Introspective Self-Knowledge and Reasoning: An Externalist Guide

According to the received view, externalist grounds or reasons need not be introspectively accessible. Roughly speaking, from an externalist point of view, a belief will be epistemically justified, iff it is based upon facts that make its truth objectively highly likely. This condition can be satisfied, even if the epistemic agent does not have actual or potential awareness of the justifying facts. No inner perspective on the belief-forming mechanism and its truth-ratio is needed for a belief to be justified. In my view, this is not the whole story. While I agree that introspective access to our reasons is a defining feature of justification for the access internalist, not the externalist, I will argue that even for the latter, some kind of introspective access is an epistemic desideratum. Yet, even given that I am right, the desirable might not be achievable for us. Recent psychological research suggests that we do not dispose of reliable introspection into the sources of our own beliefs. This seems to undermine the claim that we can introspectively know about the reasons upon which our beliefs are based. In this paper I will therefore additionally show why these results do not threaten the kind of introspective access desirable from an externalist point of view.

---

An Externalist Account of Introspective Knowledge

The Content Skeptic argues that a subject could not have introspective knowledge of a thought whose content is individuated widely. This claim is incorrect, relying on the tacit assumption that introspective knowledge differs significantly from other species of knowledge. The paper proposes a reliabilist model for understanding introspective knowledge according to which introspective knowledge is simply another species of knowledge, and according to which claims to introspective knowledge are not, as suggested by the Content Skeptic, defeated by the mere possibility of error. This way of understanding introspective knowledge affords a robust theory of privileged access consistent with semantic externalism.     

Introspective forgetting

We model the forgetting of propositional variables in a modal logical context where agents become ignorant and are aware of each others’ or their own resulting ignorance. The resulting logic is sound and complete. It can be compared to variable-forgetting as abstraction from information, wherein agents become unaware of certain variables: by employing elementary results for bisimulation, it follows that beliefs not involving the forgotten atom(s) remain true. The work for this publication was mainly carried out while Hans van Ditmarsch was associated to: Institut de Recherche en Informatique, Université Paul Sabatier, France.     

Post-error slowing: An orienting account

It is generally assumed that slowing after errors is a cognitive control effect reflecting more careful response strategies after errors. However, clinical data are not compatible with this explanation. We therefore consider two alternative explanations, one referring to the possibility of a persisting underlying problem and one on the basis of the low frequency of errors (orienting account). This latter hypothesis argues that infrequent events orient attention away from the task. Support for the orienting account was obtained in two experiments. Using a new experimental procedure, Experiment 1 demonstrated post-error slowing after infrequent errors and post-correct slowing after infrequent correct trials. In Experiment 2, slowing was observed following infrequent irrelevant tones replacing the feedback signals.     

Similarity and acquaintance: a dilemma

There is an interesting and instructive problem with Richard Fumerton’s acquaintance theory of noninferential justification. Fumerton’s explicit account requires acquaintance with the truth-maker of one’s belief and yet he admits that one can have noninferential justification when one is not acquainted with the truth-maker of one’s belief but instead acquainted with a very similar truth-maker. On the face of it this problem calls for clarification. However, there are skeptical issues lurking in the background. This paper explores these issues by developing a dilemma for an acquaintance theory.     

Introspective awareness of sensations

My goal is to formulate a theory of introspection that can be integrated with a strongly reductionist account of sensations that I have defended elsewhere. In pursuit of this goal, I offer a skeletal explanation of themetaphysical nature of introspection and I attempt to resolve several of the main questions about theepistemological status of introspective beliefs.I owe a large debt to Sydney Shoemaker. I have been helped considerably both by conversations with him and by the lectures he gave in the summer of 1985 in his N.E.H. Summer Seminar on Self-Consciousness and Self-Reference. I have also received valuable advice from Richard Lee, David Roach, David A. Schroeder, Lynne Spellman, and (especially) Anthony L. Brueckner, Willem de Vries, and David H. Westendorf.     

Long-term semantic transfer: An overlapping-operations account

Semantic priming is usually a short-lived effect. However, it is also usually investigated using undemanding tasks, such as naming or lexical decision. We instead required subjects to perform category verification. We observed semantically mediated transfer occurring at an average lag of 90 intervening trials. We also observed that this priming was specific to the stimulus properties made salient in prime and probe displays and the particular task demanded in those displays. We interpret the results within an overlapping-operations framework, based on the work of Kolers (e.g., 1976).     

Modes of Introspective Access: a Pluralist Approach

Philosophia - Several contemporary philosophical theories of introspection have been offered, yet each faces a number of difficulties in providing an explanation of the exact nature of...     

Epistemological Disjunctivism and Introspective Indiscriminability

Philosophia - According to Duncan Pritchard’s Philosophical Issues, 21(1), 434–455, (2011, 2012, 2015)version of epistemological disjunctivism, in paradigm cases of perceptual...     

Introspective disputes deflated: the case for phenomenal variation

Sceptics vis-à-vis introspection often base their scepticism on ‘phenomenological disputes’, ‘introspective disagreement’, or ‘introspective disputes’ (ID) (see Kriegel in Phenomenol CognSci 6(1):115–136, 2007; Bayne and Spener in Philos Issues 20(1):1–22, 2010; Schwitzgebel in Perplexities of consciousness, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2011): introspectors massively diverge in their opinions about experiences, and there seems to be no method to resolve these issues. Sceptics take this to show that introspection lacks any epistemic merit. Here, I provide a list of paradigmatic examples, distill necessary and sufficient conditions for IDs, present the sceptical argument encouraged by IDs, and review the two main strategies (resolution and containment) to reject such a scepticism. However, both types of strategies are unsatisfactory. In order to save introspection from the looming sceptical threat, I advocate a deflationary strategy, based on either an ‘Argument from Perceptual Kinship’ or an ‘Argument from Ownership’. In the end, there cannot be any genuine IDs, for nothing can fulfil the reasonable conditions for IDs. What looks like IDs may instead be indicators of phenomenal variation. Debates that look like IDs may then arise even if introspection were a perfect method to know one’s mind. Thus, scepticism vis-à-vis introspection based on IDs rests on shaky grounds.     

Developmental changes in word recognition: An information-processing account

Two experiments examining developmental changes in the use of context in single word reading are reported. The first experiment investigated how effectively children can access conceptual knowledge and use this to help their word recognition. The results indicated that young readers can on demand direct their attention to semantic information, and this allows them to reap a relatively greater benefit from context than older more skilful readers. The second experiment attempted to clarify the way such use of contextual information might help in the specific case when a child attempts to decode a new word for the first time. Skilled and unskilled readers pronounced pseudohomophonic nonwords faster when they were primed by a semantic context, and the context effect was greater for unskilled readers. The nonword's graphemic similarity to a lexical item was also important.

In general, the results were consistent with Stanovich's (1980) interactive-compensatory model of reading, and they suggest that in learning to read, several already existing stores of information (e.g. auditory, visual and conceptual) are integrated in order to achieve a solution to the word recognition problem.     

Poston on similarity and acquaintance

In this article, I try to defend my conception of noninferential justification from important criticisms raised by Ted Poston in a recent article published in Philosophical Studies. More specifically, I argue that from within the framework of an acquaintance theory, one can still allow for fallible noninferential justification, and one can do so without losing the advantages I claim for the theory.     

An attention account of neural priming

Repetition priming of familiar stimuli (e.g., objects) produces a decrease in visual cortical activity for repeated versus novel items, which has been attributed to more fluent processing for repeated items. By contrast, priming of unfamiliar stimuli (e.g., abstract shapes) produces an increase in visual cortical activity. The mechanism for priming-related increases in activity for repeated unfamiliar stimuli is unknown. We hypothesised that such increases in activity may reflect attentional allocation to these items. We tested this hypothesis using a priming-spatial attention paradigm. During Phase 1 of Experiment 1, participants viewed unfamiliar abstract shapes and familiar objects. During Phase 2, participants identified target letters (S or H). Each target letter was preceded by a non-informative shape or object cue that was repeated (from Phase 1) or novel in the same (valid) or opposite (invalid) hemifield. In Experiment 2, we manipulated shape familiarity by presenting shapes once or six times during Phase 1. For both experiments, at valid locations, target identification accuracy was higher following repeated versus novel unfamiliar item cues and lower following repeated versus novel familiar item cues. These findings support our hypothesis that priming-related increases in visual cortical activity for repeated unfamiliar items may, in part, reflect attentional allocation.     

An explanationist account of genealogical defeat

Sometimes, learning about the origins of a belief can make it irrational to continue to hold that belief—a phenomenon we call ‘genealogical defeat’. According to explanationist accounts, genealogical defeat occurs when one learns that there is no appropriate explanatory connection between one's belief and the truth. Flatfooted versions of explanationism have been widely and rightly rejected on the grounds that they would disallow beliefs about the future and other inductively-formed beliefs. After motivating the need for some explanationist account, we raise some problems for recent versions of explanationism. Learning from their failures, we then produce and defend a more resilient explanationism.