Humanizing Personhood

This paper explores the debate between personists, who argue that the concept of a person if of central importance for moral thought, and personists, who argue that the concept of a human being is of greater moral significance. On the one hand, it argues that normative naturalism, the most ambitious defense of the humanist position, fails to identify moral standards with standards of human behavior and thereby fails to undermine the moral significance of personhood. At the same time, it contends that a more focused attention on the morally relevant features of human life may indeed play a crucial role in enhancing our moral understanding.     

Inhibition of return is not detected using illusory line motion

Inhibition of return (IOR) is the name that has been assigned to a response time (RT) delay to a stimulus presented at a recently stimulated spatial location. A commonly held explanation for the origins of IOR is that perceptual processing is inhibited and that this inhibition translates into slower RT. Three experiments with 10 subjects were used to directly test this perceptual explanation. The first two experiments assessed the level of perceptual facilitation present in the IOR paradigm using the frequency and latency of illusory line motion judgments. Contrary to the predictions of the perceptual view, the line motion and RT measures revealed only speeded processing at previously stimulated spatial locations. Experiment 3 required a simple detection response and used the same stimulus and timing parameters as those in Experiments 1 and 2. IOR was present, replicating the recent finding that judgments based on perceptual qualities of the stimulus do not demonstrate a RT delay, whereas simple detection tasks do show RT inhibition at previously stimulated locations. These findings are discussed in relation to a number of hypotheses about the origin of the RT delay.     

Personhood: Elusive But Not Illusory

Bioethics as a field has been fortunate that its values and concerns have mirrored the values and concerns of society. In light of the September 11th attacks, it is possible that we are witnessing the beginning of a transition in American culture, one fraught with implications for bioethics. The emphasis on autonomy and individual rights may come to be tempered by greater concern over the collective good. Increased emphasis on solidarity over autonomy could greatly alter public response to research abuses aimed at defense from bioterrorism, to privacy of genetic information, and to control of private medical resources to protect the public health.     

Cognitive styles: illusory phenomena

The relationship between cognitive style and illusion magnitude was examined using the assimilation and contrast Delboeuf distortions. As in previous research, field dependence correlated positively with assimilation; however, a significant negative correlation with contrast was also found, suggesting that, while field dependence may involve the illusory integration of the stimulus field, field independence may involve its equally illusory differentiation.     

The Personhood Wars

Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics -     

Personhood and community

Abstract

Davidson develops an argument that establishes the most basic set-up for rationality. The minimal set-up is a triangle formed by two subjects and an object. Each of the two subjects occupies one of the three angles and the third angle is occupied by a subject matter – that about which the two subjects are in communication with one another. I extend Davidson’s argument somewhat and show how an entire pluralistic community is required for individuals to develop most fully as rational creatures. I do this by showing how the basic conditions for rationality set out by Davidson would start to crumble in conditions such as those set out in Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four. The ideal, as opposed to the minimal, set-up for rationality is not a triangle, but a pluralistic network of subjects. And indeed, the ideal conditions for rationality are to a large extent just that because they allow for the full implementation of Davidson’s minimal set-up.     

Personhood and human rights

Continental Philosophy Review -     

Mental Causation: Unnaturalized but not Unnatural

The central problem for a realist about mental causation is to show that mental causation is compatible with the causal completeness of physical systems. This problem has seemed intractable in large part because of a widely held view that any sort of systematic overdetermination of events by their causes is unacceptable. I account for the popularity of this view, but argue that we ought to reject it. In doing so. I show how we thereby undermine the idea that mental causes must be naturalizable in order to be legitimate. Thus I argue that a non-naturalist conception of mental causation is compatible with a plausible kind of physicalism.     

Emotions in context: Anger causes ethnic bias but not gender bias in men but not women

Emotions influence information processing because they are assumed to carry valuable information. We predict that induced anger will increase ethnic but not gender intergroup bias because anger is related to conflicts for resources, and ethnic groups typically compete for resources, whereas gender groups typically engage in relations of positive interdependence. Furthermore, we also predict that this increased ethnic intergroup bias should only be observed among men because men show more group‐based reactions to intergroup conflict than women do. Two studies, with 65 and 120 participants, respectively, indeed show that anger induction increases ethnic but not gender intergroup bias and only for men. Intergroup bias was measured with an implicit measure. In Study 2, we additionally predict (and find) that fear induction does not change ethnic or gender intergroup bias because intergroup bias is a psychological preparation for collective action and fear is not associated with taking action against out‐groups. We conclude that the effect of anger depends on its specific informational potential in a particular intergroup context. These results highlight that gender groups differ on a crucial point from ethnic groups and call for more attention to the effect of people's gender in intergroup relations research. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Last but not least

When two three-letter words are flashed up in sequence, observers cannot tell whether the top halves of the words are the same or different. It follows that words, like faces, are processed holistically, not as a set of separate features.     

Last but not least

When a simple rectangular grid is drawn toward one's face there is the striking illusion that a spherical bulge is protruding from the grid. This illusion may be helpful in studying the interaction of spatial and motion processing.     

Personhood and the practical

Traditionally, it has been assumed that metaphysical and practical questions about personhood and personal identity are inherently linked. Neo-Lockean views that draw such a link have been problematic, leading to an opposing view that metaphysical and ethical questions about persons should be sharply distinguished. This paper argues that consideration of this issue suffers from an overly narrow conception of the practical concerns associated with persons that focuses on higher-order capacities and fails to appreciate basic practical concerns more directly connected to our animality. A more inclusive alternative is proposed.     

Last but not least

A central tenet of Gestalt psychology is that the visual scene can be separated into figure and ground. The two illusions we present demonstrate that Gestalt processes can group spatial contrast information that cuts across the figure/ground separation. This finding suggests that visual processes that organise the visual scene do not necessarily require structural segmentation as their primary input.     

Acquired affective-evaluative value: conservative but not unchangeable

In a previous study on Evaluative Conditioning it was found that unlike signal-learning, evaluative learning is resistant to extinction. In the present experiment we tried to replicate and corroborate this finding. In addition, we investigated the effectiveness of a counterconditioning procedure to alter acquired evaluative value. On a within-subject base (n = 30), it was found that the mere contingent presentation of neutral with (dis)liked pictures of human faces was sufficient to change the affective-evaluative tone of the originally neutral stimuli in (negative) positive direction. Next, we replicated the finding that an extinction procedure does not have any influence on the acquired evaluative value of the originally neutral stimuli, and this even in subjects fully aware of the extinction presentations. We demonstrated the effectiveness of a counterconditioning procedure to alter acquired evaluative value, and in addition, found some evidence that awareness of the counterconditioning manipulations is not a prerequisite for its effectiveness. The theoretical consequences of these findings are phrased in terms of a fundamental distinction between signal-learning and evaluative learning, and some important implications for the behavioral treatment of affective-emotional disorders are suggested.