Desires as additional reasons? The case of tie-breaking

According to the Desire-Based Reasons Model reasons for action are provided by desires. Many, however, are critical about the Model holding an alternative view of practical reason, which is often called valued-based. In this paper I consider one particular attempt to refute the Model, which advocates of the valued-based view often appeal to: the idea of reason-based desires. The argument is built up from two premises. The first claims that desires are states that we have reason to have. The second argues that desires do not add to the stock of reasons the agent has for having them. Together the two theses entail that desires are based on reasons, which they transmit but to which they cannot add. In the paper I deal with a counterexample to the second premise: tie-breaking desires. I first distinguish two interesting cases and argue that only the second challenges the premise. Then I move onto analyze this challenge by focusing on Ruth Chang’s recent employment of it. I show that contrary to its counterintuitive appearance, the challenge can be sustained. However, I also argue that Chang overlooks the full potential of one particular response to the challenge: the introduction of higher-order reasons determining the normative significance of these desires. At the same time, I show that this response has a problem that Chang does not consider. As a result, the response can only partially disarm the challenge of tie-breaking desires; or not at all, depending on what significance we attribute to the counterexamples.     

Is Socrates free? The Theaetetus as case study

Most scholars agree that Plato’s concept of freedom, to the extent he has one, is ‘intellectualist’: true freedom is submission to the rule of reason through philosophical knowledge of rational order. Surprisingly, though, there are few explicit linkages of philosophy and freedom in Plato. Socrates is called many things in the dialogues, but not ‘free’. I aim to understand why by studying the Theaetetus, heretofore ignored in discussions of Platonic freedom. By examining the Digression (172c-177c) and Socrates’ ‘dream’ about wholes and parts (201c-206c), I show that describing freedom as ‘rule of reason’ simplifies what, for Plato, is a more tangled skein. In the Digression, philosophers are free in occupying a comprehensive standpoint transcending all limited and partial perspectives. Socrates’ dream, however, shows that logos cannot completely account for the knowledge of complex wholes or for itself as such a whole. Philosophical freedom cannot mean comprehensive discursive knowledge, then, since reason lacks a comprehensive grasp of itself. Socrates dreams of the rational whole, but is aware of why it remains only a dream, rather than wakeful knowledge. This awareness constitutes a freedom attained, not in total liberation from the confines of the partial human perspective, but within those confines.     

Epistemic justice as a condition of political freedom?

I shall first briefly revisit the broad idea of ‘epistemic injustice’, explaining how it can take either distributive or discriminatory form, in order to put the concepts of ‘testimonial injustice’ and ‘hermeneutical injustice’ in place. In previous work I have explored how the wrong of both kinds of epistemic injustice has both an ethical and an epistemic significance—someone is wronged in their capacity as a knower. But my present aim is to show that this wrong can also have a political significance in relation to non-domination, and so to freedom. While it is only the republican conception of political freedom that presents nondomination as constitutive of freedom, I shall argue that non-domination is best understood as a thoroughly generic liberal ideal of freedom to which even negative libertarians are implicitly committed, for non-domination is negative liberty as of right—secured non-interference. Crucially on this conception, non-domination requires that the citizen can contest interferences. Pettit specifies three conditions of contestation, each of which protects against a salient risk of the would-be contester not getting a ‘proper hearing’. But I shall argue that missing from this list is anything to protect against a fourth salient threat: the threat that either kind of epistemic injustice might disable contestation by way of an unjust deflation of either credibility or intelligibility. Thus we see that both testimonial and hermeneutical injustice can render a would-be contester dominated. Epistemic justice is thereby revealed as a constitutive condition of non-domination, and thus of a central liberal political ideal of freedom.     

Hope as an Intellectual Virtue?

Hope is a ubiquitous feature of human experience, but there has been relatively little scholarship within contemporary analytic philosophy devoted to the systematic analysis of its nature and value. In the last decade, however, there has been a resurgence of interest in the study of hope and, in particular, its role in human agency. This scholarly attention reflects an ambivalence about hope's effects. While the possession of hope can have salutary consequences, it can also make the agent vulnerable to certain kinds of personal risk. The pervasiveness of hope is not a sign of its quality; only a well‐tuned hope can be a virtue. Recently, Nancy Snow has argued that hope can be an intellectual virtue. Framing her account as a contribution to regulative epistemology, she contends that the intellectual virtue of hope can (i) motivate the pursuit of important epistemic ends, (ii) create dispositions that enable the successful pursuit of these aims, and (iii) generate a method for enduring intellectual projects. In this paper, I provide a critical appraisal of Snow's account of hope as an intellectual virtue. One important implication of this critique is that hope can function as an intellectual virtue only to the extent that it has benefitted from the correcting and perfecting influence of other cognitive excellences.     

Cyber-Islamophobia? The case of WikiIslam

A large amount of academic research has analysed and documented the fact that Muslims are often presented in a negative or stereotypical way in Western media and popular culture. This article focuses on how the Internet can also be used in spreading and publishing anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim opinions. Although the Internet is significant in the development of contemporary society, no studies have focused on the importance of information and communication technologies in spreading Islamophobic opinions. However, the new technologies can also be used for monitoring and combating Islamophobia, and many Muslim organisations are today using the Internet for these purposes. The article is based on an indepth analysis of both anti-Muslim and pro-Muslim homepages that can be related to the debate over Islamophobia.     

Happy as an Extraverted Clam? The Role of Personality for Subjective Well-Being

Personality characteristics, especially the traits of extraversion and neuroticism, have been proposed as the primary determinant of subjective well-being (SWB). Meta-analytic evidence presented here suggests that personality is indeed strongly related with SWB, and that only health is more strongly correlated with SWB. In a study of 137 personality traits that have been correlated with SWB, neuroticism was one of the strongest negative correlates of SWB. However, extraversion was not the primary factor associated with increased SWB. Rather, several personality characteristics that focus on the characteristic experience of emotions, on enhancing relationships, and on one's characteristic style of explaining the causes of life events are most intimately tied to SWB.     

The Interview as an RJP Medium: Shooting Oneself in the Foot?

Wanous and Colella (1989) stated that the interview is the most commonly used medium for delivering realistic job preview (RJP) information to applicants. RJPs incorporated into the interview typically involve a question-and-answer period in which the applicant is encouraged to ask questions. This study examined whether interviewer ratings are influenced by the kind of questions (realistic favorable vs. realistic, moderately unfavorable vs. unrealistic, highly unfavorable) asked in the RJP segment of the interview. The temporal placement of the question-and-answer segment (beginning of the interview vs. at the end) was considered as well. ANOVA results indicated no significant differences in job-related ratings, and MANOVA results indicated no significant differences in personal-trait ratings. Implications and directions for future research are also addressed.     

Interacting personality traits? Smoking as a test case

We question whether it is profitable to look at smoking (both smoking status and the number of cigarettes smoked a day): (1) in terms of the personality traits of Extraversion, Neuroticism and Psychoticism; (2) in terms of their pairwise interactions; (3) with respect, rather, to impulsivity or sensation seeking; or (4) taking into consideration both these levels of analysis. Our sample comprised 121 smokers and 111 non‐smokers (mostly students). No interactions were predictive of smoking. Both Psychoticism and impulsivity were found to be central traits—thereby providing support for the notion that it is a better strategy to look at smoking in terms of both these levels of analysis. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Should I have an affair? A case study

Forced to face the possibility of dying of cancer soon, a patient may question previous values and practices. A medical practitioner can learn a lot from such patients about fear, guilt, depression, and hope.     

Whose Meaning? The Wax and Gold Tradition as a Philosophical Foundation for an Ethiopian Hermeneutic

This essay is an attempt to assess critically the wax and gold tradition as a philosophical foundation of Ethiopian hermeneutics. In the first part, I shall analyze the wax and gold tradition as a poetic and literary tradition. After exploring how this tradition has shaped social and political interaction in the second part, in the third part I will show the implications of the wax and gold tradition for hermeneutics. I shall then make a critical assessment of the wax and gold tradition as an interpretive philosophy before closing the essay with concluding remarks.     

Who should manage care? The case for patients

After establishing that it is essential that health care be rationed in some fashion, the paper examines the arguments for and against clinicians as gatekeepers. It first argues that bedside clinicians do not have the information needed to make allocation decisions. Then it claims that physicians at the bedside can be expected to make the wrong choice for two reasons: their commitment to the Hippocratic ethic forces them to pursue the patient's best interest (even when resources will produce only very marginal benefit and could do much more good elsewhere) and their values will lead them to calculate the net value of treatments incorrectly. Alternative decision makers are considered. It is argued that both groups of physicians and administrators will also make allocations incorrectly and that leaving the allocation decisions to patients themselves is the best approach. Mechanisms for fair and efficient rationing by patients at the societal and individual level are examined.     

Can language restructure cognition? The case for space

Frames of reference are coordinate systems used to compute and specify the location of objects with respect to other objects. These have long been thought of as innate concepts, built into our neurocognition. However, recent work shows that the use of such frames in language, cognition and gesture varies cross-culturally, and that children can acquire different systems with comparable ease. We argue that language can play a significant role in structuring, or restructuring, a domain as fundamental as spatial cognition. This suggests we need to rethink the relation between the neurocognitive underpinnings of spatial cognition and the concepts we use in everyday thinking, and, more generally, to work out how to account for cross-cultural cognitive diversity in core cognitive domains.     

Who should manage care? The case for providers

Health care professionals should be the ones to make allocation decisions in the managed care setting because they are in the best position to assess outcomes, cost effectiveness, and quality of care.     

Fantasy or structural defect? The borderline dilemma as viewed from analysis of an experience of nonhumanness

The experience of nonhumanness, a crucial aspect of the phenomenal self of borderline states, is studied in two cases to test assumptions concerning the application of the classic ego-psychological or object-relations and self-psychological models. Are these experiences to be seen as fantasy and treated as manifest content, with dynamically active unconscious conflict and meaning, requiring interpretation, or as a developmental arrest in which structural disturbances are ameliorated through clarifying and empathic interventions? The first case is of a patient with a neurotic depression and hysterical and obsessional character traits, treated in a classic psychoanalysis. Even though dyadic oral and anal fantasies were strongly in evidence, the ego was well integrated. The second case is of a severe borderline patient who showed depressive panic and agoraphobia. Her major ego disturbances, poorly integrated and differentiated self- and object representations, and primitive defenses prevented effective psychoanalytically oriented treatment. Interventions were used to consolidate self-representations, internalize tension-regulating structures, promote adaptive ego functions and reality testing. These clarifications were necessary to move the patient to where she could tolerate facing unconscious dynamic conflicts. Only at that point could repression be lifted, memory emerge, and interpretation be utilized.