Analytic Confidence and Political Decision‐Making: Theoretical Principles and Experimental Evidence From National Security Professionals

When making decisions under uncertainty, it is important to distinguish between the probability that a judgment is true and the confidence analysts possess in drawing their conclusions. Yet analysts and decision‐makers often struggle to define “confidence” in this context, and many ways that scholars use this term do not necessarily facilitate decision‐making under uncertainty. To help resolve this confusion, we argue for disaggregating analytic confidence along three dimensions: reliability of available evidence, range of reasonable opinion, and responsiveness to new information. After explaining how these attributes hold different implications for decision‐making in principle, we present survey experiments examining how analysts and decision‐makers employ these ideas in practice. Our first experiment found that each conception of confidence distinctively influenced national security professionals' evaluations of high‐stakes decisions. Our second experiment showed that inexperienced assessors of uncertainty could consistently discriminate among our conceptions of confidence when making political forecasts. We focus on national security, where debates about defining “confidence levels” have clear practical implications. But our theoretical framework generalizes to nearly any area of political decision‐making, and our empirical results provide encouraging evidence that analysts and decision‐makers can grasp these abstract elements of uncertainty.     

Moral Hazard in Pediatrics

“Moral hazard” is a term familiar in economics and business ethics that illuminates why rational parties sometimes choose decisions with bad moral outcomes without necessarily intending to behave selfishly or immorally. The term is not generally used in medical ethics. Decision makers such as parents and physicians generally do not use the concept or the word in evaluating ethical dilemmas. They may not even be aware of the precise nature of the moral hazard problem they are experiencing, beyond a general concern for the patient's seemingly excessive burden. This article brings the language and logic of moral hazard to pediatrics. The concept reminds us that decision makers in this context are often not the primary party affected by their decisions. It appraises the full scope of risk at issue when decision makers decide on behalf of others and leads us to separate, respect, and prioritize the interests of affected parties.     

认知闭合需要、框架效应与决策偏好

在带有模糊性的决策情境中,决策者个人的认知特征会对其判断决策产生重要影响。通过实验的方法,考察了认知闭合需要和特征框架效应对个体决策偏好的影响。93名工商管理硕士（MBA）参与了实验,研究的结果支持了本研究的3个假设,即认知闭合需要与特征框架效应不仅对被试的决策偏好存在显著的影响,而且二者还存在显著的交互作用。具体来说,研究发现,在模糊情境中：高认知闭合需要的被试偏好于立刻做出决策,而低认知闭合需要的被试偏好于暂缓做出决策;接收到正向框架信息的被试偏好于立刻做出决策,而接收到负向框架信息的被试偏好于暂缓做出决策;认知闭合需要与特征框架对被试的决策偏好还存在显著的交互作用。研究结论为根据个体认知闭合需要的水平来选拔决策者、利用框架效应来影响个体的信息加工方式进而提高决策质量提供了理论依据     

Consumers Object to Algorithms Making Morally Relevant Tradeoffs Because of Algorithms’ Consequentialist Decision Strategies

Why do consumers embrace some algorithms and find others objectionable? The moral relevance of the domain in which an algorithm operates plays a role. The authors find that consumers believe that algorithms are more likely to use maximization (i.e., attempting to maximize some measured outcome) as a decision-making strategy than human decision makers (Study 1). Consumers find this consequentialist decision strategy to be objectionable in morally relevant tradeoffs and disapprove of algorithms making morally relevant tradeoffs as a result (Studies 2, 3a, & 3b). Consumers also object to human employees making morally relevant tradeoffs when they are trained to make decisions by maximizing outcomes, consistent with the notion that their objections to algorithmic decision makers stem from concerns about maximization (Study 4). The results provide insight into why consumers object to some consumer relevant algorithms while adopting others.     

Single-process versus multiple-strategy models of decision making: Evidence from an information intrusion paradigm

When decision makers are confronted with different problems and situations, do they use a uniform mechanism as assumed by single-process models (SPMs) or do they choose adaptively from a set of available decision strategies as multiple-strategy models (MSMs) imply? Both frameworks of decision making have gathered a lot of support, but only rarely have they been contrasted with each other. Employing an information intrusion paradigm for multi-attribute decisions from givens, SPM and MSM predictions on information search, decision outcomes, attention, and confidence judgments were derived and tested against each other in two experiments. The results consistently support the SPM view: Participants seemingly using a “take-the-best” (TTB) strategy do not ignore TTB-irrelevant information as MSMs would predict, but adapt the amount of information searched, choose alternative choice options, and show varying confidence judgments contingent on the quality of the “irrelevant” information. The uniformity of these findings underlines the adequacy of the novel information intrusion paradigm and comprehensively promotes the notion of a uniform decision making mechanism as assumed by single-process models.     

决策者角色及相关变量对风险偏好的影响

采用IAT技术测查被试的内隐自尊, 并引入收益和损失两种任务框架, 综合探讨了内隐自尊水平、任务得失框架对自我决策和为他人决策时风险偏好的影响。结果发现：(1)在收益框架下, 被试为他人决策时更冒险, 而在损失框架下, 为自我和他人决策的风险偏好无显著差异; (2)与为自我决策相比, 低内隐自尊者为他人决策时更冒险, 而高内隐自尊者为自我和他人决策的风险偏好无显著差异; (3)内隐自尊水平与任务框架的交互作用及内隐自尊水平、任务框架和决策者角色之间的三级交互作用均不显著。依据相关的理论和发现对这种结果进行了分析和讨论。     

Varieties of Epistemic Freedom

When we deliberate about what to do, we appear to be free to decide on different options. Three accounts use ordinary beliefs to explain this apparent freedom—appealing to different types of ‘epistemic freedom’. When an agent has epistemic freedom, her evidence while deliberating does not determine what decision she makes. This ‘epistemic gap’ between her evidence and decision explains why her decision appears free. The varieties of epistemic freedom appealed to might look similar. But there is an important difference. Two rely on an agent's ability to justifiably form beliefs unconstrained by evidence, and identify decisions as beliefs—either beliefs about acts (Velleman) or about decisions (Joyce and Ismael). But, when used to explain apparent freedom, these accounts face serious problems: they imply that agents have epistemic freedom over evidence-based beliefs, and rely on a faulty notion of justification. Underlying these troubles, it turns out that these accounts presuppose an unexplained apparent ability to form different beliefs. A third variety of epistemic freedom uses ignorance conditions instead (Levi and Kapitan). We appear free partly because we're ignorant of what we'll decide. Ignorance-based accounts avoid the above problems, and remain a promising alternative.     

Exploiting the Wisdom of Others to Make Better Decisions: Suspending Judgment Reduces Egocentrism and Increases Accuracy

Although decision makers often consult other people's opinions to improve their decisions, they fail to do so optimally. One main obstacle to incorporating others' opinions efficiently is one's own opinion. We theorize that decision makers could improve their performance by suspending their own judgment. In three studies, participants used others' opinions to estimate uncertain quantities (the caloric value of foods). In the full‐view condition, participants could form independent estimates prior to receiving others' opinions, whereas participants in the blindfold condition could not form prior opinions. We obtained an intriguing blindfold effect. In all studies, the blindfolded participants provided more accurate estimates than did the full‐view participants. Several policy‐capturing measures indicated that the advantage of the blindfolded participants was due to their unbiased weighting of others' opinions. The full‐view participants, in contrast, adhered to their prior opinion and thus failed to exploit the information contained in others' opinions. Moreover, in all three studies, the blindfolded participants were not cognizant of their advantage and expressed less confidence in their estimates than did the full‐view participants. The results are discussed in relation to theories of opinion revision and group decision making. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Do Politicians Take Risks Like the Rest of Us? An Experimental Test of Prospect Theory Under MPs

Political psychologists have been quick to use prospect theory in their work, realizing its potential for explaining decisions under risk. Applying prospect theory to political decision‐making is not without problems, though, and here we address two of these: (1) Does prospect theory actually apply to political decision‐makers, or are politicians unlike the rest of us? (2) Which dimension do politicians use as their reference point when there are multiple dimensions (e.g., votes and policy)? We address both problems in an experiment with a unique sample of Dutch members of parliament as participants. We use well‐known (incentivized) decision situations and newly developed hypothetical political decision‐making scenarios. Our results indicate that politicians’ deviate from expected utility theory in the direction predicted by prospect theory but that these deviations are somewhat smaller than those of other people. Votes appear to be a more important determinant of politicians’ reference point than is policy.     

Lay Perceptions of Selection Decision Aids in US and Non‐US Samples

Understanding why decision makers resist using standardized approaches to employee selection requires understanding basic feelings and beliefs about different approaches for collecting and combining assessment information. This study examines lay perceptions of selection decision aids, using a sample of 418 working adults. Holding constant the attributes measured, participants from the United States perceive holistic integration to be superior to mechanical integration for combining interview scores, as well as for combining test scores. Participants from outside of the United States prefer holistic integration of interview scores, but slightly prefer mechanical integration of test scores.     

心理距离与决策者角色对风险决策的影响

采用改编的I0S量表测量自我与他人的心理距离,在收益和损失情境下,综合探讨了为他人和预测他人决策时心理距离对个体风险偏好的影响.结果发现:(1)与他人心理距离越远,个体决策时越偏好风险,且反应时越短;(2)个体预测他人决策时比为他人决策时更偏好风险,但两者反应时没有显著差异;(3)心理距离与决策者角色存在交互作用,即预测时个体认为远心理距离他人比近心理距离他人更冒险,而为他人决策时两者差异消失;(4)决策角色与决策框架、心理距离与决策框架存在交互作用:在收益框架下,自我他人心理距离较远时个体更偏好风险,且个体预测比为他人决策时更冒险,损失条件下无差异.依据相关理论对这些结果进行了分析讨论.     

The influence of test scores and naturally-occurring pupil characteristics on psychoeducational decision making with children

A computer simulation of psychoeducational decision making was used to study the extent to which the assessment and decision-making process differs for different kinds of students, the extent to which naturally-occurring pupil characteristics (appearance, sex) influence diagnostic outcomes, and the extent to which decision makers perceive different assessment information and pupil characteristics as influencing their decisions. The decision-making process did not differ as a function of differences in referral information. While SES, sex and physical appearance did not affect outcome decisions, the nature of the reason for referral did. Scores on achievement tests, intelligence tests, and the disparity between the two were rated as having the greatest influence on the eligibility, classification, and prognostic decisions that were made. Decision makers said they were not influenced by naturally-occurring pupil characteristics.     

Holistic Information Integration in Child Decision Making

Weighted‐additive (WADD) strategies require decision makers to integrate multiple values weighted by their relevance. From what age can children make choices in line with such a WADD‐strategy? We compare multi‐attribute decisions of children (6–7; 8–10; 11–12‐year‐olds) with adults in an open information‐board environment without pre‐decisional information search. In two experiments, we classify decision strategies based on individual choice patterns and find that in all age groups the majority of participants are users of a WADD‐strategy. Simple decision heuristics such as lexicographic strategies were applied rarely by children and not at all by adults. In two additional follow‐up studies, we further investigate the underlying process of WADD‐application by analysing decision latencies in combination with a retrospective think‐aloud study. Results suggest that children did not apply WADD‐strategies in a deliberate fashion in our experiments. Overall, our findings demonstrate that the ability to make good and quick decisions by holistically integrating information is already present in young children. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Postdecision consolidation in a trend prediction task

To be able to learn from experience it is necessary to correctly apprehend experienced feedback and the situation in which it is provided. The results indicate how post-decision consolidation in complex domains may affect learning. The problem may be particularly pertinent in recurrent decision making where considerable risk is involved. The study explores the changes in aspect (signal) importance from pre- to postdiction as a function of outcome information. By postdiction we mean the remembering of an earlier prediction (cf. Hawkins & Hastie, 1990). Subjects were asked to decide on which of four alternative future price developments would follow a historical price trajectory for different commodities, and to rate the importance of each of the chosen alternative's corresponding aspects. The subjects revealed a bias in their support ratings of aspects--seeing support in aspects that traditionally (by themselves and in many contexts) would be seen as neutral or even counter-indicative of the alternative chosen. After an intermission, the subjects were also given information about what was indicated to be the actual development of the market. One group was told that their decisions were correct (irrespective of what the decisions were), another group that they were incorrect but close, a third group that they were incorrect by far, while a fourth group served as a control. Following this information the subjects were again asked to judge the importance of the aspects for their own prior decision on the most likely future development. The results indicated that outcome feed-back had an effect on post decision restructuring of facts. Subjects in the correct condition showed an average consolidation that increased the support, while the wrong conditions lead to negative consolidation (in retrospect indicating that they never found as much support for their decision in the past as they actually did). Thus, in a choice between consolidating their own initial prediction and the price trajectory they would have to live with, the decision makers consolidated the outcome. Therefore, the results of the study were related to the hindsight bias phenomenon (Fischhoff, 1975) and to Kahneman and Miller's (1986) mutability concept.     

当局者迷,旁观者清?自我-他人决策的理性差异及其机制

生活充满抉择,由于知识经验的局限,人们常需寻求他人建议,抑或直接请他人代己决策.诸多研究探讨了自我决策、向他人建议,以及代他人决策之间的差异.探究这种差异的动因之一在于考察何种条件下的决策更优或更“理性”.以往研究表明,自我决策或他人决策(向他人建议或代他人决策)均有可能更易违背理性决策原则,隐含着他人决策优于自我决策的“当局者迷,旁观者清”这一传统智慧有一定的边界条件.研究者一般从认知(建构水平理论)、情绪(类型和卷入度),以及动机(调节聚焦理论)三种视角对自我-他人决策差异进行解释.本文作者提出基于理由的决策(reason-based account)假设来解释自我-他人决策在理性程度上的差异.未来研究可从决策过程及脑机制上深入考察自我-他人决策差异及其机制.     

Culture and decision‐making: Investigating cultural variations in the East Asian and North American online decision‐making processes

Research in cross‐cultural psychology suggests that East Asians hold holistic thinking styles whereas North Americans hold analytic thinking styles. The present study examines the influence of cultural thinking styles on the online decision‐making processes for Hong Kong Chinese and European Canadians, with and without time constraints. We investigated the online decision‐making processes in terms of (1) information search speed, (2) quantity of information used, and (3) type of information used. Results show that, without time constraints, Hong Kong Chinese, compared to European Canadians, spent less time on decisions and parsed through information more efficiently, and Hong Kong Chinese attended to both important and less important information, whereas European Canadians selectively focused on important information. No cultural differences were found in the quantity of information used. When under time constraints, all cultural variations disappeared. The dynamics of cultural differences and similarities in decision‐making are discussed.     

How formulating implementation plans and remembering past actions facilitate the enactment of effortful decisions

Building on prior research studying effortful decision making and enactment processes (Bagozzi, Dholakia, & Basuroy, 2003; BDB), we identify and provide an in‐depth understanding of two specific self‐regulatory strategies: (1) formulating an implementation plan, and (2) remembering past actions, that decision makers can use in facilitating enactment of effortful decisions. The results of three experiments, in which the decision maker's goal and self‐regulatory strategy were manipulated, showed that for goals that decision makers chose volitionally, the motivational effects of both these strategies lay in increasing levels of proximal implementation‐related variables (implementation intentions, plan completeness, plan enactment, and goal realization) significantly. In contrast, for goals that were assigned to participants, these strategies' motivational effects additionally extended to significantly increasing distal goal‐related variables (goal desire, goal intentions, perceived self‐efficacy, and implementation desires). The theoretical implications of our findings are discussed, and future research opportunities are explored. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Iowa Gambling Task Modified for Military Domain

One key component of optimal military decision making is that the decision maker demonstrates reinforcement learning. The modification of psychological tasks gives insight into understanding how to effectively train military decision makers and how experienced decision makers arrive at optimal or near optimal decisions. We developed a task modeled after the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) to measure military decision making performance. This new task focuses on high stakes and uncertain environments particular to military decision making conditions. Thirty-four U.S. military officers from all branches of service completed the tasks yielding decision data for validation. The new task retains essential characteristics of the foundational task and gives insight into reinforcement learning of military decision makers. Results indicate that the additional metric of regret defines higher performance at a trial-by-trial level, and clustering by multiple metrics defines high performance groups.