Genomic Databases as Global Public Goods?

Recent discussions of genomics and international justice have adopted the concept of 'global public goods' to support both the view of genomics as a benefit and the sharing of genomics knowledge across nations. Such discussion relies on a particular interpretation of the global public goods argument, facilitated by the ambiguity of the concept itself. Our aim in this article is to demonstrate this by a close examination of the concept of global public goods with particular reference to its use in the context of genomic databases. We content that the argument for construing genomics as a global public good depends on seeing it as a natural good by focusing on features intrinsic to genomics knowledge. We shall argue that social and political arrangements are relevant and that recognising this opens the door to construing the use of global public goods language as a strategic one.     

Is Global Poverty a Philosophical Problem?

Peter Singer’s groundbreaking call to action in 1972, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” drew philosophical attention to the topic of famine and the associated suffering or preventable death of many throughout the world. Yet despite the volume of philosophical work Singer’s paper inspired, it would still be easy to suppose that global poverty is not a problem for philosophers to take seriously in itself but is rather a particularly stark illustration or instance of a more general problem, whether in ethics or in political philosophy. The aim of this paper is to argue that the philosophical landscape of global poverty is both sui generis and sufficiently complex that the topic should be considered not as an instance of a more general philosophical problem but as a distinct area of normative inquiry.     

Philosophy as a thief?

This is a performative piece of writing in the presence of and inspired by Richard Shusterman's Philosophy and the Art of Writing. It tries to show that the relationship between the act of writing and the formation of our human consciousness (philosophical and, more deeply, poietic) is a developing and growing process through history, and before it. The dominance of an image consciousness was slowly challenged and then replaced by a linguistic consciousness with the advent of writing, and accelerated by the invention of printing and mass literacy. Shusterman teaches us an embodied kind of philosophizing that uses the word but isn't limited by it. This paper suggests that a return to image consciousness has already occurred and that the old book consciousness is disappearing. Lessons from the book consciousness are offered.     

Cyclists as a minority group?

In the social sciences, several definitions of minority group can be found. The definitions include different aspects such as power/status, number, distinctiveness, social category, group context, dispositions, and discrimination. Compared to motorized road users, cyclists are considered vulnerable road users because they lack physical protection. We argue that such definition does not capture the social and cultural aspects that characterize the membership within the group of cyclists. We offer arguments and reflections based on recent literature advocating that cyclists may share some features of the experience of minority groups. Although cyclists differ from other minorities in important respects, they manifest many of the characteristics by which minority groups are defined.     

Alzheimer' Disease as a Disconnection Syndrome?

This paper reviews the growing amount of evidence supporting the hypothesis that Alzheimer's disease includes a disconnection syndrome. This evidence came mainly from neuropathological, electrophysiological, and neuroimaging studies. Moreover, a few recent neuropsychological studies have also explored the effects of a disconnection between cerebral areas on cognitive functioning. Finally, and more generally, the contribution of this interpretation to the understanding of Alzheimer's disease cognitive deficits is considered.     

What is philosophy as a way of life? Why philosophy as a way of life?

Despite a recent surge of interest in philosophy as a way of life, it is not clear what it might mean for philosophy to guide one's life, or how a “philosophical” way of life might differ from a life guided by religion, tradition, or some other source. We argue against John Cooper that spiritual exercises figure crucially in the idea of philosophy as a way of life—not just in the ancient world but also today, at least if the idea is to be viable. In order to make the case we attempt to clarify the nature of spiritual exercises, and to explore a number of fundamental questions, such as “What role does reason have in helping us to live well?” Here we distinguish between the discerning and motivational powers of reason, and argue that both elements have limitations as guides to living well.     

Is Today's International Human Rights System a Global Governance Regime?

Enthusiasts of the idea of globalization often view international human rights institutions as part of an emerging global governance regime. They claim that these institutions illustrate how state sovereignty is being diminished. This paper looks at the international system for thepromotion and protection of human rights aspart of normative globalization. It arguesthat this system does not constitute a systemof global governance, although in some areas itcomes close.     

Social Science as a Guide to Social Metaphysics?

If we are sympathetic to the project of naturalising metaphysics, how should we approach the metaphysics of the social world? What role can the social sciences play in metaphysical investigation? In the light of these questions, this paper examines three possible approaches to social metaphysics: inference to the best explanation from current social science, conceptual analysis, and Haslanger-inspired ameliorative projects.     

Reciprocal support provision: personality as a moderator?

In some cases, support provision can be predicted by the history of prior social exchange. Receiving may encourage providing. Moreover, personality dispositions may moderate the degree to which persons reciprocate support. Co‐student dyads (N = 43) facing an exam repeatedly reported their levels of received and provided support. Data revealed both direct and moderated reciprocal support provision. Actors' receipt of emotional support predicted the subsequent change in actors' provision of emotional support, indicating reciprocity. Also, more reciprocal emotional support provision was found in introverted and open individuals, whereas more reciprocal instrumental support provision was observed in introverts and less open individuals. Findings were partially validated when partner‐provided support instead of actor‐received support served as the predictor of later support provision. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Analyst as teacher / teacher as analyst: a confusion of tongues?

An ad hoc volunteer force, psychoanalytic educators must make do with little formal preparation in teaching methods before they enter the classroom. When they inevitably encounter common pedagogical problems, they often attribute their difficulty to a personal failure or the recalcitrance of candidates, but rarely to a lack of instruction in the craft of teaching. Given this situation, how can analysts who spend most of their time with patients learn to lead productive classroom discussions? How can they enhance participation when discussions become stale and strained? Most important, how can they determine whether candidates actually learn something in their classes? It is only slight exaggeration to say that the answers to these questions cannot be found in the thousands of pages that the profession has devoted to the subject of psychoanalytic education. A supplementary literature of psychoanalytic education is proposed that would directly address pedagogical issues through close attention to the goals and outcomes of courses and through case studies of moment-to-moment interactions in the classroom.     

Is There Such a Thing as Relative Analyticity?

Fine bases his influential conception of essence on a particular account of definitions. And he complements it with a specific account of analyticity. I will argue that Fine's conception of relative analyticity confuses the idea of a sentence's being true in virtue of a term's definition with the idea of a sentence's being true in virtue of a term's meaning. His idea that correct definitions specify essential properties of meanings is mistaken. The correctness of definitions can only be assessed by reference to the actual usage of the terms involved. The resulting conception of definitions leads to a deflationary interpretation of claims about essences.     

Interacting personality traits? Smoking as a test case

We question whether it is profitable to look at smoking (both smoking status and the number of cigarettes smoked a day): (1) in terms of the personality traits of Extraversion, Neuroticism and Psychoticism; (2) in terms of their pairwise interactions; (3) with respect, rather, to impulsivity or sensation seeking; or (4) taking into consideration both these levels of analysis. Our sample comprised 121 smokers and 111 non‐smokers (mostly students). No interactions were predictive of smoking. Both Psychoticism and impulsivity were found to be central traits—thereby providing support for the notion that it is a better strategy to look at smoking in terms of both these levels of analysis. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Do domestic dogs interpret pointing as a command?

Domestic dogs comprehend human gestural communication flexibly, particularly the pointing gesture. Here, we examine whether dogs interpret pointing informatively, that is, as simply providing information, or rather as a command, for example, ordering them to move to a particular location. In the first study a human pointed toward an empty cup. In one manipulation, the dog either knew or did not know that the designated cup was empty (and that the other cup actually contained the food). In another manipulation, the human (as authority) either did or did not remain in the room after pointing. Dogs ignored the human’s gesture if they had better information, irrespective of the authority’s presence. In the second study, we varied the level of authority of the person pointing. Sometimes this person was an adult, and sometimes a young child. Dogs followed children’s pointing just as frequently as they followed adults’ pointing (and ignored the dishonest pointing of both), suggesting that the level of authority did not affect their behavior. Taken together these studies suggest that dogs do not see pointing as an imperative command ordering them to a particular location. It is still not totally clear, however, if they interpret it as informative or in some other way.