Anthropology,Ontology, and the Possibility of Post-Mortem Repentance

Abstract: This essay considers the question of conversion unto repentance, as an act of cognition and volition, by the separated soul in the post-mortem state. It primarily explicates and interrogates Thomas Aquinas's various attempts to rule out this possibility for the damned. Since Thomas's arguments for such impossibility feature his commitment to the radical immateriality of the human soul—and, like it, the angelic spirit—the essay highlights the ontological and moral tensions within that account. The case is thus made for the ontological, logical, and moral inconsistencies of his position, in pursuit of a more holistic anthropology across the soul's various states and a more rationally and coherent eschatology—namely, an affirmation of the irreducible mutability of the created soul on its way towards likeness to God, perhaps, if not certainly, towards universal salvation.     

Bocheński's Formalization of Summa Theologiae (Ia,75,6) Reconsidered

I investigate Bocheński's first-order logic formalization of the argument for the incorruptibility of the human soul given by Aquinas in Summa Theologiae (Ia,75,6). I suggest a slightly different axiomatization that reflect better Aquinas' informal argument. Along the way, I also fix a mistake in Bocheński's derivation that the human soul is not corruptible per se.     

Aquinas and the Natural Law

Recent decades have seen a shift away from the traditional view that Aquinas's theory of the natural law is meant to supply us with normative guidance grounded in a substantive theory of human nature. In the present essay, I argue that this is a mistake. Expanding on the suggestions of Jean Porter and Ralph McInerny, I defend a derivationist reading of ST I‐II, Q. 94, A. 2 according to which Aquinas takes our knowledge of the genuine goods of human life and their proper ordering to one another to be self‐evident only to the wise who are able to discern the truth about our God‐given human nature. I then show that this reading provides a better account of Aquinas's view than two recent alternatives: John Finnis's brand of inclinationism and Daniel Mark Nelson's virtue‐based interpretation.     

Was Thomas Aquinas a Sociobiologist? Thomistic Natural Law,Rational Goods,and Sociobiology

Abstract. Traditional Darwinian theory presents two difficulties for Thomistic natural‐law morality: relativism and essentialism. The sociobiology of E. O. Wilson seems to refute the idea of evolutionary relativism. Larry Arnhart has argued that Wilson's views on sociobiology can provide a scientific framework for Thomistic natural‐law theory. However, in his attempt to reconcile Aquinas's views with Wilson's sociobiology, Arnhart fails to address a critical feature of Aquinas's ethics: the role of rational goods in natural law. Arnhart limits Aquinas's understanding of rationality to the Humean notion of economic rationality–that “reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions.” On Aquinas's view, rationality discovers goods that transcend the merely biological, viz., the pursuit of truth, virtue, and God. I believe that Aquinas's natural‐law morality is consistent with some accounts of sociobiology but not the more ontologically reductionist versions like the one presented by Wilson and defended by Arnhart. Moreover, Aquinas's normative account of rationality is successful in refuting the challenges of evolutionary relativism as well as the reductionism found in most sociobiological approaches to ethics.     

AQUINAS ON ATTACHMENT, ENVY, AND HATRED IN THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA

This essay examines Aquinas's discussions of hatred in Summa Theologica I‐II, Q. 29 and II‐II, Q. 34, in order to retrieve an account of what contemporary theorists of the emotions call its cognitive contents. In Aquinas's view, hatred is constituted as a passion by a narrative pattern that includes its intentional object, beliefs, perceptions of changes in bodily states, and motivated desires. This essay endorses Aquinas's broadly “cognitivist” account of passional hatred, in line with his way of treating passions in general. I suggest that Aquinas's account of hatred's arising out of attachment is compelling. However, I also argue that if Aquinas's treatment of hatred is to help us understand the phenomenon of hate, where classes of people are abominated for an identity they bear, and to avoid equating an oppressor's hatred with that of the oppressed for the oppressor, the cognitive pathway to hatred must be broader than through envy.     

Aquinas, Merit, and Reformation Theology after the Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification

Lutheran considerations of Aquinas have been shaped by the Reformation division. Can a Reformation consideration of Aquinas on merit move beyond either false contrast or false harmonization? Merit plays a limited, but important role in Aquinas' understanding of God's movement of the human self toward its end of eternal life. Lutheran differences from Aquinas on merit also focus on eternal life. While much of the difference is rooted in differences of theological perspective, just this difference of perspective must be further explored. Aquinas' understanding of merit challenges Lutheran theology's understanding of the self and its role in the Christian life.     

‘The Body of Christ is Made From Bread’: Transubstantiation and the Grammar of Creation

Aquinas's theology of Christ's eucharistic presence, often identified by the term ‘transubstantiation’, can best be understood by locating it in relation to the ‘grammar’ of the creator–creature relationship. After a brief overview of Aquinas on creation, the article examines closely Aquinas's analysis of the statement that ‘the body of Christ is made from bread’. This allows us to begin to imagine how Aquinas might respond to one of the most influential contemporary critiques of his sacramental theology: that of Louis‐Marie Chauvet. In addition, such an examination casts new light on Aquinas's doctrine of creation itself.     

Theology and Interpretation: The Case of Aquinas and Calvin on Romans

This article explores how Aquinas's and Calvin's theology of justification, the law and the nature of human works integrate with their interpretations of Romans by analyzing their commentaries on 1:16b–17, focusing on the iustitia Dei, and 2:13, which addresses the relationship between works and justification. Aquinas's interpretation unfolds by emphasizing the work of Christ in and through sinners, while Calvin's interpretation emphasizes the work of Christ for and to sinners. I also demonstrate how the theological judgements embedded in these sections inform their reading of Romans as a whole.     

Thomas Aquinas’ Divine Simplicity as Biblical Hermeneutic

Long draws from the Old Testament scholar Walter Brueggemann's commentary on Jeremiah some strong reasons for rejecting the traditional teaching on divine simplicity. Above all, for Brueggemann the book of Jeremiah simply will not work if God is simple: God explicitly tells Jeremiah that God suffers and also that God changes in response to Israel. According to Long, however, Thomas Aquinas's doctrine of divine simplicity actually upholds the points that Brueggemann draws from Jeremiah. Long argues that theological accounts of divine simplicity should especially have two purposes: to serve as a way of manifesting in speech the mystery of the Triune God, and to affirm God's transcendent sovereignty over creation. In light of Brueggemann's approach, Long examines four early Reformed theologians: Peter Vermigli (1499‐1562), Girolamo Zanchi (1516‐1590), John Biddle (1615‐1662) and John Owen (1616‐1683). While Biddle rejects divine simplicity, the others uphold it. Long shows that their teaching on divine simplicity focuses on God's transcendent sovereignty over creation. By contrast, Long finds Aquinas's doctrine of divine simplicity to be more helpful in upholding Brueggemann's insights, insofar as Aquinas uses the doctrine to defend the simplicity of the Triune God. Rather than focusing on God's sovereign power, Aquinas's doctrine of divine simplicity focuses on getting the Trinitarian processions right.     

Aquinas' Quinque Viae: Fools,Evil, and the Hiddenness of God

At present a broad consensus may be discerned on Aquinas' ‘five ways' for proving the existence of God: either he is responding to atheism per se by means of five rational arguments, or he is not responding to any formal denial of God's existence. Both of these approaches ignore the two specific objections Aquinas raises prior to the five ways: evil is incompatible with the existence of an infinite goodness (the first objection), and the world does not require an external explanation (the second objection). While some have speculated on the structural significance of the second objection, the first has been universally regarded as irrelevant. This, I argue, is an oversight; Aquinas' first objection (from evil) is central to the quinque viae. Seen in this light, while Aquinas' five ways are not responses to atheism per se, they do address, and ultimately subvert, a specific form of disbelief.     

AQUINAS'S ARGUMENT AGAINST SELF-HATRED

Aquinas's argument against the possibility of genuine self‐hatred runs counter to modern intuitions about self‐hatred as an explanatorily central notion in psychology, and as an effect of alienation. Aquinas's argument does not deny that persons experience hatred for themselves. It can be read either as the claim that the self‐hater mistakes what she feels toward herself as hatred, or that, though she hates what she believes is her “self,” she actually hates only traits of herself. I argue that the argument fails on both readings. The first reading entails that all passions are really self‐love, and so is incompatible with Aquinas's own “cognitivist” view of what it is that distinguishes specific passions in experience. The second reading entails that persons have no phenomenal access to “self,” rendering self‐reference—how it is that the self can be an intentional object of conscious mental states—a mystery. Augustine's claim, which Aquinas accepts on authority, that all sin originates in inordinate self‐love seems to entail the impossibility of genuine self‐hatred because both thinkers fail to distinguish between two distinct forms of self‐love: amor concupiscentiae and amor benevolentiae.     

Aquinas on Quality

For Kant, Aristotle's categories are arbitrary but brilliant and they do not ultimately correspond to extramental reality. For Aquinas, however, they are rational divisions of extramental being. In this perennial and ongoing dispute, the various positions seem to dissolve upon delving into the particulars of any one category. If, however, the categories are divisions of extramental being, it should be possible to offer plausible accounts of particular categories. I offer Aquinas's unstudied derivation of quality as a test case to see how one could hold, and how Aquinas did hold, to a realism about Aristotle's categories at a highly specific level. Although Aristotle divides quality into four species and some further subspecies, unlike Aquinas, he offers no reasons for these divisions. For Aquinas each accident is a particular mode of existing, that is, it is a particular way that an accident exists in a substance. In the case of quality, this mode of existing follows substantial form and its real extramental causes or effects further divide it into four species. Aquinas's account is both compelling and original, inspired by Aristotle but also un-Aristotelian. The paper concludes by comparing Aquinas's account of quality with the best extant account of Aristotle's quality, namely, Paul Studtmann's.     

Architectonics Matter: Some Advantages of Treating the Unicity of God in Advance of the Trinity of Persons,in Dialogue with Thomas Aquinas

Aquinas's distinction between what is essential and personal in God has been widely criticized in Protestant and Catholic modernity because of its supposed isolation of God from the economy of salvation. Based upon consideration of the divine goodness, I defend Aquinas's arrangement in Summa Theologiae I, qq. 1–49, advancing metaphysical inquiry along four lines. I discuss, first, the fittingness of ascribing conceptual priority to the common in advance of the particular; second, how Aquinas's ‘double perspective’ illuminates the New Testament language of ‘participation’ in the divine nature; third, the manner in which God's attributes structure God's works, illustrating the concordance of nature and works; fourth, and last, how Aquinas’s architectonic clarifies the relationship between God's essential names and transcendentality.     

Thomistic Multiple Incarnations

In this article I present St. Thomas Aquinas's views on the possibility of multiple incarnations. First I disambiguate four things one might mean when saying that multiple incarnations are possible. Then I provide and justify what I take to be Aquinas's answers to these questions, showing the intricacies of his argumentation and concluding that he holds an extremely robust view of the possibility of multiple incarnations. According to Aquinas, I argue, there could be three simultaneously existing concrete rational natures, each of which is assumed by all three of the Divine Persons, all at the same time.     

Murder,He Wrote: Introducing Christian Ethics through One Question in the Summa

Abstract. The topic of murder fascinates and haunts undergraduates just as it does our culture. But even as murder violently closes doors on a human life, as a topic of discussion it can also open minds, provoking, extending, and refining students' questions about the moral life, theologically and religiously understood. The aim of this essay is to explain how the brief treatment of murder found in Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologica offers an extraordinary introduction to the entire field of Christian ethics. “Of Murder” ( Aquinas 1920 , II‐II 64) may be suited to courses in theological, religious, or comparative ethics as well.     

Fine-Tuning,Atheist Criticism,and the Fifth Way

Abstract

Like the “modern watchmaker” argument formulated by William Paley, the argument from fine-tuning should not be confused with Thomas Aquinas' fifth proof for the existence of God as expressed in the Summa Theologiae. While the former is based on efficient causality, the latter is based upon final causality. Though some atheist criticisms are relevant to the fine-tuning argument, they do not affect the Fifth Way. After briefly expositing the fine-tuning argument, I will argue that Aquinas' argument from the “governance of the world” offers a more convincing proof for God—one that evades atheistic criticisms leveled against design arguments.     

The Responsiveness of Pure Actuality: Unmediated Agency,Linguistic Potentiality and the Divine Accommodation of Speech Acts

This article builds upon the trinitarian theology of Thomas Weinandy, applying his elaboration of Aquinas' notion of God's pure actuality to the matter of linguistic agency. In particular, the seemingly contradictory claim will be made that God is more responsive to us (properly understood) precisely because he cannot perform the act of response. Rather, God reveals the pure act that is himself through what the article terms notional responses. These are the epistemological accommodations of his pure actuality to finite human persons in the form of speech acts as humans change in their relation to God. In understanding God's communicative agency as such, divine transcendence will be shown to establish divine immanence rather than to stand at odds with it.     

THE ESCHATOLOGICAL CHARACTER OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF GOD

In this essay, I show how Thomas Aquinas circumscribes epistemological questions concerning both the possibility and character of our knowledge of God within a larger eschatological framework that acknowledges the beatific vision as the ultimate good that we desire as well as the ultimate end for which we were created. Thus, knowledge of God is possible and actual on Aquinas's view because it is eternally rather than merely temporally indexed—that is, properly attributable to the blessed in heaven and only derivatively attributable to persons of faith. I further argue that interpreting Aquinas's account of faith in the light of his account of the beatific vision allows us to carve out polemical space for the theologically realist claim that there can be and in fact is objectivity in our knowledge of God, whether that knowledge comes through faith (in this life) or the beatific vision (in the next life).     

Thomas Aquinas Holds Fast: Objections to Aquinas within Today's Debate on Divine Action

Various authors within the contemporary debate on divine action in nature and contemporary science argue both for and against a Thomistic account of divine action through the notions of primary and secondary causes. In this paper I argue that those who support a Thomistic account of divine action often fail to explain Aquinas' doctrine in full, while those who argue against it base their objections on an incomplete knowledge of this doctrine, or identify it with Austin Farrer's doctrine of double agency – again failing to do Aquinas justice. I analyse these objections, indicating how they do not address Aquinas' doctrine by offering a brief but full account of the latter.     

Removing the Mote in the Knower's Eye: Education and Epistemology in Hugh of St. Victor's Didascalicon

The Didascalicon of Hugh of St. Victor encourages the study of many disciplines in order for the soul to acquire knowledge that aids in the restoration of human nature. However, according to Hugh's epistemology much of the acquired knowledge depends upon sensory qualities internalized as images which distract the soul and cause it to degenerate from its original unity. This essay explores the tension between Hugh's educational optimism and Hugh's epistemological pessimism. After considering and rejecting two unsuccessful strategies the soul might pursue for avoiding degeneration and distraction, we shall utilize Hugh's non‐representational conception of cognition to develop a plausible intellectual strategy. We shall also build upon some of Hugh's remarks about music to sketch a model of self‐knowledge as a kind of proportionality in the soul.