Should Philosophers become Playwrights?

This note is in part a response to Alastair Hannay's review discussion, ‘A Kind of Philosopher: Comments in Connection with Some Recent Books on Kierkegaard’ (Inquiry, Vol. 18 [1975], No. 3). In his review, Hannay states that Kierkegaard and philosophy appear to be on the road to a reconciliation, and asks What is behind this get‐together if it is one?’. I suggest that in some remarks touching on Kierkegaard's theory of Truth, Hannay has touched on the ground for that ‘get‐together’, a Pyrrhonian scepticism.     

Should Philosophers Take Lessons from Quantum Theory?

This essay examines some of the arguments in David Deutsch's book The Fabric of Reality , chief among them its case for the so-called many-universe interpretation of quantum mechanics (QM), presented as the only physically and logically consistent solution to the QM paradoxes of wave/particle dualism, remote simultaneous interaction, the observer-induced 'collapse of the wave-packet', etc. The hypothesis assumes that all possible outcomes are realized in every such momentary 'collapse', since the observer splits off into so many parallel, coexisting, but epistemically non-interaccessible 'worlds' whose subsequent branchings constitute the lifeline-or experiential world-series- for each of those proliferating centres of consciousness. Although Deutsch concedes that his 'multiverse' theory is counter-intuitive, he none the less takes it to be borne out beyond question by the sheer observational/predictive success of QM and the conceptual dilemmas that supposedly arise with alternative (single-universe) accounts. Moreover, he claims the theory resolves a range of longstanding philosophical problems, notably those of mind/body dualism, the various traditional paradoxes of time, and the freewill/determinism issue. The essay suggests on the contrary, that Deutsch unwittingly transposes into the framework of presentday quantum debate speculative themes from the history of rationalist metaphysics, often with bizarre or philosophically dubious results, and that he rules out at least one promising rival account, namely Bohm's 'hidden variables' theory. It goes on to consider reasons for resistance to that theory among proponents of the 'orthodox' (Copenhagen) doctrine, and for the strong anti-realist, at times even irrationalist bias that has characterized much of this discussion since Bohr's debates with Einstein about quantum non-locality, observer-intervention, and the limits of precise measurement. Finally, the contrast is pointed out between Deutsch's ontologically extravagant use of the many-worlds hypothesis (akin to certain ideas advanced by speculative metaphysicians from Leibniz down) and those realist modes of counterfactual reasoning- e.g. in Kripke and the early Putnam- which deploy similar arguments to very different causal-explanatory ends.     

Should Political Leaders Be Highly Educated?

Many liberal philosophers view elite education as a virtue of political leaders and, in addition, hold that an important role of a just education system is to create better elites. A compelling and influential articulation of this view has been offered by Elizabeth Anderson. However, this view is in conflict with a commitment to substantive democracy, given the background conditions of the United States today. This article will argue, contra Anderson, that having the highly educated disproportionately represented in political leadership is incompatible with egalitarian principles of democracy. The key reason for this is that it systematically shuts out the working class from full political participation. Therefore, in order to satisfy the constraints of democracy, we must sever the connection between elite education and political office.     

What is Testimony?

C.A.J. Coady, in his book Testimony: A Philosophical Study (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), offers conditions on an assertion that p to count as testimony. He claims that the assertion that p must be by a competent speaker directed to an audience in need of evidence and it must be evidence that p . I offer examples to show that Coady's conditions are too strong. Testimony need not be evidence; the speaker need not be competent; and, the statement need not be relevant or directed to someone in need of evidence. I give alternative conditions. Coady was led into the stronger conditions by investigating testimony as it occurs in legal contexts, where special steps are taken to ensure that testimony provides the jury or the judge with evidence by a competent speaker that is relevant to the disputed question of the guilt or innocence of the defendant.     

Why Listen to Philosophers? A Constructive Critique of Disciplinary Philosophy

This article articulates a fundamental crisis of disciplinary philosophy—its lack of disciplinary self‐consciousness and the skeptical problems this generates—and, through that articulation, exemplifies a means of mitigating its force. Disciplinary philosophy organizes itself as a producer of specialized knowledge, with the apparatus of journals, publication requirements, and other professional standards, but it cannot agree on what constitutes knowledge, progress, or value, and evinces ignorance of its history and alternatives. This situation engenders a skepticism that threatens the legitimacy of disciplinary philosophy. The article proposes a response to this skepticism, rooted in the conditions that philosophers evince a specific kind of awareness of their own activity and its professional and cultural location, demonstrate this awareness by articulating it in the practice of philosophy itself, and recognize that precisely such articulation lies at the core of the Socratic idea of philosophy as a form of self‐knowledge.     

When Victimhood Goes to War? Israel and Victim Claims

Prominent sociopsychological approaches interpret collective victimhood as inseparable, central characteristic of societies involved in intractable conflicts. Victimhood is broadly perceived as an essential conflict-supportive belief also in other disciplines. In the context of Israel, there is a cross-disciplinary consensus that collective victimhood is the country's foundational identity. This project argues that states' employment of this theme changes and is context dependent. It discusses under what conditions Israel's political elites incorporate victim narratives towards armed conflicts. It examines public communication during the 2012 Operation Pillar of Defense (OPD) and the Yom Kippur war of 1973 (YKW). Employing a modified method of narrative conceptualization analysis, the research demonstrates that victim narratives were used almost twice as much during OPD than during YKW. The findings suggest that we need to differentiate between the role these narratives play for collectives versus states. For the latter, the presence of victim narratives is highly variable and reflects strategic developments. The project is the first systematic study exposing that victim narratives can be a challenge for governance. By conceptualizing victim narratives as claims, it captures the dynamic, contextual characteristics of collective victimhood in state affairs offering a theoretical tool for understanding the political dimension of this identification.     

Peer Bystanders to Bullying: Who Wants to Play with the Victim?

Given widespread concern associated with school-based bullying, researchers have looked beyond a dyadic perspective (i.e., bullies and victims only), and now consider the broader social ecology of the peer group. In this research, we examined how the behaviors of peer bystanders influence subsequent reactions to bullies and their victims. Two hundred and six 10- to 15-year-old boys (Mage?=?12.46) were invited to play a computer game with three other boys allegedly located at another school. Before the start of the game, participants “met the other players” apparently sitting in a waiting room. These child actors depicted an escalating bullying episode in which the behavior of the bystander was manipulated: aide to the bully, defender of the victim, or passive outsider. Immediately after exposure to the bullying, each participant played a ball toss game (Cyberball) with the three other boys in the video. Individual differences among participants were examined as moderators of the effect of bystander behavior on participants’ willingness to include the “victim” in the game. Results indicated that, when exposed to a passive bystander, boys’ normative beliefs about aggression, as well as their tendency to morally disengage from observed egregious acts, decreased their willingness to include the victim in the game.     

Should We Want God to Exist?

Whether God exists is a metaphysical question. But there is also a neglected evaluative question about God’s existence: Should we want God to exist? Very many, including many atheists and agnostics, appear to think we should. Theists claim that if God didn’t exist things would be far worse, and many atheists agree; they regret God’s inexistence. Some remarks by Thomas Nagel suggest an opposing view: that we should want God not to exist. I call this view anti‐theism. I explain how such view can be coherent, and why it might be correct. Anti‐theism must be distinguished from the argument from evil or the denial of God’s goodness; it is a claim about the goodness of God’s existence. Anti‐theists must claim that it’s a logical consequence of God’s existence that things are worse in certain respects. The problem is that God’s existence would also make things better in many ways. Given that God’s existence is likely to be impersonally better overall, anti‐theists face a challenge similar to that facing nonconsequentialists. I explore two ways of meeting this challenge.     

How Many Americans Attend Worship Each Week? An Alternative Approach to Measurement

Opinion polls indicate that over 40 percent of Americans attend worship services each week. However, attendance counts in several North American counties and Roman Catholic dioceses suggest that worship attendance may be much lower. In this article a new measurement strategy is used to estimate total weekly worship attendance. First, using a variety of resources we develop an estimate of the total number of religious congregations in the United States by religious family. Contrary to many published sources, the total number of congregations is estimated at just over 330,000. Second, using known population values and sample-based attendance counts we develop estimates of average weekly worship attendance for religious congregations by religious family. The resulting totals suggest that fewer than 22 percent of Americans attend worship services each week. This lower level of attendance provides further evidence that Americans tend to overreport worship participation and are less religiously active than the polls show.     

What About the Victim? Neglected Dimensions of the Standing to Blame

The Journal of Ethics - This paper points out neglected considerations about the standing to blame. It starts from the observation that the standing to blame debate largely focusses on factors...     

What is Wrong With Moral Testimony?

Is it legitimate to acquire one’s moral beliefs on the testimony of others? The pessimist about moral testimony says not. But what is the source of the difficulty? Here pessimists have a choice. On the Unavailability view, moral testimony never makes knowledge available to the recipient. On Unusability accounts, although moral testimony can make knowledge available, some further norm renders it illegitimate to make use of the knowledge thus offered. I suggest that Unusability accounts provide the strongest form of pessimist view. I consider and reject five Unavailability accounts. I then argue that any such view will fail. But what is the norm rendering moral testimonial knowledge unusable? I suggest it lies in the requirement that we grasp for ourselves the moral reasons behind a moral view. This demand is one testimony cannot meet, and that claim holds whatever account we offer of the epistemology of testimony. However, while appeal to this requirement forms the most plausible pessimist view, it is another question whether pessimism is correct.     

Should We Respond to Evil with Indifference?

In a recent article, Adam Elga outlines a strategy for Defeating Dr Evil with Self-Locating Belief. The strategy relies on an indifference principle that is not up to the task. In general, there are two things to dislike about indifference principles: adopting one normally means confusing risk for uncertainty, and they tend to lead to incoherent views in some 'paradoxical' situations. I argue that both kinds of objection can be levelled against Elga's indifference principle. There are also some difficulties with the concept of evidence that Elga uses, and these create further difficulties for the principle.     

How to Construct Marxian Thoughts as a Political Philosophy?

Importance of contemporary political philosophy has increased in recent decades. Since the 1970s, studies of Marx’s theories have become an important part of the discussion within contemporary theories of justice. More extensive studies concerning Marxist political philosophy from multiple perspectives are becoming a focal point in other fields of academic research. “How to understand Marx’s political philosophy?” has been a classic question for over a hundred years. Not an academic philosopher himself, Marx seems not to have issued a complete or consistent political philosophy by today’s standards, so it is only natural that his views would be interpreted differently by different scholars. While it is justifiable for us to construct Marx’s political philosophy, we must do it through a comprehensive theoretical reflection, and our construction must take full account of the history of the interpretations of Marx’s political philosophy. This applies especially of his theory of justice—a history which has lasted for more than a century. It is even more important for us to reread the original texts, particularly Marx’s early philosophical writings, and take them as the textual foundation for Marx’s political philosophy.     

Spirituality and Cognition: Does Spirituality Influence What We Attend to and Remember?

This study investigated how spirituality as a positive life theme might be related to one’s unique style of cognitive processing. Study participants included 80 individuals; 40 older adults and 40 younger adults. Word recall and recognition tasks assessed memory for positive, negative, neutral, and religious words. Results indicated that spirituality does not appear to be related to cognitive bias, but that words with either positive, negative, neutral, or religious connotations are recalled and recognized at different rates.     

Should Authors be Requested to Suggest Peer Reviewers?

As part of a continuous process to explore the factors that might weaken or corrupt traditional peer review, in this paper, we query the ethics, fairness and validity of the request, by editors, of authors to suggest peer reviewers during the submission process. One of the reasons for the current crisis in science pertains to a loss in trust as a result of a flawed peer review which is by nature biased unless it is open peer review. As we indicate, the fact that some editors and journals rely on authors’ suggestions in terms of who should peer review their paper already instills a potential way to abuse the trust of the submission and publishing system. An author-suggested peer reviewer choice might also tempt authors to seek reviewers who might be more receptive or sympathetic to the authors’ message or results, and thus favor the outcome of that paper. Authors should thus not be placed in such a potentially ethically compromising situation, especially as a mandatory condition for submission. However, the fact that they do not have an opt-out choice during the submission process—especially when using an online submission system that makes such a suggestion compulsory—may constitute a violation of authors’ rights.