理解的发展有重要作用。     

Children’s causal reasoning: Counterfactual thinking occurs for ‘negative’ outcomes only

Harris, German and Mills (Children’s use of counterfactual thinking in causal reasoning. Cognition, 61 (1996), 223–259), following Mackie, argue that children make explicit use of counterfactual thinking in arriving at causal judgments. They showed that children as young as 3, in explaining simple mishap events, made reference to courses of action that a protagonist had rejected, when that course of action would have prevented the observed outcome. It is hypothesized here that such counterfactual thinking might have been invoked by the ‘negative’ mishaps rather than as part of the causal reasoning process. Although the generation of counterfactuals in explanation was replicated using mishap outcomes such as those used by Harris et al., counterfactual thinking was not evident in children’s explanations of ‘positive’ outcomes. These results undermine the view that a counterfactual thinking process, as indexed by reference to possible actions rejected by a protagonist, is necessary for causal reasoning. Alternative characterizations of the relationship between causals and counterfactuals are discussed.     

Chinese Children's Moral Evaluation of Lies and Truths-Roles of Context and Parental Individualism-Collectivism Tendencies

The present study examined Chinese children's moral evaluations of truths and lies about one's own pro-social acts. Children ages 7, 9, and 11 were read vignettes in which a protagonist performs a good deed and is asked about it by a teacher, either in front of the class or in private. In response, the protagonist either tells a modest lie, which is highly valued by the Chinese culture, or tells an immodest truth, which violates the Chinese cultural norms about modesty. Children were asked to identify whether the protagonist's statement was the truth or a lie, and to evaluate how 'good' or 'bad' the statement was. Chinese children rated modest lies more positively than immodest truths, with this effect becoming more pronounced with age. Rural Chinese children and those with at least one nonprofessional parent rated immodest truths less positively when they were told in public rather than in private. Furthermore, Chinese children of parents with high collectivism scores valued modest lies more than did children of parents with low collectivism scores. These findings suggest that both macro- and micro-cultural factors contribute significantly to children's moral understanding of truth and lie telling.     

Evaluations Versus Expectations: Children's Divergent Beliefs About Resource Distribution

Past research reveals a tension between children's preferences for egalitarianism and ingroup favoritism when distributing resources to others. Here we investigate how children's evaluations and expectations of others' behaviors compare. Four‐ to 10‐year‐old children viewed events where individuals from two different groups distributed resources to their own group, to the other group, or equally across groups. Groups were described within a context of intergroup competition over scarce resources. In the Evaluation condition, children were asked to evaluate which resource distribution actions were nicer. In the Expectation condition, children were asked to predict which events were more likely to occur. With age, children's evaluations and expectations of others' actions diverged: Children evaluated egalitarian actions as nicer yet expected others to behave in ways that benefit their own group. Thus, children's evaluations about the way human social actors should behave do not mirror their expectations concerning those individuals' actions.     

Children over-imitate adults and peers more than puppets

Researchers commonly use puppets in development science. Amongst other things, puppets are employed to reduce social hierarchies between child participants and adult experimenters akin to peer interactions. However, it remains controversial whether children treat puppets like real-world social partners in these settings. This study investigated children's imitation of causally irrelevant actions (i.e., over-imitation) performed by puppet, adult, or child models. Seventy-two German children (Age_Range = 4.6–6.5 years; 36 girls) from urban, socioeconomically diverse backgrounds observed a model retrieving stickers from reward containers. The model performed causally irrelevant actions either in contact with the reward container or not. Children were more likely to over-imitate adults’ and peers’ actions as compared to puppets’ actions. Across models, they copied contact actions more than no-contact actions. While children imitate causally irrelevant actions from puppet models to some extent, their social learning from puppets does not necessarily match their social learning from real-world social agents, such as children or adults.

Research Highlights

• We examined children's over-imitation from adult, child, and puppet models to validate puppetry as an approach to simulate non-hierarchical interactions.
• Children imitated adults and child models at slightly higher rates than puppets.
• This effect was present regardless of whether the irrelevant actions involved physical contact to the reward container or not.
• In our study children's social learning from puppets does not match their social learning from human models.

     

Children's reasoning about the self‐presentational consequences of apologies and excuses following rule violations

The accounts given by those who have violated a rule are likely to have important self‐presentational consequences, potentially reducing the negative impact of the breach on social evaluations of transgressors. However, little is known about young children's self‐presentational reasoning about such accounts. In the present study, a sample of 120 4‐ to 9‐year‐olds responded to rule violation stories where the transgressor uses either an apology, an excuse, or no account. Results showed that whereas children rated both account types similarly in terms of their impact on punishment consequences, even the youngest saw apologies as leading to significantly more positive social evaluation than excuses. Correspondingly, children were more likely to identify prosocial motives for apologies than for excuses, and more likely to identify self‐protective motives for excuses than for apologies. Explicit references to self‐presentational motives when explaining the accounts increased significantly with age, and were more likely following social‐conventional rather than moral rule violations.     

The accidental transgressor: morally-relevant theory of mind

To test young children’s false belief theory of mind in a morally relevant context, two experiments were conducted. In Experiment 1, children (N = 162) at 3.5, 5.5, and 7.5 years of age were administered three tasks: prototypic moral transgression task, false belief theory of mind task (ToM), and an “accidental transgressor” task, which measured a morally-relevant false belief theory of mind (MoToM). Children who did not pass false belief ToM were more likely to attribute negative intentions to an accidental transgressor than children who passed false belief ToM, and to use moral reasons when blaming the accidental transgressor. In Experiment 2, children (N = 46) who did not pass false belief ToM viewed it as more acceptable to punish the accidental transgressor than did participants who passed false belief ToM. Findings are discussed in light of research on the emergence of moral judgment and theory of mind.     

Variations in Level of Moral Judgment as a Function of Type of Dilemma and Moral Choice

This study compares the predictive power of two models of moral judgment: (a) Kohlberg's model, which predicts stage consistency across varying content, and (b) a model that predicts variations in stage as a function of complex interactions between people and social contexts. Forty university students were asked to make and justify choices on three moral dilemmas—a dilemma involving the sale of defective merchandise (selling dilemma) and two dilemmas from Kohlberg's test of moral judgment. Half the participants made hypothetical choices on the selling dilemma; the other half were offered a selfish incentive—money—for concealing the defects in the merchandise. In support of the interactional model, (a) participants scored lower on the selling dilemma than on Kohlberg's test, (b) the monetary incentive affected moral choices, (c) participants justified the choice to conceal defects in the merchandise with significantly lower stage moral judgments than they invoked in support of the decision to disclose its defects, and (d) participants who upheld the choice to disclose supported it with higher stage justifications than those who rejected it. Surprisingly, however, participants who stood to make money disclosed more about the defects in the article and charged less than participants who did not.     

Children's counterfactual inferences about long and short causal chains

Recent findings on counterfactual reasoning in children have led to the claim that children's developing capacities in the domain of ‘theory of mind’ might reflect the emergence of the ability to engage in counterfactual thinking over the preschool period (e.g. Riggs, Peterson, Robinson & Mitchell, 1998 ). In the study reported here, groups of 3- and 4-year old children were presented with stories describing causal chains of several events, and asked counterfactual thinking tasks involving changes to different points in the chain. The ability to draw successful counterfactual inferences depended strongly on the inferential length of the problem, and the age of the children; while 3-year-olds performed above chance on short inference counterfactuals, they performed below chance on problems involving longer inference chains. Four-year-old children were above chance on all problems. Moreover, it was found that while success on longer chain inference problems was significantly correlated with the ability to pass tests of standard false belief, there was no such relationship for short inference problems, which were significantly easier than false belief problems. These results are discussed in terms of the developmental relationships between causal knowledge, counterfactual thinking and calculating the contents of mental states.     

Evaluations of moral and conventional intergroup transgressions

To investigate children's understanding of intergroup transgressions, children (3–8 years, N = 84) evaluated moral and conventional transgressions that occurred among members of the same gender group (ingroup) or members of different gender groups (outgroup). All participants judged moral transgressions to be more wrong than conventional transgressions. However, when asked to make a judgment after being told an authority figure did not see the transgression, younger participants still judged that moral violations were less acceptable than conventional transgressions, but judged both moral and conventional transgressions with an outgroup victim as more acceptable than the corresponding transgressions with an ingroup victim. Older children did not demonstrate the same ingroup bias; rather they focused only on the domain of the transgressions. The results demonstrate the impact intergroup information has on children's evaluations about both moral and conventional transgressions.     

The effect of group status on children's hierarchy-reinforcing beliefs

Members of advantaged groups are more likely than members of disadvantaged groups to think, feel, and behave in ways that reinforce their group's position within the hierarchy. This study examined how children's status within a group-based hierarchy shapes their beliefs about the hierarchy and the groups that comprise it in ways that reinforce the hierarchy. To do this, we randomly assigned children (4–8 years; N = 123; 75 female, 48 male; 21 Asian, 9 Black, 21 Latino/a, 1 Middle-Eastern/North-African, 14 multiracial, 41 White, 16 not-specified) to novel groups that differed in social status (advantaged, disadvantaged, neutral third-party) and assessed their beliefs about the hierarchy. Across five separate assessments, advantaged-group children were more likely to judge the hierarchy to be fair, generalizable, and wrong to challenge and were more likely to hold biased intergroup attitudes and exclude disadvantaged group members. In addition, with age, children in both the advantaged- and disadvantaged-groups became more likely to see membership in their own group as inherited, while at the same time expecting group-relevant behaviors to be determined more by the environment. With age, children also judged the hierarchy to be more unfair and expected the hierarchy to generalize across contexts. These findings provide novel insights into how children's position within hierarchies can contribute to the formation of hierarchy-reinforcing beliefs.

Research Highlights

• A total of 123 4–8-year-olds were assigned to advantaged, disadvantaged, and third-party groups within a hierarchy and were assessed on seven hierarchy-reinforcing beliefs about the hierarchy.
• Advantaged children were more likely to say the hierarchy was fair, generalizable, and wrong to challenge and to hold intergroup biases favoring advantaged group members.
• With age, advantaged- and disadvantaged-group children held more essentialist beliefs about membership in their own group, but not the behaviors associated with their group.
• Results suggest that advantaged group status can shape how children perceive and respond to the hierarchies they are embedded within.

     

It could have been better: The effects of counterfactual communication on impression formation

While research on counterfactuals has closely examined the psychological antecedents and consequences of thinking counterfactually (imagining alternatives to past events), little is known about the effects of counterfactual communication, and in particular, how such thoughts are interpreted by others. In this paper, I argue that counterfactual communication differentially affects impressions formed of speakers by receivers depending on the general content of the counterfactual. Findings from an archival study and a scenario study demonstrated convergent results: Individuals who communicated upward counterfactuals (thoughts of how things could have been better) were more positively perceived by receivers than were individuals who communicated downward counterfactuals (thoughts of how things could have been worse). This difference stemmed from an enhancement effect of upward counterfactuals. Further analysis revealed that the relationship between counterfactual communication and impression formation was mediated by receivers' perceptions of the extent to which speakers took responsibility for their actions. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Japanese and British Children's Understanding of the Social Function of Pretend Crying

The purpose of this study was to investigate cross-cultural differences in children's understanding of pretend crying. Five- and 6-year-olds from Japan and the United Kingdom (N = 71) heard two hypothetical stories in which the protagonist of each story pretended to cry in front of another person. Children were asked about the appearance–reality distinction of pretend crying, the other character's thoughts and behavior, and the children's own moral judgment of pretend crying. Cultural differences were found in their understanding of the social function of pretend crying. Japanese children judged that pretend crying elicited another's concern and prosocial behavior more than British children. There were no significant differences in appearance–reality distinction or moral judgments between Japanese and British children. All participants successfully discriminated between pretend crying and real crying, and most participants judged pretend crying as “not good” behavior. These results suggested that Japanese children might be more expected to be sensitive to others’ feelings, and that such cultural differences in communication and socialization lead to different patterns in expectations of the social consequences of pretend crying.     

Fostering Children’s Reasoning about Disagreements through an Inquiry-based Curriculum

ABSTRACT

We investigated how young children evaluate disagreements between two people and whether formal education affects this capacity. We compared 120 first graders tested during the 2014–2015 academic year, who received a direct instruction-based curriculum, with 112 first graders tested in the same school system during the 2016–2017 academic year, who received an inquiry-based curriculum. All children were given a belief reasoning task that tested their ability to evaluate disagreements about matters of fact, matters of interpretation, and matters of preference. Children’s evaluations of disagreements about interpretations or preferences did not differ depending on curriculum. Children who received an inquiry-based curriculum were more likely to resolve disagreements concerning facts correctly than children who received a direct instruction-based curriculum. When asked to justify their responses to disagreements about facts, children who received the inquiry-based curriculum relied more on an examination of the state of the world. We suggest that an inquiry-based curriculum fosters a greater appreciation for how first-hand experiences can create knowledge.     

Counterfactual thinking and confidence in blackjack: A test of the counterfactual inflation hypothesis

This research tests the idea that repeatedly generating counterfactual thoughts in response to recurring events can lead to impairments in memory for actual outcomes (i.e., counterfactual inflation hypothesis). Participants (N = 56) played 40 games of blackjack and listed their thoughts after each win. They were instructed to list evaluative counterfactuals, reflective counterfactuals, or any thoughts that came to mind following each loss. Because reflective counterfactuals focus only on the alternatives to reality, and not in addition to reality (like evaluative counterfactuals), they were expected to lead to the greatest degree of overestimations of performance and confidence for future blackjack playing. The results confirmed this hypothesis, and also demonstrated that the relationship between thought-listing instructions and confidence for the future was mediated by overestimations of performance. Thus, repeatedly generating reflective counterfactual thoughts appears to lead to a special case of imagination inflation with dysfunctional implications for future confidence and risk-taking.     

3～5岁幼儿反事实思维的发展研究

该研究采用结果和前提反事实推理任务,选取58名3-5岁幼儿为被试,考察了其反事实思维能力的发展。结果表明:1.3岁儿童在结果反事实推理中的得分显著低于4岁和5岁儿童,而4岁和5岁儿童的得分并不存在显著差异;2.幼儿的前提反事实推理因结构和方向不同而表现出不同的年龄变化趋势;3.幼儿产生的上行和下行反事实论断之间不存在显著差异。如成人一样,幼儿较少产生减法反事实。     

Vocabulary and automatic attention: The relation between novel words and gaze dynamics in noun generalization

Words direct visual attention in infants, children, and adults, presumably by activating representations of referents that then direct attention to matching stimuli in the visual scene. Novel, unknown, words have also been shown to direct attention, likely via the activation of more general representations of naming events. To examine the critical issue of how novel words and visual attention interact to support word learning we coded frame-by-frame the gaze of 17- to 31-month-old children (n = 66, 38 females) while generalizing novel nouns. We replicate prior findings of more attention to shape when generalizing novel nouns, and a relation to vocabulary development. However, we also find that following a naming event, children who produce fewer nouns take longer to look at the objects they eventually select and make more transitions between objects before making a generalization decision. Children who produce more nouns look to the objects they eventually select more quickly following the naming event and make fewer looking transitions. We discuss these findings in the context of prior proposals regarding children's few-shot category learning, and a developmental cascade of multiple perceptual, cognitive, and word-learning processes that may operate in cases of both typical development and language delay.

Research Highlights

• Examined how novel words guide visual attention by coding frame-by-frame where children look when asked to generalize novel names.
• Gaze patterns differed with vocabulary size: children with smaller vocabularies attended to generalization targets more slowly and did more comparison than those with larger vocabularies.
• Demonstrates a relationship between vocabulary size and attention to object properties during naming.
• This work has implications for looking-based tests of early cognition, and our understanding of children's few-shot category learning.

     

Young Chinese children's beliefs about the implications of subtypes of social withdrawal: A first look at social avoidance

The goal of this study was to examine young Chinese children's beliefs about the implications of different subtypes of social withdrawal (e.g., shyness, unsociability), including for the first time, social avoidance. Participants were 133 children in kindergarten (n = 58, M_age = 70.85 months) and grade 1 (n = 75, M_age = 83.49 months). Children were presented with vignettes describing hypothetical peers displaying shy, unsociable, avoidant, and socially competent behaviours and were then asked a series of questions to assess their beliefs about the implications of these different behaviours. Young children made distinctions between social withdrawal subtypes in terms of underlying motivations and emotions. Children also appeared to hold differential beliefs about the implications of different forms of social withdrawal: Of note, they anticipated that socially avoidant peers would experience the most negative outcomes. These findings provide some of the first evidence to suggest that social avoidance represents a distinct form of social withdrawal among young Chinese children. Results are discussed in terms of the importance of distinguishing between different subtypes of social withdrawal in Chinese culture.     

Predictors of the Peer Acceptance of Children with Diabetes: Social Behavior and Disease Severity

Objective. Investigated illness severity (medical control, disease impact, obviousness) and social behavior style as predictors of the peer acceptance of children with diabetes. Method. Sixty-five children (10–12.5 years old) with diabetes and their parents, teachers, and physicians participated. Physician ratings and laboratory tests indicated medical control. Parents and children reported disease impact and teachers rated disease obviousness. Children and teachers rated social behavior. Teachers reported peer acceptance. Results. Consistent with hypotheses, favorable social behavior positively predicted acceptance and disease impact negatively predicted acceptance; medical control did not relate to acceptance. Disease obviousness and social behavior interacted to predict acceptance. Children with more obvious disease were not stigmatized by unfavorable social behavior. Conclusions. Aspects of disease severity and social behavior influence peer acceptance and may be appropriate predictors and targets for remediation of peer problems.