How is Recalcitrant Emotion Possible?

A recalcitrant emotion is an emotion that we experience despite a judgment that seems to conflict with it. Having been bitten by a dog in her childhood, Jane cannot shake her fear of dogs, including Fido, the cute little puppy that she knows to be in no way dangerous. There is something puzzling about recalcitrant emotions, which appear to defy the putatively robust connection between emotions and judgments. If Jane really believes that Fido cannot harm her, what is she afraid of? This article seeks to show how recalcitrant emotion is possible. I argue that reductive theories that identify emotions with judgments, desires, or some combination thereof, cannot explain the possibility of emotional irrationality without contradiction. I then show that the appeal to sui generis attitudes also fails to solve the puzzle of recalcitrant emotions, and diagnose this failure as stemming from a misleading analogy between emotions and perceptions, and in particular, between recalcitrant emotions and perceptual illusions. The solution can be found in a different analogy: between emotions and actions; more specifically, between recalcitrant emotions and weakness of the will, akrasia. Like akratic actions, recalcitrant emotions entail responding to reasons, but to inferior reasons. Irrational but non-contradictory emotions are possible just as weakness of will is possible.     

The Formation of Attitudes Toward New Immigrant Groups1

People often receive information about new immigrant groups prior to any direct contact with group members. However, it is not clear how this information shapes attitudes toward the groups. To explore this issue, 204 subjects were told about an unknown immigrant group that was presented as high or low in personal relevance. Subjects were then given positive or negative consensus information about the emotions that group members elicit from others, group members' personality traits, and group members' values. As expected, results indicated that the presentation of positive information about emotional reactions, personality traits, and values caused attitudes to be more favorable than did the presentation of negative information. Importantly, however, the combined impact of the emotion and personality trait information depended on whether the group was perceived to be of high or low personal relevance. Specifically, when the information about emotions and personality traits was similarly valanced (i.e., both were positive or both were negative), attitudes toward the group tended to be less favorable in the high personal relevance condition than in the low personal relevance condition. In contrast, when mixed information was presented (i.e., positive emotions and negative personality traits or negative emotions and positive personality traits), attitudes tended to be more favorable in the high personal relevance condition. In addition, attitudes, once formed, predicted further perceptions of the group and behavioral intentions toward group members. The implications of the findings for the reduction of prejudice toward new immigrant groups are discussed.     

Competence and morality dimensions of national and ethnic stereotypes: a study in six eastern-European countries

To investigate the role of competence and morality in stereotypes, a cross-national research was set up in six eastern-European countries. Study 1 measured the perceived desirability of stereotype attributes in ingroup versus outgroup members. Across countries, biopolar Competence and Morality components emerged. It was found that the perceived desirability of ingroup attributes was primarily competence-based, while desirability perceptions of outgroup attributes were mostly morality-based. In Study 2, participants in the six countries rated the occurrence of competence- and morality-related stereotype attributes among 10 national and ethnic target groups. Study 2 also assessed general evaluative attitudes and perceptions of power and conflict in inter-nation relations. Competence and morality dimensions fully explained the evaluative structure of national and ethnic stereotypes, generating a four-fold typology of sinful–loser, sinful–winner, virtuous–loser and virtuous–winner stereotypes. This typology was strongly related to perceptions of power and conflict between national groups. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

VIRTUE, EMOTION, AND ATTENTION

Abstract: The perceptual model of emotions maintains that emotions involve, or are at least analogous to, perceptions of value. On this account, emotions purport to tell us about the evaluative realm, in much the same way that sensory perceptions inform us about the sensible world. An important development of this position, prominent in recent work by Peter Goldie amongst others, concerns the essential role that virtuous habits of attention play in enabling us to gain perceptual and evaluative knowledge. I think that there are good reasons to be sceptical about this picture of virtue. In this essay I set out these reasons, and explain the consequences this scepticism has for our understanding of the relation between virtue, emotion, and attention. In particular, I argue that our primary capacity for recognizing value is in fact a non-emotional capacity.     

Kripke,Cartesian Intuitions,and Materialism

A popular idea at present is that emotions are perceptions of values. Most defenders of this idea have interpreted it as the perceptual thesis that emotions present (rather than merely represent) evaluative states of affairs in the way sensory experiences present us with sensible aspects of the world. We argue against the perceptual thesis. We show that the phenomenology of emotions is compatible with the fact that the evaluative aspect of apparent emotional contents has been incorporated from outside. We then deal with the only two views that can make sense of the perceptual thesis. On the response–dependence view, emotional experiences present evaluative response-dependent properties (being fearsome, being disgusting, etc.) in the way visual experiences present response-dependent properties such as colors. On the response–independence view, emotional experiences present evaluative response-independent properties (being dangerous, being indigestible, etc.), conceived as ‘Gestalten’ independent of emotional feelings themselves. We show that neither view can make plausible the idea that emotions present values as such, i.e., in an open and transparent way. If emotions have apparent evaluative contents, this is in fact due to evaluative enrichments of the non-evaluative presentational contents of emotions.     

The Subjective List Theory of Well-Being

A subjective list theory of well-being is one that accepts both pluralism (the view that there is more than one basic good) and subjectivism (the view, roughly, that every basic good involves our favourable attitudes). Such theories have been neglected in discussions of welfare. I argue that this is a mistake. I introduce a subjective list theory called disjunctive desire satisfactionism, and I argue that it is superior to two prominent monistic subjectivist views: desire satisfactionism and subjective desire satisfactionism. In the course of making this argument, I introduce a problem for desire satisfactionism: it cannot accommodate the fact that whenever someone experiences an attitudinal pleasure, his welfare is (other things equal) higher during the pleasure. Finally, I argue that any subjectivist about welfare should find disjunctive desire satisfactionism highly attractive.     

Affect,Desire, and Judgement in Spinoza's Account of Motivation

Two priority problems frustrate our understanding of Spinoza on desire [cupiditas]. The first problem concerns the relationship between desire and the other two primary affects, joy [laetitia] and sadness [tristitia]. Desire seems to be the oddball of this troika, not only because, contrary to the very definition of an affect (3d3; 3 General Definition of the Affects), desires do not themselves consist in changes in one's power of acting, but also because desire seems at once more and less basic than joy and sadness. The second problem concerns the priority of desires and evaluative judgements. While 3p9s and 3p39s suggest that evaluative judgements are (necessarily) posterior to desires, Andrew Youpa has recently argued that passages in Ethics 4 indicate that rational evaluative judgements can give rise to, rather than arise out of, desires. I aim to offer solutions to these problems that reveal the elegance and coherence of Spinoza's account of motivation. Ultimately, I argue that whereas emotions and desires stand in a non-reductive, symmetrical relationship to one another, evaluative judgements must be understood as asymmetrically dependent on, and reducible to, emotions or desires. This interpretation sheds light on our understanding of Spinoza's cognitivist account of emotion. For Spinoza, while emotions are representational, they are not underpinned by evaluative judgements. Rather than inflating emotions to include evaluative judgements, he deflates evaluative judgements, treating them as emotions, or valenced representations, and nothing more.     

The attitudinal view and the integration of the particular object of emotions

In recent years, Julien Deonna and Fabrice Teroni have proposed to understand emotions as embodied evaluative attitudes we take towards objects that figure in nonevaluative representational states. Although their account nicely explains some of the key features that emotions are widely taken to have, it runs into a version of what I call the problem of integration. In the case of the attitudinal view, the integration problem takes the form of explaining how, from the point of view of the subject, the bodily responses that make up the attitude part of the emotion and the representational states that provide the particular object of the emotion come to form an intentionally structured unitary experience, that is, one in which the bodily responses are intentionally directed towards the object. I argue that what explains this integration is the way in which the experience of bodily responses and the experience of the representational states interact. This, I propose, produces what I call an experience of convergence. I also suggest that understanding emotional experience in this way not only solves the problem of the integration but also provides a more solid ground for the claim that emotions qua embodied attitudes are evaluative.     

Interaction Effect of Extrinsic Rewards and Socioeconomic Strata

In an attempt to account for the poor test performance of lower-SES children, two conflicting theories were examined: (a) the early damage theory holds that lower-SES children have undergone such early and intensive deprivation that they cannot perform in testing situations; (b) the alienation theory contends that the public schools are middle-class institutions with middle-class intrinsic rewards which do not motivate lower-SES children. When faced with the testing situation the children choose not to perform. In order to test these theories, upper- and lower-SES students (N = 250) were randomly assigned to extrinsic and conventional reward conditions. The multivariate analysis of co-variance techniques indicated a significant (.01 level) improvement in the test performance of lower-SES children when extrinsic (money, food) rewards, as well as conventional rewards, are offered. Extrinsic rewards did not significantly improve the test performance of upper-SES children.     

The irrationality of recalcitrant emotions

A recalcitrant emotion is one which conflicts with evaluative judgement. (A standard example is where someone is afraid of flying despite believing that it poses little or no danger.) The phenomenon of emotional recalcitrance raises an important problem for theories of emotion, namely to explain the sense in which recalcitrant emotions involve rational conflict. In this paper I argue that existing ‘neojudgementalist’ accounts of emotions fail to provide plausible explanations of the irrationality of recalcitrant emotions, and develop and defend my own neojudgementalist account. On my view, recalcitrant emotions are irrational insofar as they incline the subject to accept an evaluative construal that the subject has already rejected.

Indirect measures as a signal for evaluative change

Implicit and explicit attitudes can be changed by using evaluative learning procedures. In this contribution we investigated an asymmetric effect of order of administration of indirect and direct measures on the detection of evaluative change: A change in explicit attitudes is more likely detected if they are measured after implicit attitudes, whereas these latter change regardless of the order. This effect was demonstrated in two studies (n=270; n=138) using the self-referencing task whereas it was not found in a third study (n=151) that used a supraliminal sequential evaluative conditioning paradigm. In all studies evaluative change was present only for contingency aware participants. We discuss a potential explanation underlying the order of measure effect entailing that, in some circumstances, an indirect measure is not only a measure but also a signal that can be detected through self-perception processes and further elaborated at the propositional level.     

Affective intentionality and the feeling body

This text addresses a problem that is not sufficiently dealt with in most of the recent literature on emotion and feeling. The problem is a general underestimation of the extent to which affective intentionality is essentially bodily. Affective intentionality is the sui generis type of world-directedness that most affective states – most clearly the emotions – display. Many theorists of emotion overlook the extent to which intentional feelings are essentially bodily feelings. The important but quite often overlooked fact is that the bodily feelings in question are not the regularly treated, non-intentional bodily sensations (known from Jamesian accounts of emotion), but rather crucial carriers of world-directed intentionality. Consequently, most theories of human emotions and feelings recently advocated are deficient in terms of phenomenological adequacy. This text tries to make up for this deficit and develops a catalogue of five central features of intentional bodily feelings. In addition, Jesse Prinz’s embodied appraisal theory is criticized as an exemplary case of the misconstrual of the bodily nature of affective experience in naturalistic philosophy of mind.

Revisiting the Tropic of Value: Reply to Rabinowicz and Rønnow‐Rasmussen*

In this paper, I defend the view that the values of concrete objects and persons are reducible to the final values of tropes. This reductive account has recently been discussed and rejected by Rabinowicz and R0nnow‐Rasmussen (2003). I begin by explaining why the reduction is appealing in the first place. In my rejoinder to Rabinowicz and R0nnow‐Rasmussen I defend trope‐value reductionism against three challenges. 1 focus mainly on their central objection, that holds that the reduction is untenable since different evaluative attitudes have, ontologically speaking, different objects. I grant that this may well be so, but argue that the objection is based on an unwarranted, loose reading of the notion ‘value for its own sake’. On the more reasonable strict reading, it is plausible to maintain that tropes are the sole ontological category that can properly be ascribed final value.     

The When and How of Evaluative Readiness: A Social Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective

In this article we consider the phenomenon of evaluative readiness, whereby the activation in memory of a goal leads to an unintentional increase in positivity toward stimuli that can facilitate the goal. We review four lines of work that together address the question of when goals lead to this kind of automatic shift in people’s attitudes. We then consider how contemporary models of cognition might explain this effect. We review whether dual systems models and single interacting system models can explain the phenomenon of evaluative readiness. Based on recent work in cognitive psychology and computational neuroscience, we then argue for the potential explanatory value of turning to a multiple interacting systems framework for explaining the phenomenon of evaluative readiness.     

The Role of Anger in the Biased Assimilation of Political Information

Political psychologists have established that politically motivated reasoning is a common phenomenon; however, the field knows comparatively less about the psychological mechanisms that drive it. Drawing on advances in the understanding of the relevance of emotion to political reasoning and behavior, we argue that anger likely plays a major role in motivating individuals to engage in the biased assimilation of political information—an evaluative bias in favor of information that bolsters one's views and against information that undercuts them. We test this proposition with two online studies, the second of which includes a quasi‐representative sample of Americans. The studies support our expectations. Individuals felt more negative emotions toward arguments that undermined their attitudes and positive emotions toward arguments that confirmed them; however, anger was nearly alone in fueling biased reactions to issue arguments.     

The changing psychology of culture in German‐speaking countries: A Google Ngram study

This article provides evidence for the long‐term affiliation between ecological and cultural changes in German‐speaking countries, based on the assumptions derived from social change and human development theory. Based on this theory, the increase in urbanisation, as a measure of ecological change, is associated with significant cultural changes of psychology. Whereas urbanisation is linked to greater individualistic values and materialistic attitudes, rural environments are strongly associated with collectivistic values like allegiance, prevalence of religion, and feelings of belonging and benevolence. Due to an increase in the German urbanisation rate over time, our study investigates whether Germany and the German‐speaking countries around show the presumed changes in psychology. By using Google Books Ngram Viewer, we find that word frequencies, signifying individualistic (collectivistic) values, are positively (negatively) related to the urbanisation rate of Germany. Our results indicate that predictions about implications of an urbanising population for the psychology of culture hold true, supporting international universality of the social change and human development theory. Furthermore, we provide evidence for a predicted reversal for the time during and after World War II, reflecting Nazi propaganda and influence.     

Contact theory in the workplace: The case of Jewish–Arab contact in Israel

Contact theory is a fundamental theory in social psychology, suggesting that contact between antagonistic groups can reduce prejudice and stereotypes. The current study applies former studies in evaluating a specific case of the connection between contact and attitudes toward minorities in work contexts. A survey was conducted using 873 Israeli Jews in order to assess their attitudes toward the Arab population in Israel and Arabs' work characteristics. The results indicated that the connection between intergroup contact and attitudes is complex. On the one hand, workplace contact between Israeli Jews and Arabs was significantly correlated with the willingness to meet Arabs in and outside the workplace and to perceive Arabs in a less threatening way. However, contact during work was not significantly correlated with the participants' general attitude toward the Arab population. In addition, contact during work was not found to be significantly correlated with the participants' perceptions about Arabs' personality traits or work characteristics. The results of this study also suggest that attitudes toward Arabs' work characteristics have a strong connection to other dimensions of attitudes toward Arabs, even more than the impact of contact during work.     

Mathematical Proof Theory in the Light of Ordinal Analysis

We give an overview of recent results in ordinal analysis. Therefore,we discuss the different frameworks used in mathematical proof-theory, namely subsystem of analysis including reversemathematics, Kripke–Platek set theory, explicitmathematics, theories of inductive definitions,constructive set theory, and Martin-Löfs typetheory.     

Challenging the Stubborn Core of Opposition to Equality: Racial Contact and Policy Attitudes

A Random Digit Dialing survey (n = 794) examined the interracial contact experiences and racial attitudes of White South Africans. The survey measured racial attitudes not only in terms of individuals' prejudice, but also in terms of their perceptions of group threat, perceived injustice, and support for various government policies designed to rectify the legacy of apartheid. The results indicated that the frequency and quality of interracial contact predicted Whites' support for both race compensatory and race preferential policies of redress, and these effects were partly mediated by perceived threat, sense of fairness, and racial prejudice. The research points to a potential rapprochement between the social psychological theories of intergroup contact and group positioning theories derived from the work of Blumer. It also highlights the value of adopting a more expansive and politically nuanced conception of the “consequences” of contact and desegregation.     

Prefer feeling bad? Subcultural differences in emotional preferences between Han Chinese and Mongolian Chinese

As a multi‐ethnic country that is comprised of diverse cultural systems, there has been little research on the subcultural differences in emotional preferences in China. Also, little attention has been paid to examine how explicit and implicit attitudes towards emotions influence emotional preferences interactively. In this study, we manipulated explicit attitudes towards emotions among Han (N = 62) and Mongolian Chinese individuals (N = 70). We assessed participants' implicit attitudes towards emotions to explore their contributions to emotional preferences. (a) Han Chinese had lower preferences for pleasant emotions than Mongolian Chinese after inducing contra‐hedonic attitudes towards emotions, and (b) after priming contra‐hedonic attitudes towards emotions, the more Han Chinese participants evaluated pleasant emotions as negative implicitly, the less they preferred to engage in pleasant emotional activities. These findings contribute to the growing literature of subcultural differences and demonstrate that explicit and implicit attitudes towards emotions interactively influence individuals' emotional preferences between different subculture groups.